The Experts below are selected from a list of 207 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Jongkeun Park - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the incentive announcement effect of demand response on Market Power Mitigation in the electricity Market
    Renewable & Sustainable Energy Reviews, 2017
    Co-Authors: Woong Ko, Changho Rhee, Jongkeun Park
    Abstract:

    The incentive announcement effect of demand response (DR), which can mitigate exercising of Market Power, was assessed using a game theory method. To analyze player behaviors, the profit functions of generation companies, DR consumers, and normal consumers were formulated and their best response functions derived. Because the implementation method of a pre-announced DR incentive with game theory has not been studied before, a sequential game that can make a normal consumer a leader was considered. The leader's strategy, i.e., the incentive level, is determined by a neutral agent to prevent overuse of the demand resource. With this procedure, Market equilibrium can be obtained by solving the Stackelberg game. An analytical solution for Market equilibrium was derived for a simple case; simulations were used to confirm the maintenance of tendencies in a more complex case. As a result, the Market clearing price was reduced and a fairer distribution of the surplus was achieved compared with the result of the oligopoly condition case. This indicates that the exercise of Market Power is affected by the incentive announcement procedure and Market Power can be mitigated.

Woong Ko - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the incentive announcement effect of demand response on Market Power Mitigation in the electricity Market
    Renewable & Sustainable Energy Reviews, 2017
    Co-Authors: Woong Ko, Changho Rhee, Jongkeun Park
    Abstract:

    The incentive announcement effect of demand response (DR), which can mitigate exercising of Market Power, was assessed using a game theory method. To analyze player behaviors, the profit functions of generation companies, DR consumers, and normal consumers were formulated and their best response functions derived. Because the implementation method of a pre-announced DR incentive with game theory has not been studied before, a sequential game that can make a normal consumer a leader was considered. The leader's strategy, i.e., the incentive level, is determined by a neutral agent to prevent overuse of the demand resource. With this procedure, Market equilibrium can be obtained by solving the Stackelberg game. An analytical solution for Market equilibrium was derived for a simple case; simulations were used to confirm the maintenance of tendencies in a more complex case. As a result, the Market clearing price was reduced and a fairer distribution of the surplus was achieved compared with the result of the oligopoly condition case. This indicates that the exercise of Market Power is affected by the incentive announcement procedure and Market Power can be mitigated.

Carol Opatrny - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Market Power Mitigation and energy limited resources
    The Electricity Journal, 2003
    Co-Authors: Ren Orans, Arne Olson, Carol Opatrny
    Abstract:

    Abstract FERC’s Standard Market Design takes aim at the problem of withholding by proposing automated Mitigation procedures (AMP) as a tool to prevent the exercise of Market Power. However, only “light-handed” AMP with bid caps based on opportunity costs and no must-offer requirement will result in efficient operations of energy-limited resources.

Changho Rhee - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the incentive announcement effect of demand response on Market Power Mitigation in the electricity Market
    Renewable & Sustainable Energy Reviews, 2017
    Co-Authors: Woong Ko, Changho Rhee, Jongkeun Park
    Abstract:

    The incentive announcement effect of demand response (DR), which can mitigate exercising of Market Power, was assessed using a game theory method. To analyze player behaviors, the profit functions of generation companies, DR consumers, and normal consumers were formulated and their best response functions derived. Because the implementation method of a pre-announced DR incentive with game theory has not been studied before, a sequential game that can make a normal consumer a leader was considered. The leader's strategy, i.e., the incentive level, is determined by a neutral agent to prevent overuse of the demand resource. With this procedure, Market equilibrium can be obtained by solving the Stackelberg game. An analytical solution for Market equilibrium was derived for a simple case; simulations were used to confirm the maintenance of tendencies in a more complex case. As a result, the Market clearing price was reduced and a fairer distribution of the surplus was achieved compared with the result of the oligopoly condition case. This indicates that the exercise of Market Power is affected by the incentive announcement procedure and Market Power can be mitigated.

Leonardo Giacchino - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • improving Market Power Mitigation rules for peaking units
    The Electricity Journal, 2003
    Co-Authors: Joseph G Crespo, Leonardo Giacchino
    Abstract:

    Abstract Marginal cost bidding should not be used as a benchmark for setting mitigated prices because it can create perverse incentives that threaten long-run efficiency and financial viability in electricity Markets. More broadly, it is inconsistent with competitive Market behavior. Thus, marginal cost bidding should be replaced with more sophisticated and appropriate benchmarks for use by Market monitoring committees.