The Experts below are selected from a list of 37287 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

J. Finney - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • it requirements for Market Participant interaction with isos rtos
    IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2003
    Co-Authors: D. Felzien, B. Fesmire, J. Finney
    Abstract:

    Restructured energy Markets can be understood as falling on a continuum between the extremes of balanced schedule and award-based Markets depending on what is required of the Market Participant (MP). This paper focuses on the IT needs of MPs doing business in competitive Markets, regardless of specific Market rules. We examine three main areas of functionality: Market communications, operations data management, and settlements. The paper suggests the importance of automation and sharing of information between groups within the MP organization, and concludes with a brief discussion of some additional IT capabilities MPs should consider.

  • IT requirements for Market Participant interaction with ISOs/RTOs
    IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2003
    Co-Authors: D. Felzien, B. Fesmire, J. Finney
    Abstract:

    Restructured energy Markets can be understood as falling on a continuum between the extremes of balanced schedule and award-based Markets depending on what is required of the Market Participant (MP). This paper focuses on the IT needs of MPs doing business in competitive Markets, regardless of specific Market rules. We examine three main areas of functionality: Market communications, operations data management, and settlements. The paper suggests the importance of automation and sharing of information between groups within the MP organization, and concludes with a brief discussion of some additional IT capabilities MPs should consider.

J J Wagner - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • risk and Market Participant behavior in the u s slaughter cattle Market
    Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 1995
    Co-Authors: Dillon M Feuz, Scott W Fausti, J J Wagner
    Abstract:

    Incomplete information generates uncertainty for Market Participants in the slaughter-cattle Market. Buyer and seller behavior in the presence of that uncertainty is examined. Statistically significant risk premiums are charged by packers when buying slaughter cattle on either a live- or dressed-weight basis compared to buying on a grade-and-yield basis. Pratt-Arrow risk-aversion coefficients are calculated for buyers and these remain constant over all Marketing methods. Sellers Market cattle under all three Marketing methods, suggesting producers' attitudes toward risk (risk-aversion coefficients) vary.

  • risk and Market Participant behavior in the u s slaughter cattle Market
    Economics Staff Papers, 1994
    Co-Authors: Dillon M Feuz, Scott W Fausti, J J Wagner
    Abstract:

    Incomplete information generates uncertainty for Market Participants in the slaughter-cattle Market. Buyer and seller behavior in the presence of that uncertainty is examined. Statistically significant risk premiums are charged by packers when buying slaughter cattle on either a live- or dressed-weight basis compared to buying on a grade-and-yield basis. Pratt-Arrow risk-aversion coefficients are calculated for buyers and these remain constant over all Marketing methods. Sellers Market cattle under all three Marketing methods, suggesting producers' attitudes toward risk (risk-aversion coefficients) vary. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

D. Felzien - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • it requirements for Market Participant interaction with isos rtos
    IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2003
    Co-Authors: D. Felzien, B. Fesmire, J. Finney
    Abstract:

    Restructured energy Markets can be understood as falling on a continuum between the extremes of balanced schedule and award-based Markets depending on what is required of the Market Participant (MP). This paper focuses on the IT needs of MPs doing business in competitive Markets, regardless of specific Market rules. We examine three main areas of functionality: Market communications, operations data management, and settlements. The paper suggests the importance of automation and sharing of information between groups within the MP organization, and concludes with a brief discussion of some additional IT capabilities MPs should consider.

  • IT requirements for Market Participant interaction with ISOs/RTOs
    IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2003
    Co-Authors: D. Felzien, B. Fesmire, J. Finney
    Abstract:

    Restructured energy Markets can be understood as falling on a continuum between the extremes of balanced schedule and award-based Markets depending on what is required of the Market Participant (MP). This paper focuses on the IT needs of MPs doing business in competitive Markets, regardless of specific Market rules. We examine three main areas of functionality: Market communications, operations data management, and settlements. The paper suggests the importance of automation and sharing of information between groups within the MP organization, and concludes with a brief discussion of some additional IT capabilities MPs should consider.

J. Kumar - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Decision support tools for Market Participants
    IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2003
    Co-Authors: F. Albuyeh, J. Kumar
    Abstract:

    The deregulation of electric power industry, among other things, has created new requirements for Participants in various electric energy Markets and regions. In addition to the traditional power system monitoring, control, dispatch, analysis, optimization, and planning tools, the Market Participant requires tools to manage physical and financial assets, manage risk, participate in various Markets, and decision support tools to provide the edge in a very competitive environment. The power system engineer, operator, and, in general, the Market Participant is being faced with requirements for which he does not have adequate training and proper background. In this paper, an attempt is made to provide an outline of the new requirements and to provide a footprint of some of the tools that are required to participate in the deregulated electric energy Markets.

  • Improving Market Participant strategies with FTR options
    PICA 2001. Innovative Computing for Power - Electric Energy Meets the Market. 22nd IEEE Power Engineering Society. International Conference on Power I, 2001
    Co-Authors: C.w. Richter, A. Jayantilal, J. Kumar
    Abstract:

    Strategies that reduce risk and maximize profit are of great interest to electricity Market Participants. Commodities and financial instruments that can be hedged to reduce uncertainty and manage risk are important components of such a strategy. One such vehicle is the fixed transmission right (FTR). The holder of an FTR is entitled to the transmission congestion rents collected between specified points of delivery and receipt. However, if congestion occurs in an unanticipated direction, the holder of an FTR is obligated to pay. An interesting compromise derivative is the FTR option (FTRO). The FTRO gives its holder the right to the congestion rents if they are positive, without the obligation to pay if they are negative. In this paper the authors provide examples of how FTR options can be utilized as part of a comprehensive Market strategy. Profitability with and without the FTRO is determined under various Market and network scenarios. Methods and assumptions required for valuing the options are examined, including equations similar to Black-Scholes.

Dillon M Feuz - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • risk and Market Participant behavior in the u s slaughter cattle Market
    Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 1995
    Co-Authors: Dillon M Feuz, Scott W Fausti, J J Wagner
    Abstract:

    Incomplete information generates uncertainty for Market Participants in the slaughter-cattle Market. Buyer and seller behavior in the presence of that uncertainty is examined. Statistically significant risk premiums are charged by packers when buying slaughter cattle on either a live- or dressed-weight basis compared to buying on a grade-and-yield basis. Pratt-Arrow risk-aversion coefficients are calculated for buyers and these remain constant over all Marketing methods. Sellers Market cattle under all three Marketing methods, suggesting producers' attitudes toward risk (risk-aversion coefficients) vary.

  • risk and Market Participant behavior in the u s slaughter cattle Market
    Economics Staff Papers, 1994
    Co-Authors: Dillon M Feuz, Scott W Fausti, J J Wagner
    Abstract:

    Incomplete information generates uncertainty for Market Participants in the slaughter-cattle Market. Buyer and seller behavior in the presence of that uncertainty is examined. Statistically significant risk premiums are charged by packers when buying slaughter cattle on either a live- or dressed-weight basis compared to buying on a grade-and-yield basis. Pratt-Arrow risk-aversion coefficients are calculated for buyers and these remain constant over all Marketing methods. Sellers Market cattle under all three Marketing methods, suggesting producers' attitudes toward risk (risk-aversion coefficients) vary. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)