The Experts below are selected from a list of 16419 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Santiago J Rubio - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • can International Environmental cooperation be bought
    European Journal of Operational Research, 2010
    Co-Authors: Cristina Fuentesalbero, Santiago J Rubio
    Abstract:

    In this paper a two-stage game of International Environmental Agreement formation with asymmetric countries is analytically solved. The equilibrium of the game makes it possible to determine the size and composition of a stable Agreement. Two cases are studied. In the first case, countries differ only in abatement costs, while in the second case, they differ in Environmental damages. In both cases, two different institutional settings, one without transfers and another with transfers, are considered. The results establish that the asymmetry assumption has no important effects on the scope of cooperation in comparison with the symmetric case if transfers are not used or abatement costs represent the only difference among countries. However, when the only difference is in Environmental damages, the level of cooperation that can be bought through a self-financed transfer scheme increases with the degree of asymmetry.

  • self enforcing International Environmental Agreements revisited
    Social Science Research Network, 2008
    Co-Authors: Santiago J Rubio, Alistair Ulph
    Abstract:

    Barrett's (1994) paper on transboundary pollution abatement shows that if the signatories of an International Environmental Agreement act in a Stackelberg fashion, then, depending on parameter values, a self-enforcing IEA can have any number of signatories between two and the grand coalition. Barrett obtains this result using numerical simulations in a pollution abatement model where he is not constraining emissions to be non-negative. Recent attempts to use analytical approaches and to explicitly recognize the non-negativity constraints have suggested that the number of signatories of a stable IEA may be very small. The way such papers have dealt with non-negativity constraints is to restrict parameter values to ensure interior solutions for emissions. We argue that a more appropriate approach is to use Kuhn-Tucker conditions to derive the equilibrium of the emissions game. When this is done we show, analytically, that the key results from Barrett's paper are maintained. Finally, we explain why his main conclusion is correct although his analysis can implicitly imply negative emissions.

  • self enforcing International Environmental Agreements revisited
    Oxford Economic Papers, 2006
    Co-Authors: Santiago J Rubio, Alistair Ulph
    Abstract:

    In Barrett's (1994) paper on transboundary pollution abatement is shown that if the signatories of an International Environmental Agreement act in a Stackelberg fashion, then, depending on parameter values, a self-enforcing IEA can have any number of signatories between two and the grand coalition. Barrett obtains this result using numerical simulations and also ignoring the fact that emissions must be non-negative. Recent attempts to use analytical approaches and to explicitly recognize the non-negativity constraints have suggested that the number of signatories of a stable IEA may be very small. The way such papers have dealt with non-negativity constraints is to restrict parameter values to ensure interior solutions for emissions. We argue that a more appropriate approach is to use Kuhn-Tucker conditions to derive the equilibrium of the emissions game. When this is done we show, analytically, that the key results from Barrett's paper go through. Finally, we explain why his main conclusion is correct although his analysis can implicitly imply negative emissions.

Alistair Ulph - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • self enforcing International Environmental Agreements revisited
    Social Science Research Network, 2008
    Co-Authors: Santiago J Rubio, Alistair Ulph
    Abstract:

    Barrett's (1994) paper on transboundary pollution abatement shows that if the signatories of an International Environmental Agreement act in a Stackelberg fashion, then, depending on parameter values, a self-enforcing IEA can have any number of signatories between two and the grand coalition. Barrett obtains this result using numerical simulations in a pollution abatement model where he is not constraining emissions to be non-negative. Recent attempts to use analytical approaches and to explicitly recognize the non-negativity constraints have suggested that the number of signatories of a stable IEA may be very small. The way such papers have dealt with non-negativity constraints is to restrict parameter values to ensure interior solutions for emissions. We argue that a more appropriate approach is to use Kuhn-Tucker conditions to derive the equilibrium of the emissions game. When this is done we show, analytically, that the key results from Barrett's paper are maintained. Finally, we explain why his main conclusion is correct although his analysis can implicitly imply negative emissions.

  • self enforcing International Environmental Agreements revisited
    Oxford Economic Papers, 2006
    Co-Authors: Santiago J Rubio, Alistair Ulph
    Abstract:

    In Barrett's (1994) paper on transboundary pollution abatement is shown that if the signatories of an International Environmental Agreement act in a Stackelberg fashion, then, depending on parameter values, a self-enforcing IEA can have any number of signatories between two and the grand coalition. Barrett obtains this result using numerical simulations and also ignoring the fact that emissions must be non-negative. Recent attempts to use analytical approaches and to explicitly recognize the non-negativity constraints have suggested that the number of signatories of a stable IEA may be very small. The way such papers have dealt with non-negativity constraints is to restrict parameter values to ensure interior solutions for emissions. We argue that a more appropriate approach is to use Kuhn-Tucker conditions to derive the equilibrium of the emissions game. When this is done we show, analytically, that the key results from Barrett's paper go through. Finally, we explain why his main conclusion is correct although his analysis can implicitly imply negative emissions.

Cristina Fuentesalbero - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • can International Environmental cooperation be bought
    European Journal of Operational Research, 2010
    Co-Authors: Cristina Fuentesalbero, Santiago J Rubio
    Abstract:

    In this paper a two-stage game of International Environmental Agreement formation with asymmetric countries is analytically solved. The equilibrium of the game makes it possible to determine the size and composition of a stable Agreement. Two cases are studied. In the first case, countries differ only in abatement costs, while in the second case, they differ in Environmental damages. In both cases, two different institutional settings, one without transfers and another with transfers, are considered. The results establish that the asymmetry assumption has no important effects on the scope of cooperation in comparison with the symmetric case if transfers are not used or abatement costs represent the only difference among countries. However, when the only difference is in Environmental damages, the level of cooperation that can be bought through a self-financed transfer scheme increases with the degree of asymmetry.

łukasz Tracewski - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • toward quantification of the impact of 21st century deforestation on the extinction risk of terrestrial vertebrates
    Conservation Biology, 2016
    Co-Authors: łukasz Tracewski, Stuart H M Butchart, Moreno Di Marco, Gentile Francesco Ficetola, Carlo Rondinini, Andy Symes, Hannah Wheatley, Alison E Beresford
    Abstract:

    Conservation actions need to be prioritized, often taking into account species’ extinction risk. The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List provides an accepted, objective framework for the assessment of extinction risk. Assessments based on data collected in the field are the best option, but the field data to base these on are often limited. Information collected through remote sensing can be used in place of field data to inform assessments. Forests are perhaps the best-studied land-cover type for use of remote-sensing data. Using an open-access 30-m resolution map of tree cover and its change between 2000 and 2012, we assessed the extent of forest cover and loss within the distributions of 11,186 forest-dependent amphibians, birds, and mammals worldwide. For 16 species, forest loss resulted in an elevated extinction risk under red-list criterion A, owing to inferred rapid population declines. This number increased to 23 when data-deficient species (i.e., those with insufficient information for evaluation) were included. Under red-list criterion B2, 484 species (855 when data-deficient species were included) were considered at elevated extinction risk, owing to restricted areas of occupancy resulting from little forest cover remaining within their ranges. The proportion of species of conservation concern would increase by 32.8% for amphibians, 15.1% for birds, and 24.7% for mammals if our suggested uplistings are accepted. Central America, the Northern Andes, Madagascar, the Eastern Arc forests in Africa, and the islands of Southeast Asia are hotspots for these species. Our results illustrate the utility of satellite imagery for global extinction-risk assessment and measurement of progress toward International Environmental Agreement targets.

Alison E Beresford - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • toward quantification of the impact of 21st century deforestation on the extinction risk of terrestrial vertebrates
    Conservation Biology, 2016
    Co-Authors: łukasz Tracewski, Stuart H M Butchart, Moreno Di Marco, Gentile Francesco Ficetola, Carlo Rondinini, Andy Symes, Hannah Wheatley, Alison E Beresford
    Abstract:

    Conservation actions need to be prioritized, often taking into account species’ extinction risk. The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List provides an accepted, objective framework for the assessment of extinction risk. Assessments based on data collected in the field are the best option, but the field data to base these on are often limited. Information collected through remote sensing can be used in place of field data to inform assessments. Forests are perhaps the best-studied land-cover type for use of remote-sensing data. Using an open-access 30-m resolution map of tree cover and its change between 2000 and 2012, we assessed the extent of forest cover and loss within the distributions of 11,186 forest-dependent amphibians, birds, and mammals worldwide. For 16 species, forest loss resulted in an elevated extinction risk under red-list criterion A, owing to inferred rapid population declines. This number increased to 23 when data-deficient species (i.e., those with insufficient information for evaluation) were included. Under red-list criterion B2, 484 species (855 when data-deficient species were included) were considered at elevated extinction risk, owing to restricted areas of occupancy resulting from little forest cover remaining within their ranges. The proportion of species of conservation concern would increase by 32.8% for amphibians, 15.1% for birds, and 24.7% for mammals if our suggested uplistings are accepted. Central America, the Northern Andes, Madagascar, the Eastern Arc forests in Africa, and the islands of Southeast Asia are hotspots for these species. Our results illustrate the utility of satellite imagery for global extinction-risk assessment and measurement of progress toward International Environmental Agreement targets.