The Experts below are selected from a list of 325422 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Pierre Merel - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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measuring Market Power in the french comte cheese Market
Social Science Research Network, 2009Co-Authors: Pierre MerelAbstract:A new empirical industrial organisation approach is used to measure seller Market Power in the French Comte cheese Market, characterised by government-approved supply control. The estimation is performed on quarterly data at the wholesale stage over the period 1985-2005. Three different elasticity shifters are included in the demand specification, and the supply equation accounts for the existence of the European dairy quota policy. The Market Power estimate is small and statistically insignificant. Monopoly is clearly rejected. Results appear to be robust to the choice of functional form and suggest little effect of the supply control scheme on consumer prices.
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measuring Market Power in the french comte cheese Market
European Review of Agricultural Economics, 2009Co-Authors: Pierre MerelAbstract:A new empirical industrial organisation approach is used to measure seller Market Power in the French Comte cheese Market, characterised by government-approved supply control. The estimation is performed on quarterly data at the wholesale stage over the period 1985--2005. Three different elasticity shifters are included in the demand specification, and the supply equation accounts for the existence of the European dairy quota policy. The Market Power estimate is small and statistically insignificant. Monopoly is clearly rejected. Results appear to be robust to the choice of functional form and suggest little effect of the supply control scheme on consumer prices. Oxford University Press and Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics 2009; all rights reserved. For permissions, please email journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.
Severin Borenstein - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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diagnosing Market Power in california s restructured wholesale electricity Market
Social Science Research Network, 2000Co-Authors: Severin Borenstein, James Bushnell, Frank A WolakAbstract:Effective competition in wholesale electricity Markets is a necessary feature of a successful electricity supply industry restructuring. We examine the degree of competition in the California wholesale electricity Market during the period June 1998 to September 1999 by comparing the Market prices with estimates of the prices that would have resulted if owners of instate fossil fuel generating facilities behaved as price takers. We find that there were significant departures from competitive pricing and that these departures are most pronounced during the highest demand periods, which tend to occur during the months of July through September. Through most of the winter and spring of 1999 there was little evidence of the exercise of Market Power. Overall, the exercise of Market Power raised the cost of Power purchases by about 16% above the competitive level. Following the presentation of our methodology for computing the counterfactual price-taking Market price, we describe why our calculation represents a lower bound on the extent of Market Power and why the observed Market prices cannot by attributed to competitive peak-lead pricing.
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diagnosing Market Power in california s deregulated wholesale electricity Market
2000Co-Authors: Severin Borenstein, James Bushnell, Frank A WolakAbstract:Effective competition in wholesale electricity Markets is a necessary feature of a successful electricity supply industry restructuring. We examine the degree of competition in the California wholesale electricity Market during the period June 1998 to September 1999 by comparing the Market prices with estimates of the prices that would have resulted if owners of instate fossil fuel generating facilities behaved as price takers. We find that there were significant departures from competitive pricing and that these departures are most pronounced during the highest demand periods, which tend to occur during the months of July through September. Through most of the winter and spring of 1999 there was little evidence of the exercise of Market Power. Overall, the exercise of Market Power raised the cost of Power purchases by about 16% above the competitive level. Following the presentation of our methodology for computing the counterfactual price-taking Market price, we describe why our calculation represents a lower bound on the extent of Market Power and why the observed Market prices cannot by attributed to competitive peak-lead pricing.
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Market Power in Electricity Markets: Beyond Concentration Measures
The Energy Journal, 1999Co-Authors: Severin Borenstein, James Bushnell, Christopher R. KnittelAbstract:The wave of electricity Market restructuring both within the United States and abroad has brought the issue of horizontal Market Power to the forefront of energy policy. Traditionally, estimation and prediction of Market Power has relied heavily on concentration measures. In this paper, we discuss the weaknesses of concentration measures as a viable measure of Market Power in the electricity industry, and we propose an alternative method based oil Market simulations that take advantage of existing plant level data. We discuss results from previous studies the authors have performed, and present new results that allow for the detection of threshold demand levels where Market Power is likely to be a problem. In addition, we analyze the impact of that recent divestitures in the California electricity Market will have on estimated Market Power. We close with a discussion of the policy implications of the results.
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understanding competitive pricing and Market Power in wholesale electricity Markets
Research Papers in Economics, 1999Co-Authors: Severin BorensteinAbstract:Discussions of competition in restructured electricity Markets have revealed many misunderstandings about the definition, diagnosis, and implications of Market Power. In this paper, I attempt to clarify the meaning of Market Power and show how it can be distinguished from competitive pricing in Markets with significant short-run supply constraints. I also address two common myths about Market Power: (a) that it is present in all Markets and (b) that it must be present in order for firms to remain profitable in Markets with significant fixed costs. I conclude by arguing that, while a finding of Market Power in an industry does not necessarily indicate that government intervention is warranted, such analysis is an important part of creating sound public policy.
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Market Power in Electricity Markets: Beyond Concentration Measures
1999Co-Authors: Severin Borenstein, James Bushnell, Christopher R. KnittelAbstract:The wave of electricity Market restructuring both within the United States and abroad has brought the issue of horizontal Market Power to the forefront of energy policy. Traditionally, estimation and prediction of Market Power has relied heavily on concentration measures. In this paper, we discuss the weaknesses of concentration measures as a viable measure of Market Power in the electricity industry, and we propose an alternative method based oil Market simulations that take advantage of existing plant level data. We discuss results from previous studies the authors have performed, and present new results that allow for the detection of threshold demand levels where Market Power is likely to be a problem. In addition, we analyze the impact of that recent divestitures in the California electricity Market will have on estimated Market Power. We close with a discussion of the policy implications of the results. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Kairong Xiao - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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bank Market Power and monetary policy transmission evidence from a structural estimation
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2020Co-Authors: Yifei Wang, Toni M Whited, Kairong XiaoAbstract:We quantify the impact of bank Market Power on monetary policy transmission through banks to borrowers. We estimate a dynamic banking model in which monetary policy affects imperfectly competitive banks’ funding costs. Banks optimize the pass-through of these costs to borrowers and depositors, while facing capital and reserve regulation. We find that bank Market Power explains much of the transmission of monetary policy to borrowers, with an effect comparable to that of bank capital regulation. When the federal funds rate falls below 0.9%, Market Power interacts with bank capital regulation to produce a reversal of the effect of monetary policy.
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bank Market Power and monetary policy transmission evidence from a structural estimation
Social Science Research Network, 2020Co-Authors: Yifei Wang, Toni M Whited, Kairong XiaoAbstract:We quantify the impact of bank Market Power on monetary policy transmission through banks to borrowers. We estimate a dynamic banking model in which monetary policy affects imperfectly competitive banks’ funding costs. Banks optimize the pass-through of these costs to borrowers and depositors, while facing capital and reserve regulation. We find that bank Market Power explains much of the transmission of monetary policy to borrowers, with an effect comparable to that of bank capital regulation. When the federal funds rate falls below 0.9%, Market Power interacts with bank capital regulation to produce a reversal of the effect of monetary policy. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
Gregory F Udell - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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bank Market Power and sme financing constraints
Review of Finance, 2009Co-Authors: Santiago Carbovalverde, Francisco Rodriguezfernandez, Gregory F UdellAbstract:Some studies find that Market Power is associated with credit availability (information hypothesis); others find that less competitive banking Markets lead to more credit rationing (Market Power hypothesis). Empirical research has relied solely on concentration as a measure of Market Power. The industrial organization literature, however, argues that a structural competition indicator such as the Lerner index is a superior measure. We test the information hypothesis and the Market Power hypothesis using these two alternative measures of Market Power and find that they generally give conflicting results. However, we also offer evidence suggesting that both views can be reconciled. Copyright 2009, Oxford University Press.
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bank Market Power and sme financing constraints
Review of Finance, 2009Co-Authors: Santiago Carbovalverde, Francisco Rodriguezfernandez, Gregory F UdellAbstract:Theoretical models of lending and industrial organization theory predict that firm access to credit depends critically on bank Market structure. However, empirical studies offer mixed results. Some studies find that higher concentration is associated with higher credit availability consistent with the information hypothesis that less competitive banks have more incentive to invest in soft information. Other empirical studies, however, find support for the Market Power hypothesis that credit rationing is higher in less competitive bank Markets. This study tests these two competing hypotheses by employing for the first time a competition indicator from the Industrial Organization literature – the Lerner index – as an alternative to traditional measures of concentration. We test the information and the Market Power hypotheses using alternative measures and firm borrowing constraints. We find that the results are sensitive to the choice between IO margins and traditional concentration measures. In particular, the HHI seems to support the information hypothesis while the Lerner index supports the Market Power hypothesis. The Lerner index, however, is found to be a more consistent indicator of Market Power across different measures of financing constraints. Moreover, the Lerner index is found to exhibit the larger marginal effect on the probability that a firm is financially constrained among a large set of firm level, bank Market and environmental control variables. Our results are robust to alternative measures of financial constraints and cast doubt on the validity of relying on concentration measures as proxies of competition in corporate lending relationships (247 words).
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Bank Market Power and SME financing constraints
Review of Finance, 2009Co-Authors: Santiago Carb-valverde, Francisco Rodrguez-fernndez, Gregory F UdellAbstract:Some studies find that higher bank concentration is associated with higher credit availability (information hypothesis) while others maintain that credit rationing is higher in less competitive bank Markets (Market Power hypothesis). This study tests these two competing hypotheses by employing for the first time a competition indicator from the Industrial Organization literature - the Lerner index - as an alternative to concentration measures. The results are sensitive to the choice of Market Power indicators. The Lerner index is found to be the more consistent indicator and exhibit the larger (and positive) marginal effect on the probability that a firm is financially constrained.
Toni M Whited - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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bank Market Power and monetary policy transmission evidence from a structural estimation
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2020Co-Authors: Yifei Wang, Toni M Whited, Kairong XiaoAbstract:We quantify the impact of bank Market Power on monetary policy transmission through banks to borrowers. We estimate a dynamic banking model in which monetary policy affects imperfectly competitive banks’ funding costs. Banks optimize the pass-through of these costs to borrowers and depositors, while facing capital and reserve regulation. We find that bank Market Power explains much of the transmission of monetary policy to borrowers, with an effect comparable to that of bank capital regulation. When the federal funds rate falls below 0.9%, Market Power interacts with bank capital regulation to produce a reversal of the effect of monetary policy.
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bank Market Power and monetary policy transmission evidence from a structural estimation
Social Science Research Network, 2020Co-Authors: Yifei Wang, Toni M Whited, Kairong XiaoAbstract:We quantify the impact of bank Market Power on monetary policy transmission through banks to borrowers. We estimate a dynamic banking model in which monetary policy affects imperfectly competitive banks’ funding costs. Banks optimize the pass-through of these costs to borrowers and depositors, while facing capital and reserve regulation. We find that bank Market Power explains much of the transmission of monetary policy to borrowers, with an effect comparable to that of bank capital regulation. When the federal funds rate falls below 0.9%, Market Power interacts with bank capital regulation to produce a reversal of the effect of monetary policy. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
