The Experts below are selected from a list of 9357 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Vidyasagar Potdar - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Prosumer communities and relationships in smart grids a literature review evolution and future directions
Energies, 2018Co-Authors: Eunice Espe, Vidyasagar Potdar, Elizabeth ChangAbstract:Smart grids are robust, self-healing networks that allow bidirectional propagation of energy and information within the utility grid. This introduces a new type of energy user who consumes, produces, stores and shares energy with other grid users. Such a user is called a “Prosumer.” Prosumers’ participation in the smart grid is critical for the sustainability and long-term efficiency of the energy sharing process. Thus, Prosumer management has attracted increasing attention among researchers in recent years. This paper systematically examines the literature on Prosumer community based smart grid by reviewing relevant literature published from 2009 to 2018 in reputed energy and technology journals. We specifically focus on two dimensions namely Prosumer community groups and Prosumer relationships. Based on the evaluated literature, we present eight propositions and thoroughly describe several future research directions.
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Clustered Prosumer Penalty Framework on Smart Grid
Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering, 2017Co-Authors: Sreenithya Sumesh, Vidyasagar Potdar, Aneesh KrishnaAbstract:The smart grid regulators and retailers generally have a legally binding contract on purchasing energy from Prosumers (energy producers). A hefty portion of them incorporate incentives strategies for energy effectiveness in their legal contract. In the event that the Prosumers that supply energy meet or go past its objective, they will get a financial motivation, regularly an extent of the investment funds in energy rate that customers get. On the off chance that it misses the mark regarding the objective, it might be liable to a punishment. Thus, smart grid regulators reward well-performed Prosumers or Prosumer community groups using money earned from penalized poorly performed Prosumers or Prosumer community groups. Dissemination of punishments (penalties) assumes an essential part in Prosumers. This can prompt fortifying existing non-dynamic energy sharing Prosumers to end up dynamic Prosumers. This paper proposes a performance-based penalty function technique that decidedly influences the way of the Prosumers’ state of mind, along these lines bringing about a predictable energy sharing conduct.
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Formation of virtual community groups to manage Prosumers in smart grids
International Journal of Grid and Utility Computing, 2015Co-Authors: A. J. Dinusha Rathnayaka, Vidyasagar Potdar, Tharam S. Dillon, Samitha KuruppuAbstract:In the context of energy generation and distribution networks, the emergence of smart grids has enabled bidirectional energy as well as information flow between energy users and utility grids, transforming traditional energy consumers into economically motivated Prosumers, who not just consume energy but also generate green energy, and share the surplus with the main utility grid. Several studies have been carried out to manage the Prosumers, and the concept of Prosumer-Community Groups (PCG) has provided a promising approach to achieve that end. However, this concept is still in its infancy and the related aspects have not been comprehensively studied so far. Therefore, in this research paper, we address the formation of PCG. The proposed framework classifies the Prosumers' energy-sharing behaviours, while detecting the outliers, and characterises PCG. Further, we also demonstrate the practical functionality of the proposed framework using a Prosumer data set.
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A Methodology to Find Influential Prosumers in Prosumer Community Groups
IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics, 2014Co-Authors: A. J. Dinusha Rathnayaka, Vidyasagar Potdar, Omar Khadeer Hussain, Tharam S. Dillon, Elizabeth ChangAbstract:Smart grids have created an emerging entity of “Prosumer” in the energy value network who not only consumes energy but also generates and shares the green energy with the utility grid. Hence, effective management of Prosumers has become pivotal to ensure a long-term, sustainable energy-sharing process. Recently, the concept of a Prosumer Community Group (PCG) has emerged as one of the most promising and effective ways to manage Prosumers. However, developing sustainable PCGs is challenging. One of the key challenges in this regard is to assess the contribution made by individual Prosumers of a PCG, and find a subset of the most influential Prosumers whose behavior would facilitate the long-term sustainability of the PCG. In this paper, we have focused on this challenge and proposed an innovative methodology to assess and rank the Prosumers, in order to build an influential membership base. We have assessed the long-term and short-term energy behaviors of Prosumers based on multiple evaluation criteria and accordingly decided the ranks of the Prosumers, whereby the higher ranked Prosumers are deemed to be more influential in enhancing the long-term sustenance of the PCG. Furthermore, we have presented simulation results to verify our proposed methodology. The current literature on smart-grid research field has no work investigating this challenge, making our contribution novel.
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Prosumer management in socio technical smart grid
Proceedings of the CUBE International Information Technology Conference on, 2012Co-Authors: A. J. Dinusha Rathnayaka, Vidyasagar PotdarAbstract:A Smart Grid (SG) achieves bidirectional energy and information flow between the energy users and the utility grid, allowing energy users not only to consume energy, but also to generate the green energy and share the excess with the utility grid and other consumers. This type of energy user who both consumes and generates energy is called a "Prosumer". The sustainability of the SG energy sharing process heavily depends on its participating Prosumers, making Prosumer management schemes crucial within the SG. In this paper, we review the aspects of managing Prosumers in SG, which distinguishes this work from other existing surveys on SG. Based on this review, we outline open research challenges in the field of managing Prosumers, which should be further investigated in future researches.
H. Vincent Poor - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Stochastic Games for the Smart Grid Energy Management With Prospect Prosumers
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2018Co-Authors: S. Rasoul Etesami, Walid Saad, Narayan B. Mandayam, H. Vincent PoorAbstract:In this paper, the problem of the smart grid energy management under stochastic dynamics is investigated. In the considered model, at the demand side, it is assumed that customers can act as Prosumers who own renewable energy sources and can both produce and consume energy. Due to the coupling between the Prosumers’ decisions and the stochastic nature of renewable energy, the interaction among Prosumers is formulated as a stochastic game, in which each Prosumer seeks to maximize its payoff, in terms of revenues, by controlling its energy consumption and demand. In particular, the subjective behavior of Prosumers is explicitly reflected into their payoff functions using the prospect theory, a powerful framework that allows modeling real-life human choices, rather than objective, user-agnostic decisions, as normative models do. For this prospect-based stochastic game, it is shown that there always exists a stationary Nash equilibrium where the Prosumers’ trading policies in the equilibrium are independent of the time and their histories of the play. Moreover, to obtain one of such equilibrium policies, a novel distributed algorithm with no information sharing among Prosumers is proposed and shown to converge to an $\epsilon$ -Nash equilibrium in which each Prosumer is able to achieve its optimal payoff in an equilibrium up to a small additive error $\epsilon$ . On the other hand, at the supply side, the interaction between the utility company and the Prosumers is formulated as an online optimization problem in which the utility company's goal is to learn its optimal energy allocation rules. For this case, it is shown that such an optimization problem admits a no-regret algorithm meaning that regardless of the actual outcome of the game among the Prosumers, the utility company can follow a strategy that mitigates its allocation costs as if it knew the entire demand market a priori . Simulation results justify the convergence of the proposed algorithms and present new insights toward more efficient energy management in the smart grids.
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ISGT - Prospect theory for Prosumer-centric energy trading in the smart grid
2016 IEEE Power & Energy Society Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference (ISGT), 2016Co-Authors: Georges El Rahi, Walid Saad, Arnold L. Glass, Narayan B. Mandayam, H. Vincent PoorAbstract:In this paper, the problem of energy trading between smart grid Prosumers that can simultaneously consume and produce energy is studied. The problem is formulated as a noncooperative game between Prosumers whose goal is to meet their energy demands at minimum cost by optimally utilizing their storage units and renewable (wind) energy sources. In this game, each Prosumer will declare the amount of energy that will be sold or bought to maximize a utility function that captures the tradeoff between the profits gained from selling energy and the penalty incurred for failing to meet the declared amount, due to the stochastic nature of wind energy. The proposed game explicitly accounts for each Prosumer's subjective perceptions using the framework of prospect theory (PT). In particular, a Prosumer's perception of the probability of its possible profits from trading energy is captured via the weighting effect. In addition, the Prosumer's valuation of its gains and losses with respect to its own preferences is captured via the so-called framing effect. To find the equilibrium of this game, a best response algorithm is proposed. Simulation results show the difference in Prosumer behavior using traditional game-theoretic and prospect-theoretic analysis. In particular, the results show that probability weighting increases the sensitivity of the Prosumers to penalties. Moreover, under PT, a Prosumer tends to sell less energy compared to a conventional game-theoretic scenario.
A. J. Dinusha Rathnayaka - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Formation of virtual community groups to manage Prosumers in smart grids
International Journal of Grid and Utility Computing, 2015Co-Authors: A. J. Dinusha Rathnayaka, Vidyasagar Potdar, Tharam S. Dillon, Samitha KuruppuAbstract:In the context of energy generation and distribution networks, the emergence of smart grids has enabled bidirectional energy as well as information flow between energy users and utility grids, transforming traditional energy consumers into economically motivated Prosumers, who not just consume energy but also generate green energy, and share the surplus with the main utility grid. Several studies have been carried out to manage the Prosumers, and the concept of Prosumer-Community Groups (PCG) has provided a promising approach to achieve that end. However, this concept is still in its infancy and the related aspects have not been comprehensively studied so far. Therefore, in this research paper, we address the formation of PCG. The proposed framework classifies the Prosumers' energy-sharing behaviours, while detecting the outliers, and characterises PCG. Further, we also demonstrate the practical functionality of the proposed framework using a Prosumer data set.
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A Methodology to Find Influential Prosumers in Prosumer Community Groups
IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics, 2014Co-Authors: A. J. Dinusha Rathnayaka, Vidyasagar Potdar, Omar Khadeer Hussain, Tharam S. Dillon, Elizabeth ChangAbstract:Smart grids have created an emerging entity of “Prosumer” in the energy value network who not only consumes energy but also generates and shares the green energy with the utility grid. Hence, effective management of Prosumers has become pivotal to ensure a long-term, sustainable energy-sharing process. Recently, the concept of a Prosumer Community Group (PCG) has emerged as one of the most promising and effective ways to manage Prosumers. However, developing sustainable PCGs is challenging. One of the key challenges in this regard is to assess the contribution made by individual Prosumers of a PCG, and find a subset of the most influential Prosumers whose behavior would facilitate the long-term sustainability of the PCG. In this paper, we have focused on this challenge and proposed an innovative methodology to assess and rank the Prosumers, in order to build an influential membership base. We have assessed the long-term and short-term energy behaviors of Prosumers based on multiple evaluation criteria and accordingly decided the ranks of the Prosumers, whereby the higher ranked Prosumers are deemed to be more influential in enhancing the long-term sustenance of the PCG. Furthermore, we have presented simulation results to verify our proposed methodology. The current literature on smart-grid research field has no work investigating this challenge, making our contribution novel.
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Prosumer management in socio technical smart grid
Proceedings of the CUBE International Information Technology Conference on, 2012Co-Authors: A. J. Dinusha Rathnayaka, Vidyasagar PotdarAbstract:A Smart Grid (SG) achieves bidirectional energy and information flow between the energy users and the utility grid, allowing energy users not only to consume energy, but also to generate the green energy and share the excess with the utility grid and other consumers. This type of energy user who both consumes and generates energy is called a "Prosumer". The sustainability of the SG energy sharing process heavily depends on its participating Prosumers, making Prosumer management schemes crucial within the SG. In this paper, we review the aspects of managing Prosumers in SG, which distinguishes this work from other existing surveys on SG. Based on this review, we outline open research challenges in the field of managing Prosumers, which should be further investigated in future researches.
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Design of Smart Grid Prosumer Communities via Online Social Networking Communities
International Journal for Infonomics, 2012Co-Authors: A. J. Dinusha Rathnayaka, Vidyasagar Potdar, Samitha KuruppuAbstract:Smart Grid (SG) achieves bidirectional energy and information flow between the energy user and the utility grid, allowing energy users not only to consume energy, but also to generate the energy and share it with the utility grid or with other energy consumers. This type of energy user who both consumes and generates energy is called the “Prosumer”. The sustainability of the SG energy sharing process heavily depends on its participating Prosumers, making Prosumer participation and management schemes crucial in the energy sharing approaches. However, the existing literature on SG energy sharing has given very little attention to managing Prosumers. The contribution of this paper is twofold: first, we provide a comprehensive stateof-the-art review of managing Prosumers in the context of SG and introduce the concept of goal oriented Prosumer-communities through learning the aspects from social network communities. Second, we present a conceptual framework for forming a Prosumer-community, based on online community formation. The significance of the Prosumer community concept is that this will allow Prosumers to collectively bargain for the energy with utility companies, thus offering the small players (Prosumers) the negotiation power to be on par with big players (providers) and eliminate the dividing gap between them.
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CUBE - Prosumer management in socio-technical smart grid
Proceedings of the CUBE International Information Technology Conference on - CUBE '12, 2012Co-Authors: A. J. Dinusha Rathnayaka, Vidyasagar PotdarAbstract:A Smart Grid (SG) achieves bidirectional energy and information flow between the energy users and the utility grid, allowing energy users not only to consume energy, but also to generate the green energy and share the excess with the utility grid and other consumers. This type of energy user who both consumes and generates energy is called a "Prosumer". The sustainability of the SG energy sharing process heavily depends on its participating Prosumers, making Prosumer management schemes crucial within the SG. In this paper, we review the aspects of managing Prosumers in SG, which distinguishes this work from other existing surveys on SG. Based on this review, we outline open research challenges in the field of managing Prosumers, which should be further investigated in future researches.
Narayan B. Mandayam - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Stochastic Games for the Smart Grid Energy Management With Prospect Prosumers
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2018Co-Authors: S. Rasoul Etesami, Walid Saad, Narayan B. Mandayam, H. Vincent PoorAbstract:In this paper, the problem of the smart grid energy management under stochastic dynamics is investigated. In the considered model, at the demand side, it is assumed that customers can act as Prosumers who own renewable energy sources and can both produce and consume energy. Due to the coupling between the Prosumers’ decisions and the stochastic nature of renewable energy, the interaction among Prosumers is formulated as a stochastic game, in which each Prosumer seeks to maximize its payoff, in terms of revenues, by controlling its energy consumption and demand. In particular, the subjective behavior of Prosumers is explicitly reflected into their payoff functions using the prospect theory, a powerful framework that allows modeling real-life human choices, rather than objective, user-agnostic decisions, as normative models do. For this prospect-based stochastic game, it is shown that there always exists a stationary Nash equilibrium where the Prosumers’ trading policies in the equilibrium are independent of the time and their histories of the play. Moreover, to obtain one of such equilibrium policies, a novel distributed algorithm with no information sharing among Prosumers is proposed and shown to converge to an $\epsilon$ -Nash equilibrium in which each Prosumer is able to achieve its optimal payoff in an equilibrium up to a small additive error $\epsilon$ . On the other hand, at the supply side, the interaction between the utility company and the Prosumers is formulated as an online optimization problem in which the utility company's goal is to learn its optimal energy allocation rules. For this case, it is shown that such an optimization problem admits a no-regret algorithm meaning that regardless of the actual outcome of the game among the Prosumers, the utility company can follow a strategy that mitigates its allocation costs as if it knew the entire demand market a priori . Simulation results justify the convergence of the proposed algorithms and present new insights toward more efficient energy management in the smart grids.
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prospect theory for Prosumer centric energy trading in the smart grid
IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference, 2016Co-Authors: Georges El Rahi, Walid Saad, Arnold L. Glass, Narayan B. Mandayam, Vincent H PoorAbstract:In this paper, the problem of energy trading between smart grid Prosumers that can simultaneously consume and produce energy is studied. The problem is formulated as a noncooperative game between Prosumers whose goal is to meet their energy demands at minimum cost by optimally utilizing their storage units and renewable (wind) energy sources. In this game, each Prosumer will declare the amount of energy that will be sold or bought to maximize a utility function that captures the tradeoff between the profits gained from selling energy and the penalty incurred for failing to meet the declared amount, due to the stochastic nature of wind energy. The proposed game explicitly accounts for each Prosumer's subjective perceptions using the framework of prospect theory (PT). In particular, a Prosumer's perception of the probability of its possible profits from trading energy is captured via the weighting effect. In addition, the Prosumer's valuation of its gains and losses with respect to its own preferences is captured via the so-called framing effect. To find the equilibrium of this game, a best response algorithm is proposed. Simulation results show the difference in Prosumer behavior using traditional game-theoretic and prospect-theoretic analysis. In particular, the results show that probability weighting increases the sensitivity of the Prosumers to penalties. Moreover, under PT, a Prosumer tends to sell less energy compared to a conventional game-theoretic scenario.
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ISGT - Prospect theory for Prosumer-centric energy trading in the smart grid
2016 IEEE Power & Energy Society Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference (ISGT), 2016Co-Authors: Georges El Rahi, Walid Saad, Arnold L. Glass, Narayan B. Mandayam, H. Vincent PoorAbstract:In this paper, the problem of energy trading between smart grid Prosumers that can simultaneously consume and produce energy is studied. The problem is formulated as a noncooperative game between Prosumers whose goal is to meet their energy demands at minimum cost by optimally utilizing their storage units and renewable (wind) energy sources. In this game, each Prosumer will declare the amount of energy that will be sold or bought to maximize a utility function that captures the tradeoff between the profits gained from selling energy and the penalty incurred for failing to meet the declared amount, due to the stochastic nature of wind energy. The proposed game explicitly accounts for each Prosumer's subjective perceptions using the framework of prospect theory (PT). In particular, a Prosumer's perception of the probability of its possible profits from trading energy is captured via the weighting effect. In addition, the Prosumer's valuation of its gains and losses with respect to its own preferences is captured via the so-called framing effect. To find the equilibrium of this game, a best response algorithm is proposed. Simulation results show the difference in Prosumer behavior using traditional game-theoretic and prospect-theoretic analysis. In particular, the results show that probability weighting increases the sensitivity of the Prosumers to penalties. Moreover, under PT, a Prosumer tends to sell less energy compared to a conventional game-theoretic scenario.
Walid Saad - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Stochastic Games for the Smart Grid Energy Management With Prospect Prosumers
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2018Co-Authors: S. Rasoul Etesami, Walid Saad, Narayan B. Mandayam, H. Vincent PoorAbstract:In this paper, the problem of the smart grid energy management under stochastic dynamics is investigated. In the considered model, at the demand side, it is assumed that customers can act as Prosumers who own renewable energy sources and can both produce and consume energy. Due to the coupling between the Prosumers’ decisions and the stochastic nature of renewable energy, the interaction among Prosumers is formulated as a stochastic game, in which each Prosumer seeks to maximize its payoff, in terms of revenues, by controlling its energy consumption and demand. In particular, the subjective behavior of Prosumers is explicitly reflected into their payoff functions using the prospect theory, a powerful framework that allows modeling real-life human choices, rather than objective, user-agnostic decisions, as normative models do. For this prospect-based stochastic game, it is shown that there always exists a stationary Nash equilibrium where the Prosumers’ trading policies in the equilibrium are independent of the time and their histories of the play. Moreover, to obtain one of such equilibrium policies, a novel distributed algorithm with no information sharing among Prosumers is proposed and shown to converge to an $\epsilon$ -Nash equilibrium in which each Prosumer is able to achieve its optimal payoff in an equilibrium up to a small additive error $\epsilon$ . On the other hand, at the supply side, the interaction between the utility company and the Prosumers is formulated as an online optimization problem in which the utility company's goal is to learn its optimal energy allocation rules. For this case, it is shown that such an optimization problem admits a no-regret algorithm meaning that regardless of the actual outcome of the game among the Prosumers, the utility company can follow a strategy that mitigates its allocation costs as if it knew the entire demand market a priori . Simulation results justify the convergence of the proposed algorithms and present new insights toward more efficient energy management in the smart grids.
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prospect theory for Prosumer centric energy trading in the smart grid
IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference, 2016Co-Authors: Georges El Rahi, Walid Saad, Arnold L. Glass, Narayan B. Mandayam, Vincent H PoorAbstract:In this paper, the problem of energy trading between smart grid Prosumers that can simultaneously consume and produce energy is studied. The problem is formulated as a noncooperative game between Prosumers whose goal is to meet their energy demands at minimum cost by optimally utilizing their storage units and renewable (wind) energy sources. In this game, each Prosumer will declare the amount of energy that will be sold or bought to maximize a utility function that captures the tradeoff between the profits gained from selling energy and the penalty incurred for failing to meet the declared amount, due to the stochastic nature of wind energy. The proposed game explicitly accounts for each Prosumer's subjective perceptions using the framework of prospect theory (PT). In particular, a Prosumer's perception of the probability of its possible profits from trading energy is captured via the weighting effect. In addition, the Prosumer's valuation of its gains and losses with respect to its own preferences is captured via the so-called framing effect. To find the equilibrium of this game, a best response algorithm is proposed. Simulation results show the difference in Prosumer behavior using traditional game-theoretic and prospect-theoretic analysis. In particular, the results show that probability weighting increases the sensitivity of the Prosumers to penalties. Moreover, under PT, a Prosumer tends to sell less energy compared to a conventional game-theoretic scenario.
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ISGT - Prospect theory for Prosumer-centric energy trading in the smart grid
2016 IEEE Power & Energy Society Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference (ISGT), 2016Co-Authors: Georges El Rahi, Walid Saad, Arnold L. Glass, Narayan B. Mandayam, H. Vincent PoorAbstract:In this paper, the problem of energy trading between smart grid Prosumers that can simultaneously consume and produce energy is studied. The problem is formulated as a noncooperative game between Prosumers whose goal is to meet their energy demands at minimum cost by optimally utilizing their storage units and renewable (wind) energy sources. In this game, each Prosumer will declare the amount of energy that will be sold or bought to maximize a utility function that captures the tradeoff between the profits gained from selling energy and the penalty incurred for failing to meet the declared amount, due to the stochastic nature of wind energy. The proposed game explicitly accounts for each Prosumer's subjective perceptions using the framework of prospect theory (PT). In particular, a Prosumer's perception of the probability of its possible profits from trading energy is captured via the weighting effect. In addition, the Prosumer's valuation of its gains and losses with respect to its own preferences is captured via the so-called framing effect. To find the equilibrium of this game, a best response algorithm is proposed. Simulation results show the difference in Prosumer behavior using traditional game-theoretic and prospect-theoretic analysis. In particular, the results show that probability weighting increases the sensitivity of the Prosumers to penalties. Moreover, under PT, a Prosumer tends to sell less energy compared to a conventional game-theoretic scenario.
