The Experts below are selected from a list of 4341 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Peter Loscocco - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • model checking distributed mandatory access control policies
    ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 2015
    Co-Authors: Perry Alexander, Peter Loscocco, Lee Pike, George Coker
    Abstract:

    This work examines the use of model checking techniques to verify system-level security properties of a collection of interacting virtual machines. Specifically, we examine how local access control policies implemented in individual virtual machines and a hypervisor can be shown to satisfy global access control constraints. The SAL model checker is used to model and verify a collection of stateful domains with protected resources and local MAC policies attempting to access needed resources from other domains. The model is described along with verification conditions. The need to control state-space explosion is motivated and techniques for writing theorems and limiting domains explored. Finally, analysis results are examined along with analysis complexity.

  • integrating flexible support for security policies into the linux operating system
    USENIX Annual Technical Conference, 2001
    Co-Authors: Peter Loscocco, Stephen Smalley
    Abstract:

    The protection mechanisms of current mainstream operating systems are inadequate to support confidentiality and integrity requirements for end systems. mandatory access control (MAC) is needed to address such requirements, but the limitations of traditional MAC have inhibited its adoption into mainstream operating systems. The National Security Agency (NSA) worked with Secure Computing Corporation (SCC) to develop a flexible MAC architecture called Flask to overcome the limitations of traditional MAC. The NSA has implemented this architecture in the Linux operating system, producing a Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) prototype, to make the technology available to a wider community and to enable further research into secure operating systems. NAI Labs has developed an example security policy configuration to demonstrate the benefits of the architecture and to provide a foundation for others to use. This paper describes the security architecture, security mechanisms, application programming interface, security policy configuration, and performance of SELinux.

  • meeting critical security objectives with security enhanced linux
    2001
    Co-Authors: Peter Loscocco, Stephen Smalley
    Abstract:

    Security-enhanced Linux incorporates a strong, flexible mandatory access control architecture into Linux. It provides a mechanism to enforce the separation of information based on confidentiality and integrity requirements. This allows threats of tampering and bypassing of application security mechanisms to be addressed and enables the confinement of damage that can be caused by malicious or flawed applications. Using the system’s type enforcement and role-based access control abstractions, it is possible to configure the system to meet a wide range of security needs. This paper describes how Security-enhanced Linux was used to meet a number of general-purpose system security objectives.

Cungang Yang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Rasool Jalili - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • a context aware mandatory access control model for multilevel security environments
    International Conference on Computer Safety Reliability and Security, 2008
    Co-Authors: Jafar Haadi Jafarian, Morteza Amini, Rasool Jalili
    Abstract:

    mandatory access control models have traditionally been employed as a robust security mechanism in multilevel security environments like military domains. In traditional mandatory models, the security classes associated with entities are context-insensitive. However, context-sensitivity of security classes may be required in some environments. Moreover, as computing technology becomes more pervasive, flexible access control mechanisms are needed. Unlike traditional approaches for access control, such access decisions depend on the combination of the required credentials of users and the context of the system. Incorporating context-awareness into mandatory access control models results in a model appropriate for handling such context-aware policies and context- sensitive class association mostly needed in multilevel security environments. In this paper, we introduce a context-aware mandatory access control model (CAMAC) capable of dynamic adaptation of access control policies to the context, and handling context-sensitive class association, in addition to preservation of confidentiality and integrity. One of the most significant characteristics of the model is its high expressiveness which allows us to express various mandatory access control models such as Bell-LaPadula, Biba, Dion, and Chinese Wall with it.

Stephen Smalley - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • integrating flexible support for security policies into the linux operating system
    USENIX Annual Technical Conference, 2001
    Co-Authors: Peter Loscocco, Stephen Smalley
    Abstract:

    The protection mechanisms of current mainstream operating systems are inadequate to support confidentiality and integrity requirements for end systems. mandatory access control (MAC) is needed to address such requirements, but the limitations of traditional MAC have inhibited its adoption into mainstream operating systems. The National Security Agency (NSA) worked with Secure Computing Corporation (SCC) to develop a flexible MAC architecture called Flask to overcome the limitations of traditional MAC. The NSA has implemented this architecture in the Linux operating system, producing a Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) prototype, to make the technology available to a wider community and to enable further research into secure operating systems. NAI Labs has developed an example security policy configuration to demonstrate the benefits of the architecture and to provide a foundation for others to use. This paper describes the security architecture, security mechanisms, application programming interface, security policy configuration, and performance of SELinux.

  • meeting critical security objectives with security enhanced linux
    2001
    Co-Authors: Peter Loscocco, Stephen Smalley
    Abstract:

    Security-enhanced Linux incorporates a strong, flexible mandatory access control architecture into Linux. It provides a mechanism to enforce the separation of information based on confidentiality and integrity requirements. This allows threats of tampering and bypassing of application security mechanisms to be addressed and enables the confinement of damage that can be caused by malicious or flawed applications. Using the system’s type enforcement and role-based access control abstractions, it is possible to configure the system to meet a wide range of security needs. This paper describes how Security-enhanced Linux was used to meet a number of general-purpose system security objectives.

Qamar Munawer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Configuring role-based access control to enforce mandatory and discretionary access control policies
    ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 2000
    Co-Authors: Sylvia L. Osborn, Ravi Sandhu, Qamar Munawer
    Abstract:

    access control models have traditionally included mandatory access control (or lattice-based access control) and discretionary access control. Subsequently, role-based access control has been introduced, along with claims that its mechanisms are general enough to simulate the traditional methods. In this paper we provide systematic constructions for various common forms of both of the traditional access control paradigms using the role-based access control (RBAC) models of Sandhu et al., commonly called RBAC96. We see that all of the features of the RBAC96 model are required, and that although for the manatory access control simulation, only one administrative role needs to be assumed, for the discretionary access control simulations, a complex set of administrative roles is required.

  • how to do discretionary access control using roles
    Proceedings of the third ACM workshop on Role-based access control, 1998
    Co-Authors: Ravi Sandhu, Qamar Munawer
    Abstract:

    Role-based access control (RBAC) is a promising alternative to traditional discretionary access control (DAC) and mandatory access control (MAC). The central idea of RBAC is that permissions are associated with roles, and users are made members of appropriate roles thereby acquiring the roles’ permissions. RBAC is policy neutral in that the precise policy being enforced is a consequence of how various components of RBACsuch as role hierarchies, constraints and administration of user-role and role-permission assignment-are configured. This raises the important question as to whether RBAC is sufficiently powerful to simulate DAC and MAC. Simulation of MAC in RBAC has been demonstrated earlier by Nyanchama and Osborn and by Sandhu. In this paper we demonstrate how to simulate several variations of DAC in RBAC, using the wellknown RBAC96 model of Sandhu et al. In combination with earlier work we conclude that RBAC encompasses both MAC and DAC.