Indeterminism

14,000,000 Leading Edge Experts on the ideXlab platform

Scan Science and Technology

Contact Leading Edge Experts & Companies

Scan Science and Technology

Contact Leading Edge Experts & Companies

The Experts below are selected from a list of 312 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Thomas Muller - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • A Stochastic Process Model for Free Agency under Indeterminism.
    Dialectica (Bern Switzerland), 2018
    Co-Authors: Thomas Muller, Hans J. Briegel
    Abstract:

    The aim of this paper is to establish that free agency, which is a capacity of many animals including human beings, is compatible with Indeterminism: An indeterministic world allows for the existence of free agency. The question of the compatibility of free agency and Indeterminism is less discussed than its mirror image, the question of the compatibility of free agency and determinism. It is, however, of great importance for our self-conception as free agents in our (arguably) indeterministic world. We begin by explicating the notions of Indeterminism and free agency and by clarifying the interrelation of free agency and the human-specific notion of free will. We then situate our claim of the compatibility of free agency and Indeterminism precisely in the landscape of the current debate on freedom and determinism, exposing an unhappy asymmetry in that debate. Then we proceed to make our case by describing the mathematically precise, physically motivated model of projective simulation, which employs Indeterminism as a central resource for agency modeling. Projective simulation was recently developed as an AI framework for flexible learning agents (Briegel and De las Cuevas, Scientific Reports 2:400, 2012). We argue that an indeterministic process of deliberation modeled by the dynamics of projective simulation can exemplify free agency under Indeterminism, thereby establishing our compatibility claim: Free agency can develop and thrive in an indeterministic world.

  • Indeterminism and persistence
    Philosophia Naturalis, 2012
    Co-Authors: Thomas Muller
    Abstract:

    This paper aims at bringing together two debates in metaphysics that so far have been kept separate: the debate about determinism vs. Indeterminism as de re modality on the one hand, and the debate about persistence on the other hand. Both debates significantly involve talk of things. We will show that working out a proper semantics for singular terms and an accompanying theory of things, motivated by considerations of quantified modal logic, can significantly further the persistence debate. We will use our semantic framework to give an argument in support of the endurantist (3-dimensionalist) position as the best theory of persistence.

  • Towards a Theory of Limited Indeterminism in Branching Space-times
    Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2010
    Co-Authors: Thomas Muller
    Abstract:

    Branching space-times (BST; Belnap, Synthese 92:385-434, 1992) is the most advanced formal framework for representing Indeterminism. BST is however based on continuous partial orderings, while our natural way of describing indeterministic scenarios may be called discrete. This paper establishes a theorem providing a discrete data format for BST: it is proved that a discrete representation of indeterministic scenarios leading to BST models is possible in an important subclass of cases. This result enables the representation of limited Indeterminism in BST and hopefully paves the way for the representation of substances with capacities in that framework.

  • eliminating modality from the determinism debate models vs equations of physical theories
    International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium, 2009
    Co-Authors: Thomas Muller
    Abstract:

    This paper addresses a specific question of reductionism, viz., the question of whether modalities are basic for the notions of determinism and Indeterminism, or whether one can do without them. I will argue that the current treatment of these notions within philosophy of science, which takes determinism and Indeterminism to be properties of scientific theories rather than metaphysical theses about what the world is like, amounts to a reductionist stance with respect to modality for which no good reasons have been given. Furthermore, I will show that the current implementation of that treatment is not without problems: there is a discrepancy between the official definition of determinism and Indeterminism, phrased in terms of the ‘modally flat’ collection of models of a theory, and the practice of assessing determinism by looking at the possibly branching space of solutions to a theory’s constitutive equations, which moves that practice much closer to a pro-modality stance. Apart from commenting on use of models vs. equations in the determinism debate within philosophy of science, my paper is also an attempt at getting clear on the proper dialectics of the question of modal reductionism. I will thus also lay out my view as to how determinism and Indeterminism or other modal notions should be addressed.

John Earman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Marcel Weber - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Indeterminism in Neurobiology
    Philosophy of Science, 2007
    Co-Authors: Marcel Weber
    Abstract:

    I examine different arguments that could be used to establish Indeterminism of neurological processes. Even though scenarios where single events at the molecular level make the difference in the outcome of such processes are realistic, this falls short of establishing Indeterminism, because it is not clear that these molecular events are subject to quantum mechanical uncertainty. Furthermore, attempts to argue for Indeterminism autonomously (i.e., independently of quantum mechanics) fail, because both deterministic and indeterministic models can account for the empirically observed behavior of ion channels.

  • Indeterminism in Neurobiology: Some Good and Some Bad News
    2004
    Co-Authors: Marcel Weber
    Abstract:

    I examine some philosophical arguments as well as current empirical research in molecular neurobiology in order to throw some new light on the question of whether neurological processes are deterministic or indeterministic. I begin by showing that the idea of an autonomous biological Indeterminism violates the principle of the supervenience of biological properties on physical properties. If supervenience is accepted, quantum mechanics is the only hope for the neuro-indeterminist. But this would require that indeterministic quantum-mechanical effects play a role in the functioning of the nervous system. I examine several candidates of molecular processes where this could, in theory, be the case. It turns out that there is good news from recent work on ion channels. Unfortunately (for the indeterminist), this good news is neutralised at once by bad news.

Galen Strawson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the unhelpfulness of Indeterminism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2000
    Co-Authors: Galen Strawson
    Abstract:

    "Man himself' according to Immanuel Kant, "must make or have made himself into whatever, in a moral sense, whether good or evil, he is to become. Either condition must be an effect of his free choice; for otherwise he could not be held responsible for it and could therefore be morally neither good nor evil." Robert Kane agrees-he agrees that there is an inescapable sense in which true or "ultimate" moral responsibility requires a kind of self-creation. So do I: if you think about what the ordinary, strong notion of moral responsibility involves, you are forced to this conclusion. There are many ingenious compatibilist accounts of freedom and responsibility, but they cannot touch this fact.

John D. Norton - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Comments on Laraudogoitia's 'classical particle dynamics, Indeterminism and a supertask'
    The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1998
    Co-Authors: John Earman, John D. Norton
    Abstract:

    We discuss two supertasks invented recently by Laraudogoitia [1996, 1997]. Both involve an infinite number of particle collisions within a finite amount of time and both compromise determinism. We point out that the sources of the Indeterminism are rather different in the two cases—one involves unbounded particle velocities, the other involves particles with no lower bound to their sizes—and consequently that the implications for determinism are rather different—one form of Indeterminism affects Newtonian but not relativistic physics, while the other form is insensitive to the classical vs relativistic distinction. We also note some interesting linkages among supertasks, Indeterminism and foundations problems in the general theory of relativity.