The Experts below are selected from a list of 53937 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Holger Görg - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Domestic multinationals, foreign affiliates, and Labour Demand elasticities
Review of World Economics, 2013Co-Authors: Olivier N. Godart, Holger Görg, David GreenawayAbstract:Using information on a panel of multinational firms operating in the United Kingdom from 1996 to 2005, we find that Labour Demand in domestic multinationals is less sensitive to Labour cost changes than in foreign multinationals. This difference in the wage elasticity of Labour Demand persists even when we control for the skill intensity of firms or their level of intangible assets. This is in line with an interpretation that the provision of headquarter services in domestic multinational firms protects against strong fluctuations in Labour Demand. Overall, our results suggest that the wage elasticity of Labour Demand is about 40 % lower in domestic than in foreign multinationals.
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domestic multinationals foreign affiliates and Labour Demand elasticities
Social Science Research Network, 2012Co-Authors: Olivier Godart, Holger Görg, David GreenawayAbstract:Using information on a panel of multinational firms operating in the United Kingdom from 1996 to 2005, we find that Labour Demand in domestic multinationals is less sensitive to Labour cost changes than in foreign multinationals. This difference in the wage elasticity of Labour Demand persists even when we control for the skill intensity of firms or their level of intangible assets. This is in line with an interpretation that the provision of headquarter services in domestic multinational firms protects against strong fluctuations in Labour Demand. Overall, our results suggest that the wage elasticity of Labour Demand is about 40 percent lower in domestic than in foreign multinationals.
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multinational companies backward linkages and Labour Demand elasticities
Canadian Journal of Economics, 2009Co-Authors: Holger Görg, Michael Henry, Eric Strobl, Frank WalshAbstract:Leverhulme Trust (Programme Grant No. F114/BF; Economic and Social Research Council (Grant No. RES-000-22-0468).
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multinational companies backward linkages and Labour Demand elasticities
Research Papers in Economics, 2006Co-Authors: Holger Görg, Michael Henry, Eric Strobl, Frank WalshAbstract:This paper investigates the link between nationality of ownership and wage elasticities of Labour Demand at the level of the plant. In particular, we examine whether Labour Demand in multinationals becomes less elastic with respect to the wage if the plant has backward linkages with the local economy. Our empirical evidence, based on a rich plant level dataset, shows that the extent of local linkages indeed generally reduces the wage elasticity of Labour Demand. This result is economically important and holds for a number of different specifications.
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international outsourcing and the skill structure of Labour Demand in the united kingdom
The Economic Journal, 2005Co-Authors: Alexander Hijzen, Holger Görg, Robert C HineAbstract:This paper investigates empirically the link between international outsourcing and the skill structure of Labour Demand in the United Kingdom. It is the first detailed study of this issue for the UK. Outsourcing is calculated using import-use matrices of input-output tables for manufacturing industries for the period 1982 to 1996. Estimating a system of variable factor Demands, our main results show that international outsourcing has had a strong negative impact on the Demand for unskilled Labour. Hence, international outsourcing is an important component in explanations of the changing skill structure of manufacturing industries in the United Kingdom.
Geofrey P Stapledon - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the determinants of ceo compensation rent extraction or Labour Demand
British Accounting Review, 2006Co-Authors: Keryn Chalmers, Pingsheng Koh, Geofrey P StapledonAbstract:Abstract CEO compensation is topical and controversial and accordingly receiving considerable attention by various stakeholders. We investigate whether rent extraction or Labour Demand explains CEO compensation level in Australia. We do so by examining the determinants (economic, governance and ownership) of CEO compensation level and explore the relationship between predicted excess compensation and subsequent firm performance. Our results suggest that governance and ownership attributes, in addition to economic attributes, are significant determinants of CEO compensation. However, these attributes differentially determine the various components of CEO compensation. Our evidence is consistent with: (1) the determination of fixed salary and share-based compensation reflecting a firm's Demand for a high-quality CEO; and (2) the CEO's ability to extract rent through bonus and options compensation, particularly for smaller firms or firms with above average performance. However, the rent extraction is not economically significant and does not persist beyond one year. This is in sharp contrast to the US evidence where rent extraction through CEO compensation is pervasive, economically significant and persistent [Core, J., Holthausen, R., Larcker, D., 1999. Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics 51, 371–406].
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the determinants of ceo compensation rent extraction or Labour Demand
Social Science Research Network, 2006Co-Authors: Keryn Chalmers, Pingsheng Koh, Geofrey P StapledonAbstract:CEO compensation is topical and controversial and accordingly receiving considerable attention by various stakeholders. We investigate whether rent extraction or Labour Demand explains CEO compensation level in Australia. We do so by examining the determinants (economic, governance and ownership) of CEO compensation level and explore the relationship between predicted excess compensation and subsequent firm performance. Our results suggest that governance and ownership attributes, in addition to economic attributes, are significant determinants of CEO compensation. However, these attributes differentially determine the various components of CEO compensation. Our evidence is consistent with: a) the determination of fixed salary and share based compensation reflecting a firm's Demand for a high quality CEO; and b) the CEO's ability to extract rent through bonus and options compensation, particularly for smaller firms or firms with above average performance. However, the rent extraction is not economically significant and does not persist beyond one year. This is in sharp contrast to the US evidence where rent extraction through CEO compensation is pervasive, economically significant and persistent (Core, Holthausen & Larcker, 1999).
Keryn Chalmers - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the determinants of ceo compensation rent extraction or Labour Demand
British Accounting Review, 2006Co-Authors: Keryn Chalmers, Pingsheng Koh, Geofrey P StapledonAbstract:Abstract CEO compensation is topical and controversial and accordingly receiving considerable attention by various stakeholders. We investigate whether rent extraction or Labour Demand explains CEO compensation level in Australia. We do so by examining the determinants (economic, governance and ownership) of CEO compensation level and explore the relationship between predicted excess compensation and subsequent firm performance. Our results suggest that governance and ownership attributes, in addition to economic attributes, are significant determinants of CEO compensation. However, these attributes differentially determine the various components of CEO compensation. Our evidence is consistent with: (1) the determination of fixed salary and share-based compensation reflecting a firm's Demand for a high-quality CEO; and (2) the CEO's ability to extract rent through bonus and options compensation, particularly for smaller firms or firms with above average performance. However, the rent extraction is not economically significant and does not persist beyond one year. This is in sharp contrast to the US evidence where rent extraction through CEO compensation is pervasive, economically significant and persistent [Core, J., Holthausen, R., Larcker, D., 1999. Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics 51, 371–406].
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the determinants of ceo compensation rent extraction or Labour Demand
Social Science Research Network, 2006Co-Authors: Keryn Chalmers, Pingsheng Koh, Geofrey P StapledonAbstract:CEO compensation is topical and controversial and accordingly receiving considerable attention by various stakeholders. We investigate whether rent extraction or Labour Demand explains CEO compensation level in Australia. We do so by examining the determinants (economic, governance and ownership) of CEO compensation level and explore the relationship between predicted excess compensation and subsequent firm performance. Our results suggest that governance and ownership attributes, in addition to economic attributes, are significant determinants of CEO compensation. However, these attributes differentially determine the various components of CEO compensation. Our evidence is consistent with: a) the determination of fixed salary and share based compensation reflecting a firm's Demand for a high quality CEO; and b) the CEO's ability to extract rent through bonus and options compensation, particularly for smaller firms or firms with above average performance. However, the rent extraction is not economically significant and does not persist beyond one year. This is in sharp contrast to the US evidence where rent extraction through CEO compensation is pervasive, economically significant and persistent (Core, Holthausen & Larcker, 1999).
David Greenaway - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Domestic multinationals, foreign affiliates, and Labour Demand elasticities
Review of World Economics, 2013Co-Authors: Olivier N. Godart, Holger Görg, David GreenawayAbstract:Using information on a panel of multinational firms operating in the United Kingdom from 1996 to 2005, we find that Labour Demand in domestic multinationals is less sensitive to Labour cost changes than in foreign multinationals. This difference in the wage elasticity of Labour Demand persists even when we control for the skill intensity of firms or their level of intangible assets. This is in line with an interpretation that the provision of headquarter services in domestic multinational firms protects against strong fluctuations in Labour Demand. Overall, our results suggest that the wage elasticity of Labour Demand is about 40 % lower in domestic than in foreign multinationals.
-
domestic multinationals foreign affiliates and Labour Demand elasticities
Social Science Research Network, 2012Co-Authors: Olivier Godart, Holger Görg, David GreenawayAbstract:Using information on a panel of multinational firms operating in the United Kingdom from 1996 to 2005, we find that Labour Demand in domestic multinationals is less sensitive to Labour cost changes than in foreign multinationals. This difference in the wage elasticity of Labour Demand persists even when we control for the skill intensity of firms or their level of intangible assets. This is in line with an interpretation that the provision of headquarter services in domestic multinational firms protects against strong fluctuations in Labour Demand. Overall, our results suggest that the wage elasticity of Labour Demand is about 40 percent lower in domestic than in foreign multinationals.
Frank Walsh - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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multinational companies backward linkages and Labour Demand elasticities
Canadian Journal of Economics, 2009Co-Authors: Holger Görg, Michael Henry, Eric Strobl, Frank WalshAbstract:Leverhulme Trust (Programme Grant No. F114/BF; Economic and Social Research Council (Grant No. RES-000-22-0468).
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multinational companies backward linkages and Labour Demand elasticities
Research Papers in Economics, 2006Co-Authors: Holger Görg, Michael Henry, Eric Strobl, Frank WalshAbstract:This paper investigates the link between nationality of ownership and wage elasticities of Labour Demand at the level of the plant. In particular, we examine whether Labour Demand in multinationals becomes less elastic with respect to the wage if the plant has backward linkages with the local economy. Our empirical evidence, based on a rich plant level dataset, shows that the extent of local linkages indeed generally reduces the wage elasticity of Labour Demand. This result is economically important and holds for a number of different specifications.
