The Experts below are selected from a list of 38151 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Edward J Oughton - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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stochastic counterfactual risk analysis for the Vulnerability assessment of cyber Physical attacks on electricity distribution infrastructure networks
Risk Analysis, 2019Co-Authors: Edward J Oughton, Daniel Ralph, Raghav Pant, Eireann Leverett, Jennifer Copic, Scott Thacker, Rabia Dada, Simon Ruffle, Michelle TuvesonAbstract:In December 2015, a cyber-Physical attack took place on the Ukrainian electricity distribution network. This is regarded as one of the first cyber-Physical attacks on electricity infrastructure to have led to a substantial power outage and is illustrative of the increasing Vulnerability of Critical National Infrastructure to this type of malicious activity. Few data points, coupled with the rapid emergence of cyber phenomena, has held back the development of resilience analytics of cyber-Physical attacks, relative to many other threats. We propose to overcome data limitations by applying stochastic counterfactual risk analysis as part of a new Vulnerability assessment framework. The method is developed in the context of the direct and indirect socioeconomic impacts of a Ukrainian-style cyber-Physical attack taking place on the electricity distribution network serving London and its surrounding regions. A key finding is that if decision-makers wish to mitigate major population disruptions, then they must invest resources more-or-less equally across all substations, to prevent the scaling of a cyber-Physical attack. However, there are some substations associated with higher economic value due to their support of other Critical National Infrastructures assets, which justifies the allocation of additional cyber security investment to reduce the chance of cascading failure. Further cyber-Physical Vulnerability research must address the tradeoffs inherent in a system made up of multiple institutions with different strategic risk mitigation objectives and metrics of value, such as governments, infrastructure operators, and commercial consumers of infrastructure services.
Ceeman Vellaithurai - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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CPINDEX: Cyber-Physical Vulnerability Assessment for Power-Grid Infrastructures
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 2014Co-Authors: Ceeman Vellaithurai, Anurag Srivastava, Saman Zonouz, Robin BerthierAbstract:To protect complex power-grid control networks, power operators need efficient security assessment techniques that take into account both cyber side and the power side of the cyber-Physical critical infrastructures. In this paper, we present CPINDEX, a security-oriented stochastic risk management technique that calculates cyber-Physical security indices to measure the security level of the underlying cyber-Physical setting. CPINDEX installs appropriate cyber-side instrumentation probes on individual host systems to dynamically capture and profile low-level system activities such as interprocess communications among operating system assets. CPINDEX uses the generated logs along with the topological information about the power network configuration to build stochastic Bayesian network models of the whole cyber-Physical infrastructure and update them dynamically based on the current state of the underlying power system. Finally, CPINDEX implements belief propagation algorithms on the created stochastic models combined with a novel graph-theoretic power system indexing algorithm to calculate the cyber-Physical index, i.e., to measure the security-level of the system's current cyber-Physical state. The results of our experiments with actual attacks against a real-world power control network shows that CPINDEX, within few seconds, can efficiently compute the numerical indices during the attack that indicate the progressing malicious attack correctly.
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modeling cyber Physical Vulnerability of the smart grid with incomplete information
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 2013Co-Authors: Anurag K Srivastava, Timothy A Ernster, Ceeman Vellaithurai, Shengyi Pan, Thomas Morris, Uttam AdhikariAbstract:This paper addresses the attack modeling using Vulnerability of information, communication and electric grid network. Vulnerability of electric grid with incomplete information has been analyzed using graph theory based approach. Vulnerability of information and communication (cyber) network has been modeled utilizing concepts of discovery, access, feasibility, communication speed and detection threat. Common attack vector based on Vulnerability of cyber and Physical system have been utilized to operate breakers associated with generating resources to model aurora-like event. Real time simulations for modified IEEE 14 bus test case system and graph theory analysis for IEEE 118 bus system have been presented. Test case results show the possible impact on smart grid caused by integrated cyber-Physical attack.
Robin Berthier - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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CPINDEX: Cyber-Physical Vulnerability Assessment for Power-Grid Infrastructures
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 2014Co-Authors: Ceeman Vellaithurai, Anurag Srivastava, Saman Zonouz, Robin BerthierAbstract:To protect complex power-grid control networks, power operators need efficient security assessment techniques that take into account both cyber side and the power side of the cyber-Physical critical infrastructures. In this paper, we present CPINDEX, a security-oriented stochastic risk management technique that calculates cyber-Physical security indices to measure the security level of the underlying cyber-Physical setting. CPINDEX installs appropriate cyber-side instrumentation probes on individual host systems to dynamically capture and profile low-level system activities such as interprocess communications among operating system assets. CPINDEX uses the generated logs along with the topological information about the power network configuration to build stochastic Bayesian network models of the whole cyber-Physical infrastructure and update them dynamically based on the current state of the underlying power system. Finally, CPINDEX implements belief propagation algorithms on the created stochastic models combined with a novel graph-theoretic power system indexing algorithm to calculate the cyber-Physical index, i.e., to measure the security-level of the system's current cyber-Physical state. The results of our experiments with actual attacks against a real-world power control network shows that CPINDEX, within few seconds, can efficiently compute the numerical indices during the attack that indicate the progressing malicious attack correctly.
Anurag K Srivastava - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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cyber Physical Vulnerability and security analysis of power grid with hvdc line
North American Power Symposium, 2019Co-Authors: Amir Gholami, Anurag K Srivastava, Mohammad Mousavi, Ali MehrizisaniAbstract:The High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) technology is typically used for power transfer over longer distances or asynchronous back-to-back connections of the ac networks, or connecting cluster of high power renewable energies to the grid. The performance of the power system can be impacted by the HVDC control and operations. Functionality of the HVDC controllers depend on the information and communication technologies and are vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Hence, the cyber-Physical security analysis of the HVDC system needs to be investigated. This study is a step towards cyber-Physical analysis for grid with HVDC system by analyzing: 1) the cyber system vulnerabilities of the HVDC system, 2) the integrated cyber-Physical system model developement with HVDC technology, 3) the effect of cyber-attacks on the HVDC and impact on the dynamic voltage stability of the power system, and 4) the cyber-attack detection and mitigation. Also, different cyber-attack scenarios on the HVDC system are developed for analyzing the developed approach. The proposed analysis are validated by simulation of the several case studies on the integrated cyber-Physical model of the IEEE 9-bus system with the HVDC technology.
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Graph-theoretic algorithms for cyber-Physical Vulnerability analysis of power grid with incomplete information
Journal of Modern Power Systems and Clean Energy, 2018Co-Authors: Anurag K Srivastava, Timothy A Ernster, Ren Liu, Vignesh G. KrishnanAbstract:A key focus recently has been in assessing the risk of a coordinated cyber-Physical attack and minimizing the impact of a successful attack. Most of the cyber-attackers will have limited system information and conventional power grid N − 1 security analysis cannot be extended to assess the risk. Centrality measures are widely used in the network science and an attacker with incomplete information can use it to identify power system vulnerabilities by defining the system as a complex network but without real-time system measurements. This paper presents a graph theory based centrality indices for Vulnerability assessment of the power system due to various bus and branch contingencies using limited system information and provides a preliminary defense mechanism to prevent such an attack. Proposed work answers the fundamental question of possible attack scenarios by balancing risk (limited information with low risk to get caught or high risk attack to access more system information) and impact (identifying contingencies with maximal impact on system operation). Statistical comparisons are made between the graph theory measures compared to the corresponding DC power flow based N − X linear sensitivity measures. A unified N − X centrality based performance index is proposed and validated against the AC power flow based performance index by doing the real-time simulations of an N − 3 attack scenario. Defensive mechanisms using topology-based performance indices are also presented.
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modeling cyber Physical Vulnerability of the smart grid with incomplete information
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 2013Co-Authors: Anurag K Srivastava, Timothy A Ernster, Ceeman Vellaithurai, Shengyi Pan, Thomas Morris, Uttam AdhikariAbstract:This paper addresses the attack modeling using Vulnerability of information, communication and electric grid network. Vulnerability of electric grid with incomplete information has been analyzed using graph theory based approach. Vulnerability of information and communication (cyber) network has been modeled utilizing concepts of discovery, access, feasibility, communication speed and detection threat. Common attack vector based on Vulnerability of cyber and Physical system have been utilized to operate breakers associated with generating resources to model aurora-like event. Real time simulations for modified IEEE 14 bus test case system and graph theory analysis for IEEE 118 bus system have been presented. Test case results show the possible impact on smart grid caused by integrated cyber-Physical attack.
Michelle Tuveson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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stochastic counterfactual risk analysis for the Vulnerability assessment of cyber Physical attacks on electricity distribution infrastructure networks
Risk Analysis, 2019Co-Authors: Edward J Oughton, Daniel Ralph, Raghav Pant, Eireann Leverett, Jennifer Copic, Scott Thacker, Rabia Dada, Simon Ruffle, Michelle TuvesonAbstract:In December 2015, a cyber-Physical attack took place on the Ukrainian electricity distribution network. This is regarded as one of the first cyber-Physical attacks on electricity infrastructure to have led to a substantial power outage and is illustrative of the increasing Vulnerability of Critical National Infrastructure to this type of malicious activity. Few data points, coupled with the rapid emergence of cyber phenomena, has held back the development of resilience analytics of cyber-Physical attacks, relative to many other threats. We propose to overcome data limitations by applying stochastic counterfactual risk analysis as part of a new Vulnerability assessment framework. The method is developed in the context of the direct and indirect socioeconomic impacts of a Ukrainian-style cyber-Physical attack taking place on the electricity distribution network serving London and its surrounding regions. A key finding is that if decision-makers wish to mitigate major population disruptions, then they must invest resources more-or-less equally across all substations, to prevent the scaling of a cyber-Physical attack. However, there are some substations associated with higher economic value due to their support of other Critical National Infrastructures assets, which justifies the allocation of additional cyber security investment to reduce the chance of cascading failure. Further cyber-Physical Vulnerability research must address the tradeoffs inherent in a system made up of multiple institutions with different strategic risk mitigation objectives and metrics of value, such as governments, infrastructure operators, and commercial consumers of infrastructure services.