The Experts below are selected from a list of 291 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Fabien Laguillaumie - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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CT-RSA - Plaintext-Checkable encryption
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2012Co-Authors: Sébastien Canard, Aline Gouget, Georg Fuchsbauer, Fabien LaguillaumieAbstract:We study the problem of searching on encrypted data, where the search is performed using a Plaintext Message or a keyword, rather than a Message-specific trapdoor as done by state-of-the-art schemes. The use cases include delegation of key-word search e.g. to a cloud data storage provider or to an email server, using a Plaintext Message. We define a new cryptographic primitive called Plaintext-checkable encryption (PCE), which extends public-key encryption by the following functionality: given a Plaintext, a ciphertext and a public key, it is universally possible to check whether the ciphertext encrypts the Plaintext under the key. We provide efficient generic random-oracle constructions for PCE based on any probabilistic or deterministic encryption scheme; we also give a practical construction in the standard model. As another application we show how PCE can be used to improve the efficiency in group signatures with verifier-local revocation (VLR) and backward unlinkability. These group signatures provide efficient revocation of group members, which is a key issue in practical applications.
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Plaintext-Checkable Encryption
Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2012, 2012Co-Authors: Sébastien Canard, Aline Gouget, Georg Fuchsbauer, Fabien LaguillaumieAbstract:We study the problem of searching on encrypted data, where the search is performed using a Plaintext Message or a keyword, rather than a Message-specific trapdoor as done by state-of-the-art schemes. The use cases include delegation of key-word search e.g. to a cloud data storage provider or to an email server, using a Plaintext Message. We define a new cryptographic primitive called Plaintext-checkable encryption (PCE), which extends public-key encryption by the following functionality: given a Plaintext, a ciphertext and a public key, it is universally possible to check whether the ciphertext encrypts the Plaintext under the key. We provide efficient generic random-oracle constructions for PCE based on any probabilistic or deterministic encryption scheme; we also give a practical construction in the standard model. As another application we show how PCE can be used to improve the efficiency in group signatures with verifier-local revocation (VLR) and backward unlinkability. These group signatures provide efficient revocation of group members, which is a key issue in practical applications.
Robert H. Deng - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Securing messaging services through efficient signcryption with designated equality test
Information Sciences, 2019Co-Authors: Yujue Wang, Robert H. Deng, Hweehwa Pang, Yong Ding, Bo QinAbstract:Abstract To address security and privacy issues in messaging services, we present a public key signcryption scheme with designated equality test on ciphertexts (PKS-DET) in this paper. The scheme enables a sender to simultaneously encrypt and sign (signcrypt) Messages, and to designate a tester to perform equality test on ciphertexts, i.e., to determine whether two ciphertexts signcrypt the same underlying Plaintext Message. We introduce the PKS-DET framework, present a concrete construction and formally prove its security against three types of adversaries, representing two security requirements on Message confidentiality against outsiders and the designated tester, respectively, and a requirement on Message unforgeability against the designated tester. We also present three extensions, analyze the efficiency of our PKS-DET construction and extensions, and compare them with related schemes in terms of ciphertext sizes and computation costs of signcryption (encryption), unsigncryption (decryption) and ciphertext equality testing. Experimental results further confirmed the practicality of our construction.
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AsiaCCS - Practical ID-based encryption for wireless sensor network
Proceedings of the 5th ACM Symposium on Information Computer and Communications Security - ASIACCS '10, 2010Co-Authors: Cheng-kang Chu, Jianying Zhou, Joseph K. Liu, Feng Bao, Robert H. DengAbstract:In this paper, we propose a new practical identity-based encryption scheme which is suitable for wireless sensor network (WSN). We call it Receiver-Bounded Online/Offline Identity-based Encryption (RB-OOIBE). It splits the encryption process into two parts -- the offline and the online part. In the offline part, all heavy computations are done without the knowledge of the receiver's identity and the Plaintext Message. In the online stage, only light computations such as modular operation and symmetric key encryption are required, together with the receiver's identity and the Plaintext Message. Moreover, since each offline ciphertext can be re-used for the same receiver, the number of offline ciphertexts the encrypter holds only confines the number of receivers instead of the number of Messages to be encrypted. In this way, a sensor node (with limited computation power and limited storage) in WSN can send encrypted data easily: A few offline ciphertexts can be computed in the manufacturing stage while the online part is light enough for the sensor to process.
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Practical ID-based Encryption for Wireless Sensor Network.
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2010Co-Authors: Cheng-kang Chu, Jianying Zhou, Joseph K. Liu, Feng Bao, Robert H. DengAbstract:In this paper, we propose a new practical identity-based encryption scheme which is suitable for wireless sensor network (WSN). We call it Receiver-Bounded Online/Offline Identity-based Encryption (RB-OOIBE). It splits the encryption process into two parts – the offline and the online part. In the offline part, all heavy computations are done without the knowledge of the receiver’s identity and the Plaintext Message. In the online stage, only light computations such as modular operation and symmetric key encryption are required, together with the receiver’s identity and the Plaintext Message. Moreover, since each offline ciphertext can be re-used for the same receiver, the number of offline ciphertexts the encrypter holds only confines the number of receivers instead of the number of Messages to be encrypted. In this way, a sensor node (with limited computation power and limited storage) in WSN can send encrypted data easily: A few offline ciphertexts can be computed in the manufacturing stage while the online part is light enough for the sensor to process. We propose an efficient construction for this new notion. The scheme can be proven selective-ID CCA secure in the standard model. Compared to previous online/offline identity-based encryption schemes, our scheme is exempt from a high storage requirement, which is proportional to the number of Messages to be sent. The improvement is very significant if many Messages are sent to few receivers.
Muriel Medard - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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on information theoretic metrics for symmetric key encryption and privacy
Allerton Conference on Communication Control and Computing, 2014Co-Authors: Flavio P Calmon, Mayank Varia, Muriel MedardAbstract:Most practical security systems do not achieve perfect secrecy, i.e. the information observed by a computationally unbounded eavesdropper is not independent of the Plaintext Message. Nevertheless, there may still be properties of the Plaintext that the eavesdropper cannot reliably infer. In this paper, we build on previous work by the authors and introduce new bounds that are used to quantify how well an adversary can estimate certain functions of the Plaintext in the non-perfect secrecy regime. In particular, we present lower bounds for the minimum-mean-squared-error of estimating a target function of the Plaintext given that a certain class of functions of the Plaintext is known to be hard (or easy) to infer, either by design of the security system or by restrictions imposed on the adversary. We demonstrate how these bounds can be applied to characterize fundamental security properties of symmetric-key encryption schemes. Our results also shed light on the fundamental privacy-utility tradeoff that exists in privacy-preserving systems.
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Allerton - On information-theoretic metrics for symmetric-key encryption and privacy
2014 52nd Annual Allerton Conference on Communication Control and Computing (Allerton), 2014Co-Authors: Flavio P Calmon, Mayank Varia, Muriel MedardAbstract:Most practical security systems do not achieve perfect secrecy, i.e. the information observed by a computationally unbounded eavesdropper is not independent of the Plaintext Message. Nevertheless, there may still be properties of the Plaintext that the eavesdropper cannot reliably infer. In this paper, we build on previous work by the authors and introduce new bounds that are used to quantify how well an adversary can estimate certain functions of the Plaintext in the non-perfect secrecy regime. In particular, we present lower bounds for the minimum-mean-squared-error of estimating a target function of the Plaintext given that a certain class of functions of the Plaintext is known to be hard (or easy) to infer, either by design of the security system or by restrictions imposed on the adversary. We demonstrate how these bounds can be applied to characterize fundamental security properties of symmetric-key encryption schemes. Our results also shed light on the fundamental privacy-utility tradeoff that exists in privacy-preserving systems.
Sébastien Canard - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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CT-RSA - Plaintext-Checkable encryption
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2012Co-Authors: Sébastien Canard, Aline Gouget, Georg Fuchsbauer, Fabien LaguillaumieAbstract:We study the problem of searching on encrypted data, where the search is performed using a Plaintext Message or a keyword, rather than a Message-specific trapdoor as done by state-of-the-art schemes. The use cases include delegation of key-word search e.g. to a cloud data storage provider or to an email server, using a Plaintext Message. We define a new cryptographic primitive called Plaintext-checkable encryption (PCE), which extends public-key encryption by the following functionality: given a Plaintext, a ciphertext and a public key, it is universally possible to check whether the ciphertext encrypts the Plaintext under the key. We provide efficient generic random-oracle constructions for PCE based on any probabilistic or deterministic encryption scheme; we also give a practical construction in the standard model. As another application we show how PCE can be used to improve the efficiency in group signatures with verifier-local revocation (VLR) and backward unlinkability. These group signatures provide efficient revocation of group members, which is a key issue in practical applications.
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Plaintext-Checkable Encryption
Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2012, 2012Co-Authors: Sébastien Canard, Aline Gouget, Georg Fuchsbauer, Fabien LaguillaumieAbstract:We study the problem of searching on encrypted data, where the search is performed using a Plaintext Message or a keyword, rather than a Message-specific trapdoor as done by state-of-the-art schemes. The use cases include delegation of key-word search e.g. to a cloud data storage provider or to an email server, using a Plaintext Message. We define a new cryptographic primitive called Plaintext-checkable encryption (PCE), which extends public-key encryption by the following functionality: given a Plaintext, a ciphertext and a public key, it is universally possible to check whether the ciphertext encrypts the Plaintext under the key. We provide efficient generic random-oracle constructions for PCE based on any probabilistic or deterministic encryption scheme; we also give a practical construction in the standard model. As another application we show how PCE can be used to improve the efficiency in group signatures with verifier-local revocation (VLR) and backward unlinkability. These group signatures provide efficient revocation of group members, which is a key issue in practical applications.
Flavio P Calmon - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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on information theoretic metrics for symmetric key encryption and privacy
Allerton Conference on Communication Control and Computing, 2014Co-Authors: Flavio P Calmon, Mayank Varia, Muriel MedardAbstract:Most practical security systems do not achieve perfect secrecy, i.e. the information observed by a computationally unbounded eavesdropper is not independent of the Plaintext Message. Nevertheless, there may still be properties of the Plaintext that the eavesdropper cannot reliably infer. In this paper, we build on previous work by the authors and introduce new bounds that are used to quantify how well an adversary can estimate certain functions of the Plaintext in the non-perfect secrecy regime. In particular, we present lower bounds for the minimum-mean-squared-error of estimating a target function of the Plaintext given that a certain class of functions of the Plaintext is known to be hard (or easy) to infer, either by design of the security system or by restrictions imposed on the adversary. We demonstrate how these bounds can be applied to characterize fundamental security properties of symmetric-key encryption schemes. Our results also shed light on the fundamental privacy-utility tradeoff that exists in privacy-preserving systems.
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Allerton - On information-theoretic metrics for symmetric-key encryption and privacy
2014 52nd Annual Allerton Conference on Communication Control and Computing (Allerton), 2014Co-Authors: Flavio P Calmon, Mayank Varia, Muriel MedardAbstract:Most practical security systems do not achieve perfect secrecy, i.e. the information observed by a computationally unbounded eavesdropper is not independent of the Plaintext Message. Nevertheless, there may still be properties of the Plaintext that the eavesdropper cannot reliably infer. In this paper, we build on previous work by the authors and introduce new bounds that are used to quantify how well an adversary can estimate certain functions of the Plaintext in the non-perfect secrecy regime. In particular, we present lower bounds for the minimum-mean-squared-error of estimating a target function of the Plaintext given that a certain class of functions of the Plaintext is known to be hard (or easy) to infer, either by design of the security system or by restrictions imposed on the adversary. We demonstrate how these bounds can be applied to characterize fundamental security properties of symmetric-key encryption schemes. Our results also shed light on the fundamental privacy-utility tradeoff that exists in privacy-preserving systems.