The Experts below are selected from a list of 16275 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Mark Schelker - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • fiscal decentralization efficiency vs redistribution an Institutional Feature to resolve the trade off
    2005
    Co-Authors: Mark Schelker
    Abstract:

    Fiscal decentralization leads to a more efficient allocation of public fund and restricts the government to exploit the tax base. However, standard theory also suggests strong negative distributional effects and thus, centralized redistribution is proposed. This trade-off between efficiency and distribution is well established. For the case of decentralized taxation we suggest that a simple Institutional Feature - the separation of the decision to set the rate of progression from the decision to set the 'level' of taxation - can mitigate this trade-off. Our analysis focuses on decentralized taxation in Switzerland, where this simple mechanism is at work for already a long time. We estimate the influence of varying degrees of decentralization on the general 'level' as well as the structure of decentralized income taxes. Our empirical results indicate that more decentralized jurisdictions Feature generally lower income taxes and impose higher rates of progression.

Sean D Ehrlich - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • access to protection domestic institutions and trade policy in democracies
    2007
    Co-Authors: Sean D Ehrlich
    Abstract:

    Previous Institutional explanations of trade policy have focused on the role of proportional representation on the promotion of free trade. This explanation generates numerous unsolved anomalies and provides limited guidance in explaining the difference between proportional representation countries and between majoritarian countries as well as within-country variation in trade policy. This article introduces a more general Institutional theory that argues that the number of access points provided by institutions is the crucial Institutional Feature, as increasing the number of access points makes lobbying less costly, which benefits protectionists. From this, I hypothesize that the number of parties in government, the number of electoral districts, the nature of the vote, and other such institutions affect the level of protection and that, once these factors are controlled for, proportional representation has no impact on trade policy. I test this theory on tariff data in the post–World War II developed democracies and find broad support for these hypotheses.This article was previously presented at the 2004 Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association. I would like to thank Alan Deardorff, Rob Franzese, Matt Golder, Mike Hanmer, Jude Hays, Cherie Maestas, Corrine McConnaughy, Will Moore, James D. Morrow, Won-Ho Park, and Jeff Staton for advice and comments and Yoshi Ono for excellent research assistance. All errors, of course, remain my own.

Tat Yan Kong - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • globalization and labour market reform patterns of response in northeast asia
    2006
    Co-Authors: Tat Yan Kong
    Abstract:

    The ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature identifies the labour market and labour relations system as an Institutional Feature by which liberal market economies (LMEs) and co-ordinated market economies (CMEs) of advanced countries may be distinguished. This literature argues for the resilience of CME Institutional Features to the allegedly convergence-inducing or homogenizing effects of globalization. Resilience to convergence has also revealed different patterns of Institutional adaptation to globalizing pressures among CMEs. This article examines the adaptation of labour institutions to globalization using the Northeast Asian Newly Industrialized Countries of South Korea (hereafter Korea) and Taiwan as case studies. Examples are given of how Korea and Taiwan have pursued labour market liberalization, but within Institutional conditions (policies and politics) distinct from those associated with transitions to the LME. The origins of this distinctive pattern of response are explained, pointing out the need for explanations based on globalization to be supplemented by ones that emphasize economic legacies and political logics.

Nadiia Kuharuk - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the influence of the Institutional Feature of the central bank on the economic development of the country
    2015
    Co-Authors: Tetiana Girchenko, Olha Vovchak, Nadiia Kuharuk
    Abstract:

    © Tetiana Girchenko, Olha Vovchak, Nadiia Kuharuk Тетяна Гірченко, к.е.н., доцент Tetiana Girchenko, PhD (Economics), Associate Professor Інститут магістерської та післядипломної освіти Університету банківської справи Національного банку України (м. Київ), Київ, Україна Institute of Master and Postgraduate Education of the University of Banking of the National Bank of Ukraine (city of Kyiv), Kyiv, Ukraine td@ubs.gov.ua

Li Xiaolu - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Spatial misallocation and economic development
    2017
    Co-Authors: Li Xiaolu
    Abstract:

    This thesis contains three chapters with a focus on how frictions at Institutional or firm-level affect the resource allocation, market performance and welfare outcome. I quantitatively examine the aggregate implications and distributional impacts of those frictions both at the aggregate and at the city-level. Chapter 1 provides the motivation of the thesis, highlights the major contribution of each chapter to the literature, together with a summary of the main results in each chapter. Chapter 2 focuses on a unique Institutional Feature of China. Local government has great control over land supply in each city. Local officials decide the quantity of land to sell on the market, and can also use land as collateral to obtain funds from state-owned banks to finance local expenditures. The main motivation for this is to promote GDP growth, which is a key performance indicator for the promotion of local officials. What are the implications on GDP and welfare of this unique Institutional design? In this chapter, I develop a competitive spatial equilibrium framework to study these issues. In the model, each local government attempts to maximize local GDP by deciding how much residential land to supply to the market. Local government finances its expenditure both by land sales revenue and by borrowing from state-owned banks using land as collateral. Individual workers optimally choose locations and will migrate to other cities if housing prices in their home cities are too high. I calibrate the model to the Chinese economy in 2010. I compare the benchmark equilibrium outcome with a first-best allocation. I also examine the role of local GDP tournaments, by studying a counter-factual situation where the objective of local government is to maximize the utility of local individual’s. The results suggest that in the first-best allocation the largest city will be larger and the smaller cities smaller. The welfare level achieved in our benchmark economy is not significantly lower than in the other two scenarios. Chapter 3 develops a general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous firms to quantitatively evaluate the welfare implications of firm-level frictions at both the aggregate and city level in China. I use individual firm data to estimate output and labor frictions for each city and for state-owned and private firms. Our results show that state-owned firms usually have lower labor frictions and higher output frictions, although the gaps have been shrinking over time. The existing frictions had distorted employment toward SOEs. The frictions had worsened over time, leading to approximately 11 percent welfare loss between 2000 and 2005. Chapter 4 is a study on Singapore housing market. Numerous countries in the world provide their citizens and residents cheap public housing, whereas foreigners are only allowed to purchase relatively scarce and expensive private housing. Undoubtedly, the growth in native (foreign) population size will directly contribute to a higher public (private) housing price, and indirectly induce a higher private (public) housing price via general equilibrium effects. The question is how to quantitatively evaluate the magnitude of each impact. To address this issue, I propose a dynamic general equilibrium framework with heterogenous native and foreign agents interacting in both public and private housing markets. Natives can upgrade from public to private housing over their life-cycle. I also allow the option that foreigners choose to convert to a permanent residentship, then compete with natives in the public housing market. I calibrate the model into Singapore economy from 1991-2015. The calibrated model can account for about 64.9 percent of private housing price growth, and account for 61.7 percent of public housing price growth in the data. The decomposition exercises suggest that the growth of native population can generate about 76.1 percent of private housing price growth, while the growth of foreign population can generate about 78.7 percent of public housing price growth. Finally, the relaxation of borrowing constraint can generate a substantial rise in private housing price.Doctor of Philosophy (HSS