The Experts below are selected from a list of 32979 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Andrew S Tanenbaum - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • enhanced Operating System Security through efficient and fine grained address space randomization
    USENIX Security Symposium, 2012
    Co-Authors: Cristiano Giuffrida, Anton Kuijsten, Andrew S Tanenbaum
    Abstract:

    In recent years, the deployment of many application-level countermeasures against memory errors and the increasing number of vulnerabilities discovered in the kernel has fostered a renewed interest in kernel-level exploitation. Unfortunately, no comprehensive and well-established mechanism exists to protect the Operating System from arbitrary attacks, due to the relatively new development of the area and the challenges involved. In this paper, we propose the first design for fine-grained address space randomization (ASR) inside the Operating System (OS), providing an efficient and comprehensive countermeasure against classic and emerging attacks, such as return-oriented programming. To motivate our design, we investigate the differences with application-level ASR and find that some of the well-established assumptions in existing solutions are no longer valid inside the OS; above all, perhaps, that information leakage becomes a major concern in the new context. We show that our ASR strategy outperforms state-of-the-art solutions in terms of both performance and Security without affecting the software distribution model. Finally, we present the first comprehensive live rerandomization strategy, which we found to be particularly important inside the OS. Experimental results demonstrate that our techniques yield low run-time performance overhead (less than 5% on average on both SPEC and syscall-intensive benchmarks) and limited run-time memory footprint increase (around 15% during the execution of our benchmarks). We believe our techniques can greatly enhance the level of OS Security without compromising the performance and reliability of the OS.

  • enhanced Operating System Security through efficient and fine grained address space randomization
    USENIX Security Symposium, 2012
    Co-Authors: Cristiano Giuffrida, Anton Kuijsten, Andrew S Tanenbaum
    Abstract:

    In recent years, the deployment of many application-level countermeasures against memory errors and the increasing number of vulnerabilities discovered in the kernel has fostered a renewed interest in kernel-level exploitation. Unfortunately, no comprehensive and well-established mechanism exists to protect the Operating System from arbitrary attacks, due to the relatively new development of the area and the challenges involved. In this paper, we propose the first design for fine-grained address space randomization (ASR) inside the Operating System (OS), providing an efficient and comprehensive countermeasure against classic and emerging attacks, such as return-oriented programming. To motivate our design, we investigate the differences with application-level ASR and find that some of the well-established assumptions in existing solutions are no longer valid inside the OS; above all, perhaps, that information leakage becomes a major concern in the new context. We show that our ASR strategy outperforms state-of-the-art solutions in terms of both performance and Security without affecting the software distribution model. Finally, we present the first comprehensive live rerandomization strategy, which we found to be particularly important inside the OS. Experimental results demonstrate that our techniques yield low run-time performance overhead (less than 5% on average on both SPEC and syscall-intensive benchmarks) and limited run-time memory footprint increase (around 15% during the execution of our benchmarks). We believe our techniques can greatly enhance the level of OS Security without compromising the performance and reliability of the OS.

Cristiano Giuffrida - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • enhanced Operating System Security through efficient and fine grained address space randomization
    USENIX Security Symposium, 2012
    Co-Authors: Cristiano Giuffrida, Anton Kuijsten, Andrew S Tanenbaum
    Abstract:

    In recent years, the deployment of many application-level countermeasures against memory errors and the increasing number of vulnerabilities discovered in the kernel has fostered a renewed interest in kernel-level exploitation. Unfortunately, no comprehensive and well-established mechanism exists to protect the Operating System from arbitrary attacks, due to the relatively new development of the area and the challenges involved. In this paper, we propose the first design for fine-grained address space randomization (ASR) inside the Operating System (OS), providing an efficient and comprehensive countermeasure against classic and emerging attacks, such as return-oriented programming. To motivate our design, we investigate the differences with application-level ASR and find that some of the well-established assumptions in existing solutions are no longer valid inside the OS; above all, perhaps, that information leakage becomes a major concern in the new context. We show that our ASR strategy outperforms state-of-the-art solutions in terms of both performance and Security without affecting the software distribution model. Finally, we present the first comprehensive live rerandomization strategy, which we found to be particularly important inside the OS. Experimental results demonstrate that our techniques yield low run-time performance overhead (less than 5% on average on both SPEC and syscall-intensive benchmarks) and limited run-time memory footprint increase (around 15% during the execution of our benchmarks). We believe our techniques can greatly enhance the level of OS Security without compromising the performance and reliability of the OS.

  • enhanced Operating System Security through efficient and fine grained address space randomization
    USENIX Security Symposium, 2012
    Co-Authors: Cristiano Giuffrida, Anton Kuijsten, Andrew S Tanenbaum
    Abstract:

    In recent years, the deployment of many application-level countermeasures against memory errors and the increasing number of vulnerabilities discovered in the kernel has fostered a renewed interest in kernel-level exploitation. Unfortunately, no comprehensive and well-established mechanism exists to protect the Operating System from arbitrary attacks, due to the relatively new development of the area and the challenges involved. In this paper, we propose the first design for fine-grained address space randomization (ASR) inside the Operating System (OS), providing an efficient and comprehensive countermeasure against classic and emerging attacks, such as return-oriented programming. To motivate our design, we investigate the differences with application-level ASR and find that some of the well-established assumptions in existing solutions are no longer valid inside the OS; above all, perhaps, that information leakage becomes a major concern in the new context. We show that our ASR strategy outperforms state-of-the-art solutions in terms of both performance and Security without affecting the software distribution model. Finally, we present the first comprehensive live rerandomization strategy, which we found to be particularly important inside the OS. Experimental results demonstrate that our techniques yield low run-time performance overhead (less than 5% on average on both SPEC and syscall-intensive benchmarks) and limited run-time memory footprint increase (around 15% during the execution of our benchmarks). We believe our techniques can greatly enhance the level of OS Security without compromising the performance and reliability of the OS.

Anton Kuijsten - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • enhanced Operating System Security through efficient and fine grained address space randomization
    USENIX Security Symposium, 2012
    Co-Authors: Cristiano Giuffrida, Anton Kuijsten, Andrew S Tanenbaum
    Abstract:

    In recent years, the deployment of many application-level countermeasures against memory errors and the increasing number of vulnerabilities discovered in the kernel has fostered a renewed interest in kernel-level exploitation. Unfortunately, no comprehensive and well-established mechanism exists to protect the Operating System from arbitrary attacks, due to the relatively new development of the area and the challenges involved. In this paper, we propose the first design for fine-grained address space randomization (ASR) inside the Operating System (OS), providing an efficient and comprehensive countermeasure against classic and emerging attacks, such as return-oriented programming. To motivate our design, we investigate the differences with application-level ASR and find that some of the well-established assumptions in existing solutions are no longer valid inside the OS; above all, perhaps, that information leakage becomes a major concern in the new context. We show that our ASR strategy outperforms state-of-the-art solutions in terms of both performance and Security without affecting the software distribution model. Finally, we present the first comprehensive live rerandomization strategy, which we found to be particularly important inside the OS. Experimental results demonstrate that our techniques yield low run-time performance overhead (less than 5% on average on both SPEC and syscall-intensive benchmarks) and limited run-time memory footprint increase (around 15% during the execution of our benchmarks). We believe our techniques can greatly enhance the level of OS Security without compromising the performance and reliability of the OS.

  • enhanced Operating System Security through efficient and fine grained address space randomization
    USENIX Security Symposium, 2012
    Co-Authors: Cristiano Giuffrida, Anton Kuijsten, Andrew S Tanenbaum
    Abstract:

    In recent years, the deployment of many application-level countermeasures against memory errors and the increasing number of vulnerabilities discovered in the kernel has fostered a renewed interest in kernel-level exploitation. Unfortunately, no comprehensive and well-established mechanism exists to protect the Operating System from arbitrary attacks, due to the relatively new development of the area and the challenges involved. In this paper, we propose the first design for fine-grained address space randomization (ASR) inside the Operating System (OS), providing an efficient and comprehensive countermeasure against classic and emerging attacks, such as return-oriented programming. To motivate our design, we investigate the differences with application-level ASR and find that some of the well-established assumptions in existing solutions are no longer valid inside the OS; above all, perhaps, that information leakage becomes a major concern in the new context. We show that our ASR strategy outperforms state-of-the-art solutions in terms of both performance and Security without affecting the software distribution model. Finally, we present the first comprehensive live rerandomization strategy, which we found to be particularly important inside the OS. Experimental results demonstrate that our techniques yield low run-time performance overhead (less than 5% on average on both SPEC and syscall-intensive benchmarks) and limited run-time memory footprint increase (around 15% during the execution of our benchmarks). We believe our techniques can greatly enhance the level of OS Security without compromising the performance and reliability of the OS.

Jay Lepreau - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the flask Security architecture System support for diverse Security policies
    USENIX Security Symposium, 1999
    Co-Authors: Ray Spencer, Stephen Smalley, Peter Loscocco, Mike Hibler, David G Andersen, Jay Lepreau
    Abstract:

    Operating Systems must be flexible in their support for Security policies, providing sufficient mechanisms for supporting the wide variety of real-world Security policies. Such flexibility requires controlling the propagation of access rights, enforcing fine-grained access rights and supporting the revocation of previously granted access rights. Previous Systems are lacking in at least one of these areas. In this paper we present an Operating System Security architecture that solves these problems. Control over propagation is provided by ensuring that the Security policy is consulted for every Security decision. This control is achieved without significant performance degradation through the use of a Security decision caching mechanism that ensures a consistent view of policy decisions. Both fine-grained access rights and revocation support are provided by mechanisms that are directly integrated into the service-providing components of the System. The architecture is described through its prototype implementation in the Flask microkernel-based Operating System, and the policy flexibility of the prototype is evaluated. We present initial evidence that the architecture's impact on both performance and code complexity is modest. Moreover, our architecture is applicable to many other types of Operating Systems and environments.

Emre Erturk - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • two trends in mobile Security financial motives and transitioning from static to dynamic analysis
    arXiv: Cryptography and Security, 2015
    Co-Authors: Emre Erturk
    Abstract:

    The goal of this paper is to analyze the behavior and intent of recent types of privacy invasive Android adware. There are two recent trends in this area: more financial motives instead of ego motives, and the development of more dynamic analysis tools. This paper starts with a review of Android mobile Operating System Security, and also addresses the pros and cons of open source Operating System Security. Static analysis of malware provides high quality results and leads to a good understanding as shown in this paper. However, as malware grows in number and complexity, there have been recent efforts to automate the detection mechanisms and many of the static tasks. As Android's market share is rapidly growing around the world. Android Security will be a crucial area of research for IT Security professionals and their academic counterparts. The upside of the current situation is that malware is being quickly exposed, thanks to open source software development tools. This cooperation is important in curbing the widespread theft of personal information with monetary value.

  • two trends in mobile Security financial motives and transitioning from static to dynamic analysis
    International Journal of Intelligent Computing Research, 2013
    Co-Authors: Emre Erturk
    Abstract:

    The goal of this paper is to analyze the behavior and intent of recent types of privacy-invasive Android adware. There are two recent trends in this area: more financial (rather than ego) motives, and the development of more dynamic analysis tools. This paper starts with a review of Android mobile Operating System Security, and also addresses the pros and cons of open source Operating System Security. Static analysis of malware provides high quality results and leads to a good understanding as shown in this paper. However, as malware grows in number and complexity, there have been recent efforts to automate the detection mechanisms and many of the static tasks. As Android’s market share is rapidly growing around the world, Android Security will be a crucial area of research for IT Security professionals and their academic counterparts. The upside of the current situation is that malware is being quickly exposed, thanks to open-source software development tools. This cooperation is important in curbing the widespread theft of personal information with monetary value. KeywordsSecurity for Mobile Computing; Privacy Protection; Malware Analysis

  • a case study in open source software Security and privacy android adware
    World Congress on Internet Security, 2012
    Co-Authors: Emre Erturk
    Abstract:

    The goal of this paper is to analyze the behavior and intent of recent types of privacy-invasive Android adware. This paper starts with a review of Android mobile Operating System Security. This paper also addresses the broader issue as to the pros and cons of an open source Operating System in terms of Security and privacy. Static analysis of malware can provide higher quality results and lead to a better understanding. This approach is used in this paper. As Android's market share is rapidly growing around the world, Android Security will be a crucial area of research for IT Security professionals and their academic counterparts. The upside of the current situation is that malware is being quickly exposed, thanks to open-source software development tools.