The Experts below are selected from a list of 191931 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Zizhan Zheng - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Spatial-Temporal Moving Target Defense: A Markov Stackelberg Game Model
arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory, 2020Co-Authors: Wen Shen, Zizhan ZhengAbstract:Moving target defense has emerged as a critical paradigm of protecting a vulnerable system against persistent and stealthy attacks. To protect a system, a defender proactively changes the system configurations to limit the exposure of security vulnerabilities to potential attackers. In doing so, the defender creates asymmetric uncertainty and complexity for the attackers, making it much harder for them to compromise the system. In practice, the defender incurs a switching cost for each migration of the system configurations. The switching cost usually depends on both the current configuration and the following configuration. Besides, different system configurations typically require a different amount of time for an attacker to exploit and attack. Therefore, a defender must simultaneously decide both the optimal sequences of system configurations and the optimal timing for switching. In this paper, we propose a Markov Stackelberg Game framework to precisely characterize the defender's spatial and temporal decision-making in the face of advanced attackers. We introduce a relative value iteration algorithm that computes the defender's optimal moving target defense strategies. Empirical evaluation on real-world problems demonstrates the advantages of the Markov Stackelberg Game Model for spatial-temporal moving target defense.
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Optimal Timing of Moving Target Defense: A Stackelberg Game Model
MILCOM 2019 - 2019 IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM), 2019Co-Authors: Henger Li, Zizhan ZhengAbstract:As an effective approach to thwarting advanced attacks, moving target defense (MTD) has been applied to various domains. Previous works on MTD, however, mainly focus on deciding the sequence of system configurations to be used and have largely ignored the equally important timing problem. Given that both the migration cost and attack time vary over system configurations, it is crucial to jointly optimize the spatial and temporal decisions in MTD to better protect the system from persistent threats. In this work, we propose a Stackelberg Game Model for MTD where the defender commits to a joint migration and timing strategy to cope with configuration-dependent migration cost and attack time distribution. The defender's problem is formulated as a semi-Markovian decision process and a nearly optimal MTD strategy is derived by exploiting the unique structure of the Game.
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a signaling Game Model for moving target defense
International Conference on Computer Communications, 2017Co-Authors: Xiaotao Feng, Zizhan Zheng, Derya Cansever, Ananthram Swami, Prasant MohapatraAbstract:Incentive-driven advanced attacks have become a major concern to cyber-security. Traditional defense techniques that adopt a passive and static approach by assuming a fixed attack type are insufficient in the face of highly adaptive and stealthy attacks. In particular, a passive defense approach often creates information asymmetry where the attacker knows more about the defender. To this end, moving target defense (MTD) has emerged as a promising way to reverse this information asymmetry. The main idea of MTD is to (continuously) change certain aspects of the system under control to increase the attacker's uncertainty, which in turn increases attack cost/complexity and reduces the chance of a successful exploit in a given amount of time. In this paper, we go one step beyond and show that MTD can be further improved when combined with information disclosure. In particular, we consider that the defender adopts a MTD strategy to protect a critical resource across a network of nodes, and propose a Bayesian Stackelberg Game Model with the defender as the leader and the attacker as the follower. After fully characterizing the defender's optimal migration strategies, we show that the defender can design a signaling scheme to exploit the uncertainty created by MTD to further affect the attacker's behavior for its own advantage. We obtain conditions under which signaling is useful, and show that strategic information disclosure can be a promising way to further reverse the information asymmetry and achieve more efficient active defense.
Yao Shuai - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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A Two-Stage Game Model for Combined Heat and Power Trading Market
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2019Co-Authors: Ping Jiang, Yao ShuaiAbstract:The proliferation of technologies such as combined heat and power systems and smart meters has accelerated the multienergy trading. A two-stage Game Model is built in this paper to analyze the optimal strategy of each player and their interactions. Specifically, in consumer Game Model, we present an autonomous and distributed micro energy management system among users in which power and heat are traded at the same time. In supplier Game Model, integrated energy suppliers receive energy demand information and share the market according to the Game result. In addition, we present a detailed proof of the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium, which lays the foundation for researchers to build an effective Model using Game theory. Further, a distributed algorithm specifically designed for this Model is proposed. The players can retain a certain level of anonymity without revealing the details of their energy consumption or generation schedules to other players. Lastly, simulation results confirm the feasibility of two-stage Game Model and the effectiveness of the proposed distributed algorithm.
Zhang Yong-chuan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Contrastive Analysis on Electricity Market Equilibrium Based on General Game Model
Power system technology, 2010Co-Authors: Zhang Yong-chuanAbstract:Utilizing the general Game Model, it is researched whether the impact of competitors’ bidding behavior on market equilibrium is taken into account or not during drafting bidding strategy of generation companies (gencos). By means of establishing general Game Model of gencos in day-ahead market, the market clearing result is solved; and then the optimal strategies of gencos are derived while two conditions that the competitors’ behavior is taken into account or not, and it is pointed out that the market equilibrium under the two conditions corresponds to the equilibrium outcomes of Cournot Model and supply function Model, so the monotonicity of clearing results such as market clearing price, gencos’ trading quantity of electricity and income to gencos’ strategy parameters is proved; thus the variation trends of various market clearing outcomes under the variation of gencos’ strategic parameters are determined, and accordingly the market equilibrium in different condition is compared under the symmetrical generation cost case and leader-follower case. Results of calculation example verify corresponding conclusions.
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Analysis on Generators’ Bidding Strategy Based on Sequential Game Model
Power system technology, 2008Co-Authors: Zhang Yong-chuanAbstract:According to the bidding process between hydropower stations and fossil-fuel generating plants in electricity market and by use of Stackelberg sequential Game Model,the Modeling and analysis on asynchronous decision-making process among power generation enterprises under complete information condition are conducted,and the optimal power generation strategy of each power generation enterprise is solved.Comparing the bidding results by Stackelberg Game Model under complete information with that by Stackelberg Game Model under incomplete information and Cournot Game Model under complete information,the impacts of bidding information and preferential policy on bidding process and decision-making of each power generation enterprise are analyzed,and then a conclusion is obtained that different types of bidding markets should be formed under the guidance while power system is in different power supply and demand situations.The correctness of this conclusion is validated by case study results.
Song Ru-shun - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Tripartite Game Model on Commercial Bank Network Security
Computer Engineering, 2010Co-Authors: Song Ru-shunAbstract:In order to improve the security of bank network system,the tripartite network Game Model is presented which includes hackers,administrators and bank decisionmakers.Some basis are provided for strategy selecting of administrators and decisionmakers by analyzing the behaviors and interrelations between the three sides in the Model.The sub-Game Model is adopted and analyzed to acquire the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium according to the characteristics of the tripartite Model,and it makes the system administrator and the policy-making levels achieve the best strategy selection.
Ping Jiang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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A Two-Stage Game Model for Combined Heat and Power Trading Market
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2019Co-Authors: Ping Jiang, Yao ShuaiAbstract:The proliferation of technologies such as combined heat and power systems and smart meters has accelerated the multienergy trading. A two-stage Game Model is built in this paper to analyze the optimal strategy of each player and their interactions. Specifically, in consumer Game Model, we present an autonomous and distributed micro energy management system among users in which power and heat are traded at the same time. In supplier Game Model, integrated energy suppliers receive energy demand information and share the market according to the Game result. In addition, we present a detailed proof of the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium, which lays the foundation for researchers to build an effective Model using Game theory. Further, a distributed algorithm specifically designed for this Model is proposed. The players can retain a certain level of anonymity without revealing the details of their energy consumption or generation schedules to other players. Lastly, simulation results confirm the feasibility of two-stage Game Model and the effectiveness of the proposed distributed algorithm.
