The Experts below are selected from a list of 12696 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Ravi Kanbur - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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what is the world bank good for Global Public Goods and Global institutions
Social Science Research Network, 2017Co-Authors: Ravi KanburAbstract:The World Bank is in the doldrums, or worse. The Global Public Goods (GPGs) argument is often put forward as a way of reviving and even rescuing an institution whose financial base to support conventional sovereign loans is receding sharply relative to needs and competition from other sources. The World Bank does have certain advantages as an institution, which the Global community could use to address GPG issues. It has technical excellence and convening power to help build consensus on a range of GPG issues, although this cannot be fully realized without radical reform of its governance structures. It has experience with managing concessional and grant resources, which will be central to financing GPG mechanisms. And it also has experience with country operations to implement the country specific dimensions of GPG mechanisms. That is what the World Bank is good for now, three quarters of a century after its founding.
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what is the world bank good for Global Public Goods and Global institutions
Revue d’économie du développement, 2016Co-Authors: Ravi KanburAbstract:The World Bank is in the doldrums, or worse. The GPG argument is often put forward as a way of reviving and even rescuing an institution whose financial base to support conventional sovereign loans is receding sharply relative to needs and competition from other sources. The World Bank does have certain advantages as an institution, which the Global community could use to address GPG issues. It has technical excellence and convening power to help build consensus on a range of GPG issues, although this cannot be fully realized without radical reform of its governance structures. It has experience with managing concessional resources and grants, which will be central to financing GPG mechanisms. And it also has experience with country operations to implement the country specific dimensions of GPG mechanisms. That is what the World Bank is good for now, three quarters of a century after its founding.JEL Codes: O1, H41, F02.
Martin G Kocher - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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providing Global Public Goods electoral delegation and cooperation
Economic Inquiry, 2018Co-Authors: Martin G Kocher, Fangfang TanAbstract:This paper experimentally examines the effect of electoral delegation on providing Global Public Goods shared by several groups. Each group elects a delegate who can freely decide on each group member’s contribution (including the contribution of herself) to the Global Public good. Our results show that people mostly vote for delegates who assign equal contributions for every group member. However, in contrast to standard theoretical predictions, unequal contributions across groups drive cooperation down over time, and it decreases efficiency by almost 50% compared to the benchmark. This pattern is not driven by delegates trying to exploit their fellow group members, as indicated by the theory – quite to the opposite, other-regarding preferences and a re-election incentives guarantee that delegates assign equal contributions for all group members. Since the source of the resulting inefficiency is the polycentric nature of Global Public Goods provision together with other-regarding preferences, we use the term Pinefficiency to describe our finding.
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providing Global Public Goods electoral delegation and cooperation
Social Science Research Network, 2014Co-Authors: Martin G Kocher, Fangfang TanAbstract:This paper experimentally examines the effect of electoral delegation on providing Global Public Goods shared by several groups. Each group elects a delegate who can freely decide on each group member’s contribution to the Global Public good. Our results show that people mostly vote for delegates who assign equal contributions for every group member. However, in contrast to standard theoretical predictions, unequal contributions across groups drive cooperation down over time, and it decreases efficiency by almost 50% compared to the benchmark. This pattern is not driven by delegates trying to exploit their fellow group members, as indicated by the theory – quite to the opposite, other-regarding preferences and a re-election incentives guarantee that delegates assign equal contributions for all group members. It is driven by conditional cooperation of delegates across groups. Since the source of the resulting inefficiency is the polycentric nature of Global Public Goods provision together with other-regarding preferences, we use the term Pinefficiency to describe our finding.
Anne Van Aaken - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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behavioral aspects of the international law of Global Public Goods and common pool resources
Social Science Research Network, 2018Co-Authors: Anne Van AakenAbstract:Free-riding on Global Public Goods (GPG) and overuse of common pool resources (CPR) are problems with important implications for international law. This note argues that behavioral insights from laboratory experiments, in which individuals engage in Public Goods games, can contribute, despite the immense difference in context, to understanding how best to optimize the design of international legal regimes dealing with Global Public Goods and common pool resources. While some such insights are now reflected, most often implicitly, in the designs of certain of these regimes and serve to enhance their effectiveness, the value of such features is understated in the scholarship—which most often remains grounded in purely rational choice theories. Behavioral economics, to the extent it supplements or displaces rational-choice models in institutional design, may enable deeper and more sustained forms of international cooperation. While they have largely gone unnoticed, insights into how people behave need to be incorporated into international lawyers’ assessments of existing treaties and need to be considered in the design of new ones.
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behavioral aspects of the international law of Global Public Goods and common pool resources
American Journal of International Law, 2018Co-Authors: Anne Van AakenAbstract:Collective action problems with Public good characteristics such as climate change have important implications for international law. This note argues that behavioral insights from laboratory experiments, in which individuals engage in Public Goods games, can contribute to our understanding of how best to optimize the design of international legal regimes dealing with Global Public Goods and common pool resources. Behavioral economics, to the extent it supplements or displaces rational-choice models in institutional design, may enable deeper and more sustained forms of international cooperation.
Fangfang Tan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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providing Global Public Goods electoral delegation and cooperation
Economic Inquiry, 2018Co-Authors: Martin G Kocher, Fangfang TanAbstract:This paper experimentally examines the effect of electoral delegation on providing Global Public Goods shared by several groups. Each group elects a delegate who can freely decide on each group member’s contribution (including the contribution of herself) to the Global Public good. Our results show that people mostly vote for delegates who assign equal contributions for every group member. However, in contrast to standard theoretical predictions, unequal contributions across groups drive cooperation down over time, and it decreases efficiency by almost 50% compared to the benchmark. This pattern is not driven by delegates trying to exploit their fellow group members, as indicated by the theory – quite to the opposite, other-regarding preferences and a re-election incentives guarantee that delegates assign equal contributions for all group members. Since the source of the resulting inefficiency is the polycentric nature of Global Public Goods provision together with other-regarding preferences, we use the term Pinefficiency to describe our finding.
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providing Global Public Goods electoral delegation and cooperation
Social Science Research Network, 2014Co-Authors: Martin G Kocher, Fangfang TanAbstract:This paper experimentally examines the effect of electoral delegation on providing Global Public Goods shared by several groups. Each group elects a delegate who can freely decide on each group member’s contribution to the Global Public good. Our results show that people mostly vote for delegates who assign equal contributions for every group member. However, in contrast to standard theoretical predictions, unequal contributions across groups drive cooperation down over time, and it decreases efficiency by almost 50% compared to the benchmark. This pattern is not driven by delegates trying to exploit their fellow group members, as indicated by the theory – quite to the opposite, other-regarding preferences and a re-election incentives guarantee that delegates assign equal contributions for all group members. It is driven by conditional cooperation of delegates across groups. Since the source of the resulting inefficiency is the polycentric nature of Global Public Goods provision together with other-regarding preferences, we use the term Pinefficiency to describe our finding.
Inge Kaul - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Global Public Goods
2016Co-Authors: Inge KaulAbstract:Global and transnational challenges figure ever more prominently on national and international policy agendas and are increasingly analysed as Global Public Goods (GPGs). This timely collection, which includes contributions by eminent scholars from a wide range of academic disciplines, provides a comprehensive overview of the current state of the theoretical and empirical research on this topic, and suggestions on where scholarship could go next.
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providing Global Public Goods managing Globalization
2003Co-Authors: Inge KaulAbstract:Elaborating on the concepts first introduced in Global Public Goods, this book addresses the long overdue issue of how to adjust the concept of Public Goods to today's economic and political realities. The production of Global Public Goods requires the orchestration of initiatives by a large number of diverse actors across different levels and sectors. It may require the collaboration of governments, business and civil society, and in most cases it almost certainly calls for an effective linkage of the local, national, regional, and Global levels. In light of today's new realities, this book examines a series of managerial and political challenges that pertain to the design and implementation of production strategies and the monitoring and evaluation of Global Public Goods provision.As participatory decision-making enhances the political support for - and thus the effectiveness of - certain policy decisions, this volume offers suggestions on a number of pragmatic policy reforms for bringing the Global Public more into Public policy making on Global issues. Nine case studies examine the importance of the Global Public good concept from the viewpoint of developing countries, exploring how and where the concerns of the poor and the rich overlap.Providing Global Public Goods offers important and timely suggestions on how to move in a more feasible and systematic way towards a fairer process of Globalization that works in the interests of all. Available in OSO: http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/Public/content/economicsfinance/0195157400/toc.html
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providing Global Public Goods managing Globalization
2003Co-Authors: Inge KaulAbstract:Elaborating on the concepts first introduced in Global Public Goods, this book addresses the long overdue issue of how to adjust the concept of Public Goods to today's economic and political realities. The production of Global Public Goods requires the orchestration of initiatives by a large number of diverse actors across different levels and sectors. It may require the collaboration of governments, business and civil society, and in most cases it almost certainly calls for an effective linkage of the local, national, regional, and Global levels. In light of today's new realities, this book examines a series of managerial and political challenges that pertain to the design and implementation of production strategies and the monitoring and evaluation of Global Public Goods provision.As participatory decision-making enhances the political support for - and thus the effectiveness of - certain policy decisions, this volume offers suggestions on a number of pragmatic policy reforms for bringing the Global Public more into Public policy making on Global issues. Nine case studies examine the importance of the Global Public good concept from the viewpoint of developing countries, exploring how and where the concerns of the poor and the rich overlap.Providing Global Public Goods offers important and timely suggestions on how to move in a more feasible and systematic way towards a fairer process of Globalization that works in the interests of all.
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why do Global Public Goods matter today
2003Co-Authors: Inge Kaul, Pedro Conceicao, Katell Le Goulven, Ronald U MendozaAbstract:Globalization is often associated with increased privateness—with economic liberalization, placing a growing number of Goods and services intomarkets, fostering international market integration, and encouraging private cross-border economic activity such as trade, investment, transport, travel, migration and communication. No doubt, these are accompaniments of Globalization. However, Globalization is also, even perhaps quintessentially so, about increased Publicness—about people’s lives becomingmore interdependent. Events in one place of the globe are often unleashing worldwide repercussions. And a growing volume of international policy principles, treaties, norms, laws, and standards is defining common rules for an ever-wider range of activities. Just consider the elaborate rules governing ‘‘free trade’’. Clearly, international markets are far from being unfettered. Or, think of the many international agreements pertaining to Global concerns such as peace and security, controlling terrorism and drug trafficking, averting the risk of Global climate change, combating the spread of communicable diseases, or creating Global communication and transportation networks. All concern in one way or another the provision of Public Goods whose benefits—or, in the case of ‘‘bads’’, costs—cut across borders. They prove that many national Public Goods have gone Global. Globalization and Global Public Goods are inextricably linked. In fact, whether—and how—Global Public Goods are provided is what turns Globalization either into an oppor-
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how to improve the provision of Global Public Goods
2003Co-Authors: Inge Kaul, Pedro Conceicao, Katell Le Goulven, Ronald U MendozaAbstract:The studies in the volume suggest that the world is at a turning point in the provision of Global Public Goods. There are many signs of adaptive inefficiency, with institutional change lagging far behind rapidly evolving realities.1 So, even the best-intentioned policies often lead to limited or distorted results. But incipient institutional reforms are discernible: existing molds are becoming brittle, and policymaking and Public management patterns are being reconfigured. There is a clear window of opportunity for further change. Based on the analyses in the volume, addressing the following problems seems especially urgent: