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Richard J Zeckhauser - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • enrollee mix treatment intensity and cost in competing Indemnity and hmo plans
    Research Papers in Economics, 2003
    Co-Authors: Daniel Altman, David M Cutler, Richard J Zeckhauser
    Abstract:

    Why do Indemnity insurance plans cost substantially more per capita—77% more in our study—than HMOs? We answer this question using data from a large organization’s insurance pool, covering 215,000 lives. We decompose cost differences for eight major medical conditions into four sources: demographics, incidence within demographic groups, treatment intensity, and prices per service. Greater incidence of disease in the Indemnity plan (both from demographics themselves and within demographic groups) and higher prices each explain nearly 50% of the difference. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Indemnity plans do not have greater treatment intensity.

  • enrollee mix treatment intensity and cost in competing Indemnity and hmo plans
    Social Science Research Network, 2000
    Co-Authors: Daniel Altman, David M Cutler, Richard J Zeckhauser
    Abstract:

    We examine why managed care plans are less expensive than traditional Indemnity insurance plans. Our database consists of the insurance experiences of over 200,000 state and local employees in Massachusetts and their families, who are insured in a single pool. Within this group, average HMO costs are 40 percent below those of the Indemnity plan. We evaluate cost differences for 8 conditions representing over 10 percent of total health expenditures. They are: heart attacks, cancers (breast, cervical, colon, prostate), diabetes (type I and II), and live births. For each condition, we identify the portions of the cost differential arising from differences in treatment intensity, enrollee mix, and prices paid for the same treatment. Surprisingly, treatment intensity differs hardly at all between the HMOs and the Indemnity plan. That is, relative to their fee-for-service competitor, HMOs do not curb the use of expensive treatments. Across the 8 conditions, roughly half of the HMO cost savings is due to the lower incidence of the diseases in the HMOs. Virtually all of the remaining savings come because HMOs pay lower prices for the same treatment.

Olivier Mahul - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • piloting index based livestock insurance in mongolia
    Access Finance, 2006
    Co-Authors: Olivier Mahul, Jerry R. Skees
    Abstract:

    The newsletter describes the index-based livestock insurance program in Mongolia designed in the context of a World Bank lending operation with the Government of Mongolia. It goes on in describing a livestock program for Mongolia. The newsletter summarizes how traditional individual livestock insurance (based on individual losses) was ineffective in Mongolia and how an alternative approach, which is to develop a collective system for indemnifications: Indemnity payments are based on a transparent index designed to reflect the loss incurred by the herders, can be more beneficial. The newsletter also discusses layering livestock risk, which is a combination of self-insurance, market-based insurance and social insurance and also touches on the concept of an insurance Indemnity pool. The newsletter then closes with discussion on the government's fiscal exposure, how to measure livestock mortality, basis risk for individual users, lack of insurance knowledge among herders, and the potential for fraud.

  • designing optimal crop revenue insurance
    American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2003
    Co-Authors: Olivier Mahul, Brian D Wright
    Abstract:

    When the Indemnity schedule is contingent on the farmer's price and individual yield, an optimal crop revenue insurance contract depends only on the farmer's gross revenue. However, this design is not efficient if, as is the case with available contracts, the coverage function is based on imperfect estimators of individual yield and/or price. The producer's degree of prudence and the extent of basis risks have important influences on the optimal Indemnity schedule. In this broader context, optimal protection is not provided by available U.S. crop insurance contracts and may include combinations of revenue insurance, yield insurance, futures, and options contracts.

  • designing optimal crop revenue insurance
    2000 Annual meeting July 30-August 2 Tampa FL, 2000
    Co-Authors: Olivier Mahul, Brian D Wright
    Abstract:

    The optimal crop revenue insurance contract is designed from recent developments in the theory of insurance economics under incomplete markets. The message is two-fold. Firstly, when the Indemnity schedule is contingent on individual price and individual yield, the optimal contract depends only on the individual gross revenue. Secondly, this policy is shown to fail if the Indemnity function is based on aggregate price and/or aggregate yield. A closed-form solution, in which basis risks are ignored, is proposed. It differs from actual revenue insurance programs proposed to the U.S. farmers. When insurance and capital markets are unbiased, it can be replicated with existing crop yield and revenue insurance policies and hedging contracts if the decision variables are not constrained. The impact of yield and price basis risks on the form of the optimal crop revenue insurance contract is examined and a closed-form solution is derived.

  • optimum area yield crop insurance
    American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1999
    Co-Authors: Olivier Mahul
    Abstract:

    This article considers the problem of the optimal design of crop insurance when the Indemnity is based upon the aggregate yield of a surrounding area. The optimal area yield crop insurance contract depends on the individual beta coefficient which measures the sensitivity of farm yield to area yield. Indemnity payments are made whenever the realized area yield is lower (higher) than a critical yield if the beta coefficient is positive (negative). The optimal contract contains a “disappearing deductible” if the beta coefficient is higher than unity. Copyright 1999, Oxford University Press.

Berber Kramer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • from index to Indemnity insurance using digital technology demand for picture based crop insurance
    Social Science Research Network, 2019
    Co-Authors: Francisco Ceballos, Berber Kramer
    Abstract:

    Production risk is pervasive in agriculture, yet smallholder farmers lack access to quality insurance. This is due to asymmetric information in markets for Indemnity insurance, and high basis risk, limited trust, and poor understanding of index-based insurance. Digital technologies can help overcome these challenges by improving crop monitoring and yield prediction, allowing insurers to provide products that move towards Indemnity insurance. Although this can potentially improve demand, it also comes at the risk of introducing adverse selection. We analyze this trade-off by eliciting willingness to pay for both index-based insurance and picture-based insurance (PBI) for visible crop damage through incentivized auctions with smallholder farmers in northwestern India. Participants reveal a higher willingness to pay for PBI than for index-based coverage. Although at commercial rates, demand remains low for either product, PBI improves demand at the subsidized premium levels maintained by India’s national insurance scheme. Moreover, we find no evidence of adverse selection. We conclude that digital technologies can facilitate a shift from index-based insurance to Indemnity insurance. By reducing basis risk and strengthening trust and understanding, this can improve demand for crop insurance.

William J Oetgen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • characteristics of medical professional liability claims against dermatologists data from 2704 closed claims in a voluntary registry
    Journal of The American Academy of Dermatology, 2012
    Co-Authors: Alan N Moshell, Parul Divya Parikh, William J Oetgen
    Abstract:

    Background The Physician Insurers Association of America established a voluntary registry in 1985 that contains 239,756 closed claims. The registry is maintained for educational programs to reduce patient injury and medical professional liability (MPL) claims. Objective This report provides a description of MPL claims against dermatologists. Methods Descriptive techniques are used to present summary information for the dermatologic claims in the registry. Results Of 239,756 closed claims, 2704 (1.1%) involve dermatologists. Of the 2704 closed claims, 775 (28.7%) resulted in an average Indemnity payment of $137,538. The most common allegation was improper procedure performance. The most prevalent procedure was operative procedures on the skin. Error in diagnosis was the next most common allegation. The most common diagnosis was malignant melanoma. Malignant melanoma claims were paid in 42.2% of cases with an average Indemnity payment of $436,843. Limitations The data are subject to selection and reporting biases. In addition, the registry does not contain exposure data, so incidences and prevalences are not calculable. Conclusions MPL issues are important to all practicing dermatologists. The most common allegation against dermatologists in this study was improper performance of operative procedures on the skin, excluding skin grafts. Error in diagnosis of malignant melanoma was the next most common allegation. Malignant melanoma claims were paid in 42.2% of cases with an average Indemnity payment of $436,843. By focusing on the risk management of these procedures and this diagnosis, dermatologists can have the largest impact on reducing patient injuries and consequent MPL claims.

  • characteristics of medical professional liability claims in patients with cardiovascular diseases
    American Journal of Cardiology, 2010
    Co-Authors: William J Oetgen, Divya P Parikh, Joseph G Cacchione, Paul N Casale, James T Dove, John Gordon Harold, Brenda L Hindle, Michael Maglaras, George P Rodgers, Janet S Wright
    Abstract:

    This report presents data describing a large cohort of closed cardiovascular medical professional liability (MPL) claims. The Physician Insurers Association of America established a registry of closed MPL claims in 1985. This registry contains data describing 230,624 closed claims for 28 medical specialties through 2007. The registry is maintained to support educational programs designed to improve the quality of care and to reduce patient injury and MPL claims. In this report, descriptive techniques are used to present summary information for the medical cardiovascular claims in the registry. Of 230,624 closed claims, 4,248 (1.8%) involved cardiovascular medical physicians. Of the 4,248 closed cardiovascular medical claims, 770 (18%) resulted in Indemnity payments, and the average Indemnity payment was $248,291. In the entire database, 30% of closed claims were paid, and the average Indemnity payment was $204,268. The most common allegation among cardiovascular closed claims was diagnostic error, and the most prevalent diagnosis was coronary atherosclerosis. Claims involving cardiac catheterization and coronary angioplasty represented 12% and 7% of the cardiovascular closed claims. Aortic aneurysms and dissections, although relatively infrequent as clinical events, represent a substantial MPL risk because of the high percentage of paid claims (30%) and the very high average Indemnity payment of $417,298. In conclusion, MPL issues are common and are important to all practicing cardiologists. Detailed knowledge of risks associated with liability claims should assist practicing cardiologists in improving the quality of care, reducing patient injury, and reducing the incidence of claims.

David M Cutler - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • enrollee mix treatment intensity and cost in competing Indemnity and hmo plans
    Research Papers in Economics, 2003
    Co-Authors: Daniel Altman, David M Cutler, Richard J Zeckhauser
    Abstract:

    Why do Indemnity insurance plans cost substantially more per capita—77% more in our study—than HMOs? We answer this question using data from a large organization’s insurance pool, covering 215,000 lives. We decompose cost differences for eight major medical conditions into four sources: demographics, incidence within demographic groups, treatment intensity, and prices per service. Greater incidence of disease in the Indemnity plan (both from demographics themselves and within demographic groups) and higher prices each explain nearly 50% of the difference. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Indemnity plans do not have greater treatment intensity.

  • enrollee mix treatment intensity and cost in competing Indemnity and hmo plans
    Social Science Research Network, 2000
    Co-Authors: Daniel Altman, David M Cutler, Richard J Zeckhauser
    Abstract:

    We examine why managed care plans are less expensive than traditional Indemnity insurance plans. Our database consists of the insurance experiences of over 200,000 state and local employees in Massachusetts and their families, who are insured in a single pool. Within this group, average HMO costs are 40 percent below those of the Indemnity plan. We evaluate cost differences for 8 conditions representing over 10 percent of total health expenditures. They are: heart attacks, cancers (breast, cervical, colon, prostate), diabetes (type I and II), and live births. For each condition, we identify the portions of the cost differential arising from differences in treatment intensity, enrollee mix, and prices paid for the same treatment. Surprisingly, treatment intensity differs hardly at all between the HMOs and the Indemnity plan. That is, relative to their fee-for-service competitor, HMOs do not curb the use of expensive treatments. Across the 8 conditions, roughly half of the HMO cost savings is due to the lower incidence of the diseases in the HMOs. Virtually all of the remaining savings come because HMOs pay lower prices for the same treatment.