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Ann Addison - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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jung s psychoid Concept and bion s proto Mental Concept a comparison
Journal of Analytical Psychology, 2016Co-Authors: Ann AddisonAbstract:Jung and Bion both developed theoretical Concepts propounding a deeply unknowable area of the psyche in which body and mind are undifferentiated and the individual has no distinct identity, from which a differentiated consciousness arises. In Jung's case, this is enshrined in his psychoid Concept and the associated notion of synchronicity and, in Bion's case, in his proto-Mental Concept and his ideas on group dynamics. It is by means of these two Concepts that Jung and Bion approach and locate a combined body-mind, a monism, in which body and mind are seen as different aspects of the same thing. This paper reviews the claim that although the two Concepts are associated clinically with very different situations, their commonality may arise from a similar intellectual basis: both men appear to have been influenced by the same source of vitalist ideas in philosophy including Henri Bergson, and Jung's ideas also exerted a direct influence on Bion.
Idiana Universy - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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d m armstrong universals and scientific realism vol ume 1 nominalism and realism volume 2 a theory of universals both vols cambridge 1978
2016Co-Authors: Reinhardt Grossmann, Idiana UniversyAbstract:Armstrong's latest book is excellent. [1] It compares favorably with most contemporary contributions to ontology. For one, Armstrong's style is transparent and unaffected. More importantly, his positions are stated clearly. This quality cannot be praised enough, for being obscure seems to be a prerequisite for being in philosophical fashion. Just think of the ink that has been spilled on what indeterminacy of translation really means. Or try to puzzle out what the causal theory of names has to do with philosophy. Many a thesis, I fear, will receive more attention when formulated indistinctly than when espoused by Armstrong with his customary clearness. Furthermore, Armstrong's book contains an abundance of arguments. And arguments, as most of us have realized, are hard to come by in ontology. Arguments are usually supplanted either by ringing profession or else by slander of the opposing view. Some philosophers, for example, rest content with announcing that they shall not countenance abstract entities, as if such entities could be blustered out of existence. Others make fun of other minds by calling them "ghosts in machines," as if they could be shamed out of existence. Seldom do we find arguments, as I said, and even rarer is a book, like Armstrong's, which tries to be fair to the opposition. Finally, this book is written from a, point of view''scientific realism," as Armstrong calls it-and thus presents us with a metaphysical frame df reference. One can easily see how some of Armstrong's fundaMental assumptions originate in his empiricistic Weltanschauung. In the first volume, Nominalism and Realism. Armstrong argues persuasively against three ontological ppsitions. Firstly, he considers and rejects all forms of nominalism, that is, of the view that there are nothing but particulars. A property, he shows, is neither a predicate, nor a Mental Concept. nor a class, nor a concrete (spatio-temporal) whole. Nor can it be reduced to a resemblance relation between particulars. He thusjoins that small group of contemporaries, consisting mainly of Bergmann and his students, which holds that properties form an irreducible category of the world. But even though Armstrong's conclusions are not new, nowhere else has the case against nominalism been presented as clearly and cogently as in this volume. And the same can be said about Armstrong's treatment of the other two ontological positions. He argues. secondly, that "Particularism" is false. According to this view, held by such famous Brentano students as Husserl and Meinong, and most ably defended by Stout, the ordinary properties of things are particular. For example, the particular color shade of a billiard ball is said to be particular in that no other entity as a matter of ontological necessity can possess this identical color.
Reinhardt Grossmann - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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d m armstrong universals and scientific realism vol ume 1 nominalism and realism volume 2 a theory of universals both vols cambridge 1978
2016Co-Authors: Reinhardt Grossmann, Idiana UniversyAbstract:Armstrong's latest book is excellent. [1] It compares favorably with most contemporary contributions to ontology. For one, Armstrong's style is transparent and unaffected. More importantly, his positions are stated clearly. This quality cannot be praised enough, for being obscure seems to be a prerequisite for being in philosophical fashion. Just think of the ink that has been spilled on what indeterminacy of translation really means. Or try to puzzle out what the causal theory of names has to do with philosophy. Many a thesis, I fear, will receive more attention when formulated indistinctly than when espoused by Armstrong with his customary clearness. Furthermore, Armstrong's book contains an abundance of arguments. And arguments, as most of us have realized, are hard to come by in ontology. Arguments are usually supplanted either by ringing profession or else by slander of the opposing view. Some philosophers, for example, rest content with announcing that they shall not countenance abstract entities, as if such entities could be blustered out of existence. Others make fun of other minds by calling them "ghosts in machines," as if they could be shamed out of existence. Seldom do we find arguments, as I said, and even rarer is a book, like Armstrong's, which tries to be fair to the opposition. Finally, this book is written from a, point of view''scientific realism," as Armstrong calls it-and thus presents us with a metaphysical frame df reference. One can easily see how some of Armstrong's fundaMental assumptions originate in his empiricistic Weltanschauung. In the first volume, Nominalism and Realism. Armstrong argues persuasively against three ontological ppsitions. Firstly, he considers and rejects all forms of nominalism, that is, of the view that there are nothing but particulars. A property, he shows, is neither a predicate, nor a Mental Concept. nor a class, nor a concrete (spatio-temporal) whole. Nor can it be reduced to a resemblance relation between particulars. He thusjoins that small group of contemporaries, consisting mainly of Bergmann and his students, which holds that properties form an irreducible category of the world. But even though Armstrong's conclusions are not new, nowhere else has the case against nominalism been presented as clearly and cogently as in this volume. And the same can be said about Armstrong's treatment of the other two ontological positions. He argues. secondly, that "Particularism" is false. According to this view, held by such famous Brentano students as Husserl and Meinong, and most ably defended by Stout, the ordinary properties of things are particular. For example, the particular color shade of a billiard ball is said to be particular in that no other entity as a matter of ontological necessity can possess this identical color.
Timothy C Clausner - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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domains image schemas and construal
Cognitive Linguistics, 1999Co-Authors: William Croft, Timothy C ClausnerAbstract:Despite diering theoretical views within cognitive semantics there appears to be a consensus on certain fundaMental theoretical constructs: (i) the basic semantic unit is a Mental Concept; (ii) Concepts cannot be understood independent of the domain in which they are embedded; (iii) Conceptual structures represent a construal of experience, that is, an active Mental operation; and (iv) Concept categories involve prototypes and are organized by (at least) taxonomic relations. Although the basic constructs of ``Concept'', ``domain'', ``construal'', and ``category structure'' go by dierent names, they are essentially the same among researchers in cognitive linguistics. We examine a ®fth theoretical construct, that of ``image schemas'' (recurring basic Conceptual structures), and argue that image schemas are a subtype of domain. We begin with the theory of domains proposed by Langacker, which is similar to Fillmore's theory of frame semantics. Langacker distinguishes two types of domains, locational and con®gurational; we argue that it is Concepts in domains that are locational or con®gurational, not the domains themselves. We then analyze image schemas and show how they function like domains, in which are found both locational and con®gurational Concepts.
William Croft - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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domains image schemas and construal
Cognitive Linguistics, 1999Co-Authors: William Croft, Timothy C ClausnerAbstract:Despite diering theoretical views within cognitive semantics there appears to be a consensus on certain fundaMental theoretical constructs: (i) the basic semantic unit is a Mental Concept; (ii) Concepts cannot be understood independent of the domain in which they are embedded; (iii) Conceptual structures represent a construal of experience, that is, an active Mental operation; and (iv) Concept categories involve prototypes and are organized by (at least) taxonomic relations. Although the basic constructs of ``Concept'', ``domain'', ``construal'', and ``category structure'' go by dierent names, they are essentially the same among researchers in cognitive linguistics. We examine a ®fth theoretical construct, that of ``image schemas'' (recurring basic Conceptual structures), and argue that image schemas are a subtype of domain. We begin with the theory of domains proposed by Langacker, which is similar to Fillmore's theory of frame semantics. Langacker distinguishes two types of domains, locational and con®gurational; we argue that it is Concepts in domains that are locational or con®gurational, not the domains themselves. We then analyze image schemas and show how they function like domains, in which are found both locational and con®gurational Concepts.