The Experts below are selected from a list of 24321 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Petter Minnhagen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Prisoners Dilemma in real world acquaintance networks spikes and quasiequilibria induced by the interplay between structure and dynamics
Physical Review E, 2003Co-Authors: Petter Holme, Ala Trusina, Beom Jun Kim, Petter MinnhagenAbstract:We study Nowak and May's spatial Prisoners' Dilemma game driven by mutations (random choices of suboptimal strategies) on empirical social networks. The time evolution of the cooperation level is highly complex containing spikes and steps between quasistable levels. A statistical characterization of the quasistable states and a study of the mechanisms behind the steps are given. We argue that the crucial structural ingredients causing the observed behavior is an inhomogeneous degree distribution and that the connections within vertices of highest degree are rather sparse. Based on these observations we construct model networks with a similar complex time evolution of the cooperation level.
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dynamic instabilities induced by asymmetric influence Prisoners Dilemma game in small world networks
Physical Review E, 2002Co-Authors: Ala Trusina, Petter Holme, Petter Minnhagen, Jean S Chung, M ChoiAbstract:A two-dimensional small-world-type network, subject to spatial Prisoners' Dilemma dynamics and containing an influential node defined as a special node, with a finite density of directed random lin ...
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dynamic instabilities induced by asymmetric influence Prisoners Dilemma game in small world networks
Physical Review E, 2002Co-Authors: Beom Jun Kim, Ala Trusina, Petter Holme, Petter Minnhagen, Jean S Chung, M ChoiAbstract:A two-dimensional small-world-type network, subject to spatial Prisoners' Dilemma dynamics and containing an influential node defined as a special node, with a finite density of directed random links to the other nodes in the network, is numerically investigated. It is shown that the degree of cooperation does not remain at a steady state level but displays a punctuated equilibrium-type behavior manifested by the existence of sudden breakdowns of cooperation. The breakdown of cooperation is linked to an imitation of a successful selfish strategy of the influential node. It is also found that while the breakdown of cooperation occurs suddenly, its recovery requires longer time. This recovery time may, depending on the degree of steady state cooperation, either increase or decrease with an increasing number of long-range connections.
Miklos N Szilagyi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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non trivial solutions to the n person Prisoners Dilemma
Systems Research and Behavioral Science, 2002Co-Authors: Miklos N Szilagyi, Zoltan C. SzilagyiAbstract:We have developed a new agent-based simulation tool to model social Dilemmas for the case of a large number of not necessarily rational decision-makers (Szilagyi and Szilagyi, 2000). The combination of various personalities with stochastic learning makes it possible to simulate the multi-person Prisoners' Dilemma game for realistic situations. A variety of personality profiles and their arbitrary combinations can be represented, including agents whose probability of cooperation changes by an amount proportional to its reward from the environment. For the case of such agents the game has non-trivial but remarkably regular solutions. We discuss a method and present an algorithm for making accurate advance predictions of these solutions. We also propose our model as a viable approach for the study of populations of cells, organisms, groups, organizations, communities, and societies. It may lead to better understanding of the evolution of cooperation in living organisms, international alliances, sports teams, and large organizations. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Non‐trivial solutions to the N‐person Prisoners' Dilemma
Systems Research and Behavioral Science, 2002Co-Authors: Miklos N Szilagyi, Zoltan C. SzilagyiAbstract:We have developed a new agent-based simulation tool to model social Dilemmas for the case of a large number of not necessarily rational decision-makers (Szilagyi and Szilagyi, 2000). The combination of various personalities with stochastic learning makes it possible to simulate the multi-person Prisoners' Dilemma game for realistic situations. A variety of personality profiles and their arbitrary combinations can be represented, including agents whose probability of cooperation changes by an amount proportional to its reward from the environment. For the case of such agents the game has non-trivial but remarkably regular solutions. We discuss a method and present an algorithm for making accurate advance predictions of these solutions. We also propose our model as a viable approach for the study of populations of cells, organisms, groups, organizations, communities, and societies. It may lead to better understanding of the evolution of cooperation in living organisms, international alliances, sports teams, and large organizations. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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quantitative relationships between collective action and Prisoners Dilemma
Systems Research and Behavioral Science, 2000Co-Authors: Miklos N SzilagyiAbstract:Quantitative relationships are established between the production function of collective action and the payoff functions of the n-person Prisoners' Dilemma game. It is shown that the latter have more degrees of freedom than the former; therefore, it is desirable to investigate collective actions in terms of the Prisoners' Dilemma game. The special cases of S-shaped, decelerating (concave), accelerating (convex), and linear production functions are investigated. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
M Choi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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dynamic instabilities induced by asymmetric influence Prisoners Dilemma game in small world networks
Physical Review E, 2002Co-Authors: Ala Trusina, Petter Holme, Petter Minnhagen, Jean S Chung, M ChoiAbstract:A two-dimensional small-world-type network, subject to spatial Prisoners' Dilemma dynamics and containing an influential node defined as a special node, with a finite density of directed random lin ...
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dynamic instabilities induced by asymmetric influence Prisoners Dilemma game in small world networks
Physical Review E, 2002Co-Authors: Beom Jun Kim, Ala Trusina, Petter Holme, Petter Minnhagen, Jean S Chung, M ChoiAbstract:A two-dimensional small-world-type network, subject to spatial Prisoners' Dilemma dynamics and containing an influential node defined as a special node, with a finite density of directed random links to the other nodes in the network, is numerically investigated. It is shown that the degree of cooperation does not remain at a steady state level but displays a punctuated equilibrium-type behavior manifested by the existence of sudden breakdowns of cooperation. The breakdown of cooperation is linked to an imitation of a successful selfish strategy of the influential node. It is also found that while the breakdown of cooperation occurs suddenly, its recovery requires longer time. This recovery time may, depending on the degree of steady state cooperation, either increase or decrease with an increasing number of long-range connections.
Zoltan C. Szilagyi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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non trivial solutions to the n person Prisoners Dilemma
Systems Research and Behavioral Science, 2002Co-Authors: Miklos N Szilagyi, Zoltan C. SzilagyiAbstract:We have developed a new agent-based simulation tool to model social Dilemmas for the case of a large number of not necessarily rational decision-makers (Szilagyi and Szilagyi, 2000). The combination of various personalities with stochastic learning makes it possible to simulate the multi-person Prisoners' Dilemma game for realistic situations. A variety of personality profiles and their arbitrary combinations can be represented, including agents whose probability of cooperation changes by an amount proportional to its reward from the environment. For the case of such agents the game has non-trivial but remarkably regular solutions. We discuss a method and present an algorithm for making accurate advance predictions of these solutions. We also propose our model as a viable approach for the study of populations of cells, organisms, groups, organizations, communities, and societies. It may lead to better understanding of the evolution of cooperation in living organisms, international alliances, sports teams, and large organizations. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Non‐trivial solutions to the N‐person Prisoners' Dilemma
Systems Research and Behavioral Science, 2002Co-Authors: Miklos N Szilagyi, Zoltan C. SzilagyiAbstract:We have developed a new agent-based simulation tool to model social Dilemmas for the case of a large number of not necessarily rational decision-makers (Szilagyi and Szilagyi, 2000). The combination of various personalities with stochastic learning makes it possible to simulate the multi-person Prisoners' Dilemma game for realistic situations. A variety of personality profiles and their arbitrary combinations can be represented, including agents whose probability of cooperation changes by an amount proportional to its reward from the environment. For the case of such agents the game has non-trivial but remarkably regular solutions. We discuss a method and present an algorithm for making accurate advance predictions of these solutions. We also propose our model as a viable approach for the study of populations of cells, organisms, groups, organizations, communities, and societies. It may lead to better understanding of the evolution of cooperation in living organisms, international alliances, sports teams, and large organizations. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Ala Trusina - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Prisoners Dilemma in real world acquaintance networks spikes and quasiequilibria induced by the interplay between structure and dynamics
Physical Review E, 2003Co-Authors: Petter Holme, Ala Trusina, Beom Jun Kim, Petter MinnhagenAbstract:We study Nowak and May's spatial Prisoners' Dilemma game driven by mutations (random choices of suboptimal strategies) on empirical social networks. The time evolution of the cooperation level is highly complex containing spikes and steps between quasistable levels. A statistical characterization of the quasistable states and a study of the mechanisms behind the steps are given. We argue that the crucial structural ingredients causing the observed behavior is an inhomogeneous degree distribution and that the connections within vertices of highest degree are rather sparse. Based on these observations we construct model networks with a similar complex time evolution of the cooperation level.
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dynamic instabilities induced by asymmetric influence Prisoners Dilemma game in small world networks
Physical Review E, 2002Co-Authors: Ala Trusina, Petter Holme, Petter Minnhagen, Jean S Chung, M ChoiAbstract:A two-dimensional small-world-type network, subject to spatial Prisoners' Dilemma dynamics and containing an influential node defined as a special node, with a finite density of directed random lin ...
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dynamic instabilities induced by asymmetric influence Prisoners Dilemma game in small world networks
Physical Review E, 2002Co-Authors: Beom Jun Kim, Ala Trusina, Petter Holme, Petter Minnhagen, Jean S Chung, M ChoiAbstract:A two-dimensional small-world-type network, subject to spatial Prisoners' Dilemma dynamics and containing an influential node defined as a special node, with a finite density of directed random links to the other nodes in the network, is numerically investigated. It is shown that the degree of cooperation does not remain at a steady state level but displays a punctuated equilibrium-type behavior manifested by the existence of sudden breakdowns of cooperation. The breakdown of cooperation is linked to an imitation of a successful selfish strategy of the influential node. It is also found that while the breakdown of cooperation occurs suddenly, its recovery requires longer time. This recovery time may, depending on the degree of steady state cooperation, either increase or decrease with an increasing number of long-range connections.