The Experts below are selected from a list of 696 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Roman M. Sheremeta - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Current Version: May 12
    2020
    Co-Authors: Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Dan Kovenock, Roman M. Sheremeta
    Abstract:

    Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may The experimental results support all major theoretical predictions. In the auction treatment, where winning a battlefield is deterministic, disadvantaged players use a "Guerilla Warfare" strategy which stochastically allocates zero resources to a subset of battlefields. Advantaged players employ a "stochastic complete coverage" strategy, allocating random, but positive, resource levels across the battlefields. In the lottery treatment, where winning a battlefield is probabilistic, both players divide their resources equally across all battlefields. JEL Code: C72, C91, D72, D74

  • An experimental investigation of colonel blotto games. CESifo Working Paper Series 2688, CESifo Group
    2015
    Co-Authors: Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Dan Kovenock, Roman M. Sheremeta
    Abstract:

    This article examines behavior in the Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources. In this constant-sum game, two players simultaneously allocate their resources across n-battlefields, with the objective of maximizing the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support all major theoretical predictions. In the auction treatment, where winning a battlefield is deterministic, disadvantaged players often use a “Guerilla Warfare ” strategy which stochastically allocates zero resources to a subset of battlefields. Advantaged players often employ a “stochastic complete coverage ” strategy, allocating random, but positive, resource levels across the battlefields. In the lottery treatment, where winning a battlefield is probabilistic, both players divide their resources equally across all battlefields. Due to the constant-sum nature of the game, we examine behavior under both strangers and partners matching protocols. In the auction treatment, under the strangers protocol, players have significant serial correlation in allocations to a given battlefield across time. Under the partners protocol this correlation i

  • An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games
    Economic Theory, 2013
    Co-Authors: Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Dan Kovenock, Roman M. Sheremeta
    Abstract:

    This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support the main qualitative predictions of the theory. In the auction treatment, where winning a battlefield is deterministic, disadvantaged players use a “Guerilla Warfare” strategy that stochastically allocates zero resources to a subset of battlefields. Advantaged players employ a “stochastic complete coverage” strategy, allocating random, but positive, resource levels across the battlefields. In the lottery treatment, where winning a battlefield is probabilistic, both players divide their resources equally across all battlefields. However, we also find interesting behavioral deviations from the theory and discuss their implications.

  • Internet: www.wzb.eu ii ABSTRACT An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games
    2009
    Co-Authors: Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Dan Kovenock, Roman M. Sheremeta, Märkte Und Politik, Marktprozesse Und Steuerung Zitierweise/citation
    Abstract:

    This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support all major theoretical predictions. In the auction treatment, where winning a battlefield is deterministic, disadvantaged players use a “Guerilla Warfare ” strategy which stochastically allocates zero resources to a subset of battlefields. Advantaged players employ a “stochastic complete coverage ” strategy, allocating random, but positive, resource levels across the battlefields. In the lottery treatment, where winning a battlefield is probabilistic, both players divide their resources equally across all battlefields

  • Preliminary Draft – Comments most welcome! An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games
    2009
    Co-Authors: Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Dan Kovenock, Roman M. Sheremeta
    Abstract:

    This article examines behavior in the Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric forces. In this constant-sum game, two players simultaneously allocate their forces across n-battlefields, with the objective of maximizing the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support all major theoretical predictions. In the auction treatment, where winning a battlefield is deterministic, the disadvantaged players often use a “Guerilla Warfare ” strategy which stochastically allocates zero forces to a subset of battlefields. The advantaged player often employs a “stochastic complete coverage ” strategy, allocating random, but positive, force levels across the battlefields. In the lottery treatment, where winning a battlefield is probabilistic, both players divide their forces equally across all battlefields. Due to the constant-sum nature of the game, we examine behavior under both random pairing and fixed pairing protocols. Under the random pairing protocol, players have significant serial correlation in allocations to a given battlefield across time. Under fixed pairing this correlation is significantly reduced, and disappears for the disadvantaged player in the auction treatment

Wahyudi F. E. - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Strategi Perang Gerilya Isis Di Irak Periode 2014-2015
    'Faculty of Engineering Diponegoro University', 2017
    Co-Authors: Hidayat W., Utomo T. C., Wahyudi F. E.
    Abstract:

    This thesis discusses the success and solution of Guerilla Warfare strategy used by ISIS in Iraq between 2014 – 2015. By June 2014, ISIS had already occupied and took control of 30 cities in Iraq in just 19 days. The great expansion of ISIS continued until the following year of 2015. But at September 10th, 2014 when Barrack Obama, the President of the United States, announced the formation of International coalition to fight against ISIS, ISIS\u27s occupation area decreased by 14% to only 78.000 km2. The goal of this research is to capture and understand ISIS\u27s strategy to effectively practiced Guerilla Warfare and to see the efforts made by the International comunity especially members of the International coalition that was led by the United States. This research used qualitative method in which the author try to find answers to the success of ISIS\u27s war strategy that was done fast and effective in Iraq between 2014-2015. The result derived from this research is ISIS implemented theory of Guerilla Warfare strategy into politics, propagandas, military capability, financial sources, ideologies, government forms, and attacks or offensive

Wahyu, Hidayat Sudirman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Strategi Perang Gerilya ISIS di Irak Periode 2014-2015
    2017
    Co-Authors: Wahyu, Hidayat Sudirman
    Abstract:

    This thesis discusses the success and solution of Guerilla Warfare strategy used by ISIS in Iraq between 2014 – 2015. By June 2014, ISIS had already occupied and took control of 30 cities in Iraq in just 19 days. The great expansion of ISIS continued until the following year of 2015. But at September 10th, 2014 when Barrack Obama, the President of the United States, announced the formation of international coalition to fight against ISIS, ISIS’s occupation area decreased by 14% to only 78.000 km2. The goal of this research is to capture and understand ISIS’s strategy to effectively practiced Guerilla Warfare and to see the efforts made by the international comunity especially members of the international coalition that was led by the United States. This research used qualitative method in which the author try to find answers to the success of ISIS’s war strategy that was done fast and effective in Iraq between 2014-2015. The result derived from this research is ISIS implemented theory of Guerilla Warfare strategy into politics, propagandas, military capability, financial sources, ideologies, government forms, and attacks or offensive. The author found the solution and suggestions for this research. The solutions are divided into two time frame, which are short term and long term

Subhasish M. Chowdhury - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Current Version: May 12
    2020
    Co-Authors: Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Dan Kovenock, Roman M. Sheremeta
    Abstract:

    Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may The experimental results support all major theoretical predictions. In the auction treatment, where winning a battlefield is deterministic, disadvantaged players use a "Guerilla Warfare" strategy which stochastically allocates zero resources to a subset of battlefields. Advantaged players employ a "stochastic complete coverage" strategy, allocating random, but positive, resource levels across the battlefields. In the lottery treatment, where winning a battlefield is probabilistic, both players divide their resources equally across all battlefields. JEL Code: C72, C91, D72, D74

  • An experimental investigation of colonel blotto games. CESifo Working Paper Series 2688, CESifo Group
    2015
    Co-Authors: Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Dan Kovenock, Roman M. Sheremeta
    Abstract:

    This article examines behavior in the Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources. In this constant-sum game, two players simultaneously allocate their resources across n-battlefields, with the objective of maximizing the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support all major theoretical predictions. In the auction treatment, where winning a battlefield is deterministic, disadvantaged players often use a “Guerilla Warfare ” strategy which stochastically allocates zero resources to a subset of battlefields. Advantaged players often employ a “stochastic complete coverage ” strategy, allocating random, but positive, resource levels across the battlefields. In the lottery treatment, where winning a battlefield is probabilistic, both players divide their resources equally across all battlefields. Due to the constant-sum nature of the game, we examine behavior under both strangers and partners matching protocols. In the auction treatment, under the strangers protocol, players have significant serial correlation in allocations to a given battlefield across time. Under the partners protocol this correlation i

  • An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games
    Economic Theory, 2013
    Co-Authors: Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Dan Kovenock, Roman M. Sheremeta
    Abstract:

    This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support the main qualitative predictions of the theory. In the auction treatment, where winning a battlefield is deterministic, disadvantaged players use a “Guerilla Warfare” strategy that stochastically allocates zero resources to a subset of battlefields. Advantaged players employ a “stochastic complete coverage” strategy, allocating random, but positive, resource levels across the battlefields. In the lottery treatment, where winning a battlefield is probabilistic, both players divide their resources equally across all battlefields. However, we also find interesting behavioral deviations from the theory and discuss their implications.

  • Internet: www.wzb.eu ii ABSTRACT An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games
    2009
    Co-Authors: Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Dan Kovenock, Roman M. Sheremeta, Märkte Und Politik, Marktprozesse Und Steuerung Zitierweise/citation
    Abstract:

    This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support all major theoretical predictions. In the auction treatment, where winning a battlefield is deterministic, disadvantaged players use a “Guerilla Warfare ” strategy which stochastically allocates zero resources to a subset of battlefields. Advantaged players employ a “stochastic complete coverage ” strategy, allocating random, but positive, resource levels across the battlefields. In the lottery treatment, where winning a battlefield is probabilistic, both players divide their resources equally across all battlefields

  • Preliminary Draft – Comments most welcome! An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games
    2009
    Co-Authors: Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Dan Kovenock, Roman M. Sheremeta
    Abstract:

    This article examines behavior in the Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric forces. In this constant-sum game, two players simultaneously allocate their forces across n-battlefields, with the objective of maximizing the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support all major theoretical predictions. In the auction treatment, where winning a battlefield is deterministic, the disadvantaged players often use a “Guerilla Warfare ” strategy which stochastically allocates zero forces to a subset of battlefields. The advantaged player often employs a “stochastic complete coverage ” strategy, allocating random, but positive, force levels across the battlefields. In the lottery treatment, where winning a battlefield is probabilistic, both players divide their forces equally across all battlefields. Due to the constant-sum nature of the game, we examine behavior under both random pairing and fixed pairing protocols. Under the random pairing protocol, players have significant serial correlation in allocations to a given battlefield across time. Under fixed pairing this correlation is significantly reduced, and disappears for the disadvantaged player in the auction treatment

Dan Kovenock - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Current Version: May 12
    2020
    Co-Authors: Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Dan Kovenock, Roman M. Sheremeta
    Abstract:

    Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may The experimental results support all major theoretical predictions. In the auction treatment, where winning a battlefield is deterministic, disadvantaged players use a "Guerilla Warfare" strategy which stochastically allocates zero resources to a subset of battlefields. Advantaged players employ a "stochastic complete coverage" strategy, allocating random, but positive, resource levels across the battlefields. In the lottery treatment, where winning a battlefield is probabilistic, both players divide their resources equally across all battlefields. JEL Code: C72, C91, D72, D74

  • An experimental investigation of colonel blotto games. CESifo Working Paper Series 2688, CESifo Group
    2015
    Co-Authors: Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Dan Kovenock, Roman M. Sheremeta
    Abstract:

    This article examines behavior in the Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources. In this constant-sum game, two players simultaneously allocate their resources across n-battlefields, with the objective of maximizing the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support all major theoretical predictions. In the auction treatment, where winning a battlefield is deterministic, disadvantaged players often use a “Guerilla Warfare ” strategy which stochastically allocates zero resources to a subset of battlefields. Advantaged players often employ a “stochastic complete coverage ” strategy, allocating random, but positive, resource levels across the battlefields. In the lottery treatment, where winning a battlefield is probabilistic, both players divide their resources equally across all battlefields. Due to the constant-sum nature of the game, we examine behavior under both strangers and partners matching protocols. In the auction treatment, under the strangers protocol, players have significant serial correlation in allocations to a given battlefield across time. Under the partners protocol this correlation i

  • An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games
    Economic Theory, 2013
    Co-Authors: Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Dan Kovenock, Roman M. Sheremeta
    Abstract:

    This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support the main qualitative predictions of the theory. In the auction treatment, where winning a battlefield is deterministic, disadvantaged players use a “Guerilla Warfare” strategy that stochastically allocates zero resources to a subset of battlefields. Advantaged players employ a “stochastic complete coverage” strategy, allocating random, but positive, resource levels across the battlefields. In the lottery treatment, where winning a battlefield is probabilistic, both players divide their resources equally across all battlefields. However, we also find interesting behavioral deviations from the theory and discuss their implications.

  • Internet: www.wzb.eu ii ABSTRACT An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games
    2009
    Co-Authors: Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Dan Kovenock, Roman M. Sheremeta, Märkte Und Politik, Marktprozesse Und Steuerung Zitierweise/citation
    Abstract:

    This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support all major theoretical predictions. In the auction treatment, where winning a battlefield is deterministic, disadvantaged players use a “Guerilla Warfare ” strategy which stochastically allocates zero resources to a subset of battlefields. Advantaged players employ a “stochastic complete coverage ” strategy, allocating random, but positive, resource levels across the battlefields. In the lottery treatment, where winning a battlefield is probabilistic, both players divide their resources equally across all battlefields

  • Preliminary Draft – Comments most welcome! An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games
    2009
    Co-Authors: Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Dan Kovenock, Roman M. Sheremeta
    Abstract:

    This article examines behavior in the Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric forces. In this constant-sum game, two players simultaneously allocate their forces across n-battlefields, with the objective of maximizing the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support all major theoretical predictions. In the auction treatment, where winning a battlefield is deterministic, the disadvantaged players often use a “Guerilla Warfare ” strategy which stochastically allocates zero forces to a subset of battlefields. The advantaged player often employs a “stochastic complete coverage ” strategy, allocating random, but positive, force levels across the battlefields. In the lottery treatment, where winning a battlefield is probabilistic, both players divide their forces equally across all battlefields. Due to the constant-sum nature of the game, we examine behavior under both random pairing and fixed pairing protocols. Under the random pairing protocol, players have significant serial correlation in allocations to a given battlefield across time. Under fixed pairing this correlation is significantly reduced, and disappears for the disadvantaged player in the auction treatment