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Philippe Quirion - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Lump Sum vs energy efficiency subsidy recycling of carbon tax revenue in the residential sector a french assessment
Ecological Economics, 2021Co-Authors: Cyril Bourgeois, Louisgaetan Giraudet, Philippe QuirionAbstract:Abstract Empirical evidence suggests that carbon taxes are best accepted when their revenue is used to finance abatement measures. This revenue recycling option has however received little attention in modelling assessments. With the aim of filling this gap, we assess the impact of the French carbon tax on energy use for residential heating and compare the cost-effectiveness and distributional impacts of two revenue recycling options: Lump-Sum Payment and subsidies for home energy retrofits. We do so using Res-IRF, an energy-economy model that provides a highly detailed description of housing features (single vs. multi-family, energy efficiency, heating fuel) and key household characteristics (tenancy status, income). We find that the two recycling options offset the regressive impacts of the tax in comparable ways. Lump-Sum recycling is particularly effective in reducing inequalities between owner-occupiers and tenants. In turn, subsidy recycling saves energy and increases comfort more cost-effectively. In the discussion, we further point to some advantages of subsidy recycling from both a political and administrative perspective.
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Lump Sum vs energy efficiency subsidy recycling of carbon tax revenue in the residential sector a french assessment recyclage des revenus de la taxe carbone en paiements forfaitaires vs subventions a l efficacite energetique une evaluation pour le secteur residentiel francais
Research Papers in Economics, 2021Co-Authors: Cyril Bourgeois, Louisgaetan Giraudet, Philippe QuirionAbstract:Empirical evidence suggests that carbon taxes are best accepted when their revenue is used to finance abatement measures. This revenue recycling option has however received little attention in modelling assessments. With the aim of filling this gap, we assess the impact of the French carbon tax on energy use for residential heating and compare the cost-effectiveness and distributional impacts of two revenue recycling options: Lump-Sum Payment and subsidies for home energy retrofits. We do so using Res-IRF, an energy-economy model that provides a highly detailed description of housing features (single vs. multi-family, energy efficiency, heating fuel) and key household characteristics (tenancy status, income). We find that the two recycling options offset the regressive impacts of the tax in comparable ways. Lump-Sum recycling is particularly effective in reducing inequalities between owner-occupiers and tenants. In turn, subsidy recycling saves energy and increases comfort more cost-effectively. In the discussion, we further point to some advantages of subsidy recycling from both a political and administrative perspective.
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social environmental economic trade offs associated with carbon tax revenue recycling
2019Co-Authors: Cyril Bourgeois, Louisgaetan Giraudet, Philippe QuirionAbstract:As carbon taxes gain traction and grow tighter in OECD countries, the question of their recycling becomes crucial for political acceptance. Considering the impact of the French carbon tax in the residential sector, we examine the trade-offs between fuel poverty alleviation, energy savings and economic leverage for two revenue-recycling options-as a Lump-Sum Payment or as a subsidy for energy efficiency improvement, each restricted to low-income households-defined as those belonging to the first two quantiles of the income distribution. We do so using Res-IRF, a highly detailed energy-economy model that interacts housing features (single vs. multi-family, energy efficiency, heating fuel) with key household characteristics (tenancy status, income of both owners and occupants). We find that the energy efficiency subsidy recycling is superior to the Lump-Sum Payment in all respects; it even fully offsets the regressive effect of the carbon tax from 2025 onwards. No recycling, however, effectively addresses fuel poverty in private, rented housing.
Cyril Bourgeois - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Lump Sum vs energy efficiency subsidy recycling of carbon tax revenue in the residential sector a french assessment
Ecological Economics, 2021Co-Authors: Cyril Bourgeois, Louisgaetan Giraudet, Philippe QuirionAbstract:Abstract Empirical evidence suggests that carbon taxes are best accepted when their revenue is used to finance abatement measures. This revenue recycling option has however received little attention in modelling assessments. With the aim of filling this gap, we assess the impact of the French carbon tax on energy use for residential heating and compare the cost-effectiveness and distributional impacts of two revenue recycling options: Lump-Sum Payment and subsidies for home energy retrofits. We do so using Res-IRF, an energy-economy model that provides a highly detailed description of housing features (single vs. multi-family, energy efficiency, heating fuel) and key household characteristics (tenancy status, income). We find that the two recycling options offset the regressive impacts of the tax in comparable ways. Lump-Sum recycling is particularly effective in reducing inequalities between owner-occupiers and tenants. In turn, subsidy recycling saves energy and increases comfort more cost-effectively. In the discussion, we further point to some advantages of subsidy recycling from both a political and administrative perspective.
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Lump Sum vs energy efficiency subsidy recycling of carbon tax revenue in the residential sector a french assessment recyclage des revenus de la taxe carbone en paiements forfaitaires vs subventions a l efficacite energetique une evaluation pour le secteur residentiel francais
Research Papers in Economics, 2021Co-Authors: Cyril Bourgeois, Louisgaetan Giraudet, Philippe QuirionAbstract:Empirical evidence suggests that carbon taxes are best accepted when their revenue is used to finance abatement measures. This revenue recycling option has however received little attention in modelling assessments. With the aim of filling this gap, we assess the impact of the French carbon tax on energy use for residential heating and compare the cost-effectiveness and distributional impacts of two revenue recycling options: Lump-Sum Payment and subsidies for home energy retrofits. We do so using Res-IRF, an energy-economy model that provides a highly detailed description of housing features (single vs. multi-family, energy efficiency, heating fuel) and key household characteristics (tenancy status, income). We find that the two recycling options offset the regressive impacts of the tax in comparable ways. Lump-Sum recycling is particularly effective in reducing inequalities between owner-occupiers and tenants. In turn, subsidy recycling saves energy and increases comfort more cost-effectively. In the discussion, we further point to some advantages of subsidy recycling from both a political and administrative perspective.
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social environmental economic trade offs associated with carbon tax revenue recycling
2019Co-Authors: Cyril Bourgeois, Louisgaetan Giraudet, Philippe QuirionAbstract:As carbon taxes gain traction and grow tighter in OECD countries, the question of their recycling becomes crucial for political acceptance. Considering the impact of the French carbon tax in the residential sector, we examine the trade-offs between fuel poverty alleviation, energy savings and economic leverage for two revenue-recycling options-as a Lump-Sum Payment or as a subsidy for energy efficiency improvement, each restricted to low-income households-defined as those belonging to the first two quantiles of the income distribution. We do so using Res-IRF, a highly detailed energy-economy model that interacts housing features (single vs. multi-family, energy efficiency, heating fuel) with key household characteristics (tenancy status, income of both owners and occupants). We find that the energy efficiency subsidy recycling is superior to the Lump-Sum Payment in all respects; it even fully offsets the regressive effect of the carbon tax from 2025 onwards. No recycling, however, effectively addresses fuel poverty in private, rented housing.
Louisgaetan Giraudet - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Lump Sum vs energy efficiency subsidy recycling of carbon tax revenue in the residential sector a french assessment
Ecological Economics, 2021Co-Authors: Cyril Bourgeois, Louisgaetan Giraudet, Philippe QuirionAbstract:Abstract Empirical evidence suggests that carbon taxes are best accepted when their revenue is used to finance abatement measures. This revenue recycling option has however received little attention in modelling assessments. With the aim of filling this gap, we assess the impact of the French carbon tax on energy use for residential heating and compare the cost-effectiveness and distributional impacts of two revenue recycling options: Lump-Sum Payment and subsidies for home energy retrofits. We do so using Res-IRF, an energy-economy model that provides a highly detailed description of housing features (single vs. multi-family, energy efficiency, heating fuel) and key household characteristics (tenancy status, income). We find that the two recycling options offset the regressive impacts of the tax in comparable ways. Lump-Sum recycling is particularly effective in reducing inequalities between owner-occupiers and tenants. In turn, subsidy recycling saves energy and increases comfort more cost-effectively. In the discussion, we further point to some advantages of subsidy recycling from both a political and administrative perspective.
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Lump Sum vs energy efficiency subsidy recycling of carbon tax revenue in the residential sector a french assessment recyclage des revenus de la taxe carbone en paiements forfaitaires vs subventions a l efficacite energetique une evaluation pour le secteur residentiel francais
Research Papers in Economics, 2021Co-Authors: Cyril Bourgeois, Louisgaetan Giraudet, Philippe QuirionAbstract:Empirical evidence suggests that carbon taxes are best accepted when their revenue is used to finance abatement measures. This revenue recycling option has however received little attention in modelling assessments. With the aim of filling this gap, we assess the impact of the French carbon tax on energy use for residential heating and compare the cost-effectiveness and distributional impacts of two revenue recycling options: Lump-Sum Payment and subsidies for home energy retrofits. We do so using Res-IRF, an energy-economy model that provides a highly detailed description of housing features (single vs. multi-family, energy efficiency, heating fuel) and key household characteristics (tenancy status, income). We find that the two recycling options offset the regressive impacts of the tax in comparable ways. Lump-Sum recycling is particularly effective in reducing inequalities between owner-occupiers and tenants. In turn, subsidy recycling saves energy and increases comfort more cost-effectively. In the discussion, we further point to some advantages of subsidy recycling from both a political and administrative perspective.
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social environmental economic trade offs associated with carbon tax revenue recycling
2019Co-Authors: Cyril Bourgeois, Louisgaetan Giraudet, Philippe QuirionAbstract:As carbon taxes gain traction and grow tighter in OECD countries, the question of their recycling becomes crucial for political acceptance. Considering the impact of the French carbon tax in the residential sector, we examine the trade-offs between fuel poverty alleviation, energy savings and economic leverage for two revenue-recycling options-as a Lump-Sum Payment or as a subsidy for energy efficiency improvement, each restricted to low-income households-defined as those belonging to the first two quantiles of the income distribution. We do so using Res-IRF, a highly detailed energy-economy model that interacts housing features (single vs. multi-family, energy efficiency, heating fuel) with key household characteristics (tenancy status, income of both owners and occupants). We find that the energy efficiency subsidy recycling is superior to the Lump-Sum Payment in all respects; it even fully offsets the regressive effect of the carbon tax from 2025 onwards. No recycling, however, effectively addresses fuel poverty in private, rented housing.
Touzi Nizar - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Is there a Golden Parachute in Sannikov's principal-agent problem?
2020Co-Authors: Possamaï Dylan, Touzi NizarAbstract:This paper provides a complete review of the continuous-time optimal contracting problem introduced by Sannikov, in the extended context allowing for possibly different discount rates of both parties. The agent's problem is to seek for optimal effort, given the compensation scheme proposed by the principal over a random horizon. Then, given the optimal agent's response, the principal determines the best compensation scheme in terms of running Payment, retirement, and Lump-Sum Payment at retirement. A Golden Parachute is a situation where the agent ceases any effort at some positive stopping time, and receives a Payment afterwards, possibly under the form of a Lump-Sum Payment, or of a continuous stream of Payments. We show that a Golden Parachute only exists in certain specific circumstances. This is in contrast with the results claimed by Sannikov, where the only requirement is a positive agent's marginal cost of effort at zero. Namely, we show that there is no Golden Parachute if this parameter is too large. Similarly, in the context of a concave marginal utility, there is no Golden Parachute if the agent's utility function has a too negative curvature at zero. In the general case, we provide a rigorous analysis of this problem, and we prove that an agent with positive reservation utility is either never retired by the principal, or retired above some given threshold (as in Sannikov's solution). In particular, different discount factors induce naturally a face-lifted utility function, which allows to reduce the whole analysis to a setting similar to the equal-discount rates one. Finally, we also confirm that an agent with small reservation utility does have an informational rent, meaning that the principal optimally offers him a contract with strictly higher utility value.Comment: 39 pages, 4 figure
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Random horizon principal-agent problem
2020Co-Authors: Lin Yiqing, Ren Zhenjie, Touzi Nizar, Yang JunjianAbstract:We consider a general formulation of the random horizon Principal-Agent problem with a continuous Payment and a Lump-Sum Payment at termination. In the European version of the problem, the random horizon is chosen solely by the principal with no other possible action from the agent than exerting effort on the dynamics of the output process. We also consider the American version of the contract, which covers the seminal Sannikov's model, where the agent can also quit by optimally choosing the termination time of the contract. Our main result reduces such non-zero-Sum stochastic differential games to appropriate stochastic control problems which may be solved by standard methods of stochastic control theory. This reduction is obtained by following Sannikov's approach, further developed by Cvitanic, Possamai, and Touzi. We first introduce an appropriate class of contracts for which the agent's optimal effort is immediately characterized by the standard verification argument in stochastic control theory. We then show that this class of contracts is dense in an appropriate sense so that the optimization over this restricted family of contracts represents no loss of generality. The result is obtained by using the recent well-posedness result of random horizon second-order backward SDE
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Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Problem in Degenerate Systems
2019Co-Authors: Hu Kaitong, Ren Zhenjie, Touzi NizarAbstract:In this paper we present a variational calculus approach to Principal-Agent problem with a Lump-Sum Payment on finite horizon in degenerate stochastic systems, such as filtered partially observed linear systems. Our work extends the existing methodologies in the Principal-Agent literature using dynamic programming and BSDE representation of the contracts in the non-degenerate controlled stochastic systems. We first solve the Principal's problem in an enlarged set of contracts defined by a forward-backward SDE system given by the first order condition of the Agent's problem using variational calculus. Then we use the sufficient condition of the Agent's problem to verify that the optimal contract that we obtain by solving the Principal's problem is indeed implementable (i.e. belonging to the admissible contract set). Importantly we consider the control problem in a weak formulation. Finally, we give explicit solution of the Principal-Agent problem in partially observed linear systems and extend our results to some mean field interacting Agents case.Comment: 25 page
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Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Problem in Degenerate Systems
HAL CCSD, 2019Co-Authors: Hu Kaitong, Ren Zhenjie, Touzi NizarAbstract:25 pagesIn this paper we present a variational calculus approach to Principal-Agent problem with a Lump-Sum Payment on finite horizon in degenerate stochastic systems, such as filtered partially observed linear systems. Our work extends the existing methodologies in the Principal-Agent literature using dynamic programming and BSDE representation of the contracts in the non-degenerate controlled stochastic systems. We first solve the Principal's problem in an enlarged set of contracts defined by a forward-backward SDE system given by the first order condition of the Agent's problem using variational calculus. Then we use the sufficient condition of the Agent's problem to verify that the optimal contract that we obtain by solving the Principal's problem is indeed implementable (i.e. belonging to the admissible contract set). Importantly we consider the control problem in a weak formulation. Finally, we give explicit solution of the Principal-Agent problem in partially observed linear systems and extend our results to some mean field interacting Agents case
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Dynamic programming approach to principal-agent problems
HAL CCSD, 2017Co-Authors: Cvitanic Jaksa, Possamaï Dylan, Touzi NizarAbstract:We consider a general formulation of the Principal-Agent problem with a Lump-Sum Payment on a finite horizon, providing a systematic method for solving such problems. Our approach is the following: we first find the contract that is optimal among those for which the agent's value process allows a dynamic programming representation, for which the agent's optimal effort is straightforward to find. We then show that the optimization over the restricted family of contracts represents no loss of generality. As a consequence, we have reduced this non-zero Sum stochastic differential game to a stochastic control problem which may be addressed by the standard tools of control theory. Our proofs rely on the backward stochastic differential equations approach to non-Markovian stochastic control, and more specifically, on the recent extensions to the second order case
Quirion Philippe - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Recyclage des revenus de la taxe carbone en paiements forfaitaires vs. subventions à l'efficacité énergétique: Une évaluation pour le secteur résidentiel français
'Elsevier BV', 2021Co-Authors: Bourgeois Cyril, Giraudet Louis-gaëtan, Quirion PhilippeAbstract:International audienceEmpirical evidence suggests that carbon taxes are best accepted when their revenue is used to finance abatement measures. This revenue recycling option has however received little attention in modelling assessments. With the aim of filling this gap, we assess the impact of the French carbon tax on energy use for residential heating and compare the cost-effectiveness and distributional impacts of two revenue recycling options: Lump-Sum Payment and subsidies for home energy retrofits. We do so using Res-IRF, an energy-economy model that provides a highly detailed description of housing features (single vs. multi-family, energy efficiency, heating fuel) and key household characteristics (tenancy status, income). We find that the two recycling options offset the regressive impacts of the tax in comparable ways. Lump-Sum recycling is particularly effective in reducing inequalities between owner-occupiers and tenants. In turn, subsidy recycling saves energy and increases comfort more cost-effectively. In the discussion, we further point to some advantages of subsidy recycling from both a political and administrative perspective
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Arbitrages économiques, sociaux et environnementaux pour le recyclage des revenus de la taxe carbone
HAL CCSD, 2019Co-Authors: Bourgeois Cyril, Giraudet Louis-gaëtan, Quirion PhilippeAbstract:As carbon taxes gain traction and grow tighter in OECD countries, the question of their recycling becomes crucial for political acceptance. Considering the impact of the French carbon tax in the residential sector, we examine the trade-offs between fuel poverty alleviation, energy savings and economic leverage for two revenue-recycling options-as a Lump-Sum Payment or as a subsidy for energy efficiency improvement, each restricted to low-income households-defined as those belonging to the first two quantiles of the income distribution. We do so using Res-IRF, a highly detailed energy-economy model that interacts housing features (single vs. multi-family, energy efficiency, heating fuel) with key household characteristics (tenancy status, income of both owners and occupants). We find that the energy efficiency subsidy recycling is superior to the Lump-Sum Payment in all respects; it even fully offsets the regressive effect of the carbon tax from 2025 onwards. No recycling, however, effectively addresses fuel poverty in private, rented housing
