The Experts below are selected from a list of 285 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Neil Rankin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Imperfect Competition and macroeconomics a survey
Oxford Economic Papers, 1994Co-Authors: Huw David Dixon, Neil RankinAbstract:This survey outlines the general lessons of recent literature on Imperfectly competitive macroeconomics for the theory of monetary and fiscal policy. A general framework is presented which nests most of the existing literature. Although money is of itself neutral, the presence of menu costs, non-unit-elastic expectations, or sectoral nominal rigidities results in an output- and welfare-increasing role for monetary policy. Imperfect Competition alone is enough for fiscal policy to affect output but, without monetary nonneutrality, the effect is as likely to be negative as positive. Nevertheless, fiscally induced output increases are likely to be welfare increasing, unlike in competitive economies. Copyright 1994 by Royal Economic Society.
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Imperfect Competition and macroeconomics a survey
The economics of labor unions edited by Alison L. Booth Vol. 2 2002 ISBN 1-84064-526-1 págs. 474-502, 1992Co-Authors: Huw David Dixon, Neil RankinAbstract:This survey outlines the general lessons of the recent literature on Imperfectly competitive macroeconomies for the theory of monetary and fiscal policy. A general framework is presented which encompasses most of the existing literature. Although money is of itself neutral in these models, the presence of menu costs, expectations which are not unit elastic, or sectoral nominal rigidities can result in a welfare-improving role for monetary policy. Imperfect Competition also enhances the scope for the beneficial influence of fiscal policy. We explore the possibilities for multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria and the role of increasing returns to scale.
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Imperfect Competition and macroeconomics a survey
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), 1991Co-Authors: Huw David Dixon, Neil RankinAbstract:This survey outlines the general lessons of the recent literature on Imperfectly competitive macroeconomies for the theory of monetary and fiscal policy. A general framework is presented which encompasses most of the existing literature. Although money is of itself neutral in these models, the presence of menu costs, expectations which are not unit elastic, or sectoral nominal rigidities can result in a welfare-improving role for monetary policy. Imperfect Competition also enhances the scope for the beneficial influence of fiscal policy. We explore the possibilities for multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria and the role of increasing returns to scale. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Huw David Dixon - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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On Imperfect Competition with occasionally binding cash-in-advance constraints
Journal of Macroeconomics, 2016Co-Authors: Huw David Dixon, Panayiotis M. PourpouridesAbstract:We depart from the assumption of perfect Competition in the final goods sector, commonly used in cash-in-advance (CIA) models, providing extensive theoretical analysis of the general equilibrium of an economy with Imperfect Competition, endogenous production and fully flexible prices in the presence of occasionally binding CIA constraints, under general assumptions about the velocity of money. Homothetic preferences generate Marshallian demands which are linear in own price allowing for any combination of equilibrium number of firms and demand elasticity. Whether the CIA constraint binds or not depends, among others, on the degree of Imperfect Competition. As the market becomes more competitive it is certainly no less likely that the CIA constraint will bind. The degree of Imperfect Competition directly affects the distribution of consumption and indirectly the level of output and work effort via the CIA constraint. With perfect foresight, there is an optimal negative steady-state inflation rate. We also consider how the introduction of capital and bonds would fit into the framework.
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Special issue: Imperfect Competition and contemporary macroeconomics. Editor’s introduction
Portuguese Economic Journal, 2007Co-Authors: Huw David DixonAbstract:This paper introduces the special issue by tracing out the history of Imperfect Competition in macroeconomics, particularly since 1980. It argues that in the search for a micro-foundation for nominal rigidity it was necessary to abandon the assumption of competitive equilibrium where all agents are price-takers. This led to models where firms and other optimising agents set wages and prices which were part of the new Keynesian economics of the 1980s. When these were combined with quantitative dynamic equilibrium methods it gave rise to the new neoclassical synthesis models which dominate macroeconomics today. The assumption of Imperfect Competition provides an equilibrium with different properties to the competitive, and one particular focus is on the relationship between the markup and the fiscal multiplier.
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Imperfect Competition and macroeconomics a survey
Oxford Economic Papers, 1994Co-Authors: Huw David Dixon, Neil RankinAbstract:This survey outlines the general lessons of recent literature on Imperfectly competitive macroeconomics for the theory of monetary and fiscal policy. A general framework is presented which nests most of the existing literature. Although money is of itself neutral, the presence of menu costs, non-unit-elastic expectations, or sectoral nominal rigidities results in an output- and welfare-increasing role for monetary policy. Imperfect Competition alone is enough for fiscal policy to affect output but, without monetary nonneutrality, the effect is as likely to be negative as positive. Nevertheless, fiscally induced output increases are likely to be welfare increasing, unlike in competitive economies. Copyright 1994 by Royal Economic Society.
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Imperfect Competition and macroeconomics a survey
The economics of labor unions edited by Alison L. Booth Vol. 2 2002 ISBN 1-84064-526-1 págs. 474-502, 1992Co-Authors: Huw David Dixon, Neil RankinAbstract:This survey outlines the general lessons of the recent literature on Imperfectly competitive macroeconomies for the theory of monetary and fiscal policy. A general framework is presented which encompasses most of the existing literature. Although money is of itself neutral in these models, the presence of menu costs, expectations which are not unit elastic, or sectoral nominal rigidities can result in a welfare-improving role for monetary policy. Imperfect Competition also enhances the scope for the beneficial influence of fiscal policy. We explore the possibilities for multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria and the role of increasing returns to scale.
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Imperfect Competition and macroeconomics a survey
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), 1991Co-Authors: Huw David Dixon, Neil RankinAbstract:This survey outlines the general lessons of the recent literature on Imperfectly competitive macroeconomies for the theory of monetary and fiscal policy. A general framework is presented which encompasses most of the existing literature. Although money is of itself neutral in these models, the presence of menu costs, expectations which are not unit elastic, or sectoral nominal rigidities can result in a welfare-improving role for monetary policy. Imperfect Competition also enhances the scope for the beneficial influence of fiscal policy. We explore the possibilities for multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria and the role of increasing returns to scale. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Elena Lopez - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Imperfect Competition and Total Factor Productivity Growth
Journal of Productivity Analysis, 2004Co-Authors: Azzeddine Azzam, Rigoberto Lopez, Elena LopezAbstract:This article examines the role of Imperfect Competition in determining total factor productivity growth (TFPG) by bringing together a New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) model and the TFPG model of Good, Nadiri and Sickles (1999). Application of the integrated model to 1973–1992 data from 29 food processing industries revealed that, overall, changes in markups, economies of scale, and demand growth contributed positively to TFPG while the disembodied technical change was a negative contributor. Furthermore, the factors underlying the TFPG estimates are interactive and their net effects are starkly different from the conventional Solow (1957) residual TFPG measures, underscoring the need to account for Imperfect Competition, returns to scale, and demand growth in analyses of this type.
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Imperfect Competition and Total Factor Productivity Growth
Journal of Productivity Analysis, 2004Co-Authors: Azzeddine Azzam, Rigoberto A. Lopez, Elena LopezAbstract:This article examines the role of Imperfect Competition in determining total factor productivity growth (TFPG) by bringing together a New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) model and the TFPG model of Good, Nadiri and Sickles (1999). Application of the integrated model to 1973–1992 data from 29 food processing industries revealed that, overall, changes in markups, economies of scale, and demand growth contributed positively to TFPG while the disembodied technical change was a negative contributor. Furthermore, the factors underlying the TFPG estimates are interactive and their net effects are starkly different from the conventional Solow (1957) residual TFPG measures, underscoring the need to account for Imperfect Competition, returns to scale, and demand growth in analyses of this type. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004
Neale Mahoney - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Imperfect Competition in selection markets
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2017Co-Authors: Neale Mahoney, Glen E WeylAbstract:Policies to correct market power and selection can be misguided when these forces coexist. We build a model of symmetric Imperfect Competition in selection markets that parameterizes the degree of market power and selection. We use graphical price-theoretic reasoning to characterize the interaction between these forces. Using a calibrated model of health insurance, we show that the risk adjustment commonly used to offset adverse selection can reduce coverage and social surplus. Conversely, in a calibrated model of subprime auto lending, realistic levels of Competition can generate an oversupply of credit, implying that greater market power is desirable.
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Imperfect Competition in selection markets
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2014Co-Authors: Neale Mahoney, Glen E WeylAbstract:Standard policies to correct market power and selection can be misguided when these two forces co-exist. Using a calibrated model of employer-sponsored health insurance, we show that the risk adjustment commonly used by employers to offset adverse selection often reduces the amount of high-quality coverage and thus social surplus. Conversely, in a model of subprime auto lending calibrated to Einav, Jenkins and Levin (2012), realistic levels of Competition among lenders generate a significant oversupply of credit, implying greater market power is desirable. We build a model of symmetric Imperfect Competition in selection markets that parameterizes the degree of both market power and selection and use graphical price-theoretic reasoning to provide a general analysis of the interaction between selection and Imperfect Competition. We use the same logic to show that in selection markets four principles of the United States Horizontal Merger Guidelines are often reversed.
Glen E Weyl - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Imperfect Competition in selection markets
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2017Co-Authors: Neale Mahoney, Glen E WeylAbstract:Policies to correct market power and selection can be misguided when these forces coexist. We build a model of symmetric Imperfect Competition in selection markets that parameterizes the degree of market power and selection. We use graphical price-theoretic reasoning to characterize the interaction between these forces. Using a calibrated model of health insurance, we show that the risk adjustment commonly used to offset adverse selection can reduce coverage and social surplus. Conversely, in a calibrated model of subprime auto lending, realistic levels of Competition can generate an oversupply of credit, implying that greater market power is desirable.
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Imperfect Competition in selection markets
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2014Co-Authors: Neale Mahoney, Glen E WeylAbstract:Standard policies to correct market power and selection can be misguided when these two forces co-exist. Using a calibrated model of employer-sponsored health insurance, we show that the risk adjustment commonly used by employers to offset adverse selection often reduces the amount of high-quality coverage and thus social surplus. Conversely, in a model of subprime auto lending calibrated to Einav, Jenkins and Levin (2012), realistic levels of Competition among lenders generate a significant oversupply of credit, implying greater market power is desirable. We build a model of symmetric Imperfect Competition in selection markets that parameterizes the degree of both market power and selection and use graphical price-theoretic reasoning to provide a general analysis of the interaction between selection and Imperfect Competition. We use the same logic to show that in selection markets four principles of the United States Horizontal Merger Guidelines are often reversed.