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Martin Salm - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the effect of a ban on gender based pricing on risk selection in the german health Insurance Market
Health Economics, 2020Co-Authors: Shan Huang, Martin SalmAbstract:Starting from December 2012, insurers in the European Union were prohibited from charging gender-discriminatory prices. We examine the effect of this unisex mandate on risk segmentation in the German health Insurance Market. Although gender used to be a pricing factor in Germany's private health Insurance (PHI) sector, it was never used as a pricing factor in the social health Insurance (SHI) sector. The unisex mandate makes PHI relatively more attractive for women and less attractive for men. Based on data from the German socio-economic panel, we analyze how the unisex mandate affects the difference between women and men in switching rates between SHI and PHI. We find that the unisex mandate increases the probability of switching from SHI to PHI for women relative to men. On the other hand, the unisex mandate has no effect on the gender difference in switching rates from PHI to SHI. Because women have on average higher health care expenditures than men, our results imply a worsening of the PHI risk pool and an improvement of the SHI risk pool. Our results demonstrate that regulatory measures such as the unisex mandate can affect risk selection between public and private health Insurance sectors.
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the effect of a ban on gender based pricing on risk selection in the german health Insurance Market
Social Science Research Network, 2019Co-Authors: Shan Huang, Martin SalmAbstract:Starting from December 2012, insurers in the European Union were prohibited from charging gender-discriminatory prices. We examine the effect of this unisex mandate on risk segmentation in the German health Insurance Market. While gender used to be a pricing factor in Germany's private health Insurance (PHI) sector, it was never used as a pricing factor in the social health Insurance (SHI) sector. The unisex mandate makes PHI relatively more attractive for women and less attractive for men. Based on data from the SOEP we analyze how the unisex mandate affects the difference between women and men in switching rates between SHI and PHI. We find that the unisex mandate increases the probability of switching from SHI to PHI for women relative to men. This effect is strongest for self-employed individuals and mini-jobbers. On the other hand, the unisex mandate had no effect on the gender difference in switching rates from PHI to SHI. Because women have on average higher health care expenditures than men, our results imply a reduction of advantageous selection into PHI. Our results demonstrate that regulatory measures such as the unisex mandate can reduce risk selection between public and private health Insurance sectors.
Amy Finkelstein - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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redistribution by Insurance Market regulation analyzing a ban on gender based retirement annuities
Journal of Financial Economics, 2009Co-Authors: Amy Finkelstein, James M Poterba, Casey RothschildAbstract:We illustrate how equilibrium screening models can be used to evaluate the economic consequences of Insurance Market regulation. We calibrate and solve a model of the United Kingdom's compulsory annuity Market and examine the impact of gender-based pricing restrictions. We find that the endogenous adjustment of annuity contract menus in response to such restrictions can undo up to half of the redistribution from men to women that would occur with exogenous Social Security-like annuity contracts. Our findings indicate the importance of endogenous contract responses and illustrate the feasibility of employing theoretical Insurance Market equilibrium models for quantitative policy analysis.
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multiple dimensions of private information evidence from the long term care Insurance Market
The American Economic Review, 2006Co-Authors: Amy Finkelstein, Kathleen McgarryAbstract:We demonstrate the existence of multiple dimensions of private information in the long-term care Insurance Market. Two types of people purchase Insurance: individuals with private information that they are high risk and individuals with private information that they have strong taste for Insurance. Ex post, the former are higher risk than Insurance companies expect, while the latter are lower risk. In aggregate, those with more Insurance are not higher risk. Our results demonstrate that Insurance Markets may suffer from asymmetric information even absent a positive correlation between Insurance coverage and risk occurrence. The results also suggest a general test for asymmetric information.
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redistribution by Insurance Market regulation analyzing a ban on gender based retirement annuities
Research Papers in Economics, 2006Co-Authors: Amy Finkelstein, James M Poterba, Casey RothschildAbstract:This paper shows how models of Insurance Markets with asymmetric information can be calibrated and solved to yield quantitative estimates of the consequences of government regulation. We estimate the impact of restricting gender-based pricing in the United Kingdom retirement annuity Market, a Market in which individuals are required to annuitize tax-preferred retirement savings but are allowed considerable choice over the annuity contract they purchase. After calibrating a lifecycle utility model and estimating a model of annuitant mortality that allows for unobserved heterogeneity, we solve for the range of equilibrium contract structures with and without gender-based pricing. Eliminating gender-based pricing is generally thought to redistribute resources from men to women, since women have longer life expectancies. We find that allowing insurers to offer a menu of contracts may reduce the amount of redistribution from men to women associated with gender-blind pricing requirements to half the level that would occur if insurers were required to sell a single pre-specified policy. The latter "one policy" scenario corresponds loosely to settings in which governments provide compulsory annuities as part of their Social Security program. Our findings suggest that recognizing the endogenous structure of Insurance contracts is important for analyzing the economic effects of Insurance Market regulations. More generally, our results suggest that theoretical models of Insurance Market equilibrium can be used for quantitative policy analysis, not simply to derive qualitative findings.
Shan Huang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the effect of a ban on gender based pricing on risk selection in the german health Insurance Market
Health Economics, 2020Co-Authors: Shan Huang, Martin SalmAbstract:Starting from December 2012, insurers in the European Union were prohibited from charging gender-discriminatory prices. We examine the effect of this unisex mandate on risk segmentation in the German health Insurance Market. Although gender used to be a pricing factor in Germany's private health Insurance (PHI) sector, it was never used as a pricing factor in the social health Insurance (SHI) sector. The unisex mandate makes PHI relatively more attractive for women and less attractive for men. Based on data from the German socio-economic panel, we analyze how the unisex mandate affects the difference between women and men in switching rates between SHI and PHI. We find that the unisex mandate increases the probability of switching from SHI to PHI for women relative to men. On the other hand, the unisex mandate has no effect on the gender difference in switching rates from PHI to SHI. Because women have on average higher health care expenditures than men, our results imply a worsening of the PHI risk pool and an improvement of the SHI risk pool. Our results demonstrate that regulatory measures such as the unisex mandate can affect risk selection between public and private health Insurance sectors.
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the effect of a ban on gender based pricing on risk selection in the german health Insurance Market
Social Science Research Network, 2019Co-Authors: Shan Huang, Martin SalmAbstract:Starting from December 2012, insurers in the European Union were prohibited from charging gender-discriminatory prices. We examine the effect of this unisex mandate on risk segmentation in the German health Insurance Market. While gender used to be a pricing factor in Germany's private health Insurance (PHI) sector, it was never used as a pricing factor in the social health Insurance (SHI) sector. The unisex mandate makes PHI relatively more attractive for women and less attractive for men. Based on data from the SOEP we analyze how the unisex mandate affects the difference between women and men in switching rates between SHI and PHI. We find that the unisex mandate increases the probability of switching from SHI to PHI for women relative to men. This effect is strongest for self-employed individuals and mini-jobbers. On the other hand, the unisex mandate had no effect on the gender difference in switching rates from PHI to SHI. Because women have on average higher health care expenditures than men, our results imply a reduction of advantageous selection into PHI. Our results demonstrate that regulatory measures such as the unisex mandate can reduce risk selection between public and private health Insurance sectors.
Casey Rothschild - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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redistribution by Insurance Market regulation analyzing a ban on gender based retirement annuities
Journal of Financial Economics, 2009Co-Authors: Amy Finkelstein, James M Poterba, Casey RothschildAbstract:We illustrate how equilibrium screening models can be used to evaluate the economic consequences of Insurance Market regulation. We calibrate and solve a model of the United Kingdom's compulsory annuity Market and examine the impact of gender-based pricing restrictions. We find that the endogenous adjustment of annuity contract menus in response to such restrictions can undo up to half of the redistribution from men to women that would occur with exogenous Social Security-like annuity contracts. Our findings indicate the importance of endogenous contract responses and illustrate the feasibility of employing theoretical Insurance Market equilibrium models for quantitative policy analysis.
-
redistribution by Insurance Market regulation analyzing a ban on gender based retirement annuities
Research Papers in Economics, 2006Co-Authors: Amy Finkelstein, James M Poterba, Casey RothschildAbstract:This paper shows how models of Insurance Markets with asymmetric information can be calibrated and solved to yield quantitative estimates of the consequences of government regulation. We estimate the impact of restricting gender-based pricing in the United Kingdom retirement annuity Market, a Market in which individuals are required to annuitize tax-preferred retirement savings but are allowed considerable choice over the annuity contract they purchase. After calibrating a lifecycle utility model and estimating a model of annuitant mortality that allows for unobserved heterogeneity, we solve for the range of equilibrium contract structures with and without gender-based pricing. Eliminating gender-based pricing is generally thought to redistribute resources from men to women, since women have longer life expectancies. We find that allowing insurers to offer a menu of contracts may reduce the amount of redistribution from men to women associated with gender-blind pricing requirements to half the level that would occur if insurers were required to sell a single pre-specified policy. The latter "one policy" scenario corresponds loosely to settings in which governments provide compulsory annuities as part of their Social Security program. Our findings suggest that recognizing the endogenous structure of Insurance contracts is important for analyzing the economic effects of Insurance Market regulations. More generally, our results suggest that theoretical models of Insurance Market equilibrium can be used for quantitative policy analysis, not simply to derive qualitative findings.
Manuel Willington - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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collusion in the private health Insurance Market empirical evidence for chile
Research Papers in Economics, 2008Co-Authors: Claudio A Agostini, Eduardo Saavedra, Manuel WillingtonAbstract:In September 2005, the Chilean Competition Authority filed a complaint against the 5 largest private health Insurance providers for violation of antitrust laws. The 5 providers were accused of colluding to reduce the coverage of the plans offered to customers between March 2002 and March 2003. The main fact is that during that period these 5 providers reduced the coverage offered from 100% for hospitalization and 80% for ambulatory care to 90% and 70% respectively. As usual the observation of parallel conduct is not enough to infer collusion and it is required to observe additional factors that allow us to reject the hypothesis of providers behaving competitively. In this paper, we show that some specific characteristics of the health Insurance Markets generate barriers to entry and switching costs that allow the possibility of a collusive agreement. Then, we adapt an imperfect competition model of product differentiation to derive some testable propositions that allow us to distinguish between competition and collusion outcomes in the health Insurance Market in Chile. Finally, we show econometric evidence consistent with a collusive agreement among the 5 largest providers and inconsistent with a competitive equilibrium. . In particular, by comparing the prosecuted and non-prosecuted open Isapres before and during the collusive period, we show that sales efforts of the accused Isapres were reduced during the transition period toward lower-quality plans, that the profitability of the two groups of Isapres increased, and that the rate of transfers within the group of accused Isapres fell during the transition period.
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collusion in the private health Insurance Market empirical evidence for chile
Social Science Research Network, 2008Co-Authors: Claudio A Agostini, Eduardo Saavedra, Manuel WillingtonAbstract:In September 2005, the Chilean Competition Authority filed a lawsuit against the 5 largest private health Insurance providers for violation of antitrust laws, specifically accusing them of collusion in the coverage of the plans offered to consumers between March 2002 and March 2003. In fact, during that period these 5 providers reduced the coverage offered from 100% for hospitalization and 80% for ambulatory care to 90% and 70% respectively. As usual the observation of parallel conduct is not enough to infer collusion and it is required to observe additional factors allowing to reject the hypothesis of firms behaving competitively.In this paper, we analyze the institutional framework and the main characteristics of the health system in Chile to show the existence of Market segmentation, limited price competition, barriers to entry, and important switching costs. All of which allows to sustain a collusive agreement making it difficult for a new entrant to gain a significant Market share quickly, even if it offers a better health Insurance plan. Then, we adapt an imperfect competition model of product differentiation with risk averse consumers to derive some testable propositions that allow us to distinguish between competition and collusion outcomes in the health Insurance Market. Finally, we present robust econometric showing a statistically significant reduction in sales effort, Marketing expenses and switching rates among cartel members, compared to non-cartel members, and also show an increase in the profitability of all providers in the Market, but a statistically significant higher increase in the profitability of non-cartel members. The empirical evidence, therefore, is consistent with a collusive agreement among the 5 largest health providers to reduce Insurance coverage and inconsistent with a competitive equilibrium.
