The Experts below are selected from a list of 2931 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Laszlo B Kish - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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A Static-loop-current Attack Against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) Secure Key Exchange System
'MDPI AG', 2019Co-Authors: Mutaz Y. Melhem, Laszlo B KishAbstract:In this study, a new attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) key distribution system is explored. The attack is based on utilizing a parasitic voltage-source in the loop. Relevant situations often exist in the low-frequency limit in practical systems, especially when the communication is over a distance, or between different units within an instrument, due to a ground loop and/or electromagnetic interference (EMI). Our present study investigates the DC ground loop situation when no AC or EMI effects are present. Surprisingly, the usual current/voltage comparison-based defense method that exposes active attacks or parasitic features (such as wire resistance allowing information leaks) does not function here. The attack is successfully demonstrated and proposed defense methods against the attack are shown
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unconditionally secure credit debit card chip scheme and physical unclonable function
Fluctuation and Noise Letters, 2017Co-Authors: Laszlo B Kish, Claesgoran Granqvist, Kamran Entesari, Chiman KwanAbstract:The statistical-physics-based Kirchhoff-Law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) key exchange offers a new and simple unclonable system for credit/debit card chip authentication and payment. The key exchange, the authentication and the communication are unconditionally secure so that neither mathematics- nor statistics-based attacks are able to crack the scheme. The ohmic connection and the short wiring lengths between the chips in the card and the terminal constitute an ideal setting for the KLJN protocol, and even its simplest versions offer unprecedented security and privacy for credit/debit card chips and applications of physical unclonable functions (PUFs).
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random resistor random temperature Kirchhoff Law johnson noise rrrt kljn key exchange
Metrology and Measurement Systems, 2016Co-Authors: Laszlo B Kish, Claesgoran GranqvistAbstract:We introduce two new Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution schemes which are generalizations of the original KLJN scheme. The first of these, the Random-Resistor (RR-) KLJN sch ...
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random resistor random temperature Kirchhoff Law johnson noise rrrt kljn key exchange
viXra, 2015Co-Authors: Laszlo B Kish, Claesgoran GranqvistAbstract:We introduce two new Kirchhoff-Law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution schemes which are generalizations of the original KLJN scheme. The first of these, the Random-Resistor (RR–) KLJN scheme, uses random resistors with values chosen from a quasi-continuum set. It is well-known since the creation of the KLJN concept that such a system could work in cryptography, because Alice and Bob can calculate the unknown resistance value from measurements, but the RR–KLJN system has not been addressed in prior publications since it was considered impractical. The reason for discussing it now is the second scheme, the Random-Resistor–Random-Temperature (RRRT–) KLJN key exchange, inspired by a recent paper of Vadai, Mingesz and Gingl, wherein security was shown to be maintained at non-zero power flow. In the RRRT–KLJN secure key exchange scheme, both the resistances and their temperatures are continuum random variables. We prove that the security of the RRRT–KLJN scheme can prevail at non-zero power flow, and thus the physical Law guaranteeing security is not the Second Law of Thermodynamics but the Fluctuation–Dissipation Theorem. Alice and Bob know their own resistances and temperatures and can calculate the resistance and temperature values at the other end of the communication channel from measured voltage, current and power-flow data in the wire. However, Eve cannot determine these values because, for her, there are four unknown quantities while she can set up only three equations. The RRRT–KLJN scheme has several advantages and makes all former attacks on the KLJN scheme invalid or incomplete.
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analysis of an attenuator artifact in an experimental attack by gunn allison abbott against the Kirchhoff Law johnson noise kljn secure key exchange system
Fluctuation and Noise Letters, 2015Co-Authors: Laszlo B Kish, Robert Mingesz, Zoltan Gingl, Gergely Vadai, Janusz Smulko, Claesgoran GranqvistAbstract:A recent paper by Gunn-Allison-Abbott (GAA) [L. J. Gunn et al., Scientific Reports 4 (2014) 6461] argued that the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system could experience a se ...
Claesgoran Granqvist - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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unconditionally secure credit debit card chip scheme and physical unclonable function
Fluctuation and Noise Letters, 2017Co-Authors: Laszlo B Kish, Claesgoran Granqvist, Kamran Entesari, Chiman KwanAbstract:The statistical-physics-based Kirchhoff-Law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) key exchange offers a new and simple unclonable system for credit/debit card chip authentication and payment. The key exchange, the authentication and the communication are unconditionally secure so that neither mathematics- nor statistics-based attacks are able to crack the scheme. The ohmic connection and the short wiring lengths between the chips in the card and the terminal constitute an ideal setting for the KLJN protocol, and even its simplest versions offer unprecedented security and privacy for credit/debit card chips and applications of physical unclonable functions (PUFs).
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random resistor random temperature Kirchhoff Law johnson noise rrrt kljn key exchange
Metrology and Measurement Systems, 2016Co-Authors: Laszlo B Kish, Claesgoran GranqvistAbstract:We introduce two new Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution schemes which are generalizations of the original KLJN scheme. The first of these, the Random-Resistor (RR-) KLJN sch ...
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random resistor random temperature Kirchhoff Law johnson noise rrrt kljn key exchange
viXra, 2015Co-Authors: Laszlo B Kish, Claesgoran GranqvistAbstract:We introduce two new Kirchhoff-Law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution schemes which are generalizations of the original KLJN scheme. The first of these, the Random-Resistor (RR–) KLJN scheme, uses random resistors with values chosen from a quasi-continuum set. It is well-known since the creation of the KLJN concept that such a system could work in cryptography, because Alice and Bob can calculate the unknown resistance value from measurements, but the RR–KLJN system has not been addressed in prior publications since it was considered impractical. The reason for discussing it now is the second scheme, the Random-Resistor–Random-Temperature (RRRT–) KLJN key exchange, inspired by a recent paper of Vadai, Mingesz and Gingl, wherein security was shown to be maintained at non-zero power flow. In the RRRT–KLJN secure key exchange scheme, both the resistances and their temperatures are continuum random variables. We prove that the security of the RRRT–KLJN scheme can prevail at non-zero power flow, and thus the physical Law guaranteeing security is not the Second Law of Thermodynamics but the Fluctuation–Dissipation Theorem. Alice and Bob know their own resistances and temperatures and can calculate the resistance and temperature values at the other end of the communication channel from measured voltage, current and power-flow data in the wire. However, Eve cannot determine these values because, for her, there are four unknown quantities while she can set up only three equations. The RRRT–KLJN scheme has several advantages and makes all former attacks on the KLJN scheme invalid or incomplete.
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analysis of an attenuator artifact in an experimental attack by gunn allison abbott against the Kirchhoff Law johnson noise kljn secure key exchange system
Fluctuation and Noise Letters, 2015Co-Authors: Laszlo B Kish, Robert Mingesz, Zoltan Gingl, Gergely Vadai, Janusz Smulko, Claesgoran GranqvistAbstract:A recent paper by Gunn-Allison-Abbott (GAA) [L. J. Gunn et al., Scientific Reports 4 (2014) 6461] argued that the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system could experience a se ...
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analysis of an attenuator artifact in an experimental attack by gunn allison abbott against the Kirchhoff Law johnson noise kljn secure key exchange system
arXiv: Cryptography and Security, 2014Co-Authors: Laszlo B Kish, Robert Mingesz, Zoltan Gingl, Gergely Vadai, Janusz Smulko, Claesgoran GranqvistAbstract:A recent paper by Gunn-Allison-Abbott (GAA) [L.J. Gunn et al., Scientific Reports 4 (2014) 6461] argued that the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system could experience a severe information leak. Here we refute their results and demonstrate that GAA's arguments ensue from a serious design fLaw in their system. Specifically, an attenuator broke the single Kirchhoff-loop into two coupled loops, which is an incorrect operation since the single loop is essential for the security in the KLJN system, and hence GAA's asserted information leak is trivial. Another consequence is that a fully defended KLJN system would not be able to function due to its built-in current-comparison defense against active (invasive) attacks. In this paper we crack GAA's scheme via an elementary current comparison attack which yields negligible error probability for Eve even without averaging over the correlation time of the noise.
Zoltan Gingl - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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generalized Kirchhoff Law johnson noise kljn secure key exchange system using arbitrary resistors
Scientific Reports, 2015Co-Authors: Gergely Vadai, Robert Mingesz, Zoltan GinglAbstract:The Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system has been introduced as a simple, very low cost and efficient classical physical alternative to quantum key distribution systems. The ideal system uses only a few electronic components—identical resistor pairs, switches and interconnecting wires—in order to guarantee perfectly protected data transmission. We show that a generalized KLJN system can provide unconditional security even if it is used with significantly less limitations. The more universal conditions ease practical realizations considerably and support more robust protection against attacks. Our theoretical results are confirmed by numerical simulations.
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generalized Kirchhoff Law johnson noise kljn secure key exchange system using arbitrary resistors
arXiv: Cryptography and Security, 2015Co-Authors: Gergely Vadai, Robert Mingesz, Zoltan GinglAbstract:The Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system has been introduced as a simple, very low cost and efficient classical physical alternative to quantum key distribution systems. The ideal system uses only a few electronic components - identical resistor pairs, switches and interconnecting wires - to guarantee perfectly protected data transmission. We show that a generalized KLJN system can provide unconditional security even if it is used with significantly less limitations. The more universal conditions ease practical realizations considerably and support more robust protection against attacks. Our theoretical results are confirmed by numerical simulations.
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analysis of an attenuator artifact in an experimental attack by gunn allison abbott against the Kirchhoff Law johnson noise kljn secure key exchange system
Fluctuation and Noise Letters, 2015Co-Authors: Laszlo B Kish, Robert Mingesz, Zoltan Gingl, Gergely Vadai, Janusz Smulko, Claesgoran GranqvistAbstract:A recent paper by Gunn-Allison-Abbott (GAA) [L. J. Gunn et al., Scientific Reports 4 (2014) 6461] argued that the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system could experience a se ...
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analysis of an attenuator artifact in an experimental attack by gunn allison abbott against the Kirchhoff Law johnson noise kljn secure key exchange system
arXiv: Cryptography and Security, 2014Co-Authors: Laszlo B Kish, Robert Mingesz, Zoltan Gingl, Gergely Vadai, Janusz Smulko, Claesgoran GranqvistAbstract:A recent paper by Gunn-Allison-Abbott (GAA) [L.J. Gunn et al., Scientific Reports 4 (2014) 6461] argued that the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system could experience a severe information leak. Here we refute their results and demonstrate that GAA's arguments ensue from a serious design fLaw in their system. Specifically, an attenuator broke the single Kirchhoff-loop into two coupled loops, which is an incorrect operation since the single loop is essential for the security in the KLJN system, and hence GAA's asserted information leak is trivial. Another consequence is that a fully defended KLJN system would not be able to function due to its built-in current-comparison defense against active (invasive) attacks. In this paper we crack GAA's scheme via an elementary current comparison attack which yields negligible error probability for Eve even without averaging over the correlation time of the noise.
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noise properties in the ideal Kirchhoff Law johnson noise secure communication system
PLOS ONE, 2014Co-Authors: Zoltan Gingl, Robert MingeszAbstract:In this paper we determine the noise properties needed for unconditional security for the ideal Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key distribution system using simple statistical analysis. It has already been shown using physical Laws that resistors and Johnson-like noise sources provide unconditional security. However real implementations use artificial noise generators, therefore it is a question if other kind of noise sources and resistor values could be used as well. We answer this question and in the same time we provide a theoretical basis to analyze real systems as well.
Robert Mingesz - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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generalized Kirchhoff Law johnson noise kljn secure key exchange system using arbitrary resistors
Scientific Reports, 2015Co-Authors: Gergely Vadai, Robert Mingesz, Zoltan GinglAbstract:The Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system has been introduced as a simple, very low cost and efficient classical physical alternative to quantum key distribution systems. The ideal system uses only a few electronic components—identical resistor pairs, switches and interconnecting wires—in order to guarantee perfectly protected data transmission. We show that a generalized KLJN system can provide unconditional security even if it is used with significantly less limitations. The more universal conditions ease practical realizations considerably and support more robust protection against attacks. Our theoretical results are confirmed by numerical simulations.
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generalized Kirchhoff Law johnson noise kljn secure key exchange system using arbitrary resistors
arXiv: Cryptography and Security, 2015Co-Authors: Gergely Vadai, Robert Mingesz, Zoltan GinglAbstract:The Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system has been introduced as a simple, very low cost and efficient classical physical alternative to quantum key distribution systems. The ideal system uses only a few electronic components - identical resistor pairs, switches and interconnecting wires - to guarantee perfectly protected data transmission. We show that a generalized KLJN system can provide unconditional security even if it is used with significantly less limitations. The more universal conditions ease practical realizations considerably and support more robust protection against attacks. Our theoretical results are confirmed by numerical simulations.
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analysis of an attenuator artifact in an experimental attack by gunn allison abbott against the Kirchhoff Law johnson noise kljn secure key exchange system
Fluctuation and Noise Letters, 2015Co-Authors: Laszlo B Kish, Robert Mingesz, Zoltan Gingl, Gergely Vadai, Janusz Smulko, Claesgoran GranqvistAbstract:A recent paper by Gunn-Allison-Abbott (GAA) [L. J. Gunn et al., Scientific Reports 4 (2014) 6461] argued that the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system could experience a se ...
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analysis of an attenuator artifact in an experimental attack by gunn allison abbott against the Kirchhoff Law johnson noise kljn secure key exchange system
arXiv: Cryptography and Security, 2014Co-Authors: Laszlo B Kish, Robert Mingesz, Zoltan Gingl, Gergely Vadai, Janusz Smulko, Claesgoran GranqvistAbstract:A recent paper by Gunn-Allison-Abbott (GAA) [L.J. Gunn et al., Scientific Reports 4 (2014) 6461] argued that the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system could experience a severe information leak. Here we refute their results and demonstrate that GAA's arguments ensue from a serious design fLaw in their system. Specifically, an attenuator broke the single Kirchhoff-loop into two coupled loops, which is an incorrect operation since the single loop is essential for the security in the KLJN system, and hence GAA's asserted information leak is trivial. Another consequence is that a fully defended KLJN system would not be able to function due to its built-in current-comparison defense against active (invasive) attacks. In this paper we crack GAA's scheme via an elementary current comparison attack which yields negligible error probability for Eve even without averaging over the correlation time of the noise.
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noise properties in the ideal Kirchhoff Law johnson noise secure communication system
PLOS ONE, 2014Co-Authors: Zoltan Gingl, Robert MingeszAbstract:In this paper we determine the noise properties needed for unconditional security for the ideal Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key distribution system using simple statistical analysis. It has already been shown using physical Laws that resistors and Johnson-like noise sources provide unconditional security. However real implementations use artificial noise generators, therefore it is a question if other kind of noise sources and resistor values could be used as well. We answer this question and in the same time we provide a theoretical basis to analyze real systems as well.
Gergely Vadai - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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generalized Kirchhoff Law johnson noise kljn secure key exchange system using arbitrary resistors
Scientific Reports, 2015Co-Authors: Gergely Vadai, Robert Mingesz, Zoltan GinglAbstract:The Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system has been introduced as a simple, very low cost and efficient classical physical alternative to quantum key distribution systems. The ideal system uses only a few electronic components—identical resistor pairs, switches and interconnecting wires—in order to guarantee perfectly protected data transmission. We show that a generalized KLJN system can provide unconditional security even if it is used with significantly less limitations. The more universal conditions ease practical realizations considerably and support more robust protection against attacks. Our theoretical results are confirmed by numerical simulations.
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generalized Kirchhoff Law johnson noise kljn secure key exchange system using arbitrary resistors
arXiv: Cryptography and Security, 2015Co-Authors: Gergely Vadai, Robert Mingesz, Zoltan GinglAbstract:The Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system has been introduced as a simple, very low cost and efficient classical physical alternative to quantum key distribution systems. The ideal system uses only a few electronic components - identical resistor pairs, switches and interconnecting wires - to guarantee perfectly protected data transmission. We show that a generalized KLJN system can provide unconditional security even if it is used with significantly less limitations. The more universal conditions ease practical realizations considerably and support more robust protection against attacks. Our theoretical results are confirmed by numerical simulations.
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analysis of an attenuator artifact in an experimental attack by gunn allison abbott against the Kirchhoff Law johnson noise kljn secure key exchange system
Fluctuation and Noise Letters, 2015Co-Authors: Laszlo B Kish, Robert Mingesz, Zoltan Gingl, Gergely Vadai, Janusz Smulko, Claesgoran GranqvistAbstract:A recent paper by Gunn-Allison-Abbott (GAA) [L. J. Gunn et al., Scientific Reports 4 (2014) 6461] argued that the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system could experience a se ...
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analysis of an attenuator artifact in an experimental attack by gunn allison abbott against the Kirchhoff Law johnson noise kljn secure key exchange system
arXiv: Cryptography and Security, 2014Co-Authors: Laszlo B Kish, Robert Mingesz, Zoltan Gingl, Gergely Vadai, Janusz Smulko, Claesgoran GranqvistAbstract:A recent paper by Gunn-Allison-Abbott (GAA) [L.J. Gunn et al., Scientific Reports 4 (2014) 6461] argued that the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system could experience a severe information leak. Here we refute their results and demonstrate that GAA's arguments ensue from a serious design fLaw in their system. Specifically, an attenuator broke the single Kirchhoff-loop into two coupled loops, which is an incorrect operation since the single loop is essential for the security in the KLJN system, and hence GAA's asserted information leak is trivial. Another consequence is that a fully defended KLJN system would not be able to function due to its built-in current-comparison defense against active (invasive) attacks. In this paper we crack GAA's scheme via an elementary current comparison attack which yields negligible error probability for Eve even without averaging over the correlation time of the noise.
