The Experts below are selected from a list of 18696 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Kathryn L Shaw - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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personnel economics the economist s view of human resources
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2007Co-Authors: Edward P Lazear, Kathryn L ShawAbstract:Personnel economics drills deeply into the firm to study human resource management practices like compensation, hiring practices, training, and teamwork. Many questions are asked. Why should Pay vary across workers within firms--and how "compressed" should Pay be within firms? Should firms Pay workers for their performance on the job or for their skills or hours of work? How are Pay and promotions structured across jobs to induce optimal effort from employees? Why do firms use teams and how are teams used most effectively? How should all these human resource management practices, from Incentive Pay to teamwork, be combined within firms? Personnel economics offers new tools and new answers to these questions. In this paper, we display the tools and principles of personnel economics through a series of models aimed at addressing the questions posed above. We focus on the building blocks that form the foundation of personnel economics: the assumptions that both the worker and the firm are rational maximizing agents; that labor markets and product markets must reach some price-quantity equilibrium; that markets are efficient or that market failures have introduced inefficiencies; and that the use of econometrics and experimental techniques has advanced our ability to identify underlying causal relationships.
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personnel economics the economist s view of human resources
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2007Co-Authors: Edward P Lazear, Kathryn L ShawAbstract:Personnel economics drills deeply into the firm to study human resource management practices like compensation, hiring practices, training, and teamwork. Why should Pay vary across workers within firms -- and how "compressed" should Pay be within firms? Should firms Pay workers for their performance on the job or for their skills or hours of work? How are Pay and promotions structured across jobs to induce optimal effort from employees? Why do firms use teams and how are teams used most effectively? How should all these human resource management practices, from Incentive Pay to teamwork, be combined within firms? Personnel economists offer new tools to analyze these questions -- and new answers as well.
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beyond Incentive Pay insiders estimates of the value of complementary human resource management practices
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2003Co-Authors: Casey Ichniowski, Kathryn L ShawAbstract:Do human resource management (HRM) practices, such as Incentive Pay, teamwork, training, and careful screening practices, raise productivity, and if so, under what conditions does productivity rise? Recently, this question has been a central focus in organizational and personnel economics. We emphasize the value of a new research approach--an approach we label "insider econometrics"--that is aimed going deep inside businesses to obtain data and insights into the ways in which HRM practices affect specific production processes. We conclude that sets of complementary HRM practices appear to raise performance, but that some firms, such as those that make complex products or those that are starting up brand new facilities, benefit more from these practices.
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the effects of human resource management practices on productivity a study of steel finishing lines
The American Economic Review, 1997Co-Authors: Casey Ichniowski, Kathryn L Shaw, Giovanna PrennushiAbstract:The authors investigate the productivity effects of innovative employment practices using data from a sample of thirty-six homogeneous steel production lines owned by seventeen companies. The productivity regressions demonstrate that lines using a set of innovative work practices, which include Incentive Pay, teams, flexible job assignments, employment security, and training, achieve substantially higher levels of productivity than do lines with the more traditional approach, which includes narrow job definitions, strict work rules, and hourly Pay with close supervision. Their results are consistent with recent theoretical models which stress the importance of complementarities among work practices. Copyright 1997 by American Economic Association.
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the effects of human resource management practices on productivity
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1995Co-Authors: Kathryn L Shaw, Casey Ichniowski, Giovanna PrennushiAbstract:Increasingly, firms are considering the adoption of new work practices, such as problem-solving teams, enhanced communication with workers, employment security, flexibility in job assignments, training workers for multiple jobs, and greater reliance on Incentive Pay. This paper provides empirical evidence to address the question: do these human resource management practices improve worker productivity? For this study, we constructed our own data base through personal site visits to 26 steel plants which contained one specific steelmaking process, and collected longitudinal data with precise measures on productivity, work practices, and the technology in these production lines. The empirical results consistently support the following conclusion: the adoption of a coherent system of these new work practices, including work teams, flexible job assignments, employment security, training in multiple jobs, and extensive reliance on Incentive Pay, produces substantially higher levels of productivity than do more 'traditional' approaches involving narrow job definitions, strict work rules, and hourly Pay with close supervision. In contrast, adopting individual work practice innovations in isolation has no effect on productivity. We interpret this evidence as support for recent theoretical models which stress the importance of complementarities among a firm's work practices.
Vikram Nanda - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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tournament behavior in hedge funds high water marks fund liquidation and managerial stake
Review of Financial Studies, 2012Co-Authors: George O Aragon, Vikram NandaAbstract:We analyze whether risk shifting by a hedge fund manager is related to the manager's Incentive contract, personal capital stake, and the risk of fund closure. We find that the propensity to increase risk following poor performance is significantly weaker when Incentive Pay is tied to the fund's high-water mark and when funds face little immediate risk of liquidation. Risk shifting is also less prevalent when a manager has a significant amount of personal capital invested in the fund. Overall, high-water mark provisions, managerial stake, and low risk of fund closure appear to make a hedge fund manager more conservative with regard to risk shifting.
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on tournament behavior in hedge funds high water marks managerial horizon and the backfilling bias
Social Science Research Network, 2009Co-Authors: George O Aragon, Vikram NandaAbstract:We analyze the risk choices by hedge funds that perform poorly, relative to other funds and in absolute terms - and test predictions on the extent to which these decisions are related to the fund's Incentive contract, investment horizon and dissemination of performance information. We find that tournament behavior is more prevalent in the (backfilled) period when funds may be at an incubation stage, before they start voluntarily reporting to a database. Excluding backfilled data, we find that variance shifts depend on absolute rather than relative fund performance. Consistent with theoretical arguments, the propensity for losing funds to increase risk is significantly weaker among those that tie the manager's Incentive Pay to the fund's high-water mark - suggesting a possible benefit from such Incentive structures - and among funds that face little immediate risk of closure. Overall, the combination of factors such as reporting performance to a database, high-water mark provisions, and low risk of fund closure appear to make poorly performing funds more conservative with regard to risk-shifting.
Fei Song - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the sales agent problem effort choice under performance Pay as behavior toward risk
Social Science Research Network, 2017Co-Authors: Nick Zubanov, Charles Bram Cadsby, Fei SongAbstract:We present a model and an experiment that show, in a very general setting, that effort choice under a given linear Pay-for-performance contract depends on how the financial risk associated with the scheme interacts with effort. We find that, under a given contract, if risk increases with effort, risk-averse (loving) individuals exert less (more) effort. In contrast, when risk is independent of effort, risk preferences do not affect effort choice. Our findings complement the larger literature on selection into Incentive Pay by showing that lower effort exerted by the risk-averse under a given Incentive contract is another type of behaviour toward risk.
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the sales agent problem effort choice under performance Pay as behavior toward risk
Research Papers in Economics, 2017Co-Authors: Nick Zubanov, Charles Bram Cadsby, Fei SongAbstract:An investor's choice between safe and risky assets has long been seen as a behavior toward risk: more risk-averse investors buy more of the safe asset. Applying this intuition to Incentive Pay contracts, we develop a model and an experiment that show, in a very general setting, that the choice between work effort and leisure under given linear Incentives depends on how the attendant financial risk interacts with effort. We find that if the risk multiplies with effort, risk-averse individuals work less, whereas under additive risk effort choice is little affected by risk preferences. Our findings complement the literature on worker selection into Incentive Pay contracts by showing that lower effort of the risk-averse is another type of behavior toward risk. Our study is relevant to practice as well, since many jobs, such as commission work, feature multiplicative rather additive risk.
George O Aragon - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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tournament behavior in hedge funds high water marks fund liquidation and managerial stake
Review of Financial Studies, 2012Co-Authors: George O Aragon, Vikram NandaAbstract:We analyze whether risk shifting by a hedge fund manager is related to the manager's Incentive contract, personal capital stake, and the risk of fund closure. We find that the propensity to increase risk following poor performance is significantly weaker when Incentive Pay is tied to the fund's high-water mark and when funds face little immediate risk of liquidation. Risk shifting is also less prevalent when a manager has a significant amount of personal capital invested in the fund. Overall, high-water mark provisions, managerial stake, and low risk of fund closure appear to make a hedge fund manager more conservative with regard to risk shifting.
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on tournament behavior in hedge funds high water marks managerial horizon and the backfilling bias
Social Science Research Network, 2009Co-Authors: George O Aragon, Vikram NandaAbstract:We analyze the risk choices by hedge funds that perform poorly, relative to other funds and in absolute terms - and test predictions on the extent to which these decisions are related to the fund's Incentive contract, investment horizon and dissemination of performance information. We find that tournament behavior is more prevalent in the (backfilled) period when funds may be at an incubation stage, before they start voluntarily reporting to a database. Excluding backfilled data, we find that variance shifts depend on absolute rather than relative fund performance. Consistent with theoretical arguments, the propensity for losing funds to increase risk is significantly weaker among those that tie the manager's Incentive Pay to the fund's high-water mark - suggesting a possible benefit from such Incentive structures - and among funds that face little immediate risk of closure. Overall, the combination of factors such as reporting performance to a database, high-water mark provisions, and low risk of fund closure appear to make poorly performing funds more conservative with regard to risk-shifting.
Casey Ichniowski - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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beyond Incentive Pay insiders estimates of the value of complementary human resource management practices
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2003Co-Authors: Casey Ichniowski, Kathryn L ShawAbstract:Do human resource management (HRM) practices, such as Incentive Pay, teamwork, training, and careful screening practices, raise productivity, and if so, under what conditions does productivity rise? Recently, this question has been a central focus in organizational and personnel economics. We emphasize the value of a new research approach--an approach we label "insider econometrics"--that is aimed going deep inside businesses to obtain data and insights into the ways in which HRM practices affect specific production processes. We conclude that sets of complementary HRM practices appear to raise performance, but that some firms, such as those that make complex products or those that are starting up brand new facilities, benefit more from these practices.
-
the effects of human resource management practices on productivity a study of steel finishing lines
The American Economic Review, 1997Co-Authors: Casey Ichniowski, Kathryn L Shaw, Giovanna PrennushiAbstract:The authors investigate the productivity effects of innovative employment practices using data from a sample of thirty-six homogeneous steel production lines owned by seventeen companies. The productivity regressions demonstrate that lines using a set of innovative work practices, which include Incentive Pay, teams, flexible job assignments, employment security, and training, achieve substantially higher levels of productivity than do lines with the more traditional approach, which includes narrow job definitions, strict work rules, and hourly Pay with close supervision. Their results are consistent with recent theoretical models which stress the importance of complementarities among work practices. Copyright 1997 by American Economic Association.
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the effects of human resource management practices on productivity
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1995Co-Authors: Kathryn L Shaw, Casey Ichniowski, Giovanna PrennushiAbstract:Increasingly, firms are considering the adoption of new work practices, such as problem-solving teams, enhanced communication with workers, employment security, flexibility in job assignments, training workers for multiple jobs, and greater reliance on Incentive Pay. This paper provides empirical evidence to address the question: do these human resource management practices improve worker productivity? For this study, we constructed our own data base through personal site visits to 26 steel plants which contained one specific steelmaking process, and collected longitudinal data with precise measures on productivity, work practices, and the technology in these production lines. The empirical results consistently support the following conclusion: the adoption of a coherent system of these new work practices, including work teams, flexible job assignments, employment security, training in multiple jobs, and extensive reliance on Incentive Pay, produces substantially higher levels of productivity than do more 'traditional' approaches involving narrow job definitions, strict work rules, and hourly Pay with close supervision. In contrast, adopting individual work practice innovations in isolation has no effect on productivity. We interpret this evidence as support for recent theoretical models which stress the importance of complementarities among a firm's work practices.
