The Experts below are selected from a list of 2433 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Todd L. Cherry - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Pigouvian Tax Aversion and Inequity Aversion in the Lab
    Economics Bulletin, 2012
    Co-Authors: Steffen Kallbekken, Stephan Kroll, Todd L. Cherry
    Abstract:

    We use an experimental market with externalities to test whether inequality aversion could help explain the popularity of earmarking Tax revenues. We find that voter opposition is not fully explained by material self-interest: Results indicate that preferences for fairness influence voting behavior, with greater inequality in Tax revenue distribution negatively affecting the acceptability of the Tax. In addition to this, we also discover a significant degree of Tax-aversion in the votes. Our findings provide greater understanding of the behavioral underpinnings of the positive impact that earmarking has on the acceptability of Pigouvian Taxes.

  • do you not like pigou or do you not understand him Tax aversion and revenue recycling in the lab
    Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2011
    Co-Authors: Steffen Kallbekken, Stephan Kroll, Todd L. Cherry
    Abstract:

    Tax-aversion reduces the likelihood that price rationing can be a politically viable tool for environmental protection. We examine the case of the classic Pigouvian Tax to control a negative externality, and consider how recycling the revenues, labeling of the Tax and information about its purpose affects the support for Taxation. We test the support for Taxation within a single-price market experiment, in which purchases by some buyers impose external costs on others. Observing behavior consistent with Tax-aversion, we also find that recycling the revenues to more narrowly targeted groups seems to increase support for Taxation. In the absence of narrow revenue recycling, labeling a Pigouvian instrument as a ‘Tax’ may significantly lower the likelihood of voter support.

Mario Menegatti - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Pigouvian Tax, abatement policies and uncertainty on the environment
    Journal of Economics, 2011
    Co-Authors: D. Baiardi, Mario Menegatti
    Abstract:

    The paper examines the effects of environmental uncertainty on Pigouvian Tax and abatement policy used, either separately or contemporaneously, to counteract pollution. We discuss these effects by introducing three kinds of risk: risk on the environmental quality, risk on the impact of pollution and risk on the impact of abatement. For each case we determine the conditions ensuring that risk increases the size of public intervention and provide an economic interpretation and some parallelisms with other risk problems. The last part of the paper generalizes some of our results to the case of N -th order risk changes.

  • Pigouvian Tax, Abatement Policies and Uncertainty on the Environment
    2010
    Co-Authors: Mario Menegatti, D. Baiardi
    Abstract:

    The paper examines the effects of environmental uncertainty on Pigouvian Tax and abatement policy used, either separately or contemporaneously, to counteract pollution. We discuss uncertainty in three aspects: environmental quality, pollution effect and the impact of abatement. For each case we determine the conditions ensuring that uncertainty increases the size of public intervention and provide an economic interpretation and some parallelisms with other risk problems. The last part of the paper generalizes some of our results to the case of N-th order risk changes.

D. Baiardi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Pigouvian Tax, abatement policies and uncertainty on the environment
    Journal of Economics, 2011
    Co-Authors: D. Baiardi, Mario Menegatti
    Abstract:

    The paper examines the effects of environmental uncertainty on Pigouvian Tax and abatement policy used, either separately or contemporaneously, to counteract pollution. We discuss these effects by introducing three kinds of risk: risk on the environmental quality, risk on the impact of pollution and risk on the impact of abatement. For each case we determine the conditions ensuring that risk increases the size of public intervention and provide an economic interpretation and some parallelisms with other risk problems. The last part of the paper generalizes some of our results to the case of N -th order risk changes.

  • Pigouvian Tax, Abatement Policies and Uncertainty on the Environment
    2010
    Co-Authors: Mario Menegatti, D. Baiardi
    Abstract:

    The paper examines the effects of environmental uncertainty on Pigouvian Tax and abatement policy used, either separately or contemporaneously, to counteract pollution. We discuss uncertainty in three aspects: environmental quality, pollution effect and the impact of abatement. For each case we determine the conditions ensuring that uncertainty increases the size of public intervention and provide an economic interpretation and some parallelisms with other risk problems. The last part of the paper generalizes some of our results to the case of N-th order risk changes.

Steffen Kallbekken - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Pigouvian Tax Aversion and Inequity Aversion in the Lab
    Economics Bulletin, 2012
    Co-Authors: Steffen Kallbekken, Stephan Kroll, Todd L. Cherry
    Abstract:

    We use an experimental market with externalities to test whether inequality aversion could help explain the popularity of earmarking Tax revenues. We find that voter opposition is not fully explained by material self-interest: Results indicate that preferences for fairness influence voting behavior, with greater inequality in Tax revenue distribution negatively affecting the acceptability of the Tax. In addition to this, we also discover a significant degree of Tax-aversion in the votes. Our findings provide greater understanding of the behavioral underpinnings of the positive impact that earmarking has on the acceptability of Pigouvian Taxes.

  • do you not like pigou or do you not understand him Tax aversion and revenue recycling in the lab
    Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2011
    Co-Authors: Steffen Kallbekken, Stephan Kroll, Todd L. Cherry
    Abstract:

    Tax-aversion reduces the likelihood that price rationing can be a politically viable tool for environmental protection. We examine the case of the classic Pigouvian Tax to control a negative externality, and consider how recycling the revenues, labeling of the Tax and information about its purpose affects the support for Taxation. We test the support for Taxation within a single-price market experiment, in which purchases by some buyers impose external costs on others. Observing behavior consistent with Tax-aversion, we also find that recycling the revenues to more narrowly targeted groups seems to increase support for Taxation. In the absence of narrow revenue recycling, labeling a Pigouvian instrument as a ‘Tax’ may significantly lower the likelihood of voter support.

Bas Jacobs - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Redistribution and pollution Taxes with non-linear Engel curves
    Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2019
    Co-Authors: Bas Jacobs, Frederick Van Der Ploeg
    Abstract:

    Abstract This paper analyses optimal corrective Taxation and optimal income redistribution. The Pigouvian pollution Tax is higher if pollution damages disproportionally hurt the poor due to equity weighting of pollution damages. Moreover, under general utility functions, optimal pollution Taxes should be set below the Pigouvian Tax if the poor spend a disproportionate fraction of their income on polluting goods. However, if Engel curves are linear, optimal pollution Taxes should follow the first-best rule for the Pigouvian corrective Tax even if the government wants to redistribute income and the poor spend a disproportional part of their income on polluting goods. The often-used quasi-linear, CES and Stone-Geary utility functions all have linear Engel curves. If Engel curves are linear, and if pollution Taxes are not optimised, Pareto-improving green Tax reforms exist that move the pollution Tax closer to the Pigouvian Tax. Simulations demonstrate that optimal corrective Taxes should be Pigouvian if the demand for polluting goods is derived from a LES demand system, but deviate from the Pigouvian Taxes if demand for polluting goods demand is derived from a PIGLOG demand system.

  • Should Pollution Taxes be Targeted at Income Redistribution
    2017
    Co-Authors: Bas Jacobs, Rick Van Der Ploeg
    Abstract:

    This paper analyses optimal corrective Taxation and optimal income redistribution. Under general utility functions, the Pigouvian pollution Tax is higher if pollution damages disproportionally hurt the poor due to equity weighting of pollution damages. Moreover, optimal pollution Taxes should be set below the Pigouvian Tax if the poor spend a disproportionate fraction of their income on polluting goods. However, if preferences for commodities are of the Gorman (1961) polar form, optimal pollution Taxes should follow the first-best rule for the Pigouvian corrective Tax even if the government wants to redistribute income and the poor spend a disproportional part of their income on polluting goods. The often-used quasi-linear, CES and Stone-Geary utility functions all belong to the Gorman polar class. If preferences are Gorman polar, and if pollution Taxes are not optimized, Pareto-improving green Tax reforms exist that move the pollution Tax closer to the Pigouvian Tax. Simulations demonstrate that optimal corrective Taxes should be Pigouvian if the demand for polluting goods is derived from a LES demand system, but deviate from the Pigouvian Taxes if demand for polluting goods demand is derived from a PIGLOG demand system.

  • pigou meets mirrlees on the irrelevance of Tax distortions for the second best Pigouvian Tax
    Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2015
    Co-Authors: Bas Jacobs, Ruud A. De Mooij
    Abstract:

    This paper extends the Mirrlees (1971) model of optimal income redistribution with optimal corrective Taxes to internalize consumption externalities. Using general utility structures and exploring both linear and non-linear Taxes, it is demonstrated that the optimal second-best Tax on an externality-generating good should not be corrected for the marginal cost of public funds, since it equals one in the optimal Tax system. In the optimum, distortions of income Taxes are equal to marginal redistributional gains. If the government does not have access to a non-distortionary marginal source of finance, the marginal cost of public funds can be either larger or smaller than one depending on subjective preferences for income redistribution. The optimal second-best corrective Tax is then either higher or lower than the Pigouvian level. The findings in this paper generalize and amend prior results based on representative-agent models, shedding new light on the weak double-dividend hypothesis, and on the welfare gains of recycling revenue from environmental Taxes.

  • Pigou Meets Mirrlees: On the Irrelevance of Tax Distortions for the Second-Best Pigouvian Tax
    2011
    Co-Authors: Bas Jacobs, Ruud A. De Mooij
    Abstract:

    This paper extends the Mirrlees (1971) model of optimal income redistribution with optimal corrective Taxes to internalize consumption externalities. It is demonstrated that the optimal second-best Tax on an externality-generating good should not be corrected for the marginal cost of public funds. The reason is that the marginal cost of public funds equals unity in the optimal Tax system, since marginal distortions of Taxation are equal to marginal distributional gains. The Pigouvian Tax needs to be modified, however, if polluting commodities or environmental quality are more complementary to leisure than non-polluting commodities are.