The Experts below are selected from a list of 573 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Saxena Amitabh - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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A Secure Wireless Routing Protocol Using Enhanced Chain Signatures
2009Co-Authors: Saxena AmitabhAbstract:We propose a routing protocol for wireless networks. Wireless routing protocols allow hosts within a network to have some knowledge of the topology in order to know when to forward a packet (via broadcast) and when to drop it. Since a routing protocol forms the backbone of a network, it is a lucrative target for many attacks, all of which attempt to disrupt network traffic by corrupting routing tables of Neighboring Routers using false updates. Secure routing protocols designed for wired networks (such as S-BGP) are not scalable in an ad-hoc wireless environment because of two main drawbacks: (1) the need to maintain knowledge about all immediate neighbors (which requires a discovery protocol), and (2) the need to transmit the same update several times, one for each neighbor. Although information about neighbors is readily available in a fairly static and wired network, such information is often not updated or available in an ad-hoc wireless network with mobile devices. Our protocol is a variant of S-BGP called SS-BGP and allows a single broadcast for routing updates without having the need to be aware of every Neighboring Router. The protocol is based on a novel authentication primitive called Enhanced Chain Signatures (ECS).Comment: Extended versio
Amitabh Saxena - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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A Secure Wireless Routing Protocol Using Enhanced Chain Signatures
2024Co-Authors: Amitabh SaxenaAbstract:Abstract: We propose a routing protocol for wireless networks. Wireless routing protocols allow hosts within a network to have some knowledge of the topology in order to know when to forward a packet (via broadcast) and when to drop it. Since a routing protocol forms the backbone of a network, it is a lucrative target for many attacks, all of which attempt to disrupt network traffic by corrupting routing tables of Neighboring Routers using false updates. Secure routing protocols designed for wired networks (such as S-BGP) are not scalable in an ad-hoc wireless environment because of two main drawbacks: (1) the need to maintain knowledge about all immediate neighbors (which requires a discovery protocol), and (2) the need to transmit the same update several times, one for each neighbor. Although information about neighbors is readily available in a fairly static and wired network, such information is often not updated or available in an ad-hoc wireless network with mobile devices. Our protocol is a variant of S-BGP called SS-BGP and allows a single broadcast for routing updates without having the need to be aware of every Neighboring Router. The protocol is based on a novel authentication primitive called Enhanced Chain Signatures (ECS).
R. White - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Issues with Existing Cryptographic Protection Methods for Routing Protocols
2010Co-Authors: J. Jaeggli, Nokia Inc, R. White, Cisco SystemsAbstract:Routing protocols have been extended over time to use cryptographic mechanisms to ensure that data received from a Neighboring Router has not been modified in transit and actually originated from an authorized Neighboring Router. The cryptographic mechanisms defined to date and described in this document rely on a digest produced with a hash algorithm applied to the payload encapsulated in the routing protocol packet. This document outlines some of the limitations of the current mechanism, problems with manual keying of these cryptographic algorithms, and possible vectors for the exploitation of these limitations
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Issues with Existing Cryptographic Protection Methods for Routing Protocols
2010Co-Authors: V. Manral, J. Jaeggli, Nokia Inc, M. Bhatia, R. WhiteAbstract:Routing protocols have been extended over time to use cryptographic mechanisms to ensure that data received from a Neighboring Router has not been modified in transit and actually originated from an authorized Neighboring Router. The cryptographic mechanisms defined to date and described in this document rely on a digest produced with a hash algorithm applied to the payload encapsulated in the routing protocol packet. This document outlines some of the limitations of the current mechanism, problems with manual keying of these cryptographic algorithms, and possible vectors for the exploitation of these limitations. Status of This Memo This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Interne
Ramalingam Sridhar - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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a novel fault tolerant Router architecture for network on chip reconfiguration
System-on-Chip Conference, 2015Co-Authors: Pengzhan Yan, Shixiong Jiang, Ramalingam SridharAbstract:In Network-on-Chip (NoC) architectures, a faulty Router can isolate a functional processing element (PE) from other nodes, severely restricting the performance of the system. This paper presents a fault-tolerant Router architecture that can avoid PE isolation even if the Router fails. In this design, we connect the local port of the Router with one of the other four ports through a fault tolerant control unit that works with the fault detection signal. If the Router fails, the control unit will turn on and connect the PE with the Neighboring Router directly, thus protecting the system functioning. A revised XY-Routing algorithm is also presented to achieve the NoC reconfiguration when Router fails. Theoretical analysis show that for a 10∗10 mesh NoC, the reliability at year 10 is 20 times better than NoC implemented with traditional Router. Also our design has greatly improved value for mean time to failure (MTTF). In video and DSP applications, simulation results show better power control with faulty PEs. The new architecture also has other advantages over annealing re-mapping algorithm. Our design has only 12% area overhead, which is significantly better than other approaches to deal with faults.
J. Jaeggli - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Issues with Existing Cryptographic Protection Methods for Routing Protocols
2010Co-Authors: J. Jaeggli, Nokia Inc, R. White, Cisco SystemsAbstract:Routing protocols have been extended over time to use cryptographic mechanisms to ensure that data received from a Neighboring Router has not been modified in transit and actually originated from an authorized Neighboring Router. The cryptographic mechanisms defined to date and described in this document rely on a digest produced with a hash algorithm applied to the payload encapsulated in the routing protocol packet. This document outlines some of the limitations of the current mechanism, problems with manual keying of these cryptographic algorithms, and possible vectors for the exploitation of these limitations
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Issues with Existing Cryptographic Protection Methods for Routing Protocols
2010Co-Authors: V. Manral, J. Jaeggli, Nokia Inc, M. Bhatia, R. WhiteAbstract:Routing protocols have been extended over time to use cryptographic mechanisms to ensure that data received from a Neighboring Router has not been modified in transit and actually originated from an authorized Neighboring Router. The cryptographic mechanisms defined to date and described in this document rely on a digest produced with a hash algorithm applied to the payload encapsulated in the routing protocol packet. This document outlines some of the limitations of the current mechanism, problems with manual keying of these cryptographic algorithms, and possible vectors for the exploitation of these limitations. Status of This Memo This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Interne
