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Dimitri Vittas - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Regulatory Controversies of Private Pension Funds - Regulatory controversies of Private Pension funds
    Policy Research Working Papers, 1999
    Co-Authors: Dimitri Vittas
    Abstract:

    Like other financial institutions, Private Pension funds require a panoply of prudential and protective regulations to ensure their soundness and safeguard the interests of affiliated workers. These regulations include authorization criteria (such as as minimum capital,"fit and proper,"and business plan requirements), asset segregation and external custody, professional asset management, external audits and actuarial reviews, extensive information disclosure, and effective supervision. These regulations resemble those applied to banks and insurance companies and are not particularly controversial. But Private Pension funds in developing countries are often subject to structural and operational controls that are more controversial. Such controls include special authorizations and market segmentation,"one account per worker"and"one fund per company"rules, nondiscrimination provisions, regulations on fees and commissions, investment limits, minimum profitability rules, and state guarantees. The author discusses the use of such regulations in developing countries that have implemented systemic Pension reforms. He draws a distinction between this approach and the more relaxed regulatory regime that relies on the"prudent person"rule found in more advanced countries. He argues that the"draconian"regulatory approach can be justified on several grounds, but especially by the compulsory nature of the Pension system, the absence of strong and transparent capital markets, and the lack of a long tradition of Private Pension funds. But the regulations should be progressively relaxed as Private Pension funds and their affiliated workers gain in experience, sophistication, and maturity.

  • regulatory controversies of Private Pension funds
    1999
    Co-Authors: Dimitri Vittas
    Abstract:

    Like other financial institutions, Private Pension funds require a panoply of prudential and protective regulations to ensure their soundness and safeguard the interests of affiliated workers. These regulations include authorization criteria (such as as minimum capital,"fit and proper,"and business plan requirements), asset segregation and external custody, professional asset management, external audits and actuarial reviews, extensive information disclosure, and effective supervision. These regulations resemble those applied to banks and insurance companies and are not particularly controversial. But Private Pension funds in developing countries are often subject to structural and operational controls that are more controversial. Such controls include special authorizations and market segmentation,"one account per worker"and"one fund per company"rules, nondiscrimination provisions, regulations on fees and commissions, investment limits, minimum profitability rules, and state guarantees. The author discusses the use of such regulations in developing countries that have implemented systemic Pension reforms. He draws a distinction between this approach and the more relaxed regulatory regime that relies on the"prudent person"rule found in more advanced countries. He argues that the"draconian"regulatory approach can be justified on several grounds, but especially by the compulsory nature of the Pension system, the absence of strong and transparent capital markets, and the lack of a long tradition of Private Pension funds. But the regulations should be progressively relaxed as Private Pension funds and their affiliated workers gain in experience, sophistication, and maturity.

  • Private Pension funds in hungary early performance and regulatory issues
    1999
    Co-Authors: Dimitri Vittas
    Abstract:

    Despite the limited scope resulting from the high payroll taxes for the compulsory, unfunded public pillar in Hungary's Pensions system, the early voluntary Private Pensions fund performance has been encouraging. Investment returns have been well above the inflation rate and participation has expanded rapidly. However, the sector is highly fragmented and regulatory weaknesses exist: no compulsory use of custodian and licensed asset managers; use of book values and cashflow accounting rather than market values; costly tax treatment, benefiting high income earners while not providing incentives to non-taxpayers; infrequent statements and inadequate information fund performance disclosure; no minimum relative profitability levels guarantees; and a need for strengthened and more effective supervision. Without systemic reform the Private Pension fund potential will remain limited. Hungary's Pension system suffers from the same problems that afflict most pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems in Eastern Europe: high system dependency rations, low retirement ages, lax disability Pension criteria, increasing evasion, heavy Pension costs, and large deficits. In May 1996, Hungarian authorities decided to create a mixed system of two mandatory pillars and one or more voluntary pillars. The first pillar will offer all eligible Hungarian workers a basic PAYG Pension, while the second pillar will be a fully funded, Privately managed, decentralized system based on individual capitalization accounts. The Private pillars should boost economic growth by developing capital markets and removing labor market distortions. Systemic reform faces two challenges: whether to impose the mandate on individual workers or their employers, and how to build a mandatory pillar on to existing voluntary pillar institutions. The author suggests the use of a hybrid mandate combining an employer mandate with the right for workers to opt out and join an independent fund as a compromise. Most other regulatory issues would apply with as much severity under a compulsory Private funded pillar as under a voluntary one.

Peter Whiteford - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • The public–Private Pension mix in OECD countries
    2007
    Co-Authors: Monika Queisser, Edward Whitehouse, Peter Whiteford
    Abstract:

    This article surveys the relationship between public and Private Pension provision in the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. OECD. Population ageing has led many OECD countries to undertake a wide range of Pension reforms. The overall effect of these reforms has in many cases been to reduce public Pension promises, often signficantly. This, in turn, has increased the role of Private Pensions, which have expanded significantly in a number of countries. The article discusses the extent to which a number of countries will need to further increase Private provision in order to guarantee adequate future retirement incomes.

  • the public Private Pension mix in oecd countries
    MPRA Paper, 2007
    Co-Authors: Monika Queisser, Edward Whitehouse, Peter Whiteford
    Abstract:

    This article surveys the relationship between public and Private Pension provision in the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. OECD. Population ageing has led many OECD countries to undertake a wide range of Pension reforms. The overall effect of these reforms has in many cases been to reduce public Pension promises, often signficantly. This, in turn, has increased the role of Private Pensions, which have expanded significantly in a number of countries. The article discusses the extent to which a number of countries will need to further increase Private provision in order to guarantee adequate future retirement incomes.

  • The Public-Private Pension Mix in OECD Countries
    Industrial Relations Journal, 2007
    Co-Authors: Monika Queisser, Edward Whitehouse, Peter Whiteford
    Abstract:

    This article provides a survey of selected aspects of the relationship between public and Private Pension provision in European countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and compares this with other regions of the OECD. Population aging has led many OECD countries to undertake a wide range of Pension reforms. The overall effect of these reforms has in many cases been to significantly reduce public Pension promises. This, in turn, has increased the interest in the role of Private Pensions, which has expanded significantly in a number of OECD countries. The article discusses the extent to which a number of countries will need to further increase Private provision in order to guarantee adequate future retirement incomes.

Monika Queisser - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the public Private Pension mix in oecd countries
    MPRA Paper, 2007
    Co-Authors: Monika Queisser, Edward Whitehouse, Peter Whiteford
    Abstract:

    This article surveys the relationship between public and Private Pension provision in the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. OECD. Population ageing has led many OECD countries to undertake a wide range of Pension reforms. The overall effect of these reforms has in many cases been to reduce public Pension promises, often signficantly. This, in turn, has increased the role of Private Pensions, which have expanded significantly in a number of countries. The article discusses the extent to which a number of countries will need to further increase Private provision in order to guarantee adequate future retirement incomes.

  • The public–Private Pension mix in OECD countries
    2007
    Co-Authors: Monika Queisser, Edward Whitehouse, Peter Whiteford
    Abstract:

    This article surveys the relationship between public and Private Pension provision in the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. OECD. Population ageing has led many OECD countries to undertake a wide range of Pension reforms. The overall effect of these reforms has in many cases been to reduce public Pension promises, often signficantly. This, in turn, has increased the role of Private Pensions, which have expanded significantly in a number of countries. The article discusses the extent to which a number of countries will need to further increase Private provision in order to guarantee adequate future retirement incomes.

  • The Public-Private Pension Mix in OECD Countries
    Industrial Relations Journal, 2007
    Co-Authors: Monika Queisser, Edward Whitehouse, Peter Whiteford
    Abstract:

    This article provides a survey of selected aspects of the relationship between public and Private Pension provision in European countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and compares this with other regions of the OECD. Population aging has led many OECD countries to undertake a wide range of Pension reforms. The overall effect of these reforms has in many cases been to significantly reduce public Pension promises. This, in turn, has increased the interest in the role of Private Pensions, which has expanded significantly in a number of OECD countries. The article discusses the extent to which a number of countries will need to further increase Private provision in order to guarantee adequate future retirement incomes.

  • Pension reform and Private Pension funds in Peru and Colombia
    1997
    Co-Authors: Monika Queisser
    Abstract:

    The author examines the performance of the new Private Pension systems in Peru and Colombia during their first years of existence. Peru and Colombia were the second and third Latin American countries to implement a systemic reform of their Pension systems. The reforms experienced difficulties in both countries, partly because of deficiencies in the design of the new systems and partly because of shortcomings in implementation. Both countries, especially Peru, took several additional measures to rectify the design problems of their reform programs. The systems now in place differ in several important respects from the systems initially introduced. This shared experience suggests that athough flawed reform programs incur inefficiencies, the flaws can be removed and the reform programs significantly strengthened--if the authorities have a strong long-term commitment to a successful systemic Pension reform. Peru's Private Pension funds suffered unfair competition with its public pillars, which required lower contribution rates and lower retirement ages. They suffered poor financial results partly because of low salary levels and partly because they were not given permission to defer their high start-up costs, resulting in substantial capital losses. Private Pension funds in Peru have become increasingly diversified, with 25 percent of assets invested in equities by the end of 1996. But a big share of investments is in the banking sector and other financial institutions, giving the funds significant exposure to a sector that in most countries is highly leveraged and exposed to financial crises. Those investments should be more diversified sectorally. Development of Colombia's Private Pension system was also limited because it coexisted with the public system. Competition with the public system was not as unfair as in Peru, but the slow pace of reform in the public system and the disincentives for older workers to join the new system were a significant obstacle to faster growth. Despite using a preexisting fund management infrastructure, Colombia's Private Pensions funds incurred high start-up costs and suffered heavy losses. Although Colombia's financial sector was far more developed than Peru's when reform started, Colombia's portfolio has been much slower to diversify than Peru's--mostly because of high returns on fixed-income securities in Colombia and low trading in the stock market. The author discusses the public Pension systems only in terms of their relationship with and impact on the Private systems'functioning.

Traute Meyer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the liberalisation of the german social model public Private Pension reform in germany since 2001
    Journal of Social Policy, 2014
    Co-Authors: Paul Bridgen, Traute Meyer
    Abstract:

    Some commentators view reforms to the German political economy since the 1990s as constituting a broad liberalization of a previously coordinated market economy (eg Streeck 2009). Others argue that by maintaining protection for core workers the reforms represent a dualisation rather than liberalisation (eg Palier and Thelen 2010). This debate has paid little attention to public-Private Pension reform since 2001. This paper argues that Pensions have been a crucial component of the German social model since 1957 and demonstrates why comprehensive analysis of its development must consider them. After summarising how public and occupational Pensions have supported core German workers since 1957, the paper calculates core workers’ projected net Pensions and those of less privileged employees before and after recent reforms. On this basis, it concludes that Pension reforms have created a system more characteristic of a liberal than a dualised political economy. Since the reform the projected Pensions of today's young workers are closer to the poverty line and the gap between the projected benefits of core and peripheral workers has narrowed. Increasingly, as young core workers age, they will thus have less incentive to invest in employer specific skills, a development that threatens the model as a whole.

Alain De Serres - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • TAX TREATMENT OF Private Pension SAVINGS IN OCDE COUNTRIES
    2005
    Co-Authors: Kwang-yeol Yoo, Alain De Serres
    Abstract:

    Introduction 74The theory and practices of taxing Private Pensions 75A brief theoretical background 75Practices of taxing Private Pensions in the OECD countries 76Measuring the net tax cost of Private Pension arrangements 78Various approaches to measuring tax expenditures 79A present-value estimate of the net tax cost of Private Pensions: the framework for calculation 81Main findings 88Net tax cost by country ... 90Size of tax expenditure based on a present-value approach 92Net tax cost by component 94Net tax cost by age group .95Sensitivity analysis 96Assuming a lower discount rate and a higher tax rate on withdrawal 97Sensitivity of results to other assumptions 101Conclusions 101

  • tax treatment of Private Pension savings in oecd countries and the net tax cost per unit of contribution to tax favoured schemes
    2004
    Co-Authors: Kwang-yeol Yoo, Alain De Serres
    Abstract:

    This paper provides, for all OECD countries, an estimate of the net tax cost per currency unit of contribution to a tax-favoured retirement savings plan, using a present-value methodology. The latter takes into account the future flows of revenues foregone on accrued income and of revenues collected on benefit withdrawals corresponding to a unit contribution made in a given year. The net tax cost is first calculated for nine (five-year) age groups, which have different relative income levels and investment time horizons, and is then averaged across age groups. In order to take into consideration the relevant country-specific features of savings taxation, the paper also provides an overview of the tax treatment of Private Pension arrangements and alternative savings vehicles. The results indicate that the size of tax subsidy varies significantly across countries, ranging from nearly 40 cents per unit of contribution (Czech Republic) to around zero (Mexico, New Zealand). Over half of ... Traitement fiscal des Pensions privees dans les pays de l'OCDE et le cout fiscal net par unite de contribution a un plan d'epargne retraite Cette etude presente pour l’ensemble des pays de l’OCDE, une estimation du cout fiscal net (e.g. dollar ou euro) de contribution a un plan d’epargne retraite a traitement fiscal favorable, a partir d’une methode de valeur presente. Cette derniere prend en compte les pertes futures de recettes fiscales decoulant de la nontaxation des revenus d’interet ainsi que des recettes encaissees au moment de la perception des benefices par les detenteurs du plan de retraite. Le cout fiscal net est calcule pour neuf groupe d’âge (de cinq ans chacun), disposant de niveaux de revenus et d’horizons d’investissement differents. Le cout par groupe d’âge est ensuite aggrege pour obtenir un cout moyen pour l’ensemble de la population. Les resultats indiquent que la valeur de l’incitatif fiscal varie de facon significative a travers les pays, passant de 40 cents par unite de contribution (Republique Tcheque) a pres de zero (Mexique, Nouvelle-Zelande). Plus de la moitie de pays de l’OCDE encourt ...