The Experts below are selected from a list of 3987 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Joseph Boyle - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Gry Wester - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • conscientious objection by health care professionals
    Philosophy Compass, 2015
    Co-Authors: Gry Wester
    Abstract:

    Certain health care services and goods, although legal and often generally accepted in a society, are by some considered Morally problematic. Debates on conscientious objection in health care try to resolve whether and when physicians, nurses and pharmacists should be allowed to refuse to provide medical services and goods because of their ethical or religious beliefs. These debates have most often focused on issues such as how to balance the interests of patients and health care professionals, and the compatibility of conscientious objection with professional obligations, but it is also possible to think about conscientious objection in terms of how to respond to Moral Disagreement and the requirements of liberal neutrality.

Silvia Jonas - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Mathematical and Moral Disagreement
    The Philosophical Quarterly, 2019
    Co-Authors: Silvia Jonas
    Abstract:

    Abstract The existence of fundamental Moral Disagreements is a central problem for Moral realism and has often been contrasted with an alleged absence of Disagreement in mathematics. However, mathematicians do in fact disagree on fundamental questions, for example on which set-theoretic axioms are true, and some philosophers have argued that this increases the plausibility of Moral vis-à-vis mathematical realism. I argue that the analogy between mathematical and Moral Disagreement is not as straightforward as those arguments present it. In particular, I argue that pluralist accounts of mathematics render fundamental mathematical Disagreements compatible with mathematical realism in a way in which Moral Disagreements and Moral realism are not.1

Rose Parfitt - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • brad r roth sovereign equality and Moral Disagreement premises of a pluralist international legal order
    European Journal of International Law, 2012
    Co-Authors: Rose Parfitt
    Abstract:

    Professor Roth's book addresses what � if it were new, as he suggests � would be an extremely alarming development: namely, the tendency of "strong" states to intervene in the affairs of their materially "weak" but formally equal counterparts. Because such interventionism is invariably justified as necessary in order to defend the core principles of a supposedly universal Morality (usually, in the UN era, associated with human rights), Roth argues that this practice must be discouraged if the Charter system's commitment to "Moral pluralism" is not to be undermined. As he sees it: The post-World War II order, as constructively amended in the era of decolonization, established the priority of peace and respectful cooperation among judicially equal states; the ethos was one of ideological pluralism and forbearance, qualified only by a Security Council mech anism requiring an extraordinary cross-cutting consensus. That the system leaves unredressed all but the most extraordinary injustices occurring within state boundaries is not an aberrant consequence; the system, mindful that great-power predation has typically flown the flag of righteousness, prioritizes the impeding of impositions (at 284). On a continuum he sets up, running from "transcendental justice" to Moral relativism, Roth therefore argues that the Morally correct position to take is one of "bounded pluralism". Such a position is "pluralistic" in that it respects the right to non-intervention even of states ruled by "ruthless" governments on the grounds that '[w]hat appears "disproportionate" to someone else's cause, however just, frequently appears exigent in the service of one's own' (at 120). Such a position is "bounded", however, in that this respect is limited by the existence of a few clearly universal Moral standards. It is clear to Roth, for example, that "[t]he duty to refrain from coercive interference" can legitimately be "overcome in some class of unambiguously catastrophic cases" �

  • Review Essay: Brad R Roth, Sovereign Equality and Moral Disagreement: Premises of a Pluralist International Legal Order (Oxford: Oup, 2011).
    2012
    Co-Authors: Rose Parfitt
    Abstract:

    Review Essay of Brad R Roth, Sovereign Equality and Moral Disagreement: Premises of a Pluralist International Legal Order (Oxford: Oup, 2011).

Folke Tersman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • A New Route from Moral Disagreement to Moral Skepticism
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2019
    Co-Authors: Olle Risberg, Folke Tersman
    Abstract:

    Moral Disagreement is sometimes thought to pose problems for Moral realism because it shows that we cannot achieve knowledge of the Moral facts the realists posit. In particular, it is ‘fundamental’ Moral Disagreement—that is, Disagreement that is not due to distorting factors such as ignorance of relevant nonMoral facts, bad reasoning skills, or the like—that is supposed to generate skeptical implications. In this paper, we show that this version of the Disagreement challenge is flawed as it stands. The reason is that the epistemic assumptions it requires are incompatible with the possibility of fundamental Disagreement. However, we also present an alternative reconstruction of the challenge that avoids the problem. The challenge we present crucially invokes the principle that knowledge requires ‘adherence’. While that requirement is usually not discussed in this context, we argue that it provides a promising explanation of why Disagreement sometimes leads to skepticism.

  • Moral Disagreement: Actual vs Possible
    2012
    Co-Authors: Folke Tersman
    Abstract:

    Suppose that the Disagreement that exists regarding Moral issues supports a skeptical or anti-realist conclusion of some sort (i.e., a conclusion to the effect that our Moral convictions are not justified or cannot be (objectively) true). If so, could we plausibly generate the same conclusion by appealing to the mere possibility of such Disagreement? This question has recently caused some controversy. In my paper, I explain why the answer is no and why the actual existence of certain types of Disagreement have more weight, in the context of the realism/anti-realism debate, than the mere possibility of Disagreements of the pertinent types. The view that ethical anti-realism can be defended with reference to the mere possibility of certain types of Disagreement is sometimes held to lead to global anti-realism (on the ground that Disagreement is, in any area, always possible). The second aim of the paper is to show that this contention is false. On can appeal to the mere possibility of certain types of Disagreement in ethics in support of an anti-realist view and still, plausibly and coherently, deny global anti-realism.

  • Crispin Wright on Moral Disagreement
    The Philosophical Quarterly, 1998
    Co-Authors: Folke Tersman
    Abstract:

    Wright argues that if there are Moral Disagreements that cannot be attributed to inferential error, ignorance of relevant data or some similar form of deficiency (i.e., what I call ‘radical’ Disagreements), then Moral realists are committed to the view that Moral truths are evidence-transcendent. Moreover, since he thinks that this view is implausible and that Moral Disagreements can indeed be radical, he has suggested that we should reject realism here. I indicate how a realist can respond to this challenge, by offering two arguments to the effect that a realist might plausibly hold that Moral Disagreements can never be found to be radical. However, this is not so much intended to be a defence of Moral realism as a critique of Wright's basic strategy, since a similar defence may be provided in support of realism about any (minimally truth-apt) discourse.