The Experts below are selected from a list of 33666 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Bertram F Malle - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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is there a hierarchy of social inferences the likelihood and speed of inferring Intentionality mind and personality
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2012Co-Authors: Bertram F Malle, Jess S HolbrookAbstract:People interpret behavior by making inferences about agents’ Intentionality, mind, and personality. Past research studied such inferences 1 at a time; in real life, people make these inferences simultaneously. The present studies therefore examined whether 4 major inferences (Intentionality, desire, belief, and personality), elicited simultaneously in response to an observed behavior, might be ordered in a hierarchy of likelihood and speed. To achieve generalizability, the studies included a wide range of stimulus behaviors, presented them verbally and as dynamic videos, and assessed inferences both in a retrieval paradigm (measuring the likelihood and speed of accessing inferences immediately after they were made) and in an online processing paradigm (measuring the speed of forming inferences during behavior observation). Five studies provide evidence for a hierarchy of social inferences—from Intentionality and desire to belief to personality—that is stable across verbal and visual presentations and that parallels the order found in developmental and primate research.
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can unintended side effects be intentional resolving a controversy over Intentionality and morality
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 2010Co-Authors: Steve Guglielmo, Bertram F MalleAbstract:Can an event's blameworthiness distort whether people see it as intentional? In controversial recent studies, people judged a behavior's negative side effect intentional even though the agent allegedly had no desire for it to occur. Such a judgment contradicts the standard assumption that desire is a necessary condition of Intentionality, and it raises concerns about assessments of Intentionality in legal settings. Six studies examined whether blameworthy events distort Intentionality judgments. Studies 1 through 4 show that, counter to recent claims, Intentionality judgments are systematically guided by variations in the agent's desire, for moral and nonmoral actions alike. Studies 5 and 6 show that a behavior's negative side effects are rarely seen as intentional once people are allowed to choose from multiple descriptions of the behavior. Specifically, people distinguish between "knowingly" and "intentionally" bringing about a side effect, even for immoral actions. These studies suggest that Intentionality judgments are unaffected by a behavior's blameworthiness.
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Intentionality morality and their relationship in human judgment
Journal of Cognition and Culture, 2006Co-Authors: Bertram F MalleAbstract:This article explores several entanglements between human judgments of Intentionality and morality (blame and praise). After proposing a model of people's folk concept of Intentionality I discuss three topics. First, considerations of a behavior's Intentionality affect people's praise and blame of that behavior, but one study suggests that there may be an asymmetry such that blame is more affected than praise. Second, the concept of Intentionality is constitutive of many legal judgments (e.g., of murder vs. manslaughter), and one study illustrates people's subtle considerations of Intentionality in making those judgments. Third, controversial recent studies suggest that moral considerations can affect judgments of Intentionality, and an asymmetry may exist such that blame affects those judgments more than praise. I report two new studies that may shed light on these recent findings, and I discuss several theoretical models that might account for the impact of moral considerations on Intentionality judgments and for the relationship between the two more generally.
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judging mens rea the tension between folk concepts and legal concepts of Intentionality
Behavioral Sciences & The Law, 2003Co-Authors: Bertram F Malle, Sarah E NelsonAbstract:Concepts such as intention, motive, or forethought have generated a great deal of doubt, dispute, and confusion in legal decision making. Here we argue for an empirically based strategy of defining and using such mens rea concepts. Instead of the standard approach of settling these concepts by theoretical argument and the debaters' own intuitions, we rely on social psychological research to determine the meaning and significance of folk concepts concerning mens rea. We demonstrate the reliable and systematic use of people's concept of Intentionality, contrast it with the bewildering variety of related legal concepts, and apply the folk model of Intentionality to debated distinctions between intention and Intentionality, desire and intention, and belief and intention. This folk-conceptual approach promises clarity of mens rea concepts and a reconciliation of the legal and layperson's view of human behavior. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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intentions and Intentionality foundations of social cognition
2001Co-Authors: Bertram F Malle, Louis J Moses, Dare A BaldwinAbstract:Social interaction requires social cognition -- the ability to perceive, interpret, and explain the actions of others. This ability fundamentally relies on the concepts of intention and Intentionality. For example, people distinguish sharply between intentional and unintentional behavior; identify the intentions underlying others' behavior; explain completed actions with reference to intentions, beliefs, and desires; and evaluate the social worth of actions using the concepts of Intentionality and responsibility. Intentions and Intentionality highlights the roles these concepts play in social cognition. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, it offers cutting-edge work from researchers in cognitive, developmental, and social psychology and in philosophy, primatology, and law. It includes both conceptual and empirical contributions.
Rasmus Thybo Jensen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Motor Intentionality and the case of Schneider
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2009Co-Authors: Rasmus Thybo JensenAbstract:I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s use of the case of Schneider in his arguments for the existence of non-conconceptual and non-representational motor Intentionality contains a problematic methodological ambiguity. Motor Intentionality is both to be revealed by its perspicuous preservation and by its contrastive impairment in one and the same case. To resolve the resulting contradiction I suggest we emphasize the second of Merleau-Ponty’s two lines of argument. I argue that this interpretation is the one in best accordance both with Merleau-Ponty’s general methodology and with the empirical case of Schneider as it was described by Gelb and Goldstein.
Joshua Knobe - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Syntax and Intentionality: an automatic link between language and theory-of-mind.
Cognition, 2014Co-Authors: Brent Strickland, Matthew Fisher, Frank C. Keil, Joshua KnobeAbstract:Three studies provided evidence that syntax influences Intentionality judgments. In Experiment 1, participants made either speeded or unspeeded Intentionality judgments about ambiguously intentional subjects or objects. Participants were more likely to judge grammatical subjects as acting intentionally in the speeded relative to the reflective condition (thus showing an Intentionality bias), but grammatical objects revealed the opposite pattern of results (thus showing an unIntentionality bias). In Experiment 2, participants made an Intentionality judgment about one of the two actors in a partially symmetric sentence (e.g., “John exchanged products with Susan”). The results revealed a tendency to treat the grammatical subject as acting more intentionally than the grammatical object. In Experiment 3 participants were encouraged to think about the events that such sentences typically refer to, and the tendency was significantly reduced. These results suggest a privileged relationship between language and central theory-of-mind concepts. More specifically, there may be two ways of determining Intentionality judgments: (1) an automatic verbal bias to treat grammatical subjects (but not objects) as intentional (2) a deeper, more careful consideration of the events typically described by a sentence.
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the folk concept of Intentionality
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1997Co-Authors: Bertram F Malle, Joshua KnobeAbstract:Abstract When perceiving, explaining, or criticizing human behavior, people distinguish between intentional and unintentional actions. To do so, they rely on a shared folk concept of Intentionality. In contrast to past speculative models, this article provides an empirically based model of this concept. Study 1 demonstrates that people agree substantially in their judgments of Intentionality, suggesting a shared underlying concept. Study 2 reveals that when asked to define directly the termintentional,people mention four components of Intentionality: desire, belief, intention, and awareness. Study 3 confirms the importance of a fifth component, namely skill. In light of these findings, the authors propose a model of the folk concept of Intentionality and provide a further test in Study 4. The discussion compares the proposed model to past ones and examines its implications for social perception, attribution, and cognitive development.
Laura Zapparoli - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the brain in willed action a meta analytical comparison of imaging studies on motor Intentionality and sense of agency
Frontiers in Psychology, 2019Co-Authors: Silvia Seghezzi, E Zirone, E Paulesu, Laura ZapparoliAbstract:Voluntary actions can be fractionated in different phenomena: from the emergence of intentions and the ensuing motor plans and actions, to the anticipation and monitoring of their outcomes, to the appreciation of their congruency with intentions and to the eventual emergence of a sense of agency. It follows that motor intention and the sense of agency should occur at different stages in the normal generation of willed actions. Both these processes have been associated with a fronto-parietal motor network, but no study has investigated to what extent the two experiences can be dissociated for the brain regions involved. To this end, we assessed the PET/fMRI literature on agency and Intentionality using a meta-analytic technique based on a hierarchical clustering algorithm. Beside a shared brain network involving the meso-frontal and prefrontal regions, the middle insula and subcortical structures, we found that motor intention and the sense of agency are functionally underpinned by separable sets of brain regions: an "Intentionality network," involving the rostral area of the mesial frontal cortex (middle cingulum and pre-supplementary motor area), the anterior insula and the parietal lobules, and a "self-agency network," which involves the posterior areas of the mesial frontal cortex (the SMA proper), the posterior insula, the occipital lobe and the cerebellum. We were then able to confirm this functional organization by a subsequent seed-based fMRI resting-state functional connectivity analysis, with seeds derived from the Intentionality/sense of agency specific clusters of the medial wall of the frontal lobe. Our results suggest the existence of a rostro-caudal gradient within the mesial frontal cortex, with the more anterior regions linked to the concept of motor Intentionality and the brain areas located more posteriorly associated with the direct monitoring between the action and its outcome. This suggestion is reinforced by the association between the sense of agency and the activation of the occipital lobes, to suggest a direct comparison between the movement and its external (e.g., visual) consequences. The shared network may be important for the integration of Intentionality and agency in a coherent appreciation of self-generated actions.
Alberto Sanfeliu - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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bayesian human motion Intentionality prediction in urban environments
Pattern Recognition Letters, 2014Co-Authors: Gonzalo Ferrer, Alberto SanfeliuAbstract:A long-term human motion predictor in urban environments is proposed.Geometrical-based method, small learning effort and low computational complexity.Good performance even under changes of Intentionality, great flexibility.The BHMIP outperforms other state of the art methods in performance and flexibility.The method has been tested using well-known databases. Human motion prediction in indoor and outdoor scenarios is a key issue towards human robot interaction and intelligent robot navigation in general. In the present work, we propose a new human motion Intentionality indicator, denominated Bayesian Human Motion Intentionality Prediction (BHMIP), which is a geometric-based long-term predictor. Two variants of the Bayesian approach are proposed, the Sliding Window BHMIP and the Time Decay BHMIP. The main advantages of the proposed methods are: a simple formulation, easily scalable, portability to unknown environments with small learning effort, low computational complexity, and they outperform other state of the art approaches. The system only requires training to obtain the set of destinations, which are salient positions people normally walk to, that configure a scene. A comparison of the BHMIP is done with other well known methods for long-term prediction using the Edinburgh Informatics Forum pedestrian database and the Freiburg People Tracker database.
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comparative analysis of human motion trajectory prediction using minimum variance curvature
Human-Robot Interaction, 2011Co-Authors: Gonzalo Ferrer, Alberto SanfeliuAbstract:The prediction of human motion Intentionality is a key issue towards intelligent human robot interaction and robot navigation. In this work we present a comparative study of several prediction functions that are based on the minimum curvature variance from the current position to all the potential destination points, that means, the points that are relevant for people motion Intentionality. The proposed predictor computes, at each interval of time, the trajectory from the present to the destination positions, and makes a prediction of the human motion at each interval of time using only the criterion of minimum curvature variation. The method has been validated in the Edinburgh Informatics Forum Pedestrian database.
