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Stéphane Rossignol - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • National Politics and InterNational Agreements
    Journal of Public Economics, 2013
    Co-Authors: Hubert Kempf, Stéphane Rossignol
    Abstract:

    In this paper we set up a political economy model of a two-country world economy, where an interNational agreement on the provisions of public goods generating cross-border externalities, such as environment protection, subject to feasibility, efficiency and equity constraints, has to be negotiated by two elected National delegates. We prove that any interNational agreement involves higher public good provisions (through higher contributions in both countries) than in the case of no-agreement. If feasible, an IA may generate losers in either country. Under an equal tax rate rule, an interNational agreement may or may not be reached, unlike under an equal gain rule. Turning to the election stage, depending on the type of equity rule imposed on the IA, the choice of delegates depends crucially on distributive characteristics, both between and within countries: this is due to the struggle by electorates to transfer the tax burden to the other country's taxpayers.

  • National Politics and InterNational Agreements
    2010
    Co-Authors: Hubert Kempf, Stéphane Rossignol
    Abstract:

    InterNational agreements about transNational issues are difficult to reach, as the examples of the Copenhagen summit or the never-ending discussions of the future of the European Union make clear. In this paper, we relate this difficulty to the political process and the conflicts of interest attached to an agreement, both within and between National electorates, related to National income distributions. We set up a political economy model of a two-country world economy, where an interNational agreement on the financing of an interNational public good has to be negociated by two elected National delegates. We prove that any interNational agreement involves higher taxes in both countries than in the case of no-agreement. If reachable, an IA may generate losers in either country. If the political process involves a constraint on tax rates, an agreement may or may not be reached. Finally, when an agreement is reached, it may exhibit strategic delegation when the median voters are the Condorcet winners in both countries : this delegation is the outcome of the struggle by electorates to transfer the tax burden to the other country's taxpayers. In brief, the fate of an interNational agreements depends on National Politics and distributive issues in the involved countries.

Zia Mian - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Jennifer Rosen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • gender quotas for women in National Politics a comparative analysis across development thresholds
    Social Science Research, 2017
    Co-Authors: Jennifer Rosen
    Abstract:

    Women's share of global lower or single house parliamentary seats has increased by over 70% over the course of the 21st century. Yet these increases have not been uniform across countries. Rather countries with low levels of socioeconomic development have outpaced developed democracies in terms of the gains made in the formal political representation of women. One reasonable explanation for this trend is the adoption in many poorer countries of National gender quota legislation, that is, affirmative action laws intended to compensate for sex discrimination in the electoral process. Yet, cross-National analyses examining quotas as an explanatory factor typically use a simple binary (yes/no) variable that either conflates the diverse intra-quota variations into a single variable or includes only one part of the many quota variations. By contrast, using an originally compiled dataset that includes 167 countries from 1992 to 2012, this paper employs measures of gender quota legislation that capture the complexity and considerable diversity of existing quota legislation. These measures allow us to identify the specific factors that have helped so many less developed countries rise to the top of interNational rankings in recent years. The findings indicate that the effect of each type of gender quota, as well as other explanatory variables, do not operate in the same way across all countries. Specifically, voluntary political party quotas are substantially more effective in developed countries, while reserved seat quotas are only significant in least developed countries. Electoral candidate quotas, on the other hand, can be significant across all countries, however only have a positive effect when they are accompanied by placement mandates that ensure women are placed in winnable positions, sanctions for non-compliance that are significant enough to force adherence, and a minimum mandated threshold of at least 30%.

Hubert Kempf - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • National Politics and InterNational Agreements
    Journal of Public Economics, 2013
    Co-Authors: Hubert Kempf, Stéphane Rossignol
    Abstract:

    In this paper we set up a political economy model of a two-country world economy, where an interNational agreement on the provisions of public goods generating cross-border externalities, such as environment protection, subject to feasibility, efficiency and equity constraints, has to be negotiated by two elected National delegates. We prove that any interNational agreement involves higher public good provisions (through higher contributions in both countries) than in the case of no-agreement. If feasible, an IA may generate losers in either country. Under an equal tax rate rule, an interNational agreement may or may not be reached, unlike under an equal gain rule. Turning to the election stage, depending on the type of equity rule imposed on the IA, the choice of delegates depends crucially on distributive characteristics, both between and within countries: this is due to the struggle by electorates to transfer the tax burden to the other country's taxpayers.

  • National Politics and InterNational Agreements
    2010
    Co-Authors: Hubert Kempf, Stéphane Rossignol
    Abstract:

    InterNational agreements about transNational issues are difficult to reach, as the examples of the Copenhagen summit or the never-ending discussions of the future of the European Union make clear. In this paper, we relate this difficulty to the political process and the conflicts of interest attached to an agreement, both within and between National electorates, related to National income distributions. We set up a political economy model of a two-country world economy, where an interNational agreement on the financing of an interNational public good has to be negociated by two elected National delegates. We prove that any interNational agreement involves higher taxes in both countries than in the case of no-agreement. If reachable, an IA may generate losers in either country. If the political process involves a constraint on tax rates, an agreement may or may not be reached. Finally, when an agreement is reached, it may exhibit strategic delegation when the median voters are the Condorcet winners in both countries : this delegation is the outcome of the struggle by electorates to transfer the tax burden to the other country's taxpayers. In brief, the fate of an interNational agreements depends on National Politics and distributive issues in the involved countries.

S.l. Jarvenpaa - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

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