The Experts below are selected from a list of 312 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Shiro Handa - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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RWS - Evaluation of Information Leak by robustness evaluation of countermeasure to disguised CSI in PLNC considering physical layer security
2015 IEEE Radio and Wireless Symposium (RWS), 2015Co-Authors: Kengo Matsumoto, Tomoaki Ohtsuki, Fumihito Sasamori, Osamu Takyu, Takeo Fujii, Shiro HandaAbstract:In Physical Layer Network Coding (PLNC), the two Information sources access to the relay station, simultaneously and thus the transmitted signals are combined, together. Since the relay station hardly decodes each Information single, the security for avoiding the Information Leak to the relay station is maintained. Therefore, the PLNC is attracting much attention in terms of physical layer security (PLS). However, the Information source needs the transmit power control based on the channel state Information (CSI). If the relay station is untrusted, it camouflages the real CSI for stealing the Information. This paper considers the camouflaging of CSI is modeled as the liner programming problem in the subject to the statistic of CSI following the model of propagation. We clarify the maximal capacity of tapping by the relay station.
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Evaluation of Information Leak by robustness evaluation of countermeasure to disguised CSI in PLNC considering physical layer security
2015 IEEE Radio and Wireless Symposium (RWS), 2015Co-Authors: Kengo Matsumoto, Tomoaki Ohtsuki, Fumihito Sasamori, Osamu Takyu, Takeo Fujii, Shiro HandaAbstract:In Physical Layer Network Coding (PLNC), the two Information sources access to the relay station, simultaneously and thus the transmitted signals are combined, together. Since the relay station hardly decodes each Information single, the security for avoiding the Information Leak to the relay station is maintained. Therefore, the PLNC is attracting much attention in terms of physical layer security (PLS). However, the Information source needs the transmit power control based on the channel state Information (CSI). If the relay station is untrusted, it camouflages the real CSI for stealing the Information. This paper considers the camouflaging of CSI is modeled as the liner programming problem in the subject to the statistic of CSI following the model of propagation. We clarify the maximal capacity of tapping by the relay station.
Hideki Yoshioka - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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development of transcoder in conjunction with video watermarking to deter Information Leak
Distributed Computing and Artificial Intelligence, 2010Co-Authors: Takaaki Yamada, Katsuhiko Takashima, Hideki YoshiokaAbstract:A transcoder incorporating video watermarking method has been developed. This paper reports the implementation and evaluation of the system. Visibility testing showed that degradation in the quality of the watermarked images was almost imperceptible. Robustness testing showed that the embedded watermarks were robust against re-encoding with scaling. Process-time testing showed that the total processing time is increasing by 17%. Use of this system should help in deterring Information Leak in viewed and distributed video content.
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DCAI - Development of Transcoder in Conjunction with Video Watermarking to Deter Information Leak
Advances in Intelligent and Soft Computing, 2010Co-Authors: Takaaki Yamada, Katsuhiko Takashima, Hideki YoshiokaAbstract:A transcoder incorporating video watermarking method has been developed. This paper reports the implementation and evaluation of the system. Visibility testing showed that degradation in the quality of the watermarked images was almost imperceptible. Robustness testing showed that the embedded watermarks were robust against re-encoding with scaling. Process-time testing showed that the total processing time is increasing by 17%. Use of this system should help in deterring Information Leak in viewed and distributed video content.
Kengo Matsumoto - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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RWS - Evaluation of Information Leak by robustness evaluation of countermeasure to disguised CSI in PLNC considering physical layer security
2015 IEEE Radio and Wireless Symposium (RWS), 2015Co-Authors: Kengo Matsumoto, Tomoaki Ohtsuki, Fumihito Sasamori, Osamu Takyu, Takeo Fujii, Shiro HandaAbstract:In Physical Layer Network Coding (PLNC), the two Information sources access to the relay station, simultaneously and thus the transmitted signals are combined, together. Since the relay station hardly decodes each Information single, the security for avoiding the Information Leak to the relay station is maintained. Therefore, the PLNC is attracting much attention in terms of physical layer security (PLS). However, the Information source needs the transmit power control based on the channel state Information (CSI). If the relay station is untrusted, it camouflages the real CSI for stealing the Information. This paper considers the camouflaging of CSI is modeled as the liner programming problem in the subject to the statistic of CSI following the model of propagation. We clarify the maximal capacity of tapping by the relay station.
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Evaluation of Information Leak by robustness evaluation of countermeasure to disguised CSI in PLNC considering physical layer security
2015 IEEE Radio and Wireless Symposium (RWS), 2015Co-Authors: Kengo Matsumoto, Tomoaki Ohtsuki, Fumihito Sasamori, Osamu Takyu, Takeo Fujii, Shiro HandaAbstract:In Physical Layer Network Coding (PLNC), the two Information sources access to the relay station, simultaneously and thus the transmitted signals are combined, together. Since the relay station hardly decodes each Information single, the security for avoiding the Information Leak to the relay station is maintained. Therefore, the PLNC is attracting much attention in terms of physical layer security (PLS). However, the Information source needs the transmit power control based on the channel state Information (CSI). If the relay station is untrusted, it camouflages the real CSI for stealing the Information. This paper considers the camouflaging of CSI is modeled as the liner programming problem in the subject to the statistic of CSI following the model of propagation. We clarify the maximal capacity of tapping by the relay station.
Andreas Zeller - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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MEMOCODE - Quantifying the Information Leak in cache attacks via symbolic execution
Proceedings of the 15th ACM-IEEE International Conference on Formal Methods and Models for System Design, 2017Co-Authors: Sudipta Chattopadhyay, Moritz Beck, Ahmed Rezine, Andreas ZellerAbstract:Cache timing attacks allow attackers to infer the properties of a secret execution by observing cache hits and misses. But how much Information can actually Leak through such attacks? For a given program, a cache model, and an input, our CHALICE framework leverages symbolic execution to compute the amount of Information that can possibly Leak through cache attacks. At the core of CHALICE is a novel approach to quantify Information Leak that can highlight critical cache side-channel Leaks on arbitrary binary code. In our evaluation on real-world programs from OpenSSL and Linux GDK libraries, CHALICE effectively quantifies Information Leaks: For an AES-128 implementation on Linux, for instance, CHALICE finds that a cache attack can Leak as much as 127 out of 128 bits of the encryption key.
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quantifying the Information Leak in cache attacks via symbolic execution
Formal Methods, 2017Co-Authors: Sudipta Chattopadhyay, Moritz Beck, Ahmed Rezine, Andreas ZellerAbstract:Cache timing attacks allow attackers to infer the properties of a secret execution by observing cache hits and misses. But how much Information can actually Leak through such attacks? For a given program, a cache model, and an input, our CHALICE framework leverages symbolic execution to compute the amount of Information that can possibly Leak through cache attacks. At the core of CHALICE is a novel approach to quantify Information Leak that can highlight critical cache side-channel Leaks on arbitrary binary code. In our evaluation on real-world programs from OpenSSL and Linux GDK libraries, CHALICE effectively quantifies Information Leaks: For an AES-128 implementation on Linux, for instance, CHALICE finds that a cache attack can Leak as much as 127 out of 128 bits of the encryption key.
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Quantifying the Information Leak in Cache Attacks through Symbolic Execution
arXiv: Cryptography and Security, 2016Co-Authors: Sudipta Chattopadhyay, Moritz Beck, Ahmed Rezine, Andreas ZellerAbstract:Cache timing attacks allow attackers to infer the properties of a secret execution by observing cache hits and misses. But how much Information can actually Leak through such attacks? For a given program, a cache model, and an input, our CHALICE framework leverages symbolic execution to compute the amount of Information that can possibly Leak through cache attacks. At the core of CHALICE is a novel approach to quantify Information Leak that can highlight critical cache side-channel Leaks on arbitrary binary code. In our evaluation on real-world programs from OpenSSL and Linux GDK libraries, CHALICE effectively quantifies Information Leaks: For an AES-128 implementation on Linux, for instance, CHALICE finds that a cache attack can Leak as much as 127 out of 128 bits of the encryption key.
Tomoaki Ohtsuki - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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RWS - Evaluation of Information Leak by robustness evaluation of countermeasure to disguised CSI in PLNC considering physical layer security
2015 IEEE Radio and Wireless Symposium (RWS), 2015Co-Authors: Kengo Matsumoto, Tomoaki Ohtsuki, Fumihito Sasamori, Osamu Takyu, Takeo Fujii, Shiro HandaAbstract:In Physical Layer Network Coding (PLNC), the two Information sources access to the relay station, simultaneously and thus the transmitted signals are combined, together. Since the relay station hardly decodes each Information single, the security for avoiding the Information Leak to the relay station is maintained. Therefore, the PLNC is attracting much attention in terms of physical layer security (PLS). However, the Information source needs the transmit power control based on the channel state Information (CSI). If the relay station is untrusted, it camouflages the real CSI for stealing the Information. This paper considers the camouflaging of CSI is modeled as the liner programming problem in the subject to the statistic of CSI following the model of propagation. We clarify the maximal capacity of tapping by the relay station.
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Evaluation of Information Leak by robustness evaluation of countermeasure to disguised CSI in PLNC considering physical layer security
2015 IEEE Radio and Wireless Symposium (RWS), 2015Co-Authors: Kengo Matsumoto, Tomoaki Ohtsuki, Fumihito Sasamori, Osamu Takyu, Takeo Fujii, Shiro HandaAbstract:In Physical Layer Network Coding (PLNC), the two Information sources access to the relay station, simultaneously and thus the transmitted signals are combined, together. Since the relay station hardly decodes each Information single, the security for avoiding the Information Leak to the relay station is maintained. Therefore, the PLNC is attracting much attention in terms of physical layer security (PLS). However, the Information source needs the transmit power control based on the channel state Information (CSI). If the relay station is untrusted, it camouflages the real CSI for stealing the Information. This paper considers the camouflaging of CSI is modeled as the liner programming problem in the subject to the statistic of CSI following the model of propagation. We clarify the maximal capacity of tapping by the relay station.