The Experts below are selected from a list of 14748 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Zhang Jinchun - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • mechanism to Form multi agent Coalition based on genetic algorithm
    Computer Engineering, 2009
    Co-Authors: Zhang Jinchun
    Abstract:

    In allusion to the problem of Coalition Formation in dynamic open Multi-Agent System(MAS), a rule of Coalition payoff distribution based on Agents’ abilities is proposed as well as the conception of Coalition payoff ratio and other correlative propositions. The negotiation mechanism and negotiation rules among Agents are discussed. Based on these researches, a mechanism to Form Coalition based on Multi-Agent Genetic Algorithm(MAGA) is established. Simulation results show that this mechanism can reduce the quantity of system’s communications and guarantee the stability and global optimization of Coalitions, which can improve the alignment efficiency of system.

  • a mechanism to Form Coalition in multi agent system based on genetic algorithm
    Chinese Control Conference, 2008
    Co-Authors: Zhang Jijun, Zhang Jiping, Tian Baoguo, Zhang Jinchun
    Abstract:

    In order to research the problem of Coalition Formation in dynamic open multi-agent system, a rule of Coalition payoff distribution based on agentspsila abilities was proposed as well as the conception of Coalition payoff ratio and other correlative propositions. The negotiation mechanism and negotiation rules among agents were also discussed. Based on these researches, a mechanism to Form Coalition based on multi-agent genetic algorithm was established. This mechanism can enormously reduce the quantity of systempsilas communications and improve the systempsilas efficiency.

Jeannette Brosigkoch - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • how do Coalitions get built evidence from an extensive Form Coalition game with and without communication
    International Journal of Game Theory, 2012
    Co-Authors: Gary E Bolton, Jeannette Brosigkoch
    Abstract:

    In the laboratory, we investigate a non-cooperative three-person Coalition game with externalities and the opportunity to extend existing Coalitions. One bargainer, the builder, can propose and build a Coalition over two stages. We examine the hypothesis that both absolute and relative payoffs affect the Coalition Formation process (and outcome). We observe many inefficient two-person final Coalitions, and that the distribution of outcomes is sensitive to the constellation of both absolute and relative payoffs. Relative payoffs appear to be applied more myopically than has been observed in bilateral sequential bargaining games or suggested by social preference models. We hypothesize that the prevalence of two-person Coalitions stems from builder’s uncertainty about individual acceptance thresholds. In fact, allowing nonbinding communication among the bargainers increases the prevalence of efficient Coalitions. The main implication is that efficient Coalition building involves strategies for mitigating the strategic uncertainty inherent in building Coalitions.

  • how do Coalitions get built evidence from an extensive Form Coalition game with renegotiation externalities
    Research Papers in Economics, 2007
    Co-Authors: Gary E Bolton, Jeannette Brosigkoch
    Abstract:

    We investigate a three-person Coalition game in which one bargainer, the builder, can propose and build a Coalition over two stages. In equilibrium, Coalition building ends with an efficient grand Coalition, while the equilibrium path is contingent on the values of the two-person Coalitions and associated externality payoffs. Considering relative payoffs need not change the equilibrium path. Nevertheless, outcomes in the experiment are often inefficient. One explanation is that bargainers have difficulties anticipating the future actions of other bargainers. This problem might be mitigated by allowing bargainers to communicate prior to each stage. A test finds that communication does in fact increase efficiency, although unevenly, and at the cost of the builder. The study implies that the nature and pattern of communication among bargainers is a critical factor in efficient Coalition building.

Cheng Baodong - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Gary E Bolton - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • how do Coalitions get built evidence from an extensive Form Coalition game with and without communication
    International Journal of Game Theory, 2012
    Co-Authors: Gary E Bolton, Jeannette Brosigkoch
    Abstract:

    In the laboratory, we investigate a non-cooperative three-person Coalition game with externalities and the opportunity to extend existing Coalitions. One bargainer, the builder, can propose and build a Coalition over two stages. We examine the hypothesis that both absolute and relative payoffs affect the Coalition Formation process (and outcome). We observe many inefficient two-person final Coalitions, and that the distribution of outcomes is sensitive to the constellation of both absolute and relative payoffs. Relative payoffs appear to be applied more myopically than has been observed in bilateral sequential bargaining games or suggested by social preference models. We hypothesize that the prevalence of two-person Coalitions stems from builder’s uncertainty about individual acceptance thresholds. In fact, allowing nonbinding communication among the bargainers increases the prevalence of efficient Coalitions. The main implication is that efficient Coalition building involves strategies for mitigating the strategic uncertainty inherent in building Coalitions.

  • how do Coalitions get built evidence from an extensive Form Coalition game with renegotiation externalities
    Research Papers in Economics, 2007
    Co-Authors: Gary E Bolton, Jeannette Brosigkoch
    Abstract:

    We investigate a three-person Coalition game in which one bargainer, the builder, can propose and build a Coalition over two stages. In equilibrium, Coalition building ends with an efficient grand Coalition, while the equilibrium path is contingent on the values of the two-person Coalitions and associated externality payoffs. Considering relative payoffs need not change the equilibrium path. Nevertheless, outcomes in the experiment are often inefficient. One explanation is that bargainers have difficulties anticipating the future actions of other bargainers. This problem might be mitigated by allowing bargainers to communicate prior to each stage. A test finds that communication does in fact increase efficiency, although unevenly, and at the cost of the builder. The study implies that the nature and pattern of communication among bargainers is a critical factor in efficient Coalition building.

Zhang Jijun - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • a mechanism to Form Coalition in multi agent system based on genetic algorithm
    Chinese Control Conference, 2008
    Co-Authors: Zhang Jijun, Zhang Jiping, Tian Baoguo, Zhang Jinchun
    Abstract:

    In order to research the problem of Coalition Formation in dynamic open multi-agent system, a rule of Coalition payoff distribution based on agentspsila abilities was proposed as well as the conception of Coalition payoff ratio and other correlative propositions. The negotiation mechanism and negotiation rules among agents were also discussed. Based on these researches, a mechanism to Form Coalition based on multi-agent genetic algorithm was established. This mechanism can enormously reduce the quantity of systempsilas communications and improve the systempsilas efficiency.