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Anuradha M Annaswamy - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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integration of automatic generation control and demand response via a dynamic regulation Market Mechanism
IEEE Transactions on Control Systems and Technology, 2019Co-Authors: Dylan Shiltz, Milos Cvetkovic, Stefanos Baros, Anuradha M AnnaswamyAbstract:Modern power systems utilize automatic generation control (AGC) for real-time frequency regulation to ensure power balance of generation and consumption. Increasing penetration of intermittent renewables will introduce greater variability in generation, which in turn requires an even higher participation of AGC. In light of this, frequency regulation becomes a very critical service in modern power systems’ operations that has to be carried out with high economic efficiency. The use of demand response (DR) is being offered as a green, affordable alternative to conventional generation-based AGC. Although advances in wide-area monitoring and control technologies have made real-time control of DR a possibility, significant challenges remain for large-scale integration. In this paper, we propose a dynamic regulation Market Mechanism (DRMM) that allows both DR units and generators to bid for regulation service in real time, ensuring optimal allocation and reducing regulation service costs. Unlike similar proposals in the literature, the DRMM is practical to implement on a large power system with multiple areas. In particular, the DRMM requires modest communication rates on par with the existing AGC system and can explicitly accommodate constraints on DR energy deferment. We demonstrate the added benefit of the DRMM over the conventional AGC through simulations on a 3-area 900-bus power system and derive conditions for its stability.
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a dynamic Market Mechanism for combined heat and power microgrid energy management
IFAC-PapersOnLine, 2017Co-Authors: Thomas R Nudell, Massimo Brignone, Michela Robba, Andrea Bonfiglio, Federico Delfino, Anuradha M AnnaswamyAbstract:Abstract This paper develops a dynamic Market Mechanism (DMM) to optimally allocate electric and thermal power in a combined heat and power microgrid. The Market is formulated as a receding horizon constrained optimization problem, from which an optimal automated transactive procedure is developed. The Market operation is distributed in nature and incorporates the most up-to-date electric and thermal load estimates and renewable generation. These properties make our microgrid DMM, µDMM, attractive for microgrid energy management systems, as new smart buildings, battery storage systems, and renewable energy resources can be added in a plug-and-play fashion without reformulating the optimization problem and without adding computational complexity to the EMS. The result of the Market clearing is the spot prices and set-points for electric and thermal power in addition to non-binding estimates of future prices and set-points. The the Market Mechanism is simulated on a CHP Microgrid model based on the Smart Polygeneration Microgrid (SPM) located on the University of Genoa’s Savona campus.
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a dynamic regulation Market Mechanism for improved financial settlements in wholesale electricity Markets
Advances in Computing and Communications, 2017Co-Authors: Manuel J Garcia, Thomas R Nudell, Anuradha M AnnaswamyAbstract:This paper proposes a Dynamic Regulation Market Mechanism (DRMM) that results in improved financial settlements for wholesale electricity Markets. The DRMM dispatches control signals at the Tertiary Control (TC) level based on a co-optimization problem that jointly optimizes energy production and reserve capacity. At the Secondary Control (SC) level the DRMM dispatches control signals using an iterative algorithm that effectively eliminates steady state error in the system frequency. In addition to the overall DRMM remaining stable, the conditions under which it leads to improved financial settlements are described. Using a three area example, where each area corresponds to a modified IEEE-300 bus system, the control performance and the financial settlements are compared to standard SC. It is shown that the frequency response is nearly identical and that the make-whole payments, a performance metric associated with financial settlements, are smaller with the proposed DRMM.
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ACC - A Dynamic Regulation Market Mechanism for improved financial settlements in wholesale electricity Markets
2017 American Control Conference (ACC), 2017Co-Authors: Manuel J Garcia, Thomas R Nudell, Anuradha M AnnaswamyAbstract:This paper proposes a Dynamic Regulation Market Mechanism (DRMM) that results in improved financial settlements for wholesale electricity Markets. The DRMM dispatches control signals at the Tertiary Control (TC) level based on a co-optimization problem that jointly optimizes energy production and reserve capacity. At the Secondary Control (SC) level the DRMM dispatches control signals using an iterative algorithm that effectively eliminates steady state error in the system frequency. In addition to the overall DRMM remaining stable, the conditions under which it leads to improved financial settlements are described. Using a three area example, where each area corresponds to a modified IEEE-300 bus system, the control performance and the financial settlements are compared to standard SC. It is shown that the frequency response is nearly identical and that the make-whole payments, a performance metric associated with financial settlements, are smaller with the proposed DRMM.
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an integrated dynamic Market Mechanism for real time Markets and frequency regulation
IEEE Transactions on Sustainable Energy, 2016Co-Authors: Dylan Shiltz, Milos Cvetkovic, Anuradha M AnnaswamyAbstract:The intermittent and uncertain nature of renewables represents a major challenge for large scale adoption of sustainable energy resources. Of particular concern is the need to maintain both quality of grid frequency and low costs of regulation reserves in the face of increasing fluctuations in renewables. To this end, we propose an integrated dynamic Market Mechanism (DMM), which combines real-time Market and frequency regulation allowing Market players, including renewable generators and flexible consumers, to iteratively negotiate electricity prices at the wholesale level while using the most recent information on the available wind power and the quality of grid frequency. Main features of the integrated DMM are as follows: 1) a Newton-Raphson-based method, which leads to fast convergence to the optimal dispatch; and 2) use of an aggregated frequency error as a feedback signal for the negotiation process, which leads to reduced regulation capacity requirements. The benefits of this DMM are illustrated via simulations on the IEEE 118 bus system.
Rahul Jain - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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A Risk Aware Two-Stage Market Mechanism for Electricity with Renewable Generation
2020 American Control Conference (ACC), 2020Co-Authors: Nathan Dahlin, Rahul JainAbstract:Over the last few decades, electricity Markets around the world have adopted multi-settlement structures, allowing for balancing of supply and demand as more accurate forecast information becomes available. Given increasing uncertainty due to adoption of renewables, more recent Market design work has focused on optimization of expectation of some quantity, e.g. social welfare. However, social planners and policy makers are often risk averse, so that such risk neutral formulations do not adequately reflect prevailing attitudes towards risk, nor explain the decisions that follow. Hence we incorporate the commonly used risk measure conditional value at risk (CVaR) into the central planning objective, and study how a two-stage Market operates when the individual generators are risk neutral. Our primary result is to show existence (by construction) of a sequential competitive equilibrium (SCEq) in this risk-aware two-stage Market. Given equilibrium prices, we design a Market Mechanism which achieves social cost minimization assuming that agents are non strategic.
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A Two-Stage Market Mechanism for Electricity with Renewable Generation
arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory, 2019Co-Authors: Nathan Dahlin, Rahul JainAbstract:We consider a two stage Market Mechanism for trading electricity including renewable generation as an alternative to the widely used multi-settlement Market structure. The two stage Market structure allows for recourse decisions by the Market operator, which is not possible in today's Markets. We allow for different generation cost curves in the forward and the real-time stage. We have considered costs of demand response programs, and black outs but have ignored network structure for the sake of simplicity. Our first result is to show existence (by construction) of a sequential competitive equilibrium (SCEq) in such a two-stage Market. We then argue social welfare properties of such an SCEq. We then design a Market Mechanism that achieves social welfare maximization when the Market participants are non-strategic.
Florian Dörfler - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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A Market Mechanism for Virtual Inertia
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 1Co-Authors: Bala Kameshwar Poolla, Saverio Bolognani, Li Na, Florian DörflerAbstract:One of the recognized principal issues brought along by the steadfast migration towards power electronic interfaced energy sources is the loss of rotational inertia. In conventional power systems, the inertia of the synchronous machines plays a crucial role in safeguarding against any drastic variations in frequency by acting as a buffer in the event of large and sudden power generation-demand imbalances. In future power electronic-based power systems, the same role can be played by strategically located virtual inertia devices. However, the question looms large as to how the system operators would procure and pay for these devices. In this article, we propose a Market Mechanism inspired by the ancillary service Markets in power supply. We consider a linear network-reduced power system model along with a robust H2 performance metric penalizing the worst-case primary control effort. With a social welfare maximization problem for the system operator as a benchmark, we construct a Market Mechanism in which bids are invited from agents providing virtual inertia, who in turn are compensated via a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payment rule. The resulting Mechanism ensures truthful bidding to be the dominant bidding strategy and guarantees non-negative payoffs for the agents. A three-region case study is considered in simulations, and a comparison with a regulatory approach to the same problem is presented.
Dörfler Florian - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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A Market Mechanism for Virtual Inertia
IEEE, 2020Co-Authors: Poolla, Bala Kameshwar, Bolognani Saverio, Dörfler FlorianAbstract:One of the recognized principal issues brought along by the steadfast migration towards power electronic interfaced energy sources is the loss of rotational inertia. In conventional power systems, the inertia of the synchronous machines plays a crucial role in safeguarding against any drastic variations in frequency by acting as a buffer in the event of large and sudden power generation-demand imbalances. In future power electronic-based power systems, the same role can be played by strategically located virtual inertia devices. However, the question looms large as to how the system operators would procure and pay for these devices. In this article, we propose a Market Mechanism inspired by the ancillary service Markets in power supply. We consider a linear network-reduced power system model along with a robust H2 performance metric penalizing the worst-case primary control effort. With a social welfare maximization problem for the system operator as a benchmark, we construct a Market Mechanism in which bids are invited from agents providing virtual inertia, who in turn are compensated via a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payment rule. The resulting Mechanism ensures truthful bidding to be the dominant bidding strategy and guarantees non-negative payoffs for the agents. A three-region case study is considered in simulations, and a comparison with a regulatory approach to the same problem is presented. © 2020 IEEE.ISSN:1949-3053ISSN:1949-306
Tang Jian-juan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Thinking of Our Country Sports System Reform in the Market Mechanism
Journal of Xiangnan University, 2007Co-Authors: Tang Jian-juanAbstract:Our country sports system reform is the point that turns the sports reform deeply,the Market economy is the initial point of sports system reform,the article discussed the sports system reform in the Market Mechanism of motive and encourage characteristic,analyzing the Market Mechanism and the sports systems in the competition and equilibrium of match the relation,put forward currently sports system circulate Mechanism,developing the function of Market Mechanism reasonably.
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Sports system reform and the Market Mechanism of China
Journal of Shandong Institute of Physical Education and Sports, 2006Co-Authors: Tang Jian-juanAbstract:The sports system reform in China is the point that turns the sports reform deeply,the Market economy system of perfect for sports system of reform lay an economic foundation and provided the beneficial reference.The article discussed the sports system reform in the Market Mechanism of motive and encourage characteristics,analyzed the Market Mechanism and the sports systems in the competition and equilibrium of match the relation,put forward the current sports system circulation Mechanism and developed the function of Market Mechanism reasonably.
