The Experts below are selected from a list of 39474 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Marius Florin Niculescu - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the double edged sword of backward compatibility the adoption of multigenerational platforms in the presence of intergenerational services
2016Co-Authors: Ilhorn Hann, Byungwan Koh, Marius Florin NiculescuAbstract:We investigate the impact of the intergenerational nature of services, via backward compatibility, on the adoption of multigenerational platforms. We consider a mobile Internet platform that has evolved over several generations and for which users download complementary services from third-party providers. These services are often intergenerational: newer platform generations are backward compatible with respect to services released under earlier generation platforms. In this paper, we propose a model to identify the main drivers of consumers’ choice of platform generation, accounting for (i) the migration from older to newer platform generations, (ii) the Indirect Network effect on platform adoption due to same-generation services, and (iii) the effect on platform adoption due to the consumption of intergenerational services via backward compatibility. Using data on mobile Internet platform adoption and services consumption for the time period of 2001–2007 from a major wireless carrier in an Asian countr...
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the double edged sword of backward compatibility the adoption of multi generational platforms in the presence of intergenerational services
2016Co-Authors: Ilhorn Hann, Byungwan Koh, Marius Florin NiculescuAbstract:We investigate the impact of the intergenerational nature of services, via backward compatibility, on the adoption of multi-generational platforms. We consider a mobile Internet platform that has evolved over several generations and for which users download complementary services from third party providers. These services are often intergenerational: newer platform generations are backward compatible with respect to services released under earlier generation platforms. In this paper, we propose a model to identify the main drivers of consumers’ choice of platform generation, accounting for (i) the migration from older to newer platform generations, (ii) the Indirect Network effect on platform adoption due to same-generation services, and (iii) the effect on platform adoption due to the consumption of intergenerational services via backward compatibility. Using data on mobile Internet platform adoption and services consumption for the time period of 2001-2007 from a major wireless carrier in an Asian country, we estimate the three effects noted above. We show that both the migration from older to newer platform generations and the Indirect Network effects are significant. The surprising finding is that intergenerational services that connect subsequent generations of platforms essentially engender backward compatibility with two opposing effects. While an intergenerational service may accelerate the migration to the subsequent platform generations, it may also, perhaps unintentionally, provide a fresh lease on life for earlier generation platforms due to the continued use of earlier generation services on newer platform generations.
Ilhorn Hann - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the double edged sword of backward compatibility the adoption of multigenerational platforms in the presence of intergenerational services
2016Co-Authors: Ilhorn Hann, Byungwan Koh, Marius Florin NiculescuAbstract:We investigate the impact of the intergenerational nature of services, via backward compatibility, on the adoption of multigenerational platforms. We consider a mobile Internet platform that has evolved over several generations and for which users download complementary services from third-party providers. These services are often intergenerational: newer platform generations are backward compatible with respect to services released under earlier generation platforms. In this paper, we propose a model to identify the main drivers of consumers’ choice of platform generation, accounting for (i) the migration from older to newer platform generations, (ii) the Indirect Network effect on platform adoption due to same-generation services, and (iii) the effect on platform adoption due to the consumption of intergenerational services via backward compatibility. Using data on mobile Internet platform adoption and services consumption for the time period of 2001–2007 from a major wireless carrier in an Asian countr...
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the double edged sword of backward compatibility the adoption of multi generational platforms in the presence of intergenerational services
2016Co-Authors: Ilhorn Hann, Byungwan Koh, Marius Florin NiculescuAbstract:We investigate the impact of the intergenerational nature of services, via backward compatibility, on the adoption of multi-generational platforms. We consider a mobile Internet platform that has evolved over several generations and for which users download complementary services from third party providers. These services are often intergenerational: newer platform generations are backward compatible with respect to services released under earlier generation platforms. In this paper, we propose a model to identify the main drivers of consumers’ choice of platform generation, accounting for (i) the migration from older to newer platform generations, (ii) the Indirect Network effect on platform adoption due to same-generation services, and (iii) the effect on platform adoption due to the consumption of intergenerational services via backward compatibility. Using data on mobile Internet platform adoption and services consumption for the time period of 2001-2007 from a major wireless carrier in an Asian country, we estimate the three effects noted above. We show that both the migration from older to newer platform generations and the Indirect Network effects are significant. The surprising finding is that intergenerational services that connect subsequent generations of platforms essentially engender backward compatibility with two opposing effects. While an intergenerational service may accelerate the migration to the subsequent platform generations, it may also, perhaps unintentionally, provide a fresh lease on life for earlier generation platforms due to the continued use of earlier generation services on newer platform generations.
Byungwan Koh - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the double edged sword of backward compatibility the adoption of multigenerational platforms in the presence of intergenerational services
2016Co-Authors: Ilhorn Hann, Byungwan Koh, Marius Florin NiculescuAbstract:We investigate the impact of the intergenerational nature of services, via backward compatibility, on the adoption of multigenerational platforms. We consider a mobile Internet platform that has evolved over several generations and for which users download complementary services from third-party providers. These services are often intergenerational: newer platform generations are backward compatible with respect to services released under earlier generation platforms. In this paper, we propose a model to identify the main drivers of consumers’ choice of platform generation, accounting for (i) the migration from older to newer platform generations, (ii) the Indirect Network effect on platform adoption due to same-generation services, and (iii) the effect on platform adoption due to the consumption of intergenerational services via backward compatibility. Using data on mobile Internet platform adoption and services consumption for the time period of 2001–2007 from a major wireless carrier in an Asian countr...
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the double edged sword of backward compatibility the adoption of multi generational platforms in the presence of intergenerational services
2016Co-Authors: Ilhorn Hann, Byungwan Koh, Marius Florin NiculescuAbstract:We investigate the impact of the intergenerational nature of services, via backward compatibility, on the adoption of multi-generational platforms. We consider a mobile Internet platform that has evolved over several generations and for which users download complementary services from third party providers. These services are often intergenerational: newer platform generations are backward compatible with respect to services released under earlier generation platforms. In this paper, we propose a model to identify the main drivers of consumers’ choice of platform generation, accounting for (i) the migration from older to newer platform generations, (ii) the Indirect Network effect on platform adoption due to same-generation services, and (iii) the effect on platform adoption due to the consumption of intergenerational services via backward compatibility. Using data on mobile Internet platform adoption and services consumption for the time period of 2001-2007 from a major wireless carrier in an Asian country, we estimate the three effects noted above. We show that both the migration from older to newer platform generations and the Indirect Network effects are significant. The surprising finding is that intergenerational services that connect subsequent generations of platforms essentially engender backward compatibility with two opposing effects. While an intergenerational service may accelerate the migration to the subsequent platform generations, it may also, perhaps unintentionally, provide a fresh lease on life for earlier generation platforms due to the continued use of earlier generation services on newer platform generations.
Brian V Viard - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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pricing of complementary goods and Network effects
2005Co-Authors: Nicholas Economides, Brian V ViardAbstract:We discuss the case of a monopolist of a base good in the presence of a complementary good provided either by it or by another firm. We assess and calibrate the extent of the influence on the profits from the base good that is created by the existence of the complementary good, i.e., the extent of the Network effect. We establish an equivalence between a model of a base and a complementary good and a reduced-form model of the base good in which Network effects are assumed in the consumers utility functions as a surrogate for the presence of direct or Indirect Network effects, such as complementary goods produced by other firms. We also assess and calibrate the influence on profits of the intensity of Network effects and quality improvements in both goods. We evaluate the incentive that a monopolist of the base good has to improve its quality rather than that of the complementary good under different market structures. Finally, based on our results, we discuss a possible explanation of the fact that Microsoft Office has a significantly higher price than Microsoft Windows although both products have comparable market shares.
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pricing of complementary goods and Network effects
2004Co-Authors: Brian V Viard, Nicholas EconomidesAbstract:We discuss the case of a monopolist of a base good in the presence of a complementary good provided either by it or by another firm. We assess and calibrate the extent of the influence of the profits from the base good that is created by the existence of complementary good, i.e., the extent of the Network effect. We establish an equivalence between a model of a base and a complementary good and a reduced-form model of the base good in which Network effects are assumed in the consumers' utility functions as a surrogate for the presence of direct or Indirect Network effects, such as complementary goods produced by other firms. We also assess and calibrate the influence on profits of the intensity of Network effects and quality improvements in both goods. We evaluate the incentive that a monopolist of the base good has to improve its quality rather than that of the complementary good under different market structures. Finally, based on our results, we discuss a possible explanation of the fact that Microsoft Office has a significantly higher price that Microsoft Windows although both products have comparable market shares.
Nicholas Economides - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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pricing of complementary goods and Network effects
2005Co-Authors: Nicholas Economides, Brian V ViardAbstract:We discuss the case of a monopolist of a base good in the presence of a complementary good provided either by it or by another firm. We assess and calibrate the extent of the influence on the profits from the base good that is created by the existence of the complementary good, i.e., the extent of the Network effect. We establish an equivalence between a model of a base and a complementary good and a reduced-form model of the base good in which Network effects are assumed in the consumers utility functions as a surrogate for the presence of direct or Indirect Network effects, such as complementary goods produced by other firms. We also assess and calibrate the influence on profits of the intensity of Network effects and quality improvements in both goods. We evaluate the incentive that a monopolist of the base good has to improve its quality rather than that of the complementary good under different market structures. Finally, based on our results, we discuss a possible explanation of the fact that Microsoft Office has a significantly higher price than Microsoft Windows although both products have comparable market shares.
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pricing of complementary goods and Network effects
2004Co-Authors: Brian V Viard, Nicholas EconomidesAbstract:We discuss the case of a monopolist of a base good in the presence of a complementary good provided either by it or by another firm. We assess and calibrate the extent of the influence of the profits from the base good that is created by the existence of complementary good, i.e., the extent of the Network effect. We establish an equivalence between a model of a base and a complementary good and a reduced-form model of the base good in which Network effects are assumed in the consumers' utility functions as a surrogate for the presence of direct or Indirect Network effects, such as complementary goods produced by other firms. We also assess and calibrate the influence on profits of the intensity of Network effects and quality improvements in both goods. We evaluate the incentive that a monopolist of the base good has to improve its quality rather than that of the complementary good under different market structures. Finally, based on our results, we discuss a possible explanation of the fact that Microsoft Office has a significantly higher price that Microsoft Windows although both products have comparable market shares.
