The Experts below are selected from a list of 150 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Atsushi Yamagishi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • transboundary pollution tax competition and the efficiency of uncoordinated Environmental regulation
    Canadian Journal of Economics, 2019
    Co-Authors: Atsushi Yamagishi
    Abstract:

    Under capital tax competition, surprisingly, Ogawa and Wildasin (2009, American Economic Review, 99(4), 1206-1217) find that uncoordinated Policymaking leads to a first-best outcome even in the presence of transboundary pollution. However, I show that if the level of Environmental regulation is endogenized, the regulation level becomes too loose compared with the optimum ("race to the bottom"). Thus, despite the efficiency result of Ogawa and Wildasin (2009), efforts to achieve an International Environmental Policy coordination are needed. I then examine the dependence of this result on the level of decisive voter's capital endowment. If the decisive voter's capital endowment is below the average, uncoordinated regulation is always looser than the optimum. On the contrary, uncoordinated regulation may become inefficiently strict if it is above the average ("race to the top").

  • transboundary pollution tax competition and the efficiency of uncoordinated Environmental regulation
    Canadian Journal of Economics, 2019
    Co-Authors: Atsushi Yamagishi
    Abstract:

    Under capital tax competition, surprisingly, Ogawa and Wildasin (2009) find that uncoordinated Policymaking leads to a first‐best outcome even in the presence of transboundary pollution. However, I show that if the level of Environmental regulation is endogenized, the regulation level becomes too loose compared with the optimum (“race to the bottom”). Thus, despite the efficiency result of Ogawa and Wildasin (2009), efforts to achieve International Environmental Policy coordination are needed. I then examine the dependence of this result on the level of decisive voter's capital endowment. The regulation is inefficiently loose in many cases, but it can be too strict if the decisive voter's capital endowment is above the average. Thus, the possibility of “race to the top” cannot be eliminated. The inefficiency result does not generally depend on the timing of Policymaking, although the efficiency may be restored in the limit case where the decisive voter has no capital at all. Pollution transfrontaliere, competition fiscale et efficacite des politiques environnementales non coordonnees. En matiere de competition fiscale sur le capital, Ogawa et Wildasin (2009) ont decouvert de maniere surprenante que l'elaboration de politiques non coordonnees genere de meilleurs resultats, meme en presence de pollution transfrontaliere. Neanmoins, l'auteur montre que si le niveau de reglementation environnementale est endogeneise, ce dernier devient trop laxiste (« nivellement par le bas ») et s'ecarte de l'ideal. Par consequent, malgre les resultats d'efficacite d'Ogawa et Wildasin (2009), des efforts sont necessaires pour parvenir a des politiques environnementales coordonnees sur le plan International. L'auteur examine ensuite la dependance de ce resultat relativement au niveau de dotation en capital de l'electeur decisif. Dans de nombreux cas, la reglementation est inefficace et laxiste mais peut s'averer trop stricte si la dotation en capital de l'electeur decisif est au‐dessus de la moyenne. Ainsi, la possibilite d'un « nivellement par le haut » ne peut etre ecartee. Les resultats d'inefficacite ne dependent generalement pas du calendrier d'elaboration des politiques, bien que l'efficacite peut etre restauree dans le cas restreint ou l'electeur decisif ne possede aucun capital.

Udo E Simonis - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • distributive justice in International Environmental Policy axiomatic foundation and exemplary formulation
    Environmental Values, 2001
    Co-Authors: Carsten Helm, Udo E Simonis
    Abstract:

    Proceeding on a limited number of general, widely accepted equity criteria, we develop a proposal for distributing common resources. In particular, the proposed fair division mechanism is individually rational, envy-free, Pareto-efficient and satisfies the stand alone test, which follows as a minimum requirement from the resource and population monotonicity criteria. Applied to International climate Policy, the thrust of this proposal is that the South should initially be fully compensated for the greenhouse gas abatement measures it is to undertake as a result of efficiency considerations.

  • distributive justice in International Environmental Policy axiomatic foundation and exemplary formulation
    Publications of Darmstadt Technical University Institute for Business Studies (BWL), 2001
    Co-Authors: Carsten Helm, Udo E Simonis
    Abstract:

    Proceeding on a limited number of general, widely accepted equity criteria, we develop a proposal for distributing common resources. In particular, the proposed fair division mechanism is individually rational, envy-free, Pareto-efficient and satisfies the stand alone test, which follows as a minimum requirement from the resource and population monotonicity criteria. Applied to International climate Policy, the thrust of this proposal is that the South should initially be fully compensated for the greenhouse gas abatement measures it is to undertake as a result of efficiency considerations. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

David Vogel - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • trading places the role of the united states and the european union in International Environmental politics
    Comparative Political Studies, 2010
    Co-Authors: Daniel R Kelemen, David Vogel
    Abstract:

    When Environmental issues emerged on the International agenda in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the United States was of one of the strongest and most consistent supporters of International Environmental treaties and agreements. The member states of the European Union subsequently ratified all the International treaties created in this period, but U.S. leadership was crucial and European states were laggards in many cases. Since the 1990s, the political dynamics of International Environmental Policy have shifted, with the European Union emerging as a global Environmental leader and the United States repeatedly opposing multilateral Environmental agreements. The authors argue that a “regulatory politics” model that synthesizes the effects of domestic politics and International regulatory competition provides the most powerful explanation of why the United States and European Union have “traded places” with respect to their support for International Environmental agreements.

David P Dolowitz - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Carsten Helm - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • distributive justice in International Environmental Policy axiomatic foundation and exemplary formulation
    Environmental Values, 2001
    Co-Authors: Carsten Helm, Udo E Simonis
    Abstract:

    Proceeding on a limited number of general, widely accepted equity criteria, we develop a proposal for distributing common resources. In particular, the proposed fair division mechanism is individually rational, envy-free, Pareto-efficient and satisfies the stand alone test, which follows as a minimum requirement from the resource and population monotonicity criteria. Applied to International climate Policy, the thrust of this proposal is that the South should initially be fully compensated for the greenhouse gas abatement measures it is to undertake as a result of efficiency considerations.

  • distributive justice in International Environmental Policy axiomatic foundation and exemplary formulation
    Publications of Darmstadt Technical University Institute for Business Studies (BWL), 2001
    Co-Authors: Carsten Helm, Udo E Simonis
    Abstract:

    Proceeding on a limited number of general, widely accepted equity criteria, we develop a proposal for distributing common resources. In particular, the proposed fair division mechanism is individually rational, envy-free, Pareto-efficient and satisfies the stand alone test, which follows as a minimum requirement from the resource and population monotonicity criteria. Applied to International climate Policy, the thrust of this proposal is that the South should initially be fully compensated for the greenhouse gas abatement measures it is to undertake as a result of efficiency considerations. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)