The Experts below are selected from a list of 90 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Andrea Calabrò - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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ownership and control in Local Public Utilities the italian case
Journal of Management & Governance, 2013Co-Authors: Andrea Calabrò, Mariateresa Torchia, Francesco RanalliAbstract:The paper discusses the ownership and control structures of Local Public Utilities by showing evidence from the Italian case. In this discussion, the focus is on three main aspects: the ownership structure, the board composition and independence, and citizens’ involvement (service charters). The main results from this study reveal that there are controversial aspects, which need further investigation. The existence of a principal–principal conflict is clearly arising from an in-depth analysis of the ownership structures. In addition, the board of directors, because of the lack of actual independence, does not seem to be a useful arena to manage and solve these conflicts. Other governance mechanisms are thus needed, to increase accountability to citizens. Within this, service charters seem to be a useful tool to protect the “Public interest”. However, service charters content analysis suggests that further implementation actions are due. The paper contributes to the debate on conflicts of interests and governance mechanisms in Local Public Utilities suggesting possible developments of agency theory and discussing implications for further research. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2013
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Ownership and control in Local Public Utilities: the Italian case
Journal of Management & Governance, 2013Co-Authors: Andrea Calabrò, Mariateresa Torchia, Francesco RanalliAbstract:The paper discusses the ownership and control structures of Local Public Utilities by showing evidence from the Italian case. In this discussion, the focus is on three main aspects: the ownership structure, the board composition and independence, and citizens’ involvement (service charters). The main results from this study reveal that there are controversial aspects, which need further investigation. The existence of a principal–principal conflict is clearly arising from an in-depth analysis of the ownership structures. In addition, the board of directors, because of the lack of actual independence, does not seem to be a useful arena to manage and solve these conflicts. Other governance mechanisms are thus needed, to increase accountability to citizens. Within this, service charters seem to be a useful tool to protect the “Public interest”. However, service charters content analysis suggests that further implementation actions are due. The paper contributes to the debate on conflicts of interests and governance mechanisms in Local Public Utilities suggesting possible developments of agency theory and discussing implications for further research.
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conflicts of interest and governance mechanisms in italian Local Public Utilities
International Journal of Public Administration, 2011Co-Authors: Andrea Calabrò, Mariateresa TorchiaAbstract:Stemming from different theoretical perspectives the article examines the conflicts of interest arising among the actors (citizens, Local governments, private shareholders, service providers) that at various levels are involved in Local Public Utilities governance systems. The main results of a multiple case study analysis on 10 Italian listed Local Public Utilities are summarized. Different and coexisting situations of conflicts of interest among multiple principals and agents are identified. In this context, governance mechanisms (e.g., the board of directors) have different roles and functions and may prevent and mitigate such conflicts. However, our findings suggest that the ownership structure influences board composition and functioning and that higher numbers of independent directors do not necessarily mean “actual” board independence. The article contributes to the debate on conflicts of interest and governance mechanisms in Local Public Utilities.
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conflict of interests and governance mechanisms in italian Local Public Utilities
Banca Impresa Società, 2011Co-Authors: Andrea Calabrò, Mariateresa TorchiaAbstract:Stemming from agency theory, the paper examines governance mechanisms in Local Public Utilities (LPUs) in order to identify different and co-existing situations of conflict of interest t that may arise among the different actors (citizens, Local Governments, private shareholders, service providers) involved in the governance of LPUs. The paper summarizes the main results of the multiple case study analysis on 10 Italian listed LPUs identifying multiple principals and agents. Although governance mechanisms (e.g., the board of directors) have different roles and functions and may prevent and mitigate such conflicts, our findings suggest that there are several problematic issues. First, the effects of ownership structure on board composition and functioning. Second, higher numbers of independent directors do not mean "actual" board independence. Third, the Service Charter as a tool for promoting transparency, accountability and Public participation is not yet well implemented. The paper contributes to the debate on LPUs suggesting possible developments of agency theory by including forms of citizens' participation and engagement (co-production).
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governance issues in Local Public Utilities the italian perspective
2011Co-Authors: Andrea CalabròAbstract:Through the lens of agency theory, the paper examines the conflicts of interest arising among the actors (citizens, Local governments, private shareholders, service providers, etc.) that, at various levels, are involved in Local Public Utilities governance systems. The main results of a multiple case study analysis on ten Italian listed Local Public Utilities are summarized by identifying different and co-existing situations of conflict of interest among multiple principals and agents. Although governance mechanisms (e.g., the board of directors) have different roles and functions and may prevent and mitigate such conflicts, our findings pointed out that various problematic issues exist. First, the effects of the ownership structure on board composition and functioning needs to be further explored. Second, higher numbers of independent directors do not mean actual board independence. Third, service charters as tools for promoting transparency, accountability and Public participation are not well implemented yet. The chapter contributes to the debate on Local Public Utilities governance suggesting possible agency theory developments by focusing on different forms of citizens’ participation (e.g., co-production).
Francesco Ranalli - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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ownership and control in Local Public Utilities the italian case
Journal of Management & Governance, 2013Co-Authors: Andrea Calabrò, Mariateresa Torchia, Francesco RanalliAbstract:The paper discusses the ownership and control structures of Local Public Utilities by showing evidence from the Italian case. In this discussion, the focus is on three main aspects: the ownership structure, the board composition and independence, and citizens’ involvement (service charters). The main results from this study reveal that there are controversial aspects, which need further investigation. The existence of a principal–principal conflict is clearly arising from an in-depth analysis of the ownership structures. In addition, the board of directors, because of the lack of actual independence, does not seem to be a useful arena to manage and solve these conflicts. Other governance mechanisms are thus needed, to increase accountability to citizens. Within this, service charters seem to be a useful tool to protect the “Public interest”. However, service charters content analysis suggests that further implementation actions are due. The paper contributes to the debate on conflicts of interests and governance mechanisms in Local Public Utilities suggesting possible developments of agency theory and discussing implications for further research. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2013
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Ownership and control in Local Public Utilities: the Italian case
Journal of Management & Governance, 2013Co-Authors: Andrea Calabrò, Mariateresa Torchia, Francesco RanalliAbstract:The paper discusses the ownership and control structures of Local Public Utilities by showing evidence from the Italian case. In this discussion, the focus is on three main aspects: the ownership structure, the board composition and independence, and citizens’ involvement (service charters). The main results from this study reveal that there are controversial aspects, which need further investigation. The existence of a principal–principal conflict is clearly arising from an in-depth analysis of the ownership structures. In addition, the board of directors, because of the lack of actual independence, does not seem to be a useful arena to manage and solve these conflicts. Other governance mechanisms are thus needed, to increase accountability to citizens. Within this, service charters seem to be a useful tool to protect the “Public interest”. However, service charters content analysis suggests that further implementation actions are due. The paper contributes to the debate on conflicts of interests and governance mechanisms in Local Public Utilities suggesting possible developments of agency theory and discussing implications for further research.
Mariateresa Torchia - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Ownership and control in Local Public Utilities: the Italian case
Journal of Management & Governance, 2013Co-Authors: Andrea Calabrò, Mariateresa Torchia, Francesco RanalliAbstract:The paper discusses the ownership and control structures of Local Public Utilities by showing evidence from the Italian case. In this discussion, the focus is on three main aspects: the ownership structure, the board composition and independence, and citizens’ involvement (service charters). The main results from this study reveal that there are controversial aspects, which need further investigation. The existence of a principal–principal conflict is clearly arising from an in-depth analysis of the ownership structures. In addition, the board of directors, because of the lack of actual independence, does not seem to be a useful arena to manage and solve these conflicts. Other governance mechanisms are thus needed, to increase accountability to citizens. Within this, service charters seem to be a useful tool to protect the “Public interest”. However, service charters content analysis suggests that further implementation actions are due. The paper contributes to the debate on conflicts of interests and governance mechanisms in Local Public Utilities suggesting possible developments of agency theory and discussing implications for further research.
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ownership and control in Local Public Utilities the italian case
Journal of Management & Governance, 2013Co-Authors: Andrea Calabrò, Mariateresa Torchia, Francesco RanalliAbstract:The paper discusses the ownership and control structures of Local Public Utilities by showing evidence from the Italian case. In this discussion, the focus is on three main aspects: the ownership structure, the board composition and independence, and citizens’ involvement (service charters). The main results from this study reveal that there are controversial aspects, which need further investigation. The existence of a principal–principal conflict is clearly arising from an in-depth analysis of the ownership structures. In addition, the board of directors, because of the lack of actual independence, does not seem to be a useful arena to manage and solve these conflicts. Other governance mechanisms are thus needed, to increase accountability to citizens. Within this, service charters seem to be a useful tool to protect the “Public interest”. However, service charters content analysis suggests that further implementation actions are due. The paper contributes to the debate on conflicts of interests and governance mechanisms in Local Public Utilities suggesting possible developments of agency theory and discussing implications for further research. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2013
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conflicts of interest and governance mechanisms in italian Local Public Utilities
International Journal of Public Administration, 2011Co-Authors: Andrea Calabrò, Mariateresa TorchiaAbstract:Stemming from different theoretical perspectives the article examines the conflicts of interest arising among the actors (citizens, Local governments, private shareholders, service providers) that at various levels are involved in Local Public Utilities governance systems. The main results of a multiple case study analysis on 10 Italian listed Local Public Utilities are summarized. Different and coexisting situations of conflicts of interest among multiple principals and agents are identified. In this context, governance mechanisms (e.g., the board of directors) have different roles and functions and may prevent and mitigate such conflicts. However, our findings suggest that the ownership structure influences board composition and functioning and that higher numbers of independent directors do not necessarily mean “actual” board independence. The article contributes to the debate on conflicts of interest and governance mechanisms in Local Public Utilities.
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conflict of interests and governance mechanisms in italian Local Public Utilities
Banca Impresa Società, 2011Co-Authors: Andrea Calabrò, Mariateresa TorchiaAbstract:Stemming from agency theory, the paper examines governance mechanisms in Local Public Utilities (LPUs) in order to identify different and co-existing situations of conflict of interest t that may arise among the different actors (citizens, Local Governments, private shareholders, service providers) involved in the governance of LPUs. The paper summarizes the main results of the multiple case study analysis on 10 Italian listed LPUs identifying multiple principals and agents. Although governance mechanisms (e.g., the board of directors) have different roles and functions and may prevent and mitigate such conflicts, our findings suggest that there are several problematic issues. First, the effects of ownership structure on board composition and functioning. Second, higher numbers of independent directors do not mean "actual" board independence. Third, the Service Charter as a tool for promoting transparency, accountability and Public participation is not yet well implemented. The paper contributes to the debate on LPUs suggesting possible developments of agency theory by including forms of citizens' participation and engagement (co-production).
Graziella Sicoli - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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intellectual capital management in Local Public Utilities
Social Science Research Network, 2012Co-Authors: Romilda Mazzotta, Giovanni Bronzetti, Graziella SicoliAbstract:The competitive advantage of companies is increasingly focused on Intellectual Capital (IC) and on its management. Factors such as skills, innovation, stakeholders’ relation, development and sharing of knowledge have become key success factors. These aspects are important for Local Public Utilities. These organizations produce goods and services operating in competitive markets in a utility function for the Local community using technological and organizational infrastructure resources. In the past, in these organizations, IC was critical to reach objectives such as to satisfy citizen needs. Local Public Utilities focused their assets on the technical components of management including plant equipment, technical expertise, professionalism, and quality control and security systems. The introduction of the economic efficiency logic and competitiveness led to a rethinking of the IC role. The production of Public services becomes competitive in the market according to logic of economic efficiency. The relationship with the community begins to be formalized in “service contracts”; new management structures are introduced and companies need to remunerate the capital invested. Consequently, companies must implement strategic and organizational changes and focus on intangible assets as knowledge, skills and operational mechanisms. In the new scenario IC becomes an important strategic tool both in the company and in the outside environment. Proper IC management can improve company value.
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intellectual capital management in Local Public Utilities
Review of Business and Finance Studies, 2012Co-Authors: Romilda Mazzotta, Giovanni Bronzetti, Graziella SicoliAbstract:ABSTRACTThe competitive advantage of companies is increasingly focused on Intellectual Capital (IC) and on its management. Factors such as skills, innovation, stakeholders' relation, development and sharing of knowledge have become key success factors. These aspects are important for Local Public Utilities. These organizations produce goods and services operating in competitive markets in a utility function for the Local community using technological and organizational infrastructure resources. In the past, in these organizations, IC was critical to reach objectives such as to satisfy citizen needs. Local Public Utilities focused their assets on the technical components of management including plant equipment, technical expertise, professionalism, and quality control and security systems. The introduction of the economic efficiency logic and competitiveness led to a rethinking of the IC role. The production of Public services becomes competitive in the market according to logic of economic efficiency. The relationship with the community begins to be formalized in "service contracts"; new management structures are introduced and companies need to remunerate the capital invested. Consequently, companies must implement strategic and organizational changes and focus on intangible assets as knowledge, skills and operational mechanisms. In the new scenario IC becomes an important strategic tool both in the company and in the outside environment. Proper IC management can improve company value.JEL: E24; 123; J24; O15KEYWORDS: Intellectual capital, Intellectual capital management, Local Public Utilities.INTRODUCTIONKnowledge is a strategic resource and, for a competitive business, organizations are increasingly knowledge based and more often concerned about intellectual capital (IC) rather than tangible assets (Guthrie and Petty, 2000; Carmeli and Tishler, 2004; Schiuma et al, 2007). Intellectual capital is a company's softer assets such as professional experience, skills, knowledge, organizational structure and routine and internal/external relationship. The intellectual capital framework classifies these characteristics into human capital, organizational or structural capital and relational or customer capital (Edvisson and Malone, 1997; Stewart, 1997; Guthrie and Petty, 2000; Youndt and Snell, 2004). Human capital refers to the knowledge, skill and experience of employees and managers; relational capital consisting of knowledge resources derived from networks of relationships between peer, customers, suppliers and business associates; and organizational capital represent institutionalized knowledge and codified experience stored in databases, routines, patents, manuals and the like (Bontis, 1998; Stewart 1997). These three new forms of capital capture a company in movement as it transforms its skills and knowledge into competitiveness. Therefore, companies must maintain and develop the existing capital structure and also acquire know-how, skills and professionalism, train and develop employees by emphasizing their business skills and capital to focus on trading and customers.In service companies, intellectual capital and knowledge management are as important as they can be in production-oriented companies. There is a lack of systematic research on whether there are fundamental differences in the IC of service-oriented versus product-oriented companies. For this reason this paper aims to examine the IC stocks, creation and management mechanisms in service-oriented firms. The paper examines these items for Italian Local Public Utilities. The Local Public Utilities (LPU) are companies operating in the services sector, established as limited companies in which the shareholder is Public. The aim of LPU is to create value for stakeholders. LPU stakeholders are not only the contributors of resources but also the community for which services are produced (Catturi, 2004). An LPU, therefore, creates value for stakeholders to adequately compensate all the factors used in the production process and meet, at the same time, the needs of Local communities (Grossi, 2005). …
Francesca Stroffolini - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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a normative analysis of Local Public Utilities investments in water networks
Social Science Research Network, 2015Co-Authors: Alberto Cavaliere, Mario Maggi, Francesca StroffoliniAbstract:We analyze rehabilitation investments in a regulated water industry with perfectly inelastic demand. We compare alternative organizational solutions for Local provision (municipalization, corporatization and privatization), though subject to a common regulatory mechanism. We can then assess the effects of incentive regulation in Public firms and find that even benevolent politicians always stick to the price-cap, in order to save on distortionary taxation. However, incentives to invest result to be excessive only in private firms, as the cost of capital is accounted differently by Public and private undertakings.We also provide a theory of mixed firms, based on strategic interaction between politicians and managers, which contributes to endogenously explain partial privatization and minority participation by private stockholders. In this last case incentives to invest appear to be driven just by governance and ownership reasons.
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investments in water networks a normative analysis of Local Public Utilities
Research Papers in Economics, 2015Co-Authors: Alberto Cavaliere, Mario Maggi, Francesca StroffoliniAbstract:We analyze rehabilitation investments in a regulated water industry with perfectly inelastic demand. We compare alternative organizational solutions for Local provision (municipalization, corporatization and privatization), though subject to a common regulatory mechanism. We can then assess the effects of incentive regulation in Public firms and find that even benvolent politicians always stick to the price-cap, in order to save on distortionary taxation. How- ever, incentives to invest result to be excessive only in private firms, as the cost of capital is accounted differently by Public and private undertakings. We also provide a theory of mixed firms, based on strategic interaction be- tween politicians and managers, which contributes to endogenously explain partial privatization and minority participation by private stockholders. In this last case incentives to invest appear to be driven just by governance and ownership reasons.
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a normative analysis of Local Public Utilities investments in water networks
Research Papers in Economics, 2015Co-Authors: Alberto Cavaliere, Mario Maggi, Francesca StroffoliniAbstract:We analyze rehabilitation investments in a regulated water industry with perfectly inelastic demand. We compare alternative organizational solutions for Local provision (municipalization, corporatization and privatization), though subject to a common regulatory mechanism. We can then assess the effects of incentive regulation in Public firms and find that even benvolent politicians always stick to the price-cap, in order to save on distortionary taxation. However, incentives to invest result to be excessive only in private firms, as the cost of capital is accounted differently by Public and private undertakings. We also provide a theory of mixed firms, based on strategic interaction between politicians and managers, which contributes to endogenously explain partial privatization and minority participation by private stockholders. In this last case incentives to invest appear to be driven just by governance and ownership reasons.