The Experts below are selected from a list of 2880 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Zili Shao - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Security protection and checking in embedded system integration against buffer overflow attacks
International Conference on Information Technology: Coding and Computing 2004. Proceedings. ITCC 2004., 2004Co-Authors: Zili Shao, Qingfeng Zhuge, Bin XiaoAbstract:With more embedded systems networked, it becomes an important research problem to effectively defend embedded systems against buffer overflow attacks and efficiently check if systems have been protected. In this paper, we propose the HSDefender (hardware/software Defender) technique that considers the protection and checking together to solve this problem. Our basic idea is to design a secure instruction set and require third-party software developers to use secure instructions to call Functions. Then the security checking can be easily performed by system integrators even without the knowledge of the source code. We first classify buffer overflow attacks into two categories, stack smashing attacks and Function Pointer attacks, and then provide two corresponding defending strategies. We analyze the HSDefender technique in respect of hardware cost, security, and performance, and experiment with it on the SimpleScalar/ARM simulator using benchmarks from MiBench. The results show that HSDefender can defend a system against more types of buffer overflow attacks with less overhead compared with the previous work.
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defending embedded systems against buffer overflow via hardware software
Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, 2003Co-Authors: Zili Shao, Qingfeng Zhuge, Y HeAbstract:Buffer over-flow attacks have been causing serious security problems for decades. With more embedded systems networked, it becomes an important research problem to defend embedded systems against buffer overflow attacks. We propose the hardware/software address protection (HSAP) technique to solve this problem. We first classify buffer overflow attacks into two categories (stack smashing attacks and Function Pointer attacks) and then provide two corresponding defending strategies. In our technique, hardware boundary check method and Function Pointer XOR method are used to protect a system against stack smashing attacks and Function Pointer attacks, respectively. Although the focus of the HSAP technique is on embedded systems because of the availability of hardware support, we show that the HSAP technique is applied to any type of processors to defend against buffer overflow attacks. We use four classes of processors to illustrate that the applicability of our technique is independent of architectures. We experiment with our HSAP technique in ARM Evaluator-7T simulation development environments. The results show that our HSAP technique defends a system against more types of buffer overflow attacks with little overhead.
Y He - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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defending embedded systems against buffer overflow via hardware software
Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, 2003Co-Authors: Zili Shao, Qingfeng Zhuge, Y HeAbstract:Buffer over-flow attacks have been causing serious security problems for decades. With more embedded systems networked, it becomes an important research problem to defend embedded systems against buffer overflow attacks. We propose the hardware/software address protection (HSAP) technique to solve this problem. We first classify buffer overflow attacks into two categories (stack smashing attacks and Function Pointer attacks) and then provide two corresponding defending strategies. In our technique, hardware boundary check method and Function Pointer XOR method are used to protect a system against stack smashing attacks and Function Pointer attacks, respectively. Although the focus of the HSAP technique is on embedded systems because of the availability of hardware support, we show that the HSAP technique is applied to any type of processors to defend against buffer overflow attacks. We use four classes of processors to illustrate that the applicability of our technique is independent of architectures. We experiment with our HSAP technique in ARM Evaluator-7T simulation development environments. The results show that our HSAP technique defends a system against more types of buffer overflow attacks with little overhead.
Qingfeng Zhuge - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Security protection and checking in embedded system integration against buffer overflow attacks
International Conference on Information Technology: Coding and Computing 2004. Proceedings. ITCC 2004., 2004Co-Authors: Zili Shao, Qingfeng Zhuge, Bin XiaoAbstract:With more embedded systems networked, it becomes an important research problem to effectively defend embedded systems against buffer overflow attacks and efficiently check if systems have been protected. In this paper, we propose the HSDefender (hardware/software Defender) technique that considers the protection and checking together to solve this problem. Our basic idea is to design a secure instruction set and require third-party software developers to use secure instructions to call Functions. Then the security checking can be easily performed by system integrators even without the knowledge of the source code. We first classify buffer overflow attacks into two categories, stack smashing attacks and Function Pointer attacks, and then provide two corresponding defending strategies. We analyze the HSDefender technique in respect of hardware cost, security, and performance, and experiment with it on the SimpleScalar/ARM simulator using benchmarks from MiBench. The results show that HSDefender can defend a system against more types of buffer overflow attacks with less overhead compared with the previous work.
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defending embedded systems against buffer overflow via hardware software
Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, 2003Co-Authors: Zili Shao, Qingfeng Zhuge, Y HeAbstract:Buffer over-flow attacks have been causing serious security problems for decades. With more embedded systems networked, it becomes an important research problem to defend embedded systems against buffer overflow attacks. We propose the hardware/software address protection (HSAP) technique to solve this problem. We first classify buffer overflow attacks into two categories (stack smashing attacks and Function Pointer attacks) and then provide two corresponding defending strategies. In our technique, hardware boundary check method and Function Pointer XOR method are used to protect a system against stack smashing attacks and Function Pointer attacks, respectively. Although the focus of the HSAP technique is on embedded systems because of the availability of hardware support, we show that the HSAP technique is applied to any type of processors to defend against buffer overflow attacks. We use four classes of processors to illustrate that the applicability of our technique is independent of architectures. We experiment with our HSAP technique in ARM Evaluator-7T simulation development environments. The results show that our HSAP technique defends a system against more types of buffer overflow attacks with little overhead.
Hu Shi-min - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Effective Detection of Sleep-in-Atomic-Context Bugs in the Linux Kernel
'Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)', 2020Co-Authors: Bai Jia-ju, Lawall Julia, Hu Shi-minAbstract:International audienceAtomic context is an execution state of the Linux kernel, in which kernel code monopolizes a CPU core. In this state, the Linux kernel may only perform operations that cannot sleep, as otherwise a system hang or crash may occur. We refer to this kind of concurrency bug as a sleep-in-atomic-context (SAC) bug. In practice, SAC bugs are hard to find, as they do not cause problems in all executions. In this paper, we propose a practical static approach named DSAC, to effectively detect SAC bugs in the Linux kernel. DSAC uses three key techniques: (1) a summary-based analysis to identify the code that may be executed in atomic context, (2) a connection-based alias analysis to identify the set of Functions referenced by a Function Pointer, and (3) a path-check method to filter out repeated reports and false bugs. We evaluate DSAC on Linux 4.17, and find 1159 SAC bugs. We manually check all the bugs, and find that 1068 bugs are real. We have randomly selected 300 of the real bugs and sent them to kernel developers. 220 of these bugs have been confirmed, and 51 of our patches fixing 115 bugs have been applied
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DCNS: Automated Detection of Conservative Non-Sleep Defects in the Linux Kernel
'Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)', 2019Co-Authors: Bai Jia-ju, Lawall Julia, Tan Wende, Hu Shi-minAbstract:International audienceFor waiting, the Linux kernel offers both sleep-able and non-sleep operations. However, only non-sleep operations can be used in atomic context. Detecting the possibility of execution in atomic context requires a complete inter-procedural flow analysis, often involving Function Pointers. Developers may thus conservatively use non-sleep operations even outside of atomic context, which may damage system performance, as such operations unproductively monopolize the CPU. Until now, no systematic approach has been proposed to detect such conservative non-sleep (CNS) defects. In this paper, we propose a practical static approach, named DCNS, to automatically detect conservative non-sleep defects in the Linux kernel. DCNS uses a summary-based analysis to effectively identify the code in atomic context and a novel file-connection-based alias analysis to correctly identify the set of Functions referenced by a Function Pointer. We evaluate DCNS on Linux 4.16, and in total find 1629 defects. We manually check 943 defects whose call paths are not so difficult to follow, and find that 890 are real. We have randomly selected 300 of the real defects and sent them to kernel developers, and 251 have been confirmed
Charlie Miller - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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engineering heap overflow exploits with javascript
USENIX Security Symposium, 2008Co-Authors: Mark Daniel, Jake Honoroff, Charlie MillerAbstract:This paper presents a new technique for exploiting heap overflows in JavaScript interpreters. Briefly, given a heap overflow, JavaScript commands can be used to insure that a Function Pointer is reliably present for smashing, just after the overflown buffer. A case study serves to highlight the technique: the Safari exploit that the authors used to win the 2008 CanSecWest Pwn2Own contest.
