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Theo Notteboom - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Port Hinterland Connectivity
International Transport Forum Discussion Papers, 2015Co-Authors: Olaf Merk, Theo NotteboomAbstract:The competitiveness of a seaport depends on the extent the cargo handled in the port can reach its Hinterland destination (e.g. Acciaro & McKinnon, 2013). The importance of Hinterland connections has been recognised as one of the most critical issues in port competitiveness and development in most ports around the world. Upgrading of facilities and equipment, privatization of port operations and increased sophistication of berth planning have resulted in drastic reduction of ship turnaround times over the last decade. The smoothness of port-Hinterland connections has not followed at the same pace. Increasing ship vessel size – and the related emergence of maritime hubs and spokes – will only exacerbate the bottlenecks related to port Hinterland connectivity. One of the main issues related to the development of adequate Hinterland connections in ports is the need to coordinate multiple actors often with conflicting mandates that constitute the melee of private and public institutions governing port Hinterland infrastructure development.
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concentration and the formation of multi port gateway regions in the european container port system an update
Journal of Transport Geography, 2010Co-Authors: Theo NotteboomAbstract:The European container port system features a unique blend of different port types and sizes combined with a vast economic Hinterland. This paper provides an update of the detailed container traffic analysis developed by Notteboom (1997) by extending it to the period 1985–2008 and to 78 container ports. The paper also aims at identifying key trends and issues underlying recent developments in the European container port system. These trends include the formation of multi-port gateway regions, changes in the Hinterland orientation of ports and port regionalization processes. While the local Hinterland remains the backbone of ports’ traffic positions, a growing demand for routing flexibility fuels competition for distant Hinterlands between multi-port gateway regions. The prevailing assumption that containerisation would lead to further port concentration is not a confirmed fact in Europe: the European port system and most of its multi-port gateway regions witness a gradual cargo deconcentration process. Still, the container handling market remains far more concentrated than other cargo handling segments in the European port system, as there are strong market-related factors supporting a relatively high cargo concentration level in the container sector.
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the relationship between seaports and the intermodal Hinterland in light of global supply chains european challenges
Port competition and hinterland connections, 2009Co-Authors: Theo NotteboomAbstract:This paper describes how the seaport-Hinterland interaction plays an increasingly important role in shaping the supply chain solution of shippers and logistics service providers. Security concerns, combined with concerns over the reliability of transport solutions, have led seaports and Hinterland corridors to take up a more active role in supply chains. This paper looks at port developments and logistics dynamics in Europe and it proposes some steps towards a further integration between seaports and Hinterland. The key point focused on in this paper is that the competitive battle among ports will increasingly be fought ashore. Hinterland connections are thus a key area for competition and coordination among actors. This paper approaches port-Hinterland dynamics from the perspective of the various market players involved, including port authorities, shipping lines, terminal operators, transport operators (rail, barge, road and short sea) and logistics service providers. The paper addresses the impact of horizontal and vertical relations in supply chains on the structure of these chains and on the relationships between seaports and the intermodal Hinterland.
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re assessing port Hinterland relationships in the context of global commodity chains
International Workshop on Ports Cities and Global Supply Chains (2005 : Hong Kong China), 2007Co-Authors: Theo Notteboom, Jean-paul RodrigueAbstract:Given the tremendous changes in logistics, ports are coping with a very flexible environment. This has brought several major challenges in contemporary maritime transportation, particularly over the Hinterland which has received renewed attention in recent years. The maritime component of the global freight transportation system has become very dynamic and efficient. As large segments of freight distribution systems are becoming more closely integrated, port-Hinterland relationships have become a fundamental component of freight distribution. It may even been argued, and as paradoxically as it sounds, that contemporary improvements in maritime shipping are mainly derived from improvements in inland transport systems. The current technological and commercial context indicates important changes in the conceptualization of Hinterlands. Among the most significant forces that are shaping Hinterlands, the fragmentation of Global Commodity Chains (GCC) can be considered as particularly relevant.
Wayne K. Talley - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Hinterland transport chains: a behavioral examination approach
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 2018Co-Authors: Wayne K. TalleyAbstract:A Hinterland transport chain is the transport network on the landward side of a seaport, over which cargo moves to/from the seaport. A Hinterland transport chain choice is jointly determined by seaports, dry ports, intermodal carriers, importers and exporters. In this paper, determinants of sea/dry port choice, shipper choice and intermodal carrier choice are deduced to also be determinants of Hinterland transport chain choice. Furthermore, a behavioral model is presented that describes the joint choice of a Hinterland transport chain, accounting for each of the above parties’ objectives: sea/dry ports seek to maximize throughput; intermodal carriers seek to maximize profits; and shippers seek to minimize logistics cost. The behavioral model is used in the analysis of unexplored areas in the Hinterland transport chain literature, i.e. the fundamental issues of the existence and uniqueness of such chains.
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Hinterland transport chains: Determinant effects on chain choice
International Journal of Production Economics, 2017Co-Authors: Wayne K. TalleyAbstract:A Hinterland is the landward side of a seaport, whereas a seaport (dry port) is the sea node (inland node) of a Hinterland transport chain, i.e. the Hinterland transport network over which cargo moves. A Hinterland transport chain is jointly determined by seaports, dry ports, intermodal carriers, importers and exporters. A mathematical model is proposed to model this joint choice. Analysis of the model shows that the impact of the seaport's and dry port's throughput, intermodal carriers’ profit, importers’ and exporters’ logistics costs on the Hinterland chain choice can either be amplified or extenuated, depending on the existence of what we refer to as indirect effects.
Peter W. De Langen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Business Models and Network Design in Hinterland Transport
Handbook of Global Logistics, 2013Co-Authors: Peter W. De Langen, Jan C. Fransoo, Ben RooyAbstract:International container transport is the backbone of global supply chains. Hinterland transport, the transport from the port to the final destination and vice versa, is an important component of international container transport. However, academic attention to Hinterland transport has emerged only recently. This chapter discusses business models and network design in Hinterland transport. Understanding business models is relevant, as many different types of companies (e.g., shipping lines, terminal operating companies and forwarders) play a role in Hinterland transport. Their business models influence how they position themselves in the market, their stance concerning cooperation and coordination in Hinterland transport, and their scope in network design. Network design is a core issue in Hinterland transport. New services need to be designed—and in such a way that they are expected to be profitable. Furthermore, current service patterns only change through deliberate redesign. So competition through the (re)design of transport services is a very important—perhaps the most important—form of competition in intermodal freight transport. One potentially promising innovation in this respect is the extended gate concept, where an inland hub becomes the ‘virtual gate’ of the deep sea terminal.
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the role of port authorities in new intermodal service development the case of barcelona port authority
Research in transportation business and management, 2012Co-Authors: Roy Van Den Berg, Peter W. De Langen, Carles Rua CostaAbstract:Abstract Improving intermodal connectivity is important for ports. However, developing new rail connections, especially in the contestable Hinterland, is complex and requires substantial investments. Therefore, rail operators are reluctant to start new connections unless risks are limited. Port authorities can play a role in these Hinterland connections to increase traffic to their ports. Barcelona is one of the leading port authorities in this respect, with a well developed Hinterland strategy and a developing network of inland rail nodes. The Port Authority of Barcelona also invests in new rail shuttles, for instance between Barcelona and Lyon. This shuttle initiative is centre stage in this paper, as it may stand out as a best practise for port authority involvement in developing new rail connections. The paper starts with an introduction of the importance of intermodal transport for the development of Hinterlands of ports. The second part will provide an overview of the Hinterland strategy of Barcelona and describes in detail the participation of the port of Barcelona in the start-up phase of the intermodal connection to Lyon. The final section discusses the main conclusions from the case study with regard to the involvement of port authorities in the development of new intermodal transport services.
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Hinterland strategies of port authorities: A case study of the port of Barcelona
Research in Transportation Economics, 2011Co-Authors: Roy Van Den Berg, Peter W. De LangenAbstract:Port authorities generally focus on the development of the local port area and play a minor role in the development of port Hinterlands, whereas shippers, forwarders, barge and rail operators have always been involved in the port-Hinterland connection. The increasing importance of intermodal Hinterland networks for the competitive position of ports has urged port authorities to become active in the Hinterland. This new role has already been suggested by different academics. However, limited empirical evidence exists of port authorities taking stakes in inland terminals or developing transport services. Barcelona, as one of the leading port authorities in this respect, is used as a case study in this paper. The case study provides insight in the components and execution of the Hinterland strategy of Barcelona. It shows that the strategy of the port authority of Barcelona and the consequent active involvement in the Hinterland has had a significant impact on attracting container volumes from distant Hinterlands and improving the accessibility of the port.
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Coordination in Hinterland Transport Chains: A Major Challenge for the Seaport Community
Maritime Economics & Logistics, 2008Co-Authors: Martijn R Van Der Horst, Peter W. De LangenAbstract:Many different private companies – shipping lines, terminal operating companies, forwarders, Hinterland transport providers, and inland terminal operators – are involved in Hinterland transport. In addition, different public actors such as the port authority, customs, and infrastructure managers are involved. Creating effective Hinterland transport chains requires the coordination between all these actors; coordination does not come about spontaneously. Its development may be hindered by free-riding problems, a lack of contractual relationships, information asymmetry, and a lack of incentives for cooperation. This paper presents analyses of the coordination problems in Hinterland chains of seaports and arrangements to resolve these problems. The most relevant coordination problems in Hinterland chains are discussed. Based on insights from institutional economics, four main categories of arrangements to improve coordination are identified: the introduction of incentives, the creation of an interfirm alliance, changing the scope of the organisation, and collective action. An analysis is presented of a substantial number of coordination arrangements in Hinterland transport to and from the port of Rotterdam, thereby indicating how coordination could be improved.
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Hinterland access regimes in seaports
European Journal of Transport and Infrastructure Research, 2004Co-Authors: Peter W. De Langen, A. ChoulyAbstract:Seaports serve Hinterlands. Various inland modes such as road, rail, inland waterways and pipeline are used to access the Hinterland. The quality of the access to and from the Hinterland differs between seaports and affects their competitiveness. The quality of the Hinterland access depends among others on the behaviour of a large variety of actors, such as shipping lines, terminal operators, forwarders, the port authority and the national/regional government. Therefore, effective Hinterland access is at least partially an organisational challenge. Together these actors create a ‘Hinterland access regime’. The analysis of this regime is central in this paper. First, the relevance of Hinterland access for seaports is briefly discussed. Second, the term ‘Hinterland access regime’ is defined and the theoretical framework presented in De Langen (2004) is used to analyse the quality of the Hinterland access regime. Third, survey results on the quality of the Hinterland access regime in three seaport clusters, Rotterdam, Durban and the Lower Mississippi Port Cluster (LMPC) are discussed. This analysis shows major differences between Hinterland access regimes. Fourth, opportunities to improve the Hinterland access regime in these three ports are discussed.
Bruno De Borger - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Private Port Pricing and Public Investment in Port and Hinterland Capacity
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 2008Co-Authors: Bruno De Borger, Stef Proost, Kurt Van DenderAbstract:We study duopolistic pricing by ports that are congestible, share the same overseas customers and have each a downstream, congestible transport network to a common Hinterland. In the central set-up, local (country) governments care about local welfare only and decide on the capacity of the port and of the Hinterland network. We obtain the following results. First, profit-maximising ports internalise Hinterland congestion in as far as it affects their customers. Second, investment in port capacity reduces prices and congestion at each port, but increases Hinterland congestion in the region where the port investment is made. Investment in a port's Hinterland is likely to lead to more port congestion and higher prices for port use, and to less congestion and a lower price at the competing port. Third, the induced increase in Hinterland congestion is a substantial cost of port investment that strongly reduces the direct benefits of extra port activities. Fourth, imposing congestion tolls on the Hinterland road network raises both port and Hinterland capacity investments. We illustrate all results numerically and discuss policy implications. © 2008 LSE and the University of Bath
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private port pricing and public investment in port and Hinterland capacity
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 2007Co-Authors: Bruno De Borger, Stef Proost, Kurt Van DenderAbstract:We study duopolistic pricing by ports that are congestible, share the same overseas customers and have each a downstream, congestible transport network to a common Hinterland. In the central set-up, local (country) governments care about local welfare only and decide on the capacity of the port and of the Hinterland network. We obtain the following results. First, profit-maximizing ports internalize Hinterland congestion in as far as it affects their customers. Second, investment in port capacity reduces prices and congestion at both ports, but increases Hinterland congestion in the region where the port investment is made. Investment in a port’s Hinterland is likely to lead to more port congestion and higher prices for port use, and to less congestion and a lower price at the competing port. Third, the induced increase in Hinterland congestion is a substantial cost of port investment that strongly reduces the direct benefits of extra port activities. Fourth, imposing congestion tolls on the Hinterland road network raises both port and Hinterland capacity investments. We illustrate all results numerically and discuss policy implications.
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private port pricing and public investment in port and Hinterland capacity
11th World Conference on Transport ResearchWorld Conference on Transport Research Society, 2007Co-Authors: Bruno De Borger, Stef Proost, Kurt Van DenderAbstract:This paper examines pricing and investment actions in a setting similar to that of European ports such as Rotterdam, Antwerp, and Le Havre. Key features of the scenario are that the ports are congestion prone, and that they serve a Hinterland that they are connected to by congested transport networks. The ports compete for traffic in an oligopolistic setting. The analysis emphasizes the interaction between the duopolistic port market and Hinterland congestion. Two aspects of shipments are focused on: the costs of using port services and the cost of Hinterland transport toward those final destinations. The framework of the analysis is a two-stage game in capacities and prices. The governance structure is such that decisions about capacity are public, but pricing is private. Main results show that ports charge users for congestion at the port and also for the share of Hinterland congestion they impose on other customers of the port. This “partial internalization” means that ports with heavily congested Hinterlands will charge higher prices. A second finding is that extra investment in one port reduces congestion at both ports, but raises Hinterland congestion where the port is located. Along similar lines, investment in the Hinterland will lead to more congestion at the port that it serves and resulting higher port charges. A third finding is that local governments that invest to maximize welfare will invest in the local port, but the induced increase in Hinterland congestion is an important factor in those actions. The results suggest that duopolistic port pricing induces public entities to invest less in port capacity. Finally, private ports do not necessarily charge higher port prices. In fact, if the country governments directly control prices of the port within their jurisdiction, they may charge even higher prices than private operators.
Kurt Van Dender - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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private port pricing and public investment in port and Hinterland capacity
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 2007Co-Authors: Bruno De Borger, Stef Proost, Kurt Van DenderAbstract:We study duopolistic pricing by ports that are congestible, share the same overseas customers and have each a downstream, congestible transport network to a common Hinterland. In the central set-up, local (country) governments care about local welfare only and decide on the capacity of the port and of the Hinterland network. We obtain the following results. First, profit-maximizing ports internalize Hinterland congestion in as far as it affects their customers. Second, investment in port capacity reduces prices and congestion at both ports, but increases Hinterland congestion in the region where the port investment is made. Investment in a port’s Hinterland is likely to lead to more port congestion and higher prices for port use, and to less congestion and a lower price at the competing port. Third, the induced increase in Hinterland congestion is a substantial cost of port investment that strongly reduces the direct benefits of extra port activities. Fourth, imposing congestion tolls on the Hinterland road network raises both port and Hinterland capacity investments. We illustrate all results numerically and discuss policy implications.
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private port pricing and public investment in port and Hinterland capacity
11th World Conference on Transport ResearchWorld Conference on Transport Research Society, 2007Co-Authors: Bruno De Borger, Stef Proost, Kurt Van DenderAbstract:This paper examines pricing and investment actions in a setting similar to that of European ports such as Rotterdam, Antwerp, and Le Havre. Key features of the scenario are that the ports are congestion prone, and that they serve a Hinterland that they are connected to by congested transport networks. The ports compete for traffic in an oligopolistic setting. The analysis emphasizes the interaction between the duopolistic port market and Hinterland congestion. Two aspects of shipments are focused on: the costs of using port services and the cost of Hinterland transport toward those final destinations. The framework of the analysis is a two-stage game in capacities and prices. The governance structure is such that decisions about capacity are public, but pricing is private. Main results show that ports charge users for congestion at the port and also for the share of Hinterland congestion they impose on other customers of the port. This “partial internalization” means that ports with heavily congested Hinterlands will charge higher prices. A second finding is that extra investment in one port reduces congestion at both ports, but raises Hinterland congestion where the port is located. Along similar lines, investment in the Hinterland will lead to more congestion at the port that it serves and resulting higher port charges. A third finding is that local governments that invest to maximize welfare will invest in the local port, but the induced increase in Hinterland congestion is an important factor in those actions. The results suggest that duopolistic port pricing induces public entities to invest less in port capacity. Finally, private ports do not necessarily charge higher port prices. In fact, if the country governments directly control prices of the port within their jurisdiction, they may charge even higher prices than private operators.
