The Experts below are selected from a list of 117279 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Hui Huang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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china s legal reponses to the global Financial crisis from domestic reform to international engagement
2011Co-Authors: Hui HuangAbstract:This article aims to identify and examine the key issues impacting China’s Financial Regulation in light of the recent global Financial crisis (GFC). The investigation generates a number of important findings. First, the effects of the GFC on China’s Financial system have been relatively mild. However, this is largely owing to its lack of Financial sophistication and isolation from the global markets. Second, China’s domestic responses to the GFC have been quite effective, but at the same time it has serious side-effects for China’s Financial Regulation. Third, China is well-positioned to embrace new international standards such as those contained in the Basel III Accord. This article sets forth suggestions for reform of China’s domestic Financial regulatory structure, and evaluates the steps China has taken towards playing a bigger role in the future development of international Financial Regulation.
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institutional structure of Financial Regulation in china lessons from the global Financial crisis
2010Co-Authors: Hui HuangAbstract:In light of the recent global Financial crisis, this article aims to critically examine China's Financial regulatory structure and, based on the results of such examination, set out reform proposals for China. At present, China adopts a traditional sectoral system of Financial Regulation, which has exhibited several inadequacies in meeting the regulatory challenges in a rapidly changing market. In quest of a solution to the problem, a comparative analysis is conducted of the Financial regulatory regimes in some advanced economies, including the US, the UK and Australia, each of which is representative of a distinct regulatory model. When looking to these overseas experiences for guidance, regard is taken not only of their objective advantages and disadvantages, but also of the local conditions in China. It is concluded that the US model merits consideration in the short term and, with the further growth of China's Financial markets in the long run, the Australian model provides the preferred direction for...
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institutional structure of Financial Regulation in china lessons from the global Financial crisis
2009Co-Authors: Hui HuangAbstract:In light of the recent global Financial crisis, this article aims to critically examine China’s Financial regulatory structure and based on the results of such examination, set out reform proposals for China. At present, China adopts a traditional sectoral system of Financial Regulation, which has exhibited several inadequacies in meeting the regulatory challenges in a rapidly changing market. In quest of a solution to the problem, a comparative analysis is conducted of the Financial regulatory regime in some advanced economies including the US, the UK and Australia, each of which is representative of a distinct regulatory model. When looking to these overseas experiences for guidance, regard is had not only to their objective advantages and disadvantages, but also to the local conditions in China. It is concluded that the US model merits consideration in the short term, and with the further growth of China’s Financial markets in the long run, the Australian model provides the preferred direction for reform over the UK model.
Howell E Jackson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the nature of the fintech firm and its implications for Financial Regulation
2020Co-Authors: Howell E JacksonAbstract:This chapter explores recent Fintech innovations through the lens of Ronald Coase’s classic article: The Nature of the Firm. Applying a transaction cost analysis, the chapter argues that developments in computer technology, data processing, and information networks are reshaping the manner in which Financial services are produced, unsettling the boundaries separating regulated firms from outside vendors and open market transactions. These changes raise challenging questions as to the appropriate contours of regulatory perimeters as well as the structure of Regulation and supervision in the many area of Financial Regulation. Fintech innovations also have the potential to be harnessed to serve public purposes, including expanding access to Financial services and improving supervisory practices. At a minimum, Fintech innovations and most especially machine learning and artificial intelligence complicate the application of legal doctrines based on human intentionality. More broadly, the scale and scope of these technological developments may lead to a fundamentally rethinking of the appropriate goals of regulatory policy for Financial firms and the economy more broadly, particularly with respect to privacy and the accumulation of personal information in private and public hands.
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fiduciary law and Financial Regulation
2019Co-Authors: Howell E Jackson, Talia B GillisAbstract:This chapter explores the application of fiduciary duties to regulated Financial firms and Financial services. At first blush, the need for such a chapter might strike some as surprising in that fiduciary duties and systems of Financial Regulation can be conceptualized as governing distinctive and non-overlapping spheres: Fiduciary duties police private activity through open-ended, judicially defined standards imposed on an ex post basis, whereas Financial Regulations set largely mandatory, ex ante obligations for regulated entities under supervisory systems established in legislation and implemented through expert administrative agencies. Yet, as we document in this chapter, fiduciary duties often do overlap with systems of Financial Regulation. In many regulatory contexts, fiduciary duties arise as a complement to, or sometimes substitute for, other mechanisms of Financial Regulation. Moreover, the interactions between fiduciary duties and systems of Financial Regulation generate a host of recurring and challenging interpretative issues. Our motivation in writing this chapter is to explore the reasons why fiduciary duties arise so frequently in the field of Financial Regulation, and then to provide a structured account of how the principles of fiduciary duties interact with the more rule-based legal requirements that characterize Financial Regulation. As grist for this undertaking we focus on a set of roughly two dozen judicial decisions and administrative rulings to illustrate our claims.
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fiduciary law in Financial Regulation
2018Co-Authors: Howell E Jackson, Talia B GillisAbstract:This chapter explores the application of fiduciary duties to regulated Financial firms and Financial services. At first blush, the need for such a chapter might strike some as surprising in that fiduciary duties and systems of Financial Regulation can be conceptualized as governing distinctive and non-overlapping spheres: Fiduciary duties police private activity through open-ended, judicially defined standards imposed on an ex post basis, whereas Financial Regulations set largely mandatory, ex ante obligations for regulated entities under supervisory systems established in legislation and implemented through expert administrative agencies. Yet, as we document in this chapter, fiduciary duties often do overlap with systems of Financial Regulation. In many regulatory contexts, fiduciary duties arise as a complement to, or sometimes substitute for, other mechanisms of Financial Regulation. Moreover, the interactions between fiduciary duties and systems of Financial Regulation generate a host of recurring and challenging interpretative issues. Our motivation in writing this chapter is to explore the reasons why fiduciary duties arise so frequently in the field of Financial Regulation, and then to provide a structured account of how the principles of fiduciary duties interact with the more rule-based legal requirements that characterize Financial Regulation. As grist for this undertaking we focus on a set of roughly two dozen judicial decisions and administrative rulings to illustrate our claims.
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Financial Regulation law and policy chapter 1 1 finance today
2016Co-Authors: Michael S Barr, Howell E Jackson, Margaret E TahyarAbstract:Financial Regulation: Law and Policy is a new textbook that aims to teach students about today's Financial sector with a modular, accessible, balanced, practical, and ready-to-use approach. Our goal is to give students the tools to understand how American history and political economy have shaped the regulatory perimeter, how different policy choices have been made at different times across different parts of the Financial sector, and how these choices matter a great deal in shaping not only Financial stability, but also how the Financial sector supports the economy and society. The textbook includes chapters on Insured Depository Institutions, Insurance, Securities Firms and Capital Markets, Consumer Protection and the CFPB, Financial Conglomerates, Payment Systems, Corporate Governance, Lender of Last Resort and Resolution, Mutual Funds and Other Investment Vehicles, Derivatives and Rate Markets, and Shadow Banking. The textbook comes with a teacher's manual that explores key themes, suggests a range of teaching approaches, answers questions posed in the textbook, and includes class slides for each chapter. This download contains the summary table of contents and Chapter 1.1: Finance Today.
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an american perspective on the u k Financial services authority politics goals regulatory intensity
2005Co-Authors: Howell E JacksonAbstract:Although similarities between the British and American systems of Financial Regulation are often remarked upon in academic commentary, the organizational structure of Financial supervision in the two countries has diverged substantially in the past decade, as the United Kingdom has now largely consolidated its Financial regulatory agencies in the Financial Services Authority whereas the United States has maintained the world’s most decentralized and fragmented collection of Financial supervisory agencies. In this essay, Professor Howell Jackson explores various reasons why Financial Regulation in these two countries differs so dramatica lly in organizational structure. Focusing first on the differences in political economy that surrounded the enactment of the Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000 in the United Kingdom and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 in the United States, Professor Jackson discusses deeper differences in the regulatory philosophies of the two countries and also presents data on the relative intensity of Financial Regulation in both jurisdiction. He speculates that the comparatively more ambitious regulatory agenda of the U.S. system pushes the country towards a more elaborate system of Financial oversight that is inherently more difficult to consolidate. In the United Kingdom, in contrast, the goals of the Financial regulators are more modest and, to the extent that cost efficiency is one of the country’s regulatory objectives in the field of Financial Regulation, that policy tends to foster a less cumbersome system of Financial Regulation that more easily accommodates consolidation of regulatory functions. The paper concludes with some broader comparative data suggesting that while British Financial Regulation may be less intensive than Financial Regulation in the United States, it is substantially more intensive than Financial Regulation in many other jurisdictions, particularly civil law jurisdictions on the Continent.
Glen E Weyl - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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benefit cost analysis for Financial Regulation
2013Co-Authors: Eric A Posner, Glen E WeylAbstract:Calls for benefit-cost analysis in rule-making, based on the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act, have revealed a paucity of work on allocative efficiency in Financial markets. We propose three principles to help fill this gap. First, we highlight the need for quantifying the statistical cost of a crisis to trade off the risk of a crisis against loss of growth during good times. Second, we propose a framework quantifying the social value of price discovery, and highlighting which arbitrages are over- and under-supplied from a social perspective. Finally, we distinguish between insurance benefits and gambling-facilitation harms of market completion.
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benefit cost analysis for Financial Regulation
2013Co-Authors: Eric A Posner, Glen E WeylAbstract:Calls for benefit-cost analysis in rule-making based on the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act have revealed a paucity of work on allocative efficiency in Financial markets. We propose three principles to help fill this gap. First, we highlight the need to quantify the "statistical cost of a crisis" in order to trade-off the risk of a crisis against loss of growth during good times. Second, we propose a framework quantifying the social value of price discovery and highlighting which arbitrages are over- and under-supplied from a social perspective. Finally, we distinguish between insurance benefits and gambling-facilitation harms of market completion.
Sebastian Di Tella - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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optimal Regulation of Financial intermediaries
2019Co-Authors: Sebastian Di TellaAbstract:I characterize the optimal Financial Regulation policy in an economy where Financial intermediaries trade capital assets on behalf of households, but must retain an equity stake to align incentives. Financial Regulation is necessary because intermediaries cannot be excluded from privately trading in capital markets. They don't internalize that high asset prices force everyone to bear more risk. The socially optimal allocation can be implemented with a tax on asset holdings. I derive a sufficient statistic for the externality in terms of observable variables, valid for heterogeneous intermediaries and asset classes, and arbitrary aggregate shocks. I use market data on leverage and volatility of intermediaries' equity to measure the externality, which co-moves with the business cycle.
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optimal Regulation of Financial intermediaries
2017Co-Authors: Sebastian Di TellaAbstract:I characterize the optimal Financial Regulation policy in an economy where Financial intermediaries trade capital assets on behalf of households, but must retain an equity stake to align incentives. Financial Regulation is necessary because intermediaries cannot be excluded from privately trading in capital markets. They don’t internalize that high asset prices force everyone to bear more risk. The socially optimal allocation can be implemented with a tax on asset holdings. I derive a sufficient statistic for the externality/optimal policy in terms of observable variables, valid for heterogenous intermediaries and asset classes, and arbitrary aggregate shocks. I use market data on leverage and volatility of intermediaries’ equity to measure the externality, which co-moves with the business cycle.
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optimal Regulation of Financial intermediaries
2017Co-Authors: Sebastian Di TellaAbstract:I characterize the optimal Financial Regulation policy in an economy where Financial intermediaries trade capital assets on behalf of households, but must retain an equity stake for incentive reasons. Financial Regulation is necessary because intermediaries cannot be excluded from privately trading in capital markets. They don’t internalize that high asset prices force everyone to bear more risk. The socially optimal allocation can be implemented with a tax on asset holdings, or equivalently, reserve requirements. I derive a simple formula for the externality/optimal policy in terms of observable variables, valid for heterogenous intermediaries and asset classes, and arbitrary aggregate shocks. I use market data on leverage and volatility of intermediaries’ equity to measure the externality, which co-moves with the business cycle.
Vikrant Vig - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Financial Regulation and securitization evidence from subprime loans
2009Co-Authors: Benjamin J Keys, Tanmoy K Mukherjee, Amit Seru, Vikrant VigAbstract:We examine the consequences of existing Regulations on the quality of mortgage loans originations in the originate-to-distribute (OTD) market. The information asymmetries in the OTD market can lead to moral hazard problems on the part of lenders. We find, using a plausibly exogenous source of variation in the ease of securitization, that the quality of loan origination varies inversely with the amount of Regulation: more regulated lenders originate loans of worse quality. We interpret this result as a possible evidence that the fragility of lightly regulated originators’ capital structure can mitigate moral hazard. In addition, we find that incentives which require mortgage brokers to have ‘skin in the game’ and stronger risk management departments inside the bank partially alleviate the moral hazard problem in this setting. Finally, having more lenders inside a mortgage pool is associated with higher quality loans, suggesting that sharper relative performance evaluation made possible by more competition among contributing lenders can also mitigate the moral hazard problem to some extent. Overall, our evidence suggests that market forces rather than Regulation may have been more effective in mitigating moral hazard in the OTD market. The findings caution against policies that impose stricter lender Regulations which fail to align lenders’ incentives with the investors of mortgage-backed securities.
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Financial Regulation and securitization evidence from subprime loans
2009Co-Authors: Benjamin J Keys, Tanmoy K Mukherjee, Amit Seru, Vikrant VigAbstract:We examine the consequences of existing Regulations on the quality of mortgage loans originations in the originate to distribute (OTD) market. The information asymmetries in the OTD market can lead to moral hazard problems on the part of lenders. We find, using a plausibly exogenous source of variation in the ease of securitization, that the quality of loan originations varies inversely with the amount of Regulation: more regulated lenders originate loans of worse quality. We interpret this result as possible evidence that the fragility of lightly regulated originators' capital structure can mitigate moral hazard. In addition, we find that incentives which require mortgage brokers to have 'skin in the game' and stronger risk management departments inside the bank partially alleviates the moral hazard problem in this setting. Finally, having more lenders inside a mortgage pool is associated with better quality of loans, suggesting that sharper relative performance evaluation made possible by more competition among contributing lenders can also mitigate the moral hazard problem to some extent. Overall, our evidence suggests that market forces rather than Regulation may have been more effective in mitigating moral hazard in the OTD market. The findings caution against policies that impose stricter lender Regulations which fail to align lenders' incentives with the investors of mortgage-backed securities.
