The Experts below are selected from a list of 10032 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Zhifeng Yang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Minority Shareholders control rights and the quality of corporate decisions in weak investor protection countries a natural experiment from china
The Accounting Review, 2013Co-Authors: Zhihong Chen, Zhifeng YangAbstract:ABSTRACT : Using a 2004 Chinese securities regulation that requires equity offering proposals to obtain the separate approval of voting Minority Shareholders, we examine whether giving Minority Shareholders increased control over corporate decisions helps to reduce value-decreasing corporate decisions for firms domiciled in weak investor protection countries. We find that the regulation deters management from submitting value-decreasing equity offering proposals in firms with higher mutual fund ownership. There is also weak evidence that Minority Shareholders are more likely to veto value-decreasing equity offering proposals in firms with higher mutual fund ownership in the post-regulation period. Overall, our evidence suggests that in weak investor protection countries, the effect of granting Minority Shareholders increased control over corporate decisions on the quality of corporate decisions depends on the composition of Minority Shareholders. JEL Classifications: G32; G34; G38
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Minority Shareholders control rights and the quality of corporate decisions in weak investor protection countries a natural experiment from china
Social Science Research Network, 2012Co-Authors: Zhihong Chen, Zhifeng YangAbstract:Using a 2004 Chinese securities regulation that requires equity offering proposals to obtain the separate approval of voting Minority Shareholders, we examine whether giving Minority Shareholders increased control over corporate decisions helps reduce value-decreasing corporate decisions for firms domiciled in weak investor protection countries. We find that the regulation deters management from submitting value-decreasing equity offering proposals in firms with higher mutual fund ownership. There is also weak evidence that Minority Shareholders are more likely to veto value-decreasing equity offering proposals in firms with higher mutual fund ownership in the post-regulation period. Overall, our evidence suggests that in weak investor protection countries, the effect of granting Minority Shareholders increased control over corporate decisions on the quality of corporate decisions depends on the composition of Minority Shareholders.
Pablo Martin De Holan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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protected by the family how closely held family firms protect Minority Shareholders
Social Science Research Network, 2006Co-Authors: Pablo Martin De Holan, Luis J SanzAbstract:Most companies in the world are owned by families, and a majority of them are registered in countries where the legal protection of Minority Shareholders is weak. Is family control the consequence of the lack of investor protection? It is known that agency problems among owners actually increase in family-ownership situations, so family control by itself may not be an efficient substitute for the legal protection of Minority investors. In this article we analyze successful strategies used by Canadian and Latin American business groups and firms to increase the satisfaction of their Minority Shareholders and to limit the incentives of the controlling Shareholders to abuse them, and predict the outcomes of that protection. From these experiences we are able to suggest some conditions that are required in order for family control to be an effective response to the lack of legal investor protection.
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protected by the family how closely held family firms protect Minority Shareholders
Journal of Business Research, 2006Co-Authors: Pablo Martin De Holan, Luis J SanzAbstract:Abstract Most companies in the world are family-owned, and a majority of them operate in countries where the legal protection of Minority Shareholders is weak at best. In spite of previous arguments to the contrary, research shows that agency problems among owners actually increase in family-ownership situations, so family control by itself may not be an efficient substitute for the legal protection of Minority investors. In this article we analyze successful strategies used by non-US business groups and firms to increase the satisfaction of their Minority Shareholders and to limit the incentives of the controlling Shareholders to abuse them, and predict the outcomes of that protection. From these experiences we are able to suggest conditions needed to link family control and Minority shareholder protection.
Bruno Meyerhof Salama - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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legal protection of Minority Shareholders of listed corporations in brazil brief history legal structure and empirical evidence
Social Science Research Network, 2011Co-Authors: Bruno Meyerhof Salama, Viviane Muller PradoAbstract:This article examines key elements in the history, structure, and application of the legal framework offering protection to Minority Shareholders in Brazilian listed corporations. Section I examines the history of Minority Shareholders protection in Brazil. It does so in order to give context to the main reformations to the Brazilian Corporations Law of 1976. It also highlights recent developments in the Brazilian stock markets, particularly the fact that dispersed ownership can for the first time in Brazilian history be found in a few listed corporations. Section II presents the main traits of the current legal framework for the protection of Minority Shareholders. It analyzes the most important provisions under the Brazilian Corporations Law, as well as the most relevant regulations issued by the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (BM&FBovespa). Section III presents the results of an empirical work on the degree of enforcement of laws and regulations protecting Minority Shareholders. The data shows that judicial and administrative application of such legal provisions is still relatively unpredictable and time consuming. Section IV concludes.
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legal protection of Minority Shareholders of listed corporations in brazil brief history legal structure and empirical evidence
Journal of Civil Law Studies, 2011Co-Authors: Bruno Meyerhof Salama, Viviane Muller PradoAbstract:“Shareholders are stupid and impertinent: stupid, because they buy shares, and impertinent, because they demand a return.” This is how Carl Fuerstenberg, a high profile German banker of the between-wars period once referred to Minority Shareholders. Today, the argument that Minority Shareholders are mere opportunists lacks foundation. It is now well established that the existence of vibrant stock markets with ample participation by Minority Shareholders is an important vehicle for savings mobilization, financial development and economic growth.In recent years a number of studies have shown that enhanced Minority shareholder protection is associated with higher valuation of corporate assets and with more developed and valuable capital markets. Because of this, in the past decade a consensus emerged in academic circles suggesting that Minority Shareholders deserve legal protection not only for equitable reasons, but for efficiency considerations as well.
Luis J Sanz - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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protected by the family how closely held family firms protect Minority Shareholders
Social Science Research Network, 2006Co-Authors: Pablo Martin De Holan, Luis J SanzAbstract:Most companies in the world are owned by families, and a majority of them are registered in countries where the legal protection of Minority Shareholders is weak. Is family control the consequence of the lack of investor protection? It is known that agency problems among owners actually increase in family-ownership situations, so family control by itself may not be an efficient substitute for the legal protection of Minority investors. In this article we analyze successful strategies used by Canadian and Latin American business groups and firms to increase the satisfaction of their Minority Shareholders and to limit the incentives of the controlling Shareholders to abuse them, and predict the outcomes of that protection. From these experiences we are able to suggest some conditions that are required in order for family control to be an effective response to the lack of legal investor protection.
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protected by the family how closely held family firms protect Minority Shareholders
Journal of Business Research, 2006Co-Authors: Pablo Martin De Holan, Luis J SanzAbstract:Abstract Most companies in the world are family-owned, and a majority of them operate in countries where the legal protection of Minority Shareholders is weak at best. In spite of previous arguments to the contrary, research shows that agency problems among owners actually increase in family-ownership situations, so family control by itself may not be an efficient substitute for the legal protection of Minority investors. In this article we analyze successful strategies used by non-US business groups and firms to increase the satisfaction of their Minority Shareholders and to limit the incentives of the controlling Shareholders to abuse them, and predict the outcomes of that protection. From these experiences we are able to suggest conditions needed to link family control and Minority shareholder protection.
Zhihong Chen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Minority Shareholders control rights and the quality of corporate decisions in weak investor protection countries a natural experiment from china
The Accounting Review, 2013Co-Authors: Zhihong Chen, Zhifeng YangAbstract:ABSTRACT : Using a 2004 Chinese securities regulation that requires equity offering proposals to obtain the separate approval of voting Minority Shareholders, we examine whether giving Minority Shareholders increased control over corporate decisions helps to reduce value-decreasing corporate decisions for firms domiciled in weak investor protection countries. We find that the regulation deters management from submitting value-decreasing equity offering proposals in firms with higher mutual fund ownership. There is also weak evidence that Minority Shareholders are more likely to veto value-decreasing equity offering proposals in firms with higher mutual fund ownership in the post-regulation period. Overall, our evidence suggests that in weak investor protection countries, the effect of granting Minority Shareholders increased control over corporate decisions on the quality of corporate decisions depends on the composition of Minority Shareholders. JEL Classifications: G32; G34; G38
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Minority Shareholders control rights and the quality of corporate decisions in weak investor protection countries a natural experiment from china
Social Science Research Network, 2012Co-Authors: Zhihong Chen, Zhifeng YangAbstract:Using a 2004 Chinese securities regulation that requires equity offering proposals to obtain the separate approval of voting Minority Shareholders, we examine whether giving Minority Shareholders increased control over corporate decisions helps reduce value-decreasing corporate decisions for firms domiciled in weak investor protection countries. We find that the regulation deters management from submitting value-decreasing equity offering proposals in firms with higher mutual fund ownership. There is also weak evidence that Minority Shareholders are more likely to veto value-decreasing equity offering proposals in firms with higher mutual fund ownership in the post-regulation period. Overall, our evidence suggests that in weak investor protection countries, the effect of granting Minority Shareholders increased control over corporate decisions on the quality of corporate decisions depends on the composition of Minority Shareholders.