The Experts below are selected from a list of 72543 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Craig G Dunbar - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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factors affecting Investment Bank initial public offering market share
Journal of Financial Economics, 2000Co-Authors: Craig G DunbarAbstract:This paper examines the effect of several factors on the market share of Investment Banks that act as book managers in initial public offerings (IPOs) between 1984 and 1993. For established Banks, IPO underpricing has a negative impact on market share, suggesting future issuers avoid Banks that leave too much "money on the table". While average abnormal long-run performance has a positive impact on established Bank's market share, association with extremely positive long-run performance damages market share. Abnormal underwriter compensation (cash spread plus expenses) has a positive impact on the market share of established Banks. Since these Banks expect increased future market share they place more at risk in current offerings and, therefore, charge higher compensation. Investment Banks concentrating their activities in fewer industries lose market share. Banks marketing IPOs in January or on Mondays also lose market share. Finally, association with withdrawn IPOs has a significantly negative effect on an Investment Bank's ability to compete for future offerings. These factors have a less significant effect, statistically and economically, on the market share of less established Banks, consistent with the notion that less reputation is placed at risk.
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factors affecting Investment Bank initial public offering market share
Journal of Financial Economics, 2000Co-Authors: Craig G DunbarAbstract:Abstract This paper examines the effect of several factors on the market share of Investment Banks that act as book managers in initial public offerings (IPOs) between 1984 and 1995. For established Banks, IPO first-day returns, one-year abnormal performance, abnormal compensation, industry specialization, analyst reputation, and association with withdrawn offers have a significant impact on changes in market share. These factors have a more significant effect on market share changes in low-volume IPO markets. These factors have a less significant effect on market share, statistically and economically, for less established Banks, consistent with the notion that less reputation is placed at risk.
David P Weber - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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do non Investment Bank analysts make better earnings forecasts
Journal of Accounting Auditing & Finance, 2008Co-Authors: John Jacob, Steve Rock, David P WeberAbstract:This study compares the earnings forecasts of analysts employed by Investment Banks with those employed by firms not involved in Investment Banking. We discuss possible resource and informational a...
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do non Investment Bank analysts make better earnings forecasts
Social Science Research Network, 2007Co-Authors: John Jacob, Steve Rock, David P WeberAbstract:This study compares the earnings forecasts of analysts employed by Investment Banks to those employed by firms not involved in Investment Banking. We discuss possible resource and informational advantages for Investment Bank analysts, and conflicts of interest faced by both groups, suggesting that, despite incentives stemming from corporate financing operations, Investment Bank analysts may nevertheless provide superior forecasts. We also compare forecast accuracy and relative optimism within Investment Bank analysts between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. Our results indicate that, controlling for relevant factors identified in prior research, Investment Bank analysts forecasts are on average more accurate than forecasts made by other analysts. Among Investment Bank analysts, affiliated analysts issue more accurate forecasts than unaffiliated analysts. Further analyzes reveal evidence consistent with the employment of higher-quality analysts and additional resources contributing to, but not completely explaining, the relation between forecast accuracy and Investment Banking and also with Investment-Banking affiliations conferring informational advantages. Regarding alleged biases caused by conflicts of interest, we find that Investment Bank analysts forecasts are less optimistic than those of their non-Investment Bank counterparts. We discuss implications of our results for the Global Settlement brokered by NYSAG Elliott Spitzer, the SEC and ten large Investment Banks.
Robert S Hansen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Investment Bank monitoring and bonding of security analysts research
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2019Co-Authors: Oya Altinkilic, Vadim S Balashov, Robert S HansenAbstract:Abstract We assess Investment Banks’ influence over the agreement between their analysts’ research behavior and their clients’ interests, in the post-reform era. Competing Banks discipline their analysts with worse career outcomes for producing biased reports, issuing shirking reports, and for involvement in the earnings guidance game, showing meaningful monitoring of their analysts. Highly reputable Banks provide more monitoring discipline of their analysts and bonding of their moral hazard than other Banks. The findings agree with the Banks taking responsibility for aligning analysts’ behavior with clients’ interests.
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Investment Bank monitoring and bonding of security analysts research
Social Science Research Network, 2018Co-Authors: Oya Altinkilic, Vadim S Balashov, Robert S HansenAbstract:We assess Investment Banks’ influence over the agreement between their analysts’ research behavior and their clients’ interests, in the post-reform era. Competing Banks discipline their analysts with worse career outcomes for producing biased reports, issuing shirking reports, and for involvement in the earnings guidance game, showing meaningful monitoring of their analysts. Highly reputable Banks provide more monitoring discipline of their analysts and bonding of their moral hazard than other Banks. Bank reputation is uniquely important because the expected benefits from analyst personal reputation are too little to bond the typical analyst’s moral hazard. The findings agree with the Banks taking responsibility for aligning analysts’ behavior with clients’ interests.
Xuemin Yan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the performance of Investment Bank affiliated mutual funds conflicts of interest or informational advantage
Social Science Research Network, 2011Co-Authors: (grace) Qing Hao, Xuemin YanAbstract:Using a comprehensive sample of U.S. mutual funds from 1992 to 2004, we find strong evidence that Investment Bank affiliated funds underperform unaffiliated funds. Consistent with the conflict of interest hypothesis, we find that affiliated funds hold disproportionately large amounts of stocks of their IPO and SEO clients. Moreover, worse performing clients are more likely to be held by affiliated funds. Our results are robust to alternative risk-adjustments, portfolio weighting schemes, and regression methodologies. Overall, our findings are consistent with the idea that Investment Banks use affiliated funds to support underwriting business at the expense of fund shareholders.
Matthias Thiemann - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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building a hidden Investment state the european Investment Bank national development Banks and european economic governance
Journal of European Public Policy, 2019Co-Authors: Daniel Mertens, Matthias ThiemannAbstract:The European Commission’s Investment Plan for Europe and the enduring economic crisis has brought state-owned development Banks again to the fore of public and scholarly debate in Europe. This arti...
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Building a hidden Investment state? The European Investment Bank, national development Banks and European economic governance
Journal of European Public Policy, 2018Co-Authors: Daniel Mertens, Matthias ThiemannAbstract:The European Commission’s Investment Plan for Europe and the enduring economic crisis has brought state-owned development Banks again to the fore of public and scholarly debate in Europe. This article proposes to place these Banks’ activities and recent institutional co-operation in the context of European integration and assumes a historical perspective on European economic governance and development Banking. Most importantly, it argues that the European Investment Bank has become a centre of gravity in long-standing political attempts to increase the Investment firepower of the European Union. Based on detailed process-tracing analysis through publicly available data and interview material, the article delineates a gradual process of institutional innovation and network formation that advanced since the late 1980s and culminated in recent post-crisis policy processes. The contemporary visibility of development Banking in Europe, we conclude, follows from these and is representative of a nucleus for a – somewhat hidden – European Investment state, whose reach and stability, however, is yet to be determined.
