The Experts below are selected from a list of 759 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Pita Roycroft - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the tort of wilkinson v downton after rhodes the reincarnation of Intentional Infliction of emotional distress and its future viability in new zealand
    Social Science Research Network, 2016
    Co-Authors: Pita Roycroft
    Abstract:

    This paper analyses the tort in Wilkinson v Downton, commonly referred to as Intentional Infliction of emotional distress, in light of the United Kingdom Supreme Court’s decision in Rhodes v OPO. After considering the three base elements of the Rhodes Court’s newly reformulated tort, and giving a brief introduction to the New Zealand equivalent, the paper suggests the law in this area is in need of further clarification and reform. The Rhodes formulation, while useful, does not go far enough in securing a viable future for the tort in light of the developments in negligence and privacy. The paper justifies the tort’s independence and suggests reforms to its elements in this respect. In particular, it concludes that the conduct element ought to be based on a ‘reasonable target’ test, and the consequence element ought to be modified to allow recovery for damage amounting to severe emotional distress outside the range of ordinary human experience.

Marisa Anne Pagnattaro - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the outrageous tort Intentional Infliction of emotional distress in the workplace
    Social Science Research Network, 2001
    Co-Authors: Marisa Anne Pagnattaro
    Abstract:

    Federal anti-discrimination statutes are designed to address workplace harassment that involves discriminatory treatment of employees. What is less recognized, however, is the growing body of state law in which employees are seeking redress for workplace harassment based on the common law tort of Intentional Infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The standard for actionable behavior varies from state to state, yet the workplace contexts that give rise to IIED claims are relatively consistent. IIED claims are made for a wide range of acts, including criticizing job performance; transferring an employee within a company; using rude, demeaning and vulgar language; imposing stressful working conditions; conducting investigations; and terminating employment. Courts, however, tend to be reluctant to sustain such claims unless the acts are clearly “extreme and outrageous.” As a general rule, plaintiffs have been successful in maintaining a claim for IIED: if there is a pattern of continuing behavior (especially if related to sexual harassment), if there is a retaliatory motive for the behavior, or if there is an awareness of a plaintiff’s particular susceptibility to emotional distress. Across the country, courts have tended to set a high standard for the kinds of acts that constitute the basis of IIED claims. Yet, even in states that are notoriously favorable to employers – such as Georgia – liability is being imposed. Using cases from Georgia and selected cases from other states to illustrate the categories of behavior that frequently form the basis of IIED claims, this article is designed to create a framework of inquiry for employers who are concerned about potential liability.

Eugene Volokh - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • freedom of speech and the Intentional Infliction of emotional distress tort
    Social Science Research Network, 2010
    Co-Authors: Eugene Volokh
    Abstract:

    Twenty years ago, Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell held that even outrageous, severely distressing speech is constitutionally protected, at least when it deals with a matter of public concern, and is said about a public figure. In this short essay, I argue - in the context of Snyder v. Phelps, which will be argued in Fall 2010 before the U.S. Supreme Court - that the same must apply to all speech on a matter of public concern. Whatever the merits of the public/private figure distinction when it’s applied to false statements of fact, it ought not be applied to opinions, however outrageous they might be. As the Court held in Hustler, “‘[o]utrageousness’ in the area of political and social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow [government actors] to impose liability on the basis of the [actors’] tastes or views.” And the same is true whether the plaintiff is a public figure or a private one.Likewise, I argue that the other arguments sometimes used to defend liability in Snyder v. Phelps - the invasion of privacy argument, the argument that the defendants’ speech interfered with plaintiff’s own religious freedom, and the argument that liability for speech near funeral picketing rests on the time, place, and manner of speech and not its viewpoint - can’t suffice to overcome the defendants’ First Amendment arguments. Contemptible as defendants’ speech is, it can’t be restricted through the vague, content-based, and potentially viewpoint-based emotional distress tort. And this is true even though narrow and content-neutral limits on picketing immediately outside a funeral might well be constitutional.

Daniel John Crooks - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

David Schkade - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • assessing punitive damages
    2014
    Co-Authors: Cass R Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade
    Abstract:

    This essay reports and discusses the implications of an experimental study involving punitive damage awards. The study finds that in products liability cases, people's normative judgments (about outrageousness and appropriate punishment) are relatively uniform, at least when measured on a bounded numerical scale (0 to 6). With the unbounded dollar scale, however, outcomes become extremely erratic and unpredictable. Various reform proposals, designed to overcome erratic awards, are discussed, including damage caps, compensatory judgment "multipliers," and conversion formulas based on jury judgments on a bounded numerical scale. Implications are also discussed for many other issues of law and economic valuation, including compensatory damages in such areas as pain and suffering, libel, sexual harassment and other civil rights violations, contingent valuation, and Intentional Infliction of emtional distress.

  • assessing punitive damages with notes on cognition and valuation in law
    Yale Law Journal, 1998
    Co-Authors: Cass R Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade
    Abstract:

    Although legal scholars have disagreed about whether juries should be allowed to award punitive damages and about how judges should instruct them, the debate has included little discussion of jurors' cognitive capabilities. In this Article, Professors Sunstein, Kahneman, and Schkade respond to this gap by offering an experimental study. The study seeks to separate the tasks that a jury is suited to perform from those that a jury can accomplish only with great inconsistency. In personal injury cases, the study shows, jurors' normative judgments about outrageousness and appropriate punishment are relatively uniform, at least when measured on a bounded numerical scale (0 to 6). Indeed, these normative judgments are uniform across race, age, education, wealth, and gender When subjects map their judgments onto an unbounded dollar scale, however outcomes become erratic and unpredictable. Drawing on these results, the authors question the current legal approaches to the regulation of punitive damages. They then analyze various reform proposals designed to overcome erratic awards, including damage caps, compensatory judgement "multipliers," and conversion formulas that translate either jury judgments on bounded numerical scabs or jury arrangement of comparison cases into punitive damage awards. Finally the authors discuss the implications of the study for many other issues of law: including contingent valuation and compensatory damages in such areas as pain and suffering, libel, sexual harassment, and Intentional Infliction of emotional distress. Language: en