The Experts below are selected from a list of 7566 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Jon M Peha - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
sharing spectrum through spectrum policy reform and cognitive radio
Proceedings of the IEEE, 2009Co-Authors: Jon M PehaAbstract:Traditionally, interference protection is guaranteed through a policy of spectrum licensing, whereby wireless systems get exclusive access to spectrum. This is an effective way to prevent interference, but it leads to highly inefficient use of spectrum. Cognitive radio along with software radio, spectrum sensors, mesh networks, and other emerging technologies can facilitate new forms of spectrum sharing that greatly improve spectral efficiency and alleviate scarcity, if policies are in place that support these forms of sharing. On the other hand, new technology that is inconsistent with spectrum policy will have little impact. This paper discusses policies that can enable or facilitate use of many spectrum-sharing arrangements, where the arrangements are categorized as being based on coexistence or cooperation and as sharing among equals or primary-secondary sharing. A shared spectrum band may be managed directly by the regulator, or this responsibility may be delegated in large part to a License-Holder. The type of sharing arrangement and the entity that manages it have a great impact on which technical approaches are viable and effective. The most efficient and cost-effective form of spectrum sharing will depend on the type of systems involved, where systems under current consideration are as diverse as television broadcasters, cellular carriers, public safety systems, point-to-point links, and personal and local-area networks. In addition, while cognitive radio offers policy-makers the opportunity to improve spectral efficiency, cognitive radio also provides new challenges for policy enforcement. A responsible regulator will not allow a device into the marketplace that might harm other systems. Thus, designers must seek innovative ways to assure regulators that new devices will comply with policy requirements and will not cause harmful interference.
-
sharing spectrum through spectrum policy reform and cognitive radio policy management by regulators and License Holders is important for implementing the best means for dynamically sharing the limited and precious communications spectrum
2009Co-Authors: Jon M PehaAbstract:Traditionally, interference protection is guaran- teed through a policy of spectrum licensing, whereby wireless systems get exclusive access to spectrum. This is an effective way to prevent interference, but it leads to highly inefficient use of spectrum. Cognitive radio along with software radio, spectrum sensors, mesh networks, and other emerging tech- nologies can facilitate new forms of spectrum sharing that greatly improve spectral efficiency and alleviate scarcity, if policies are in place that support these forms of sharing. On the other hand, new technology that is inconsistent with spectrum policy will have little impact. This paper discusses policies that can enable or facilitate use of many spectrum-sharing arrange- ments, where the arrangements are categorized as being based on coexistence or cooperation and as sharing among equals or primary-secondary sharing. A shared spectrum band may be managed directly by the regulator, or this responsibility may be delegated in large part to a License-Holder. The type of sharing arrangement and the entity that manages it have a great impact on which technical approaches are viable and effective. The most efficient and cost-effective form of spectrum sharing will depend on the type of systems involved, where systems under current consideration are as diverse as television broadcasters, cellular carriers, public safety systems, point-to-point links, and personal and local-area networks. In addition, while cognitive radio offers policy-makers the opportunity to improve spectral efficiency, cognitive radio also provides new challenges for policy enforcement. A responsible regulator will not allow a device into the marketplace that might harm other systems. Thus, designers must seek innovative ways to assure regulators that new devices will comply with policy require- ments and will not cause harmful interference.
-
real time secondary markets for spectrum
Telecommunications Policy, 2004Co-Authors: Jon M Peha, Sooksan PanichpapiboonAbstract:Abstract Spectrum licensing enables quality of service guarantees, but often leads to inefficient use of spectrum. UnLicensed spectrum promotes efficiency through sharing, but quality of service cannot be guaranteed, which is a serious problem for some applications. Such applications may be better served by a real-time secondary market, where secondary users ask the License-Holder for temporary access to spectrum as needed. Access is granted when and only when quality of service requirements can be met for both License-Holder and secondary users. This paper quantitatively assesses real-time secondary markets for the special case of a cellular License-Holder. It demonstrates that many secondary users can access spectrum with little impact on the primary cellular customers, and that cellular carriers profit even if the price for secondary access is quite low. Finally, it addresses the challenges of transferring funds from secondary user to License-Holder.
-
real time secondary markets for spectrum
Social Science Research Network, 2003Co-Authors: Jon M Peha, Sooksan PanichpapiboonAbstract:Spectrum licensing is one effective way to guarantee adequate quality of service for License-Holders, because they can have exclusive access to spectrum. However, exclusivity also leads to inefficient use of spectrum, which contributes to today’s shortage of spectrum. UnLicensed spectrum is a valuable way to increase sharing, and potentially achieve much greater spectral efficiency, but guaranteed quality of service is not available in unLicensed spectrum, which is a serious problem for some applications. This paper explores a regulatory alternative where License-Holder and secondary spectrum users share spectrum, thereby increasing spectrum efficiency and alleviating spectrum scarcity, and where quality of service can be guaranteed. This is a real-time secondary market, where secondary users ask the License-Holder for temporary access to spectrum as needed. The License-Holder permits this sharing when and only when it determines that quality of service requirements can still be met for both License-Holder and secondary users. In this paper, we quantitatively assess the costs and benefits of a real-time secondary market for the special case where the License-Holder happens to be a GSM-based cellular carrier. We demonstrate that the License-Holder can let many secondary users share spectrum with little impact on the capacity available to cellular customers. We further show that the cellular carrier profits from this arrangement even if the price for secondary access is quite low, making this an attractive scheme for both License-Holder and secondary users. Finally, we address the challenges of transferring funds from secondary user to License-Holder, and show that solutions to these challenges do exist.
Sooksan Panichpapiboon - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
real time secondary markets for spectrum
Telecommunications Policy, 2004Co-Authors: Jon M Peha, Sooksan PanichpapiboonAbstract:Abstract Spectrum licensing enables quality of service guarantees, but often leads to inefficient use of spectrum. UnLicensed spectrum promotes efficiency through sharing, but quality of service cannot be guaranteed, which is a serious problem for some applications. Such applications may be better served by a real-time secondary market, where secondary users ask the License-Holder for temporary access to spectrum as needed. Access is granted when and only when quality of service requirements can be met for both License-Holder and secondary users. This paper quantitatively assesses real-time secondary markets for the special case of a cellular License-Holder. It demonstrates that many secondary users can access spectrum with little impact on the primary cellular customers, and that cellular carriers profit even if the price for secondary access is quite low. Finally, it addresses the challenges of transferring funds from secondary user to License-Holder.
-
real time secondary markets for spectrum
Social Science Research Network, 2003Co-Authors: Jon M Peha, Sooksan PanichpapiboonAbstract:Spectrum licensing is one effective way to guarantee adequate quality of service for License-Holders, because they can have exclusive access to spectrum. However, exclusivity also leads to inefficient use of spectrum, which contributes to today’s shortage of spectrum. UnLicensed spectrum is a valuable way to increase sharing, and potentially achieve much greater spectral efficiency, but guaranteed quality of service is not available in unLicensed spectrum, which is a serious problem for some applications. This paper explores a regulatory alternative where License-Holder and secondary spectrum users share spectrum, thereby increasing spectrum efficiency and alleviating spectrum scarcity, and where quality of service can be guaranteed. This is a real-time secondary market, where secondary users ask the License-Holder for temporary access to spectrum as needed. The License-Holder permits this sharing when and only when it determines that quality of service requirements can still be met for both License-Holder and secondary users. In this paper, we quantitatively assess the costs and benefits of a real-time secondary market for the special case where the License-Holder happens to be a GSM-based cellular carrier. We demonstrate that the License-Holder can let many secondary users share spectrum with little impact on the capacity available to cellular customers. We further show that the cellular carrier profits from this arrangement even if the price for secondary access is quite low, making this an attractive scheme for both License-Holder and secondary users. Finally, we address the challenges of transferring funds from secondary user to License-Holder, and show that solutions to these challenges do exist.
Ben Liang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
designing truthful spectrum double auctions with local markets
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 2014Co-Authors: Wei Wang, Ben LiangAbstract:Market-driven spectrum auctions offer an efficient way to improve spectrum utilization by transferring unused or underused spectrum from its primary License Holder to spectrum-deficient secondary users. Such a spectrum market exhibits strong locality in two aspects: 1) that spectrum is a local resource and can only be traded to users within the License area, and 2) that Holders can partition the entire License areas and sell any pieces in the market. We design a spectrum double auction that incorporates such locality in spectrum markets, while keeping the auction economically robust and computationally efficient. Our designs are tailored to cases with and without the knowledge of bid distributions. Complementary simulation studies show that spectrum utilization can be significantly improved when distribution information is available. Therefore, an auctioneer can start from one design without any a priori information, and then switch to the other alternative after accumulating sufficient distribution knowledge. With minor modifications, our designs are also effective for a profit-driven auctioneer aiming to maximize the auction revenue.
-
district embracing local markets in truthful spectrum double auctions
Sensor Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks, 2011Co-Authors: Wei Wang, Ben LiangAbstract:Market-driven spectrum auctions offer an efficient way to improve spectrum utilization by transferring unused or under-used spectrum from its primary License Holder to spectrum-deficient secondary users. Such a spectrum market exhibits strong locality in two aspects: 1) that spectrum is a local resource and can only be traded to users within the License area, and 2) that Holders can partition the entire License areas and sell any pieces in the market. We design a spectrum double auction that incorporates such locality in spectrum markets, while keeping the auction economically robust and computationally efficient. Our designs in District are tailored to cases with and without knowledge of bid distributions. An auctioneer can start from one design without any a priori information, and then switch to the other alternative after accumulating sufficient distribution knowledge. Complementary simulation studies show that spectrum utilization can be significantly improved when distribution information is available.
Wei Wang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
designing truthful spectrum double auctions with local markets
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 2014Co-Authors: Wei Wang, Ben LiangAbstract:Market-driven spectrum auctions offer an efficient way to improve spectrum utilization by transferring unused or underused spectrum from its primary License Holder to spectrum-deficient secondary users. Such a spectrum market exhibits strong locality in two aspects: 1) that spectrum is a local resource and can only be traded to users within the License area, and 2) that Holders can partition the entire License areas and sell any pieces in the market. We design a spectrum double auction that incorporates such locality in spectrum markets, while keeping the auction economically robust and computationally efficient. Our designs are tailored to cases with and without the knowledge of bid distributions. Complementary simulation studies show that spectrum utilization can be significantly improved when distribution information is available. Therefore, an auctioneer can start from one design without any a priori information, and then switch to the other alternative after accumulating sufficient distribution knowledge. With minor modifications, our designs are also effective for a profit-driven auctioneer aiming to maximize the auction revenue.
-
district embracing local markets in truthful spectrum double auctions
Sensor Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks, 2011Co-Authors: Wei Wang, Ben LiangAbstract:Market-driven spectrum auctions offer an efficient way to improve spectrum utilization by transferring unused or under-used spectrum from its primary License Holder to spectrum-deficient secondary users. Such a spectrum market exhibits strong locality in two aspects: 1) that spectrum is a local resource and can only be traded to users within the License area, and 2) that Holders can partition the entire License areas and sell any pieces in the market. We design a spectrum double auction that incorporates such locality in spectrum markets, while keeping the auction economically robust and computationally efficient. Our designs in District are tailored to cases with and without knowledge of bid distributions. An auctioneer can start from one design without any a priori information, and then switch to the other alternative after accumulating sufficient distribution knowledge. Complementary simulation studies show that spectrum utilization can be significantly improved when distribution information is available.
Vahid Tarokh - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
cognitive radio networks
IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, 2008Co-Authors: Natasha Devroye, Vahid TarokhAbstract:In recent years, the development of intelligent, adaptive wireless devices called cognitive radios, together with the introduction of secondary spectrum licensing, has led to a new paradigm in communications: cognitive networks. Cognitive networks are wireless networks that consist of several types of users: often a primary user (the primary License-Holder of a spectrum band) and secondary users (cognitive radios). These cognitive users employ their cognitive abilities to communicate without harming the primary users. The study of cognitive networks is relatively new and many questions are yet to be answered. In this article we highlight some of the recent information theoretic limits, models, and design of these promising networks.
