The Experts below are selected from a list of 27783 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Katja Seim - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • bid preference programs and participation in highway procurement auctions
    The American Economic Review, 2011
    Co-Authors: Elena Krasnokutskaya, Katja Seim
    Abstract:

    We use data from highway procurement auctions subject to California's Small Business Preference program to study the effect of bid preferences on auction outcomes. Our analysis is based on an estimated model of firms' bidding and participation decisions, which allows us to evaluate the effects of current and alternative policy designs. We show that incorporating participation responses significantly alters the assessment of Preferential Treatment policies.

  • bid preference programs and participation in highway procurement auctions
    The American Economic Review, 2011
    Co-Authors: Elena Krasnokutskaya, Katja Seim
    Abstract:

    We use data from highway procurement auctions subject to California's Small Business Preference program to study the effect of bid preferences on auction outcomes. Our analysis is based on an estimated model of firms' bidding and participation decisions, which allows us to evaluate the effects of current and alternative policy designs. We show that incorporating participation responses significantly alters the assessment of Preferential Treatment policies. (JEL D44, H76, R42)

Elena Krasnokutskaya - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • bid preference programs and participation in highway procurement auctions
    The American Economic Review, 2011
    Co-Authors: Elena Krasnokutskaya, Katja Seim
    Abstract:

    We use data from highway procurement auctions subject to California's Small Business Preference program to study the effect of bid preferences on auction outcomes. Our analysis is based on an estimated model of firms' bidding and participation decisions, which allows us to evaluate the effects of current and alternative policy designs. We show that incorporating participation responses significantly alters the assessment of Preferential Treatment policies.

  • bid preference programs and participation in highway procurement auctions
    The American Economic Review, 2011
    Co-Authors: Elena Krasnokutskaya, Katja Seim
    Abstract:

    We use data from highway procurement auctions subject to California's Small Business Preference program to study the effect of bid preferences on auction outcomes. Our analysis is based on an estimated model of firms' bidding and participation decisions, which allows us to evaluate the effects of current and alternative policy designs. We show that incorporating participation responses significantly alters the assessment of Preferential Treatment policies. (JEL D44, H76, R42)

Darren W Dahl - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • consumer reaction to unearned Preferential Treatment
    Journal of Consumer Research, 2013
    Co-Authors: Lan Jiang, Joandrea Hoegg, Darren W Dahl
    Abstract:

    Prior research on consumer response to Preferential Treatment has focused on Treatment that has been earned through loyalty or effort, and most of this work has reported positive outcomes for recipients. Unearned Preferential Treatment (e.g., receiving a surprise discount, getting a free upgrade), in contrast, has received little attention. The current research demonstrates that, although receiving unearned Preferential Treatment does generate positive reactions, it is not always an entirely pleasurable experience. Results from four experiments show that when unearned Preferential Treatment is received in front of others, the positive feelings of appreciation for the Treatment can be accompanied by feelings of social discomfort stemming from concerns about being judged negatively by other customers. These feelings of discomfort can reduce satisfaction with a shopping experience and affect purchasing behaviors. The negative impact of unearned Preferential Treatment on satisfaction is moderated by the chara...

Clemens Bonner - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Preferential regulatory Treatment and banks demand for government bonds
    Research Papers in Economics, 2015
    Co-Authors: Clemens Bonner
    Abstract:

    Government bonds receive Preferential Treatment in financial regulation. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of this Preferential Treatment on banks' demand for government bonds. Using unique transaction-level data, our analysis suggests that Preferential Treatment in liquidity and capital regulation increases banks' demand for government bonds beyond their own risk appetite. Liquidity and capital regulation also seem to incentivize banks to substitute other bonds with government bonds. On top of that, we find evidence that regulation leads to a longer-term increase in government bond holdings. Finally, our results suggest that higher government bond holdings are associated with more lending and lower profits during normal times but not during stress.

  • Preferential Regulatory Treatment and Banks' Demand for Government Bonds
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014
    Co-Authors: Clemens Bonner
    Abstract:

    The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of Preferential regulatory Treatment on banks’ demand for government bonds. Using unique transaction-level data, our analysis suggests that Preferential Treatment in microprudential liquidity and capital regulation significantly increases banks’ demand for government bonds. Liquidity and capital regulation also seem to incentivize banks to substitute other bonds with government bonds. We also find evidence that this "regulatory effect" leads banks to reduce lending to the real economy.

Weiwei Weng - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • endogenous Preferential Treatment in centralized admissions
    The RAND Journal of Economics, 2009
    Co-Authors: Stephen Y Chiu, Weiwei Weng
    Abstract:

    We study a model of centralized admissions in which schools are allowed to pre-commit to admitting qualified applicants who rank them as their top choices over more qualified applicants who do not. A less popular school may use the pre-commitment to steal applicants who otherwise would not choose it as their top choice (the stealing motive); a popular school may use the pre-commitment to prevent its own applicants from being stolen (the preemptive motive). We identify the conditions for these two motives to exist. We also clarify the relationship of this phenomenon with that of pre-arrangement of school places.

  • endogenous Preferential Treatment in centralized admissions
    Social Science Research Network, 2007
    Co-Authors: Stephen Y Chiu, Weiwei Weng
    Abstract:

    A large portion of school and college places in the world are allocated through centralized admissions schemes. In this paper, we study a model of centralized admissions with the feature that schools are allowed to pre-commit to admitting qualified applicants who rank them as top choice over more qualified applicants who do not. We identify two motives for doing so. A less popular school may use the pre-commitment to steal applicants who otherwise would not choose it as their top choice (stealing motive); a popular school may use the pre-commitment to prevent its own applicants from being stolen (preemptive motive). We show the conditions for such motives to exist, and in doing so, illustrate the roles of school popularity, difference in schools' preferences, and relative school size.