The Experts below are selected from a list of 26514 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Eleni Diamanti - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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preventing calibration attacks on the Local Oscillator in continuous variable quantum key distribution
Physical Review A, 2013Co-Authors: Paul Jouguet, Sebastien Kunzjacques, Eleni DiamantiAbstract:Establishing an information-theoretic secret key between two parties using a quantum key distribution (QKD) system is only possible when an accurate characterization of the quantum channel and proper device calibration routines are combined. Indeed, security loopholes due to inappropriate calibration routines have been shown for discrete-variable QKD. Here, we propose and provide experimental evidence of an attack targeting the Local Oscillator calibration routine of a continuous-variable QKD system. The attack consists in manipulating the classical Local Oscillator pulses during the QKD run in order to modify the clock pulses used at the detection stage. This allows the eavesdropper to bias the shot noise estimation usually performed using a calibrated relationship. This loophole can be used to perform successfully an intercept-resend attack. We characterize the loophole and suggest possible countermeasures.
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preventing calibration attacks on the Local Oscillator in continuous variable quantum key distribution
Physical Review A, 2013Co-Authors: Paul Jouguet, Sebastien Kunzjacques, Eleni DiamantiAbstract:Establishing an information-theoretic secret key between two parties using a quantum key distribution (QKD) system is only possible when an accurate characterization of the quantum channel and proper device calibration routines are combined. Indeed, security loopholes due to inappropriate calibration routines have been shown for discrete-variable QKD. Here, we propose and provide experimental evidence of an attack targeting the Local Oscillator calibration routine of a continuous-variable QKD system. The attack consists in manipulating the classical Local Oscillator pulses during the QKD run in order to modify the clock pulses used at the detection stage. This allows the eavesdropper to bias the shot noise estimation usually performed using a calibrated relationship. This loophole can be used to perform successfully an intercept-resend attack. We characterize the loophole and suggest possible countermeasures.
Paul Jouguet - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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preventing calibration attacks on the Local Oscillator in continuous variable quantum key distribution
Physical Review A, 2013Co-Authors: Paul Jouguet, Sebastien Kunzjacques, Eleni DiamantiAbstract:Establishing an information-theoretic secret key between two parties using a quantum key distribution (QKD) system is only possible when an accurate characterization of the quantum channel and proper device calibration routines are combined. Indeed, security loopholes due to inappropriate calibration routines have been shown for discrete-variable QKD. Here, we propose and provide experimental evidence of an attack targeting the Local Oscillator calibration routine of a continuous-variable QKD system. The attack consists in manipulating the classical Local Oscillator pulses during the QKD run in order to modify the clock pulses used at the detection stage. This allows the eavesdropper to bias the shot noise estimation usually performed using a calibrated relationship. This loophole can be used to perform successfully an intercept-resend attack. We characterize the loophole and suggest possible countermeasures.
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preventing calibration attacks on the Local Oscillator in continuous variable quantum key distribution
Physical Review A, 2013Co-Authors: Paul Jouguet, Sebastien Kunzjacques, Eleni DiamantiAbstract:Establishing an information-theoretic secret key between two parties using a quantum key distribution (QKD) system is only possible when an accurate characterization of the quantum channel and proper device calibration routines are combined. Indeed, security loopholes due to inappropriate calibration routines have been shown for discrete-variable QKD. Here, we propose and provide experimental evidence of an attack targeting the Local Oscillator calibration routine of a continuous-variable QKD system. The attack consists in manipulating the classical Local Oscillator pulses during the QKD run in order to modify the clock pulses used at the detection stage. This allows the eavesdropper to bias the shot noise estimation usually performed using a calibrated relationship. This loophole can be used to perform successfully an intercept-resend attack. We characterize the loophole and suggest possible countermeasures.
Sebastien Kunzjacques - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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preventing calibration attacks on the Local Oscillator in continuous variable quantum key distribution
Physical Review A, 2013Co-Authors: Paul Jouguet, Sebastien Kunzjacques, Eleni DiamantiAbstract:Establishing an information-theoretic secret key between two parties using a quantum key distribution (QKD) system is only possible when an accurate characterization of the quantum channel and proper device calibration routines are combined. Indeed, security loopholes due to inappropriate calibration routines have been shown for discrete-variable QKD. Here, we propose and provide experimental evidence of an attack targeting the Local Oscillator calibration routine of a continuous-variable QKD system. The attack consists in manipulating the classical Local Oscillator pulses during the QKD run in order to modify the clock pulses used at the detection stage. This allows the eavesdropper to bias the shot noise estimation usually performed using a calibrated relationship. This loophole can be used to perform successfully an intercept-resend attack. We characterize the loophole and suggest possible countermeasures.
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preventing calibration attacks on the Local Oscillator in continuous variable quantum key distribution
Physical Review A, 2013Co-Authors: Paul Jouguet, Sebastien Kunzjacques, Eleni DiamantiAbstract:Establishing an information-theoretic secret key between two parties using a quantum key distribution (QKD) system is only possible when an accurate characterization of the quantum channel and proper device calibration routines are combined. Indeed, security loopholes due to inappropriate calibration routines have been shown for discrete-variable QKD. Here, we propose and provide experimental evidence of an attack targeting the Local Oscillator calibration routine of a continuous-variable QKD system. The attack consists in manipulating the classical Local Oscillator pulses during the QKD run in order to modify the clock pulses used at the detection stage. This allows the eavesdropper to bias the shot noise estimation usually performed using a calibrated relationship. This loophole can be used to perform successfully an intercept-resend attack. We characterize the loophole and suggest possible countermeasures.
Fabian Laudenbach - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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pilot assisted intradyne reception for high speed continuous variable quantum key distribution with true Local Oscillator
arXiv: Quantum Physics, 2019Co-Authors: Fabian Laudenbach, Bernhard Schrenk, Christoph Pacher, Michael Hentschel, Chihang Fred Fung, Fotini Karinou, Andreas Poppe, Momtchil Peev, Hannes HubelAbstract:We present a pilot-assisted coherent intradyne reception methodology for CV-QKD with true Local Oscillator. An optically phase-locked reference tone, prepared using carrier-suppressed optical single-sideband modulation, is multiplexed in polarisation and frequency to the 250 Mbaud quantum signal in order to provide optical frequency- and phase matching between quantum signal and Local Oscillator. Our concept allows for high symbol rates and can be operated at an extremely low excess-noise level, as validated by experimental measurements.
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high rate continuous variables quantum key distribution with piloted disciplined Local Oscillator
European Conference on Optical Communication, 2017Co-Authors: Bernhard Schrenk, Fabian Laudenbach, Christoph Pacher, Chihang Fred Fung, Andreas Poppe, Roland Lieger, D Hillerkuss, E Querasser, Gerhard Humer, Michael HentschelAbstract:We present a pilot-disciplined coherent intradyne reception methodology for 250 Mbaud CV-QKD with frequency/phase-matched Local Oscillator. Experimental measurements indicate a secure key rate of 2.9 Mb/s over a link length of 12.8 km and >30 Mb/s for shorter-reach scenarios.
Michael Hentschel - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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pilot assisted intradyne reception for high speed continuous variable quantum key distribution with true Local Oscillator
arXiv: Quantum Physics, 2019Co-Authors: Fabian Laudenbach, Bernhard Schrenk, Christoph Pacher, Michael Hentschel, Chihang Fred Fung, Fotini Karinou, Andreas Poppe, Momtchil Peev, Hannes HubelAbstract:We present a pilot-assisted coherent intradyne reception methodology for CV-QKD with true Local Oscillator. An optically phase-locked reference tone, prepared using carrier-suppressed optical single-sideband modulation, is multiplexed in polarisation and frequency to the 250 Mbaud quantum signal in order to provide optical frequency- and phase matching between quantum signal and Local Oscillator. Our concept allows for high symbol rates and can be operated at an extremely low excess-noise level, as validated by experimental measurements.
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high rate continuous variables quantum key distribution with piloted disciplined Local Oscillator
European Conference on Optical Communication, 2017Co-Authors: Bernhard Schrenk, Fabian Laudenbach, Christoph Pacher, Chihang Fred Fung, Andreas Poppe, Roland Lieger, D Hillerkuss, E Querasser, Gerhard Humer, Michael HentschelAbstract:We present a pilot-disciplined coherent intradyne reception methodology for 250 Mbaud CV-QKD with frequency/phase-matched Local Oscillator. Experimental measurements indicate a secure key rate of 2.9 Mb/s over a link length of 12.8 km and >30 Mb/s for shorter-reach scenarios.