The Experts below are selected from a list of 50328 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Hans M. Kristensen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
a history of us Nuclear Weapons in south korea
Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists, 2017Co-Authors: Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. NorrisAbstract:ABSTRACTDuring the Cold War, the United States deployed Nuclear Weapons in South Korea continuously for 33 years, from 1958 to 1991. The South Korean-based Nuclear arsenal peaked at an all-time high of approximately 950 warheads in 1967. Since the last US Nuclear Weapons were withdrawn from South Korea in 1991, the United States has protected South Korea and Japan under a “Nuclear umbrella” using Nuclear bombers and submarines based elsewhere. While defense hawks in Seoul and Washington have, in 2017, called for the United States to redeploy tactical Nuclear Weapons to South Korea, the authors argue against this idea. Doing so, they say, would provide no resolution of the crisis over North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and would likely increase Nuclear risks. Redeployment would also have serious implications for broader regional issues because it would likely be seen by China and Russia as further undermining their security.
-
israeli Nuclear Weapons 2014
Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists, 2014Co-Authors: Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. NorrisAbstract:Although the Israeli government neither confirms nor denies that it possesses Nuclear Weapons, it is generally accepted by friend and foe alike that Israel is a Nuclear-armed state—and has been so ...
-
Nuclear Weapons modernizations
2014Co-Authors: Hans M. KristensenAbstract:This article reviews the Nuclear Weapons modernization programs underway in the world's nine Nuclear Weapons states. It concludes that despite significant reductions in overall Weapons inventories since the end of the Cold War, the pace of reductions is slowing - four of the Nuclear Weapons states are even increasing their arsenals, and all the Nuclear Weapons states are busy modernizing their remaining arsenals in what appears to be a dynamic and counterproductive Nuclear competition. The author questions whether perpetual modernization combined with no specific plan for the elimination of Nuclear Weapons is consistent with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and concludes that new limits on Nuclear modernizations are needed.
-
Worldwide deployments of Nuclear Weapons, 2014:
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2014Co-Authors: Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. NorrisAbstract:As of mid-2014, the authors estimate that there are approximately 16,300 Nuclear Weapons located at some 98 sites in 14 countries. Roughly 10,000 of these Weapons are in military arsenals; the remaining Weapons are retired and awaiting dismantlement. Approximately 4,000 are operationally available, and some 1,800 are on high alert and ready for use on short notice. The largest concentrations of Nuclear Weapons reside in Russia and the United States, which possess 93 percent of the total global inventory. The United States today stores Nuclear Weapons at 18 sites, including 12 sites in 11 states in the United States and another six sites in five European countries. There is considerable uncertainty about the number of Russian Nuclear Weapons storage sites, but the authors estimate that Russia today stores Nuclear Weapons permanently at 40 domestic locations.
-
global Nuclear Weapons inventories 1945 2013
Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists, 2013Co-Authors: Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. NorrisAbstract:The authors calculate that some 125,000 Nuclear warheads have been built since 1945, about 97 percent of them by the United States and the Soviet Union and Russia. The nine nations with Nuclear Weapons now possess more than 10,000 Nuclear warheads in their military stockpiles, the authors estimate, with several thousand additional US and Russian retired warheads in storage, awaiting dismantlement. The Nuclear stockpiles of China, as well as Pakistan, India, Israel, and North Korea, are minuscule in comparison with the US and Russian arsenals, but more difficult to estimate. Still, the authors believe that China’s Nuclear Weapons stockpile has surpassed Great Britain’s. Although the total number of Nuclear warheads in the world is decreasing because of US and Russian reductions, all the nations with Nuclear Weapons continue to modernize or upgrade their Nuclear arsenals.
Robert S. Norris - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
a history of us Nuclear Weapons in south korea
Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists, 2017Co-Authors: Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. NorrisAbstract:ABSTRACTDuring the Cold War, the United States deployed Nuclear Weapons in South Korea continuously for 33 years, from 1958 to 1991. The South Korean-based Nuclear arsenal peaked at an all-time high of approximately 950 warheads in 1967. Since the last US Nuclear Weapons were withdrawn from South Korea in 1991, the United States has protected South Korea and Japan under a “Nuclear umbrella” using Nuclear bombers and submarines based elsewhere. While defense hawks in Seoul and Washington have, in 2017, called for the United States to redeploy tactical Nuclear Weapons to South Korea, the authors argue against this idea. Doing so, they say, would provide no resolution of the crisis over North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and would likely increase Nuclear risks. Redeployment would also have serious implications for broader regional issues because it would likely be seen by China and Russia as further undermining their security.
-
israeli Nuclear Weapons 2014
Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists, 2014Co-Authors: Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. NorrisAbstract:Although the Israeli government neither confirms nor denies that it possesses Nuclear Weapons, it is generally accepted by friend and foe alike that Israel is a Nuclear-armed state—and has been so ...
-
Worldwide deployments of Nuclear Weapons, 2014:
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2014Co-Authors: Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. NorrisAbstract:As of mid-2014, the authors estimate that there are approximately 16,300 Nuclear Weapons located at some 98 sites in 14 countries. Roughly 10,000 of these Weapons are in military arsenals; the remaining Weapons are retired and awaiting dismantlement. Approximately 4,000 are operationally available, and some 1,800 are on high alert and ready for use on short notice. The largest concentrations of Nuclear Weapons reside in Russia and the United States, which possess 93 percent of the total global inventory. The United States today stores Nuclear Weapons at 18 sites, including 12 sites in 11 states in the United States and another six sites in five European countries. There is considerable uncertainty about the number of Russian Nuclear Weapons storage sites, but the authors estimate that Russia today stores Nuclear Weapons permanently at 40 domestic locations.
-
global Nuclear Weapons inventories 1945 2013
Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists, 2013Co-Authors: Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. NorrisAbstract:The authors calculate that some 125,000 Nuclear warheads have been built since 1945, about 97 percent of them by the United States and the Soviet Union and Russia. The nine nations with Nuclear Weapons now possess more than 10,000 Nuclear warheads in their military stockpiles, the authors estimate, with several thousand additional US and Russian retired warheads in storage, awaiting dismantlement. The Nuclear stockpiles of China, as well as Pakistan, India, Israel, and North Korea, are minuscule in comparison with the US and Russian arsenals, but more difficult to estimate. Still, the authors believe that China’s Nuclear Weapons stockpile has surpassed Great Britain’s. Although the total number of Nuclear warheads in the world is decreasing because of US and Russian reductions, all the nations with Nuclear Weapons continue to modernize or upgrade their Nuclear arsenals.
-
Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, 2012
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2012Co-Authors: Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. NorrisAbstract:In this Nuclear Notebook, the authors write about nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons—starting with the difficulty of finding a universal definition for them. Although the United States and Russia have reduced their nonstrategic stockpiles, significant inventories remain. And other Nuclear Weapons states appear to have nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons as well. Today, at least five of the world’s nine Nuclear Weapons states have, or are developing, what appears to meet the definition of a nonstrategic Nuclear weapon: Russia, the United States, France, Pakistan, and China. The authors present information on the Weapons at each of these arsenals.
Richard Falk - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Nuclear Weapons, War, and the Discipline of International Law
At the Nuclear Precipice, 2008Co-Authors: Richard FalkAbstract:The deepest challenge confronting those who seek the abolition of Nuclear Weapons arsenals and unconditional prohibition of future acquisition cannot be met by relying on the pious rhetoric about the legal prohibitions applicable to Nuclear weaponry. International law certainly affects the aura of illegitimacy that surrounds any discussion of Nuclear weaponry, but its clear pronouncements and authoritative arrangements have not demonstrated any capacity to influence behavior, especially of the Nuclear weapon states. Most international law experts would agree that any threat or use of Nuclear Weapons, except possibly in retaliation against a prior Nuclear Weapons strike or when the survival of a state was at stake, is unlawful, yet the doctrines and policies of states have involved threats without adverse consequences. The highest judicial body in the United Nations (UN) system endorsed this general assessment in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons delivered in 1996. Beyond this, the most comprehensive international treaty on the subject, the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968), commits Nuclear weapon states in Article VI to end “the Nuclear arms race at an early date” and “pursue negotiations in good faith” to achieve “Nuclear disarmament.” Such clear legal admonitions have been ignored by Nuclear weapon states, most pointedly by the United States, without causing any notable criticism either in diplomatic circles or within domestic politics.
Erik Gartzke - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Nuclear posture nonproliferation policy and the spread of Nuclear Weapons
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2014Co-Authors: Erik Gartzke, Matthew KroenigAbstract:What is the relationship between Nuclear postures and nonproliferation policies and the spread of Nuclear Weapons? At first blush, this might appear to be an obvious question. After all, states go to great lengths—extending Nuclear security guarantees to nonNuclear weapon states, forward-deploying Nuclear Weapons on the territory of allies, sizing their own Nuclear arsenals with the proliferation decisions of other states in mind, supporting international institutions in conducting inspections of Nuclear facilities in nonNuclear weapon states, restricting the availability of sensitive Nuclear technology, applying and enforcing sanctions against would-be proliferators, conducting military strikes against Nuclear facilities, and promoting Nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes, among many other steps—to prevent the spread of Nuclear Weapons. It would be strange to imagine that states pursue such actions unless they can expect a policy payoff in terms of peace or security. Yet, there is little systematic evidence to suggest that Nuclear postures and policies have a meaningful impact on the spread of Nuclear Weapons. Correctly understanding the effects of Nuclear posture and policy on both horizontal proliferation (the spread of Nuclear Weapons to new states) and vertical proliferation (increases in the size and sophistication of Nuclear arsenals within existing Nuclear states) is a subject of extreme real-world importance. United
-
Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2007Co-Authors: Erik GartzkeAbstract:Nuclear Weapons proliferation is a topic of intense interest and concern among both academics and policy makers. Diverse opinions exist about the determinants of proliferation and the policy options to alter proliferation incentives. We evaluate a variety of explanations in two stages of Nuclear proliferation, the presence of Nuclear Weapons production programs and the actual possession of Nuclear Weapons. We examine proliferation quantitatively, using data collected by the authors on national latent Nuclear Weapons production capability and several other variables, while controlling for the conditionality of Nuclear Weapons possession based on the presence of a Nuclear Weapons program. We find that security concerns and technological capabilities are important determinants of whether states form Nuclear Weapons programs, while security concerns, economic capabilities, and domestic politics help to explain the possession of Nuclear Weapons. Signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are less likely to initiate Nuclear Weapons programs, but the NPT has not deterred proliferation at the system level.
Matthew Kroenig - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Nuclear posture nonproliferation policy and the spread of Nuclear Weapons
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2014Co-Authors: Erik Gartzke, Matthew KroenigAbstract:What is the relationship between Nuclear postures and nonproliferation policies and the spread of Nuclear Weapons? At first blush, this might appear to be an obvious question. After all, states go to great lengths—extending Nuclear security guarantees to nonNuclear weapon states, forward-deploying Nuclear Weapons on the territory of allies, sizing their own Nuclear arsenals with the proliferation decisions of other states in mind, supporting international institutions in conducting inspections of Nuclear facilities in nonNuclear weapon states, restricting the availability of sensitive Nuclear technology, applying and enforcing sanctions against would-be proliferators, conducting military strikes against Nuclear facilities, and promoting Nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes, among many other steps—to prevent the spread of Nuclear Weapons. It would be strange to imagine that states pursue such actions unless they can expect a policy payoff in terms of peace or security. Yet, there is little systematic evidence to suggest that Nuclear postures and policies have a meaningful impact on the spread of Nuclear Weapons. Correctly understanding the effects of Nuclear posture and policy on both horizontal proliferation (the spread of Nuclear Weapons to new states) and vertical proliferation (increases in the size and sophistication of Nuclear arsenals within existing Nuclear states) is a subject of extreme real-world importance. United
