The Experts below are selected from a list of 291 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Jing Peng - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • impact of Platform Owner s entry on third party stores
    Information Systems Research, 2020
    Co-Authors: Jing Peng
    Abstract:

    One important decision faced by the Owners of online marketplaces is whether they should enter the market and sell products directly to customers. In this study, we provide data-driven insights to ...

  • impact of Platform Owner s entry on third party stores
    2020
    Co-Authors: Jing Peng
    Abstract:

    Online marketplaces thrive by offering products from a wide array of third-party stores. One major decision faced by the Owners of online marketplaces is whether they should enter into the market and sell products directly to customers. Although a few game-theoretical models have addressed this issue, there is still no empirical research to guide the decisions of managers. To fill this gap, this paper empirically investigates the impact of a Platform Owner’s entry on the demand of third-party stores, as well as their potential reactions, using data from a Chinese e-commerce Platform which supports both online and offline transactions. We establish several important findings. First, we find that the offline demand of competing third-party stores decreases with the entry of the Platform, whereas their online demand does not change significantly. Second, we systematically investigate three potential mechanisms underlying the effects of Platform entry in the online and offline channels: the competition effect, the spillover effect, and the disintermediation effect. We show that the decreased offline demand results from third-party stores’ defensive strategy to divert their offline customers away from the Platform (i.e., disintermediation), rather than from the defection of customers under competition. Third, in contrast to the prior finding from mobile app Platforms, we find that the demand of larger third-party stores decreases more with the entry of the Platform, suggesting that the effect of Platform entry is context dependent. Our study suggests that, while making entry decisions, Platform Owners should consider the nature of their marketplaces (i.e., whether the competition among sellers is exclusive), as well as the potential reactions from third-party sellers.

Ola Henfridsson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Capability search and redeem across digital ecosystems
    Journal of Information Technology, 2013
    Co-Authors: Lisen Selander, Ola Henfridsson, Fredrik Svahn
    Abstract:

    Prior research on digital ecosystems focuses on the focal firm (e.g., a Platform Owner) and its ecosystem governance. However, there is a dearth of literature examining the non-focal actor, that is, an ecosystem participant who is at the periphery of a digital ecosystem. This paper proposes a theoretical perspective of the non-focal firm's participation across digital ecosystems for cultivating its innovation habitat through capability search and redeem. Capability search involves the location of external capability deemed valuable for extending the firm's innovation habitat. Capability redeem refers to the firm's use of external capability to develop, distribute, and/or monetize its products and services. We generate and sensitize the proposed perspective in the context of Sony Ericsson's innovation habitat by interpreting the mobile device manufacturer's participation across four digital ecosystems (Visual Basic, Java, Digital Music, and Android). Our findings suggest that the non-focal actor cannot rely on a single ecosystem for addressing all relevant layers of innovation. It benefits from pursuing a pluralistic strategy, operating across digital ecosystems to avoid investing all efforts in the same ecosystem. The model of ecosystem capability search and redeem, which is a result of ideographic research explanation, extends current perspectives on digital ecosystems and contributes to the emerging literature in the digital age.

  • ICIS - MICRO -STRATEGIZING IN Platform ECOSYSTEMS: A MULTIPLE CASE STUDY
    2011
    Co-Authors: Ahmad Ghazawneh, Ola Henfridsson
    Abstract:

    The strategy by which a Platform Owner manages the future trajectory of its Platform involves many unknowns. In particular, the ambition to simultaneously control the Platform and distribute design capability to users is challenging. While there is an emerging literature on strategy in Platform ecosystems, little empirical evidence exists about the series of strategic actions that Platform Owners conduct to create value in an ecosystem context. Drawing on a strategy-as-process perspective, this paper augments existing Platform perspectives by seeking to understand the micro-strategizing of a Platform Owner. To this end, we report a multiple case study of Apple’s use of application programming interfaces for generating value from the iPhone Platform. Our comparative analysis identifies and explores five different micro-strategies that can be enacted proactively or reactively: counteracting, monetizing, resourcing, securing, and sustaining. The paper concludes with a number of theoretical and practical implications of these micro-strategies and their interaction.

Slinger Jansen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • ICEIS (Revised Selected Papers) - Understanding Governance Mechanisms and Health in Software Ecosystems: A Systematic Literature Review
    Enterprise Information Systems, 2018
    Co-Authors: Carina Alves, Joyce Aline Pereira De Oliveira, Slinger Jansen
    Abstract:

    In a software ecosystem, organizations work collaboratively to remain profitable and survive market changes. For the relationship between these organizations to succeed, it is necessary to participate in the ecosystem software without violating rules of collaboration or to take advantages that destabilize the general health of the ecosystem. The application of governance mechanisms is essential for achieving this balance. Governance mechanisms are employed to define the level of control, rights of decision and scope of Owner versus shared Ownership in an ecosystem. Selecting appropriate governance mechanisms, organizations can gain strategic advantage over others leading them to better performance and, consequently, to be healthier. In this article, we report a systematic literature review that aggregates definitions of software ecosystem governance and classify governance mechanisms in three dimensions: value creation, coordination of players, and organizational openness and control. Additionally, we propose a research agenda that addresses relevant topics for researchers and practitioners to explore these issues. Initially, we performed a systematic literature review of 63 primary studies. In this extended article, we have included more 26 studies to analyze the relation between health and governance. In total, we reviewed 89 studies. 52 metrics were identified and classified into the three health elements (productivity, robustness, niche creation). Our results suggest that software ecosystems governance determines decision rights between Platform Owners and extension developers, control mechanisms used by the Platform Owner, and Platform Ownership. We posit that ecosystem health is under the direct influence of how governance mechanisms are implemented by ecosystem’s players.

  • Managing software ecosystems through partnering
    2013
    Co-Authors: J. Van Angeren, Karl Michael Popp, Jaap Kabbedijk, Slinger Jansen
    Abstract:

    Software vendors and Owners of software Platforms function within a network of actors relevant to their business, called a software ecosystem (Burkard et al 2012; Messerschmitt & Szyperski 2003). A software ecosystem is defined as "a set of actors functioning as a unit and interacting with a shared market for software and services, together with the relationships among them" (Jansen et al 2009, p.1). Within such an ecosystem, a large software vendor or Platform Owner has the role of software ecosystem orchestrator (Jansen et al 2009). Since their software product, Platform or even the organization as a whole is the binding factor within the ecosystem, these large software vendors or Platform Owners are the main parties responsible for managing and expanding the ecosystem. Typical types of actors within a software ecosystem are suppliers that supply software or services to the software vendor, system integrators that implement software products or Platforms for the customer and partners (Popp & Meyer 2010). Actors within the ecosystem exchange products, services or assets and possibly receive compensation in return. This continuous exchange makes software ecosystems an important part of the business model of software companies (Popp 2011).

Olivia Negoita - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Modelling Perceived Risks Associated to the Entry of Complementors’ in Platform Enterprises: A Case Study
    Sustainability, 2018
    Co-Authors: Elena-teodora Miron, Anca Purcarea, Olivia Negoita
    Abstract:

    Third-party innovators, i.e., complementors, in Platform enterprises develop and commercialize add-on products which are one of the main attraction points for customers. To ensure a sustainable evolution of the enterprise, the Platform Owner needs to attract and retain high-quality third-party innovators. We posit that the transaction costs incurred upon joining the enterprise as well as the controls imposed by the Platform Owner throughout the development and commercialization process shape the innovator’s perceived risk and influence his decision on whether to join or not. Based on a literature review, the paper at hand proposes a conceptual model for complementors to assess their perceived risk and subsequently evaluates the model in a case study of a Platform enterprise for IT-based modelling tools. While some of the propositions are validated, i.e., that informational controls decrease the perceived environmental uncertainty and implicitly the perceived risks, other propositions, such as the fact that asset specificity is a deterrent to entering the Platform enterprise could not be validated. Further case studies are necessary to provide a conclusive proof of the proposed model.

Rebecca Henderson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in Complementary Markets: Evidence from Intel
    Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2007
    Co-Authors: Annabelle Gawer, Rebecca Henderson
    Abstract:

    This paper explores Intel's strategy with respect to complements. We find that, as the literature predicts, Intel's entry decisions are shaped by the belief that it does not have the capabilities to enter all possible markets, and thus that it must encourage widespread entry despite the fact that potential entrants (rationally) fear Intel's ability to “squeeze” them ex post. We explore the ways in which Intel addresses this issue, highlighting in particular the firm's use of organizational structure and processes as commitment mechanisms. Our results have implications for our understanding of the dynamics of competition in complements and of the role of organizational form in shaping competition.

  • Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in Complementary Markets: Evidence from Intel
    National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005
    Co-Authors: Annabelle Gawer, Rebecca Henderson
    Abstract:

    This paper draws on a detailed history of Intel's strategy with respect to the complementary markets for microprocessors to explore the usefulness of the current theoretical literature for explaining behavior. We find that as the literature predicts, Intel invests heavily in these markets, both through direct entry and through subsidy. We also find, again consistent with the literature, that the firm's entry decisions are shaped by the belief that it does not have either the capabilities or the resources to enter all possible markets, and thus that it believes it is critical to encourage widespread entry. As several authors have pointed out, this imperative places the firm in a difficult strategic position, since it needs to attempt to commit to potential entrants that it will not engage in an ex-post "squeeze", despite the fact that ex post it has very strong incentives to do so. We find that the fact that the complementary markets in which Intel competes are complex, dynamic and multilayered considerably sharpens this dilemma. We explore the ways in which Intel attempts to solve it, highlighting in particular the organizational structure and processes through which they attempt to commit to making money in the markets which they choose to enter while also committing not to making too much. Our results have implications for both our understanding of the dynamics of competition in complements and of the role of organizational structures and processes in shaping competition.