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A. Wool - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • A note on the fragility of the "Michael" Message Integrity Code
    IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, 2004
    Co-Authors: A. Wool
    Abstract:

    The IEEE 802.11 wireless local area network standard did not incorporate a cryptographic Message Integrity Code into its wired equivalent privacy (WEP) protocol, and relied upon CRC-32 for Message Integrity. This was shown to be completely insecure since WEP uses a stream cipher (RC4) for encryption. The latest IEEE 802.11i draft addresses this, and other, weaknesses discovered in WEP. IEEE 802.11i suggests three new modes of operation: two based on the Advanced Encryption Standard cipher and one [temporal key Integrity protocol (TKIP)] still based on RC4. The TKIP mode is intended for use on legacy hardware, which is computationally weak. TKIP uses a new, keyed, 64-b, Message Integrity Code called Michael. In this letter, we highlight a weakness in Michael and suggest a simple fix.

Jennifer Seberry - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Observations on the Message Integrity Code in IEEE802.11 Wireless
    2016
    Co-Authors: Ieee. Wireless Lans, Willy Susilo, Jennifer Seberry, Jianyong Huang
    Abstract:

    This paper surveys the security of the Message Integrity Code used in the IEEE802.11 Wireless LANs. To address the security flaws of Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), the IEEE802.11i draft defines two data confidentiality and Integrity protocols, Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) and Counter-Mode-CBC-MAC Protocol (CCMP). TKIP is based on RC4, andCCMP is based on the AES cipher. TKIP includes a keyed hash functions, called Michael, as the messag Integrity Code. The aim of this paper is to summarise the recent research results of Michael and analyse the practicability of two attacks against Michael

  • security analysis of michael the ieee 802 11i Message Integrity Code
    Embedded and Ubiquitous Computing, 2005
    Co-Authors: J G Huang, Willy Susilo, Jennifer Seberry, Martin W Bunder
    Abstract:

    The latest IEEE 802.11i uses a keyed hash function, called Michael, as the Message Integrity Code. This paper describes some properties and weaknesses of Michael. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for finding collisions of Michael. Our observation reveals that the collision status of Michael only depends on the second last block Message and the output of the block function in the third last round. We show that Michael is not collision-free by providing a method to find collisions of this keyed hash function. Moreover, we develop a method to find fixed points of Michael. If the output of the block function in any round is equal to any of these fixed points, a packet forgery attack could be mounted against Michael. Since the Michael value is encrypted by RC4, the proposed packet forgery attack does not endanger the security of the whole TKIP system.

  • observations on the Message Integrity Code in ieee802 11wireless lans
    2004
    Co-Authors: J G Huang, Willy Susilo, Jennifer Seberry
    Abstract:

    This paper surveys the security of the Message Integrity Code used in the IEEE802.11 Wireless LANs. To address the security flaws of Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), the IEEE802.11i draft defines two data confidentiality and Integrity protocols, Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) and Counter-Mode-CBCMAC Protocol (CCMP). TKIP is based on RC4, andCCMP is based on the AES cipher. TKIP includes a keyed hash functions, called Michael, as the messag Integrity Code. The aim of this paper is to summarise the recent research results of Michael and analyse the practicability of two attacks against Michael. Disciplines Physical Sciences and Mathematics Publication Details This conference paper was originally published as Huang, J, Susilo, W and Seberry, J, Observations on the Message Integrity Code in IEEE802.11Wireless LANs, in Proceedings of the 3rd Workshop on the Internet, Telecommunications and Signal Processing (WITSP'04), Adelaide, Australia, 20-22 December 2004, CDROM, 328-332. This conference paper is available at Research Online: http://ro.uow.edu.au/infopapers/511 Observations on the Message Integrity Code in IEEE802.11 Wireless LANs Jianyong Huang, Willy Susilo and Jennifer Seberry School of Information Technology and Computer Science University of Wollongong Australia Email: {jyh33, wsusilo, jennie}@uow.edu.au

Willy Susilo - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Observations on the Message Integrity Code in IEEE802.11 Wireless
    2016
    Co-Authors: Ieee. Wireless Lans, Willy Susilo, Jennifer Seberry, Jianyong Huang
    Abstract:

    This paper surveys the security of the Message Integrity Code used in the IEEE802.11 Wireless LANs. To address the security flaws of Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), the IEEE802.11i draft defines two data confidentiality and Integrity protocols, Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) and Counter-Mode-CBC-MAC Protocol (CCMP). TKIP is based on RC4, andCCMP is based on the AES cipher. TKIP includes a keyed hash functions, called Michael, as the messag Integrity Code. The aim of this paper is to summarise the recent research results of Michael and analyse the practicability of two attacks against Michael

  • security analysis of michael the ieee 802 11i Message Integrity Code
    Embedded and Ubiquitous Computing, 2005
    Co-Authors: J G Huang, Willy Susilo, Jennifer Seberry, Martin W Bunder
    Abstract:

    The latest IEEE 802.11i uses a keyed hash function, called Michael, as the Message Integrity Code. This paper describes some properties and weaknesses of Michael. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for finding collisions of Michael. Our observation reveals that the collision status of Michael only depends on the second last block Message and the output of the block function in the third last round. We show that Michael is not collision-free by providing a method to find collisions of this keyed hash function. Moreover, we develop a method to find fixed points of Michael. If the output of the block function in any round is equal to any of these fixed points, a packet forgery attack could be mounted against Michael. Since the Michael value is encrypted by RC4, the proposed packet forgery attack does not endanger the security of the whole TKIP system.

  • observations on the Message Integrity Code in ieee802 11wireless lans
    2004
    Co-Authors: J G Huang, Willy Susilo, Jennifer Seberry
    Abstract:

    This paper surveys the security of the Message Integrity Code used in the IEEE802.11 Wireless LANs. To address the security flaws of Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), the IEEE802.11i draft defines two data confidentiality and Integrity protocols, Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) and Counter-Mode-CBCMAC Protocol (CCMP). TKIP is based on RC4, andCCMP is based on the AES cipher. TKIP includes a keyed hash functions, called Michael, as the messag Integrity Code. The aim of this paper is to summarise the recent research results of Michael and analyse the practicability of two attacks against Michael. Disciplines Physical Sciences and Mathematics Publication Details This conference paper was originally published as Huang, J, Susilo, W and Seberry, J, Observations on the Message Integrity Code in IEEE802.11Wireless LANs, in Proceedings of the 3rd Workshop on the Internet, Telecommunications and Signal Processing (WITSP'04), Adelaide, Australia, 20-22 December 2004, CDROM, 328-332. This conference paper is available at Research Online: http://ro.uow.edu.au/infopapers/511 Observations on the Message Integrity Code in IEEE802.11 Wireless LANs Jianyong Huang, Willy Susilo and Jennifer Seberry School of Information Technology and Computer Science University of Wollongong Australia Email: {jyh33, wsusilo, jennie}@uow.edu.au

J G Huang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • security analysis of michael the ieee 802 11i Message Integrity Code
    Embedded and Ubiquitous Computing, 2005
    Co-Authors: J G Huang, Willy Susilo, Jennifer Seberry, Martin W Bunder
    Abstract:

    The latest IEEE 802.11i uses a keyed hash function, called Michael, as the Message Integrity Code. This paper describes some properties and weaknesses of Michael. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for finding collisions of Michael. Our observation reveals that the collision status of Michael only depends on the second last block Message and the output of the block function in the third last round. We show that Michael is not collision-free by providing a method to find collisions of this keyed hash function. Moreover, we develop a method to find fixed points of Michael. If the output of the block function in any round is equal to any of these fixed points, a packet forgery attack could be mounted against Michael. Since the Michael value is encrypted by RC4, the proposed packet forgery attack does not endanger the security of the whole TKIP system.

  • observations on the Message Integrity Code in ieee802 11wireless lans
    2004
    Co-Authors: J G Huang, Willy Susilo, Jennifer Seberry
    Abstract:

    This paper surveys the security of the Message Integrity Code used in the IEEE802.11 Wireless LANs. To address the security flaws of Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), the IEEE802.11i draft defines two data confidentiality and Integrity protocols, Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) and Counter-Mode-CBCMAC Protocol (CCMP). TKIP is based on RC4, andCCMP is based on the AES cipher. TKIP includes a keyed hash functions, called Michael, as the messag Integrity Code. The aim of this paper is to summarise the recent research results of Michael and analyse the practicability of two attacks against Michael. Disciplines Physical Sciences and Mathematics Publication Details This conference paper was originally published as Huang, J, Susilo, W and Seberry, J, Observations on the Message Integrity Code in IEEE802.11Wireless LANs, in Proceedings of the 3rd Workshop on the Internet, Telecommunications and Signal Processing (WITSP'04), Adelaide, Australia, 20-22 December 2004, CDROM, 328-332. This conference paper is available at Research Online: http://ro.uow.edu.au/infopapers/511 Observations on the Message Integrity Code in IEEE802.11 Wireless LANs Jianyong Huang, Willy Susilo and Jennifer Seberry School of Information Technology and Computer Science University of Wollongong Australia Email: {jyh33, wsusilo, jennie}@uow.edu.au

Chittirameshkumar Rameshkumar Behara - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • A Novel Message Integrity Code Based Authentication Protocol
    2015
    Co-Authors: Chittirameshkumar Rameshkumar Behara
    Abstract:

    Abstract: Now a day’s wireless local area network rapidly increase of mobile device and more efficient of link setup mechanism. For the rapidly increase of WLAN we are also provide security of transferring data. For this purpose so many authentication protocol are proposed and one of the protocol is 802.11i. Through experiments we observe that the authentication delay of 802.11i is intolerable under some scenarios, and we point that the main reason resulting in such inefficiency is due to its design from the framework perspective which introduces too many Messages. In this paper we are proposed protocol for generating low cast id based authentication protocol for authentication users and transferring data through network we are using Message Integrity Code (MIC) protocol. By providing those approaches we can moreefficiency, simplicity and more security for the data transmission