The Experts below are selected from a list of 11007 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Arijit Mukherjee - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Patent Protection, Innovation and Technology Licensing
Australian Economic Papers, 2020Co-Authors: Leonard F.s. Wang, Arijit MukherjeeAbstract:type="main"> We show that the common wisdom suggesting higher investment in innovation under a stronger Patent Protection may not be true if the innovator can license its technology ex-post innovation. If the initial cost of production is high and the slope of the marginal cost of undertaking innovation is moderate, investment in innovation is maximised at a Patent Protection that is weaker than the strongest Patent Protection. Otherwise, strongest Patent Protection maximises investment in innovation. We also show that welfare is maximised neither at the strongest Patent Protection nor at the weakest Patent Protection but at an intermediate Patent Protection. Our results are important for Patent policies.
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R&D, Licensing and Patent Protection
Industrial Organization, 2020Co-Authors: Arijit MukherjeeAbstract:This paper investigates the effect of different Patent regimes on R&D investment and social welfare in a duopoly market with uncertain R&D process. We find that strong Patent Protection increases R&D investment of at least one firm but whether both firms’ R&D investment will be more under strong Patent Protection is ambiguous. While ex-ante welfare is more likely to be higher under strong Patent Protection, ex-post welfare may be higher under strong Patent Protection. Whether the possibility of licensing increases both firms' R&D investment is also ambiguous. Licensing with up-front fixed-fee can increase policy dilemma by increasing the possibility of higher ex-ante welfare under strong Patent Protection but higher ex-post welfare under weak Patent Protection. However, the results may be different for licensing contract with per- unit output royalty.
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Patent Protection and innovation in a vertical structure
Economics Bulletin, 2020Co-Authors: Debasmita Basak, Arijit MukherjeeAbstract:We show a new way through which Patent Protection affects innovation. We show that Patent Protection may reduce the final goods producers' incentives for innovation in industries with imperfectly competitive input markets. The input market structure may play an important role in this respect.
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Vertical technology transfer and the implications of Patent Protection
2020Co-Authors: Arijit Mukherjee, Chiranjib NeogiAbstract:Significant amount of vertical technology transfer occurs between developed and developing country firms, yet the literature on intellectual property rights did not pay much attention to this aspect. We show that whether or not the incumbent and the entrant final goods producers are from the same developed country, Patent Protection in the developing country raises developed-country welfare if (i) Patent Protection in the developing country deters entry in the final goods market, (ii) the marginal cost difference between the incumbent and the entrant final goods producers is sufficiently small, and (iii) the marginal cost difference between the incumbent and the entrant developing-country firms is sufficiently high.
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Patent Protection and R&D with Endogenous Market Structure
Journal of Industrial Economics, 2017Co-Authors: Arijit MukherjeeAbstract:In a model with endogenous number of innovating firms, we show that whether Patent Protection increases R&D investment is ambiguous, and depends on the market demand function and the cost of R&D. If the market size increases with number of firms, Patent Protection reduces R&D investment if the cost of R&D is sufficiently high, and higher product differentiation increases the possibility of lower R&D investment under Patent Protection. If the market size does not increase with number of firms, Patent Protection never reduces R&D investment. We find that welfare is lower under Patent Protection than under no Patent Protection.
Walter G Park - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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international Patent Protection 1960 2005
Research Policy, 2008Co-Authors: Walter G ParkAbstract:This note provides an update to the index of Patent Protection published in this journal in 1997. The original paper presented the index for 1960-1990 for 110 countries. The index has now been updated to 2005 and extended to 122 countries. The adoption of stronger Patent laws and the composition of Patent rights vary across countries by level of economic development.
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International Patent Protection: 1960-2005
Research Policy, 2008Co-Authors: Walter G ParkAbstract:This note provides an update to the index of Patent Protection published in this journal in 1997. The original paper presented the index for 1960-1990 for 110 countries. The index has now been updated to 2005 and extended to 122 countries. The adoption of stronger Patent laws and the composition of Patent rights vary across countries by level of economic development. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Kamal Saggi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Patent Protection in developing countries and global welfare wto obligations versus flexibilities
Journal of International Economics, 2020Co-Authors: Eric W Bond, Kamal SaggiAbstract:Abstract This paper develops a North-South model to evaluate the South's incentive for Patent Protection when a Northern firm's investment in quality-enhancing research and development (R&D) is affected by its Patent policy. The model is used to (a) evaluate the impact of requiring the South to fulfill its key WTO obligation of instituting Patent Protection and (b) to address the role of two major flexibilities that WTO members enjoy with respect to their Patent policies: the freedom to implement exhaustion policies of their choosing and the right to use compulsory licensing (CL) subject to certain stipulations. Two forces drive the model: how much the firm invests in R&D and whether or not selling in the South maximizes its global profit. CL improves consumer access in the South and can even raise innovation and global welfare. Provided the South implements Patent Protection, innovation and welfare are higher if the North follows national as opposed to international exhaustion. However, the South's incentive for Patent Protection is not necessarily stronger under national exhaustion. Not only is CL more likely to be used under international exhaustion, the welfare gain resulting from its application is also higher relative to that under national exhaustion.
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compulsory licensing and Patent Protection a north south perspective
The Economic Journal, 2018Co-Authors: Eric W Bond, Kamal SaggiAbstract:In a stylised model involving a developing country (called South) and a foreign Patent holder, we analyse whether and how the incidence and social value of compulsory licensing (CL) depends upon the South's Patent Protection policy. If South is free to deny Patent Protection, CL fails to arise in equilibrium and the option to use it makes both parties worse off. If South is obliged to offer Patent Protection, CL can occur and even yield a Pareto improvement. The ability to control price increases the South's incentive for Patent Protection as well as the likelihood of CL.
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Compulsory Licensing and Patent Protection: A North‐South Perspective
The Economic Journal, 2017Co-Authors: Eric W Bond, Kamal SaggiAbstract:In a stylised model involving a developing country (called South) and a foreign Patent holder, we analyse whether and how the incidence and social value of compulsory licensing (CL) depends upon the South's Patent Protection policy. If South is free to deny Patent Protection, CL fails to arise in equilibrium and the option to use it makes both parties worse off. If South is obliged to offer Patent Protection, CL can occur and even yield a Pareto improvement. The ability to control price increases the South's incentive for Patent Protection as well as the likelihood of CL.
Eric W Bond - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Patent Protection in developing countries and global welfare wto obligations versus flexibilities
Journal of International Economics, 2020Co-Authors: Eric W Bond, Kamal SaggiAbstract:Abstract This paper develops a North-South model to evaluate the South's incentive for Patent Protection when a Northern firm's investment in quality-enhancing research and development (R&D) is affected by its Patent policy. The model is used to (a) evaluate the impact of requiring the South to fulfill its key WTO obligation of instituting Patent Protection and (b) to address the role of two major flexibilities that WTO members enjoy with respect to their Patent policies: the freedom to implement exhaustion policies of their choosing and the right to use compulsory licensing (CL) subject to certain stipulations. Two forces drive the model: how much the firm invests in R&D and whether or not selling in the South maximizes its global profit. CL improves consumer access in the South and can even raise innovation and global welfare. Provided the South implements Patent Protection, innovation and welfare are higher if the North follows national as opposed to international exhaustion. However, the South's incentive for Patent Protection is not necessarily stronger under national exhaustion. Not only is CL more likely to be used under international exhaustion, the welfare gain resulting from its application is also higher relative to that under national exhaustion.
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compulsory licensing and Patent Protection a north south perspective
The Economic Journal, 2018Co-Authors: Eric W Bond, Kamal SaggiAbstract:In a stylised model involving a developing country (called South) and a foreign Patent holder, we analyse whether and how the incidence and social value of compulsory licensing (CL) depends upon the South's Patent Protection policy. If South is free to deny Patent Protection, CL fails to arise in equilibrium and the option to use it makes both parties worse off. If South is obliged to offer Patent Protection, CL can occur and even yield a Pareto improvement. The ability to control price increases the South's incentive for Patent Protection as well as the likelihood of CL.
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Compulsory Licensing and Patent Protection: A North‐South Perspective
The Economic Journal, 2017Co-Authors: Eric W Bond, Kamal SaggiAbstract:In a stylised model involving a developing country (called South) and a foreign Patent holder, we analyse whether and how the incidence and social value of compulsory licensing (CL) depends upon the South's Patent Protection policy. If South is free to deny Patent Protection, CL fails to arise in equilibrium and the option to use it makes both parties worse off. If South is obliged to offer Patent Protection, CL can occur and even yield a Pareto improvement. The ability to control price increases the South's incentive for Patent Protection as well as the likelihood of CL.
Tatsuro Iwaisako - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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welfare effects of Patent Protection in a semi endogenous growth model
Macroeconomic Dynamics, 2020Co-Authors: Tatsuro IwaisakoAbstract:This paper examines how strengthening Patent Protection affects welfare in a nonscale qualityladder model, which was developed by Segerstrom (1998) and generalized by Li (2003). In the Segerstrom-Li model, Patent Protection creates no distortion in static allocation among the production sectors. In order to examine the welfare effects of strengthening Patent Protection adequately, we incorporate a competitive outside good into the Segerstrom-Li model. In the general model, we derive the welfare-maximizing degree of Patent Protection analytically by utilizing a linear approximation of the transition path. The result shows that the welfare-maximizing degree of Patent Protection is weaker when the market share of the competitive outside good is psitive than when it is zero. In other words, evaluating the welfare effect of Patent Protection without considering the static distortion which it creates leads to excessive Patent Protection.
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welfare effects of Patent Protection and productive public services why do developing countries prefer weaker Patent Protection
Economics Letters, 2013Co-Authors: Tatsuro IwaisakoAbstract:This paper examines the welfare-maximizing degree of Patent Protection in a growth model where the engines of economic growth are R&D and public services. The result shows that if public services are small, the welfare-maximizing level of Patent Protection is weaker.
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Patent Protection capital accumulation and economic growth
Economic Theory, 2013Co-Authors: Tatsuro Iwaisako, Koichi FutagamiAbstract:In this paper, we investigate how strengthening Patent Protection affects economic growth in an endogenous growth model where both innovation and capital accumulation are the driving forces of economic growth. In this model, stronger Patent Protection raises the profit flow obtained by innovation but reduces the factor demand for capital. This process accelerates innovation but discourages capital accumulation, and because of the negative effect on economic growth through reducing capital accumulation, strengthening Patent Protection may then impede economic growth. This result contrasts with earlier studies where innovation is the sole driving force for economic growth. Moreover, in an open economy model where technologies are transferred and capital is imported from abroad, the strictest Protection of Patents enhances technology adoption from abroad but impedes capital accumulation, and thus, the relation derived between Patent Protection and output can be nonmonotone. In terms of implications, these findings may be able to partly explain the complex relation found by some empirical studies in this area.
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a welfare analysis of global Patent Protection in a model with endogenous innovation and foreign direct investment
European Economic Review, 2011Co-Authors: Tatsuro Iwaisako, Hitoshi Tanaka, Koichi FutagamiAbstract:This paper constructs a North–South quality-ladder model in which foreign direct investment (FDI) is determined by the endogenous location choice of firms, and examines analytically how strengthening Patent Protection in the South affects welfare in the South. Strengthening Patent Protection increases the South's welfare by enhancing innovation and FDI, but it also allows the firms with Patents to charge higher prices for their goods, which decreases welfare. However, the model shows that the former positive welfare effect outweighs the latter negative effect. Moreover, introducing the strictest form of Patent Protection in the South, that is, harmonizing Patent Protection in the South with that in the North, may maximize welfare in the South as well as in the North. Further, a similar result can also be obtained in a nonscale effect model.
