The Experts below are selected from a list of 360 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Massimo Morelli - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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third party intervention and strategic Militarization
Social Science Research Network, 2019Co-Authors: Adam Meirowitz, Massimo Morelli, Kristopher W Ramsay, Francesco SquintaniAbstract:Codified at the 2005 United Nations World Summit, the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect articulates an ideal of international interventions motivated by compassion for victims and a desire to bring stability to hot-spots around the world. Despite this consensus, practitioners and scholars have debated the importance of unintended consequences stemming from the expectation of third party intervention. We analyze how third party intervention shapes the incentives to arm, negotiate settlements, and fight wars in a parsimonious game theoretic model. Among the unintended consequences we find: interventions that indiscriminately lower the destructiveness of war increase the probability of conflict and increasing the cost of arming makes destructive wars more likely. Other interventions, however, can have much more beneficial effects and our analysis highlights peace-enhancing forms of third party intervention. From a welfare perspective, most interventions do not change the ex ante loss from war, but do have distributional effects on the terms of peace. As a result R2P principles are hard to implement because natural forms of intervention create incentives that make them largely self-defeating.
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dispute resolution institutions and strategic Militarization
Journal of Political Economy, 2019Co-Authors: Adam Meirowitz, Massimo Morelli, Kristopher W Ramsay, Francesco SquintaniAbstract:Engagement in a destructive war can be understood as the “punishment” for entering into a dispute. Institutions that reduce the chance that disputes lead to war make this punishment less severe. Th...
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third party intervention and strategic Militarization
Research Papers in Economics, 2019Co-Authors: Adam Meirowitz, Massimo Morelli, Kristopher W Ramsay, Francesco SquintaniAbstract:Codi fied at the 2005 United Nations World Summit, the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect articulates an ideal of international interventions motivated by compassion for victims and a desire to bring stability to hot-spots around the world. Despite this consensus, practitioners and scholars have debated the importance of unintended consequences stemming from the expectation of third party intervention. We analyze how third party intervention shapes the incentives to arm, negotiate settlements, and fi ght wars in a parsimonious game theoretic model. Among the unintended consequences we fi nd: interventions that indiscriminately lower the destructiveness of war increase the probability of conflict and increasing the cost of arming may increase the aggressiveness of negotiations and on balance could make destructive wars more likely. Other interventions, however, can have much more bene ficial eeffects and our analysis highlights peace-enhancing forms of third party intervention.
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dispute resolution institutions and strategic Militarization
Research Papers in Economics, 2015Co-Authors: Adam Meirowitz, Massimo Morelli, Kristopher W Ramsay, Francesco SquintaniAbstract:Existant studies of confl ict, negotiation and international relations do not take into account that the institutions used to resolve disputes shape the incentives for entering disputes in the first place. Because engagement in a costly and destructive war is the `punishment' for entering a dispute, institutions that reduce the chances that a dispute lead to open con flict may make more disputes emerge and incentivize Militarization. We provide a simple model in which the support for unmediated peace talks, while effective in improving the chance of peace for a given distribution of military strength, ultimately leads to the emergence of more disputes and to higher con flict outbreak. Happily, we find that not all con flict resolution institutions suffer from these, apparently paradoxical, but actually quite intuitive drawbacks. We identify a form of third-party intervention inspired by the celebrated work by Myerson, and show that it can broker peace in emerged disputes effectively and also avoid perverse Militarization incentives.
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dispute resolution institutions and strategic Militarization
Social Science Research Network, 2013Co-Authors: Adam Meirowitz, Massimo Morelli, Kristopher W Ramsay, Francesco SquintaniAbstract:A central question in political science is how to best manage information asymmetries and commitment problems when disputes arise between states or nations. We argue that common framings of this problem miss an important feature: the institutions determining how disputes are resolved shape the incentives for nations to enter disputes. Because war can be sometimes understood as the down-side risk from entering a dispute, institutions that reduce the chances of war-fighting may induce perverse incentives to enter into disputes and militarize. We develop a simple crisis model that captures both the Militarization decisions and bargaining behavior. We examine how features like direct communication and third-party involvement alter the incentives. Seemingly effective institutions that improve the chance of peace for a given distribution of military strength, can actually lower the chance of peace once one accounts for distortions to Militarization decisions. To illustrate the value of this broader perspective we show how a form of intervention by a mediator concerned only with resolving the current crisis, turns out to create optimal Militarization and bargaining incentives.
Francesco Squintani - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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third party intervention and strategic Militarization
Social Science Research Network, 2019Co-Authors: Adam Meirowitz, Massimo Morelli, Kristopher W Ramsay, Francesco SquintaniAbstract:Codified at the 2005 United Nations World Summit, the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect articulates an ideal of international interventions motivated by compassion for victims and a desire to bring stability to hot-spots around the world. Despite this consensus, practitioners and scholars have debated the importance of unintended consequences stemming from the expectation of third party intervention. We analyze how third party intervention shapes the incentives to arm, negotiate settlements, and fight wars in a parsimonious game theoretic model. Among the unintended consequences we find: interventions that indiscriminately lower the destructiveness of war increase the probability of conflict and increasing the cost of arming makes destructive wars more likely. Other interventions, however, can have much more beneficial effects and our analysis highlights peace-enhancing forms of third party intervention. From a welfare perspective, most interventions do not change the ex ante loss from war, but do have distributional effects on the terms of peace. As a result R2P principles are hard to implement because natural forms of intervention create incentives that make them largely self-defeating.
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dispute resolution institutions and strategic Militarization
Journal of Political Economy, 2019Co-Authors: Adam Meirowitz, Massimo Morelli, Kristopher W Ramsay, Francesco SquintaniAbstract:Engagement in a destructive war can be understood as the “punishment” for entering into a dispute. Institutions that reduce the chance that disputes lead to war make this punishment less severe. Th...
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third party intervention and strategic Militarization
Research Papers in Economics, 2019Co-Authors: Adam Meirowitz, Massimo Morelli, Kristopher W Ramsay, Francesco SquintaniAbstract:Codi fied at the 2005 United Nations World Summit, the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect articulates an ideal of international interventions motivated by compassion for victims and a desire to bring stability to hot-spots around the world. Despite this consensus, practitioners and scholars have debated the importance of unintended consequences stemming from the expectation of third party intervention. We analyze how third party intervention shapes the incentives to arm, negotiate settlements, and fi ght wars in a parsimonious game theoretic model. Among the unintended consequences we fi nd: interventions that indiscriminately lower the destructiveness of war increase the probability of conflict and increasing the cost of arming may increase the aggressiveness of negotiations and on balance could make destructive wars more likely. Other interventions, however, can have much more bene ficial eeffects and our analysis highlights peace-enhancing forms of third party intervention.
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dispute resolution institutions and strategic Militarization
Research Papers in Economics, 2015Co-Authors: Adam Meirowitz, Massimo Morelli, Kristopher W Ramsay, Francesco SquintaniAbstract:Existant studies of confl ict, negotiation and international relations do not take into account that the institutions used to resolve disputes shape the incentives for entering disputes in the first place. Because engagement in a costly and destructive war is the `punishment' for entering a dispute, institutions that reduce the chances that a dispute lead to open con flict may make more disputes emerge and incentivize Militarization. We provide a simple model in which the support for unmediated peace talks, while effective in improving the chance of peace for a given distribution of military strength, ultimately leads to the emergence of more disputes and to higher con flict outbreak. Happily, we find that not all con flict resolution institutions suffer from these, apparently paradoxical, but actually quite intuitive drawbacks. We identify a form of third-party intervention inspired by the celebrated work by Myerson, and show that it can broker peace in emerged disputes effectively and also avoid perverse Militarization incentives.
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dispute resolution institutions and strategic Militarization
Social Science Research Network, 2013Co-Authors: Adam Meirowitz, Massimo Morelli, Kristopher W Ramsay, Francesco SquintaniAbstract:A central question in political science is how to best manage information asymmetries and commitment problems when disputes arise between states or nations. We argue that common framings of this problem miss an important feature: the institutions determining how disputes are resolved shape the incentives for nations to enter disputes. Because war can be sometimes understood as the down-side risk from entering a dispute, institutions that reduce the chances of war-fighting may induce perverse incentives to enter into disputes and militarize. We develop a simple crisis model that captures both the Militarization decisions and bargaining behavior. We examine how features like direct communication and third-party involvement alter the incentives. Seemingly effective institutions that improve the chance of peace for a given distribution of military strength, can actually lower the chance of peace once one accounts for distortions to Militarization decisions. To illustrate the value of this broader perspective we show how a form of intervention by a mediator concerned only with resolving the current crisis, turns out to create optimal Militarization and bargaining incentives.
Adam Meirowitz - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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third party intervention and strategic Militarization
Social Science Research Network, 2019Co-Authors: Adam Meirowitz, Massimo Morelli, Kristopher W Ramsay, Francesco SquintaniAbstract:Codified at the 2005 United Nations World Summit, the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect articulates an ideal of international interventions motivated by compassion for victims and a desire to bring stability to hot-spots around the world. Despite this consensus, practitioners and scholars have debated the importance of unintended consequences stemming from the expectation of third party intervention. We analyze how third party intervention shapes the incentives to arm, negotiate settlements, and fight wars in a parsimonious game theoretic model. Among the unintended consequences we find: interventions that indiscriminately lower the destructiveness of war increase the probability of conflict and increasing the cost of arming makes destructive wars more likely. Other interventions, however, can have much more beneficial effects and our analysis highlights peace-enhancing forms of third party intervention. From a welfare perspective, most interventions do not change the ex ante loss from war, but do have distributional effects on the terms of peace. As a result R2P principles are hard to implement because natural forms of intervention create incentives that make them largely self-defeating.
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dispute resolution institutions and strategic Militarization
Journal of Political Economy, 2019Co-Authors: Adam Meirowitz, Massimo Morelli, Kristopher W Ramsay, Francesco SquintaniAbstract:Engagement in a destructive war can be understood as the “punishment” for entering into a dispute. Institutions that reduce the chance that disputes lead to war make this punishment less severe. Th...
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third party intervention and strategic Militarization
Research Papers in Economics, 2019Co-Authors: Adam Meirowitz, Massimo Morelli, Kristopher W Ramsay, Francesco SquintaniAbstract:Codi fied at the 2005 United Nations World Summit, the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect articulates an ideal of international interventions motivated by compassion for victims and a desire to bring stability to hot-spots around the world. Despite this consensus, practitioners and scholars have debated the importance of unintended consequences stemming from the expectation of third party intervention. We analyze how third party intervention shapes the incentives to arm, negotiate settlements, and fi ght wars in a parsimonious game theoretic model. Among the unintended consequences we fi nd: interventions that indiscriminately lower the destructiveness of war increase the probability of conflict and increasing the cost of arming may increase the aggressiveness of negotiations and on balance could make destructive wars more likely. Other interventions, however, can have much more bene ficial eeffects and our analysis highlights peace-enhancing forms of third party intervention.
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dispute resolution institutions and strategic Militarization
Research Papers in Economics, 2015Co-Authors: Adam Meirowitz, Massimo Morelli, Kristopher W Ramsay, Francesco SquintaniAbstract:Existant studies of confl ict, negotiation and international relations do not take into account that the institutions used to resolve disputes shape the incentives for entering disputes in the first place. Because engagement in a costly and destructive war is the `punishment' for entering a dispute, institutions that reduce the chances that a dispute lead to open con flict may make more disputes emerge and incentivize Militarization. We provide a simple model in which the support for unmediated peace talks, while effective in improving the chance of peace for a given distribution of military strength, ultimately leads to the emergence of more disputes and to higher con flict outbreak. Happily, we find that not all con flict resolution institutions suffer from these, apparently paradoxical, but actually quite intuitive drawbacks. We identify a form of third-party intervention inspired by the celebrated work by Myerson, and show that it can broker peace in emerged disputes effectively and also avoid perverse Militarization incentives.
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dispute resolution institutions and strategic Militarization
Social Science Research Network, 2013Co-Authors: Adam Meirowitz, Massimo Morelli, Kristopher W Ramsay, Francesco SquintaniAbstract:A central question in political science is how to best manage information asymmetries and commitment problems when disputes arise between states or nations. We argue that common framings of this problem miss an important feature: the institutions determining how disputes are resolved shape the incentives for nations to enter disputes. Because war can be sometimes understood as the down-side risk from entering a dispute, institutions that reduce the chances of war-fighting may induce perverse incentives to enter into disputes and militarize. We develop a simple crisis model that captures both the Militarization decisions and bargaining behavior. We examine how features like direct communication and third-party involvement alter the incentives. Seemingly effective institutions that improve the chance of peace for a given distribution of military strength, can actually lower the chance of peace once one accounts for distortions to Militarization decisions. To illustrate the value of this broader perspective we show how a form of intervention by a mediator concerned only with resolving the current crisis, turns out to create optimal Militarization and bargaining incentives.
Matthew O Jackson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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strategic Militarization deterrence and wars
Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2009Co-Authors: Matthew O Jackson, Massimo MorelliAbstract:We study countries choosing armament levels and then whether or not to go to war. We show that if the costs of war are not overly high or low, then all equilibria must involve dove, hawk, and deterrent strategies and the probability of war is positive (but less than one) in any given period. Wars are between countries with differing armament levels and the frequency of wars is tempered by the presence of armament levels that are expressly chosen for their deterrent properties. As the probability of winning a war becomes more reactive to increased armament, the frequency of wars decreases. As it becomes increasingly possible to negotiate a credible settlement, the probability of peace increases, but the variance of armament levels increases and war becomes increasingly likely when negotiations break down.
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strategic Militarization deterrence and wars
Social Science Research Network, 2008Co-Authors: Matthew O Jackson, Massimo MorelliAbstract:We study countries choosing armament levels and then whether or not to go to war. We show that if the costs of war are not overly high or low, then all equilibria must involve "dove," "hawk," and "deterrent" strategies and the probability of war is positive (but less than one) in any given period. Wars are between countries with differing armament levels and the frequency of wars is tempered by the presence of armament levels that are expressly chosen for their deterrent properties. As the probability of winning a war becomes more reactive to increased armament, the frequency of wars decreases. Finally, as it becomes increasingly possible to negotiate a credible settlement, the probability of peace increases, but the variance of armament levels increases and war becomes increasingly likely when negotiation is not available. This matches observed patterns in the data over time.
Kristopher W Ramsay - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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third party intervention and strategic Militarization
Social Science Research Network, 2019Co-Authors: Adam Meirowitz, Massimo Morelli, Kristopher W Ramsay, Francesco SquintaniAbstract:Codified at the 2005 United Nations World Summit, the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect articulates an ideal of international interventions motivated by compassion for victims and a desire to bring stability to hot-spots around the world. Despite this consensus, practitioners and scholars have debated the importance of unintended consequences stemming from the expectation of third party intervention. We analyze how third party intervention shapes the incentives to arm, negotiate settlements, and fight wars in a parsimonious game theoretic model. Among the unintended consequences we find: interventions that indiscriminately lower the destructiveness of war increase the probability of conflict and increasing the cost of arming makes destructive wars more likely. Other interventions, however, can have much more beneficial effects and our analysis highlights peace-enhancing forms of third party intervention. From a welfare perspective, most interventions do not change the ex ante loss from war, but do have distributional effects on the terms of peace. As a result R2P principles are hard to implement because natural forms of intervention create incentives that make them largely self-defeating.
-
dispute resolution institutions and strategic Militarization
Journal of Political Economy, 2019Co-Authors: Adam Meirowitz, Massimo Morelli, Kristopher W Ramsay, Francesco SquintaniAbstract:Engagement in a destructive war can be understood as the “punishment” for entering into a dispute. Institutions that reduce the chance that disputes lead to war make this punishment less severe. Th...
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third party intervention and strategic Militarization
Research Papers in Economics, 2019Co-Authors: Adam Meirowitz, Massimo Morelli, Kristopher W Ramsay, Francesco SquintaniAbstract:Codi fied at the 2005 United Nations World Summit, the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect articulates an ideal of international interventions motivated by compassion for victims and a desire to bring stability to hot-spots around the world. Despite this consensus, practitioners and scholars have debated the importance of unintended consequences stemming from the expectation of third party intervention. We analyze how third party intervention shapes the incentives to arm, negotiate settlements, and fi ght wars in a parsimonious game theoretic model. Among the unintended consequences we fi nd: interventions that indiscriminately lower the destructiveness of war increase the probability of conflict and increasing the cost of arming may increase the aggressiveness of negotiations and on balance could make destructive wars more likely. Other interventions, however, can have much more bene ficial eeffects and our analysis highlights peace-enhancing forms of third party intervention.
-
dispute resolution institutions and strategic Militarization
Research Papers in Economics, 2015Co-Authors: Adam Meirowitz, Massimo Morelli, Kristopher W Ramsay, Francesco SquintaniAbstract:Existant studies of confl ict, negotiation and international relations do not take into account that the institutions used to resolve disputes shape the incentives for entering disputes in the first place. Because engagement in a costly and destructive war is the `punishment' for entering a dispute, institutions that reduce the chances that a dispute lead to open con flict may make more disputes emerge and incentivize Militarization. We provide a simple model in which the support for unmediated peace talks, while effective in improving the chance of peace for a given distribution of military strength, ultimately leads to the emergence of more disputes and to higher con flict outbreak. Happily, we find that not all con flict resolution institutions suffer from these, apparently paradoxical, but actually quite intuitive drawbacks. We identify a form of third-party intervention inspired by the celebrated work by Myerson, and show that it can broker peace in emerged disputes effectively and also avoid perverse Militarization incentives.
-
dispute resolution institutions and strategic Militarization
Social Science Research Network, 2013Co-Authors: Adam Meirowitz, Massimo Morelli, Kristopher W Ramsay, Francesco SquintaniAbstract:A central question in political science is how to best manage information asymmetries and commitment problems when disputes arise between states or nations. We argue that common framings of this problem miss an important feature: the institutions determining how disputes are resolved shape the incentives for nations to enter disputes. Because war can be sometimes understood as the down-side risk from entering a dispute, institutions that reduce the chances of war-fighting may induce perverse incentives to enter into disputes and militarize. We develop a simple crisis model that captures both the Militarization decisions and bargaining behavior. We examine how features like direct communication and third-party involvement alter the incentives. Seemingly effective institutions that improve the chance of peace for a given distribution of military strength, can actually lower the chance of peace once one accounts for distortions to Militarization decisions. To illustrate the value of this broader perspective we show how a form of intervention by a mediator concerned only with resolving the current crisis, turns out to create optimal Militarization and bargaining incentives.