The Experts below are selected from a list of 315 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Stephanie Stolarz-fantino - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Self‐control in a Prisoner's Dilemma game: the role of trial spacing and an interfering task
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 2006Co-Authors: Edmund Fantino, Santino C. Gaitan, Stephen F. Meyer, Stephanie Stolarz-fantinoAbstract:Self-control was studied in an iterated one-player Prisoner's Dilemma game in which students' choices affected the Payoff Matrix on the next trial. The frequency of self-control responses (choice of the smaller Payoff now, but with the more generous Payoff Matrix more likely on the next trial) and defection responses (choice of the larger Payoff now, but with the less generous Payoff Matrix more likely on the next trial) were measured. In Experiment 1, players achieved a criterion of five consecutive self-control responses more quickly as a positive function of trial spacing, the presence between trials of a discriminative stimulus associated with the upcoming Payoff Matrix, and the probability that the self-control or defection response would be reciprocated by the computer. Experiment 2 replicated the effect of trial spacing except when there was an interfering task during the interval, suggesting that trial spacing permits better appreciation of the contingencies. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Edmund Fantino - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Self‐control in a Prisoner's Dilemma game: the role of trial spacing and an interfering task
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 2006Co-Authors: Edmund Fantino, Santino C. Gaitan, Stephen F. Meyer, Stephanie Stolarz-fantinoAbstract:Self-control was studied in an iterated one-player Prisoner's Dilemma game in which students' choices affected the Payoff Matrix on the next trial. The frequency of self-control responses (choice of the smaller Payoff now, but with the more generous Payoff Matrix more likely on the next trial) and defection responses (choice of the larger Payoff now, but with the less generous Payoff Matrix more likely on the next trial) were measured. In Experiment 1, players achieved a criterion of five consecutive self-control responses more quickly as a positive function of trial spacing, the presence between trials of a discriminative stimulus associated with the upcoming Payoff Matrix, and the probability that the self-control or defection response would be reciprocated by the computer. Experiment 2 replicated the effect of trial spacing except when there was an interfering task during the interval, suggesting that trial spacing permits better appreciation of the contingencies. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Martin A Nowak - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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fourier decomposition of Payoff Matrix for symmetric three strategy games
Physical Review E, 2014Co-Authors: Kinga S Bodo, Gyorgy Szabo, Benjamin Allen, Martin A NowakAbstract:In spatial evolutionary games the Payoff matrices are used to describe pair interactions among neighboring players located on a lattice. Now we introduce a way how the Payoff matrices can be built up as a sum of Payoff components reflecting basic symmetries. For the two-strategy games this decomposition reproduces interactions characteristic to the Ising model. For the three-strategy symmetric games the Fourier components can be classified into four types representing games with self-dependent and cross-dependent Payoffs, variants of three-strategy coordinations, and the rock-scissors-paper (RSP) game. In the absence of the RSP component the game is a potential game. The resultant potential Matrix has been evaluated. The general features of these systems are analyzed when the game is expressed by the linear combinations of these components.
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the replicator equation on graphs
Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2006Co-Authors: Hisashi Ohtsuki, Martin A NowakAbstract:We study evolutionary games on graphs. Each player is represented by a vertex of the graph. The edges denote who meets whom. A player can use any one of n strategies. Players obtain a Payoff from interaction with all their immediate neighbors. We consider three different update rules, called 'birth-death', 'death-birth' and 'imitation'. A fourth update rule, 'pairwise comparison', is shown to be equivalent to birth-death updating in our model. We use pair approximation to describe the evolutionary game dynamics on regular graphs of degree k. In the limit of weak selection, we can derive a differential equation which describes how the average frequency of each strategy on the graph changes over time. Remarkably, this equation is a replicator equation with a transformed Payoff Matrix. Therefore, moving a game from a well-mixed population (the complete graph) onto a regular graph simply results in a transformation of the Payoff Matrix. The new Payoff Matrix is the sum of the original Payoff Matrix plus another Matrix, which describes the local competition of strategies. We discuss the application of our theory to four particular examples, the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Snow-Drift game, a coordination game and the Rock-Scissors-Paper game.
Jianming Liu - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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intrusion detection system based on Payoff Matrix for wireless sensor networks
International Conference on Genetic and Evolutionary Computing, 2009Co-Authors: Rongsheng Dong, Lianglong Liu, Jianming LiuAbstract:The high node density, large scale node number and limitation of resource in wireless sensor networks introduce significant challenges when preventing active denial of services (DoS) attacks. This paper established an attacking-defending gaming model, where the strategy space and Payoff Matrix are given to both the intrusion detection system (IDS) and the malicious nodes. The Nash equilibrium of mixed strategy is then achieved. Simulation results show that our gaming model can detect active DoS attacks effectively.
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WGEC - Intrusion Detection System Based on Payoff Matrix for Wireless Sensor Networks
2009 Third International Conference on Genetic and Evolutionary Computing, 2009Co-Authors: Rongsheng Dong, Lianglong Liu, Jianming LiuAbstract:The high node density, large scale node number and limitation of resource in wireless sensor networks introduce significant challenges when preventing active denial of services (DoS) attacks. This paper established an attacking-defending gaming model, where the strategy space and Payoff Matrix are given to both the intrusion detection system (IDS) and the malicious nodes. The Nash equilibrium of mixed strategy is then achieved. Simulation results show that our gaming model can detect active DoS attacks effectively.
Santino C. Gaitan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Self‐control in a Prisoner's Dilemma game: the role of trial spacing and an interfering task
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 2006Co-Authors: Edmund Fantino, Santino C. Gaitan, Stephen F. Meyer, Stephanie Stolarz-fantinoAbstract:Self-control was studied in an iterated one-player Prisoner's Dilemma game in which students' choices affected the Payoff Matrix on the next trial. The frequency of self-control responses (choice of the smaller Payoff now, but with the more generous Payoff Matrix more likely on the next trial) and defection responses (choice of the larger Payoff now, but with the less generous Payoff Matrix more likely on the next trial) were measured. In Experiment 1, players achieved a criterion of five consecutive self-control responses more quickly as a positive function of trial spacing, the presence between trials of a discriminative stimulus associated with the upcoming Payoff Matrix, and the probability that the self-control or defection response would be reciprocated by the computer. Experiment 2 replicated the effect of trial spacing except when there was an interfering task during the interval, suggesting that trial spacing permits better appreciation of the contingencies. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
